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CHAPTER ONE
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITIVENESS
1. A General Introduction
This essay examines the competitive dynamics of the United States
semiconductor and computer industries, their performance in international
competition, and the effects of alternative government policy initiatives
upon the future of these sectors and the U.S. economy. Through the
empirical analysis of these issues, the essay also seeks to further our
general understanding of the sources of and relationships between corporate
strategy, government policy, sectoral dynamics, and national competitive
advantage, particularly in technology intensive industries. My principal
empirical conclusions are that the U.S. semiconductor and computer
industries are in technological and competitive decline, particularly
relative to Japan; that this decline derives in large part from
institutional and strategic forces not captured in traditional economic
models; that further decay would have serious economic and political
consequences for the United States; and that such decline will continue
unless significant structural and policy changes, some of them rather
unconventional in character, are introduced into the U.S. system.
To some extent the essay can be read as a traditional industry study.
While its subject is a sector of unusually high economic, military, and
geopolitical importance, and the study comes to some rather strong
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conclusions, it often uses categories such as structure, technology,
competitive strategy, government policy, and market performance. However,
the implications of these traditional variables are changed by simultaneous
consideration of others less traditional, and the explanation of industry
behavior I finally propose is somewhat heterodox, at least from the
standpoint of economics.
This nontraditional argument is related to the manner in which the
essay also seeks to illuminate two other, far wider issues, with respect to
both of which traditional explanations are insufficient. One is the general
but still empirical question of the American economy's -declining performance
relative to earlier time periods and/or other nations; the second is the
performance of the neoclassical competitive equilibrium paradigm itself
relative to newer, nondeterministic, theories. These matters are of course
related. To the extent that the argument driving the sectoral analysis
presented here can be applied to other parts of the economy, it may to some
extent explain why microeconomic industry analysis and macroeconomic growth
accounting have been unable to describe recent U.S. performance
satisfactorily.
My analysis suggests that competitive success and aggregate rates of
industrial progress, particularly where continuous technological improvement
is an issue, are strongly tied to strategic and institutional forces. In
particular, aggregate behavior depends heavily upon long term, but local (in
the sense of small and specific) strategic interactions between employees,
firms, and governments (for example, their propensity to cooperate with each
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other). The outcomes of these strategic processes are in turn strongly
conditioned by time horizons, by the incentives, rules and/or norms of
behavior which govern arenas such as markets and trade negotiations, by
feasible choices with respect to cooperative versus adversarial strategies,
and by appropriability considerations.
Indeed in the semiconductor / computer case, such "strategic" and
"evolutionary" forces emerge as comparable in importance to traditional
economic categories such as factor endowments, the terms of trade, or well
developed markets. Sometimes strategic forces negate the impact of economic
variables such as interest rates; in other cases, they greatly magnify them.
In fact under some conditions the specifically strategic effects of economic
policies such as interest rate management (e.g., via the effect of discount
rates upon the propensity to risk future retaliation for hostile strategic
actions) will vastly overshadow their purely traditional effects, such as
changes in the rate of capital accumulation or investment. This proposition
has potentially strong implications for both description and policy.
On this "strategic" view, for example, optimal policy with respect to
long run industrial competitiveness would necessarily involve more than
conventional analyses and economic measures such as macroeconomic
adjustments, R&D commitments, adequate investment, and education. Analysis
and policy measures which contemplate time horizons and the strategic
conduct of individuals, firms, industries, and other interest groups would
also be required. Frequently, it might prove optimal to employ highly
specific policies tailored to sectoral conditions. In the United States of
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the present day, the general thrust of such measures might include reducing
the effective discount rates of institutions, shifting incentives towards
domestic productivity growth (versus consumption and distributional
conflict), changing the regions of (and boundaries between) cooperative
versus adversarial behavior, and recognizing the importance of government
policy in shaping international strategic interactions, particularly between
the American and Japanese strategic systems.
And finally, the empirical argument presented here bears upon a yet
larger, more theoretical issue. Both as an intellectual technology and as a
body of substantive propositions, neoclassical economic theory appears to
face significant limits. The shared assumptions of most models continue to
neglect demonstrably important variables such as strategic effects, the
impact of information costs and uncertainty, technological dynamics, and
government policy. Relatedly, neoclassical models generally emphasize
product market behavior while neglecting other domains of action such as
technological or political cooperation and competition. Moreover, even
within the narrow common ground shared by the major neoclassical models, the
range of permissible alternative assumptions (e.g. with respect to the
nature and extent of market imperfections) is sufficient to generate a wide
range of divergent results. Consequently stylized, artificial assumptions
are often required to generate "determinate" theoretical results, making the
relationship between theory and reality fairly tenuous.
Similarly, many economic models are driven or constrained by the
tractability limits associated with mathematical analytics or numerical
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estimation techniques. Deterministic equilibrium models seem not to lend
themselves well to the analysis of situations in which history, incomplete
information, or strategic interdependence play major roles; nor do analytic
or econometric models exploit recently developed techniques of computer
simulation. Once again, the correspondence between theory and observation
is weakened and rendered, ironically, highly indeterminate.
Some of these characteristics of economic theory may be sociologically
derived. Many facets of neoclassical theory seem rooted in an earlier, less
internationalized period in which economic activity was more frequently
dominated by laissez faire systems, and by physical assets more than
technology and information; a period also in which technological change,
time pressures, learning effects, and strategic interactions were generally
less intense, and in which elegant mathematics was the research technology
of preference.
But whatever their source, these limits appear serious, and so it is
pertinent to ask whether alternative models might yield improved theoretical
descriptions of modern industrial dynamics. I will argue that at least if
the information technology sector is any guide, an emerging theory of
nondeterministic dynamics holds great promise for improved analysis. This
discipline comprises models of interaction and dynamics which explicitly
include local interactions, nonlinear dynamics, instabilities, and
uncertainty. Its methodology relies heavily upon nonlinear mathematics,
stochastic processes, and the intensive use of computer simulation to
explore both qualitative behaviors and the robustness of results relative to
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parameters such as discount rates and alternative strategic choices.
Such nondeterministic or evolutionary models include chaos theory;
hysteresis models such as catastrophe theory; fractal theory and related
models of diffusion-limited aggregation; simulated annealing; and perhaps
most importantly for economics, analyses of iterative stochastic and/or
strategic processes. While these models are being developed and applied by
a wide array of disciplines - ranging from computer science to evolutionary
genetics to political economy - the most prominent analyses devoted
principally to social science are the strategic models pioneered by Thomas
Schelling and Robert Axelrod. In the body of this essay, I will compare
neoclassical explanations of semiconductor industry behavior with a model
based upon a generalization of Axelrod's model of iterated strategic choice.
In an appendix, I review and contrast these two theoretical approaches (the
deterministic equilibrium models of economics versus nondeterministic
evolutionary strategics) in a somewhat more general, theoretical way.
2. The Empirical Argument
The case I use to explore these questions is an arena which encloses
the semiconductor and computer systems industries. The information
technology arena, as I will sometimes call it, is a large industrial complex
which has recently become the object of intense, internationalized strategic
competition and of equally intense policy debates in several nations. (By
the term "arena" I mean a domain of interaction, competition, and/or
interdependence, for example a market or a set of business-government
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relationships.) This arena, or system of arenas, includes the semiconductor
industry, its associated capital equipment industry, the information systems
sector (particularly computers), their consumers, and several other
institutional structures, particularly government policy establishments and
several related input and asset markets (e.g. for capital, technology,
skilled labor, and corporate control).
The direct sectoral analysis traces the history of the Japanese and
American industries, their characteristics, and their respective fortunes.
The two national industries, it turns out, have developed along divergent
structural and strategic paths. By virtue of their early institutional and
technological particularities, the American semiconductor and computer
industries developed quite different patterns from each other and from their
principal Japanese competitors. In large part because semiconductors were
initially commodity components, because early U.S. semiconductor markets
were predominantly military, and because (IBM aside) many established firms
in the U.S. computer and consumer electronics industries showed early
indications of stagnation, few large U.S. firms invested successfully in
semiconductor technology. (IBM and AT&T were major exceptions, but AT&T was
precluded by its antitrust agreements from open market semiconductor sales
between 1956 and 1982, and IBM also refrained from such sales for strategic
reasons.)
Left to itself, the U.S. semiconductor industry remained fragmented and
developed a chronic pattern of shortsightedness, instability, noncooperative
behavior, and entrepreneurialism. The industry then institutionalized this
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regime because incremental decisions made from within it rationally assumed
it to be a fact of life: any individual agent was an arena taker, unable to
shape the environment but required to adapt to it. As a decentralized
infrastructure developed, a strategy of short term reliance upon it became
less expensive relative to long term cooperation or vertical integration;
and as we shall see, powerful strategic forces opposed firms acting against
this tendency.
Conversely, the U.S. computer industry rapidly became and until quite
recently remained a concentrated oligopoly dominated by IBM. Over the past
decade, however, the gradual stagnation of the established industry and the
emergence of novel systems markets opened opportunities for new entrants,
and the newer portions of the U.S. computer sector increasingly resemble the
semiconductor industry in their fragmentation and instability. As a
consequence, the Japanese computer industry's efforts increasingly resemble
the Japanese industry's strategy in semiconductor markets.
The result was a fragmented, unstable U.S. arena structure and, with a
few exceptions, strategic norms of shortsighted, parochial, noncooperative
behavior. As I will argue in detail below, this pattern of structural
instability and strategic noncooperation constituted a strategic
fragmentation trap analogous to a liquidity trap in macroeconomics. It was
a suboptimal but stable equilibrium from which participants could not escape
because it was not individually rational to try, and because no individual
actor could overcome the centripetal force of the system. Only collective
action or policy imposed from above could break the systemic incentives
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which perpetuated the problem. This stable pattern of noncooperative
fragmentation in turn generated competitive inefficiency. With the arrival
of foreign competitors embedded in more favorable strategic systems, this
inefficiency led to rapidly declining competitiveness, particularly in the
semiconductor sector.
And the Japanese industry was, in fact, embedded in a more favorable
strategic system, albeit one dependent in part upon the absence of U.S.
retaliation in response to predatory Japanese behavior. But the Japanese
industry was not structured in a manner which accords with traditional
economic prescriptions. The Japanese electronics industry became and has
remained a stable, highly concentrated oligopoly of roughly half a dozen
giant, diversified, vertically integrated firms closely linked to even
larger industrial groups and financial institutions. Moreover, these firms
often cooperate extensively with each other and with the Japanese
government, which prevented foreign competition and sometimes encouraged the
formation of domestic consortia or cartels. Yet despite this structure the
Japanese industry has not displayed the stagnation and rent harvesting
deemed typically "cartellistic" by neoclassical models. To the contrary,
Japanese industry has employed extensive strategic coordination primarily in
furtherance of farsighted, technologically progressive strategies, and has
displayed ferociously aggressive growth and competition.
The analysis thus concludes that the American semiconductor industry
lost its competitive advantage primarily through strategic and institutional
processes which shortened its time horizons, facilitated Japanese predation,
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and favored consumption and distributional conflict relative to cooperation
or long-term investments in productivity growth and institutional
sophistication. Though previously more concentrated and stable, the U.S.
computer industry has begun to exhibit similar dynamics, albeit not yet to
the same degree as the semiconductor sector, and faces a potentially similar
trajectory of decline. Structural, strategic, and government policy changes
would therefore be necessary though perhaps not sufficient conditions for
retention of the long-run technical and competitive strength of these
industries. And while some portion of these industries' behavior can
assuredly be attributed to traditional economic forces, the most important
effect of economic variables (particularly factor costs) may have been to
raise the effective discount rates of U.S. actors, thereby lessening their
propensity to engage in long run reciprocity and productive cooperation. In
a capital intensive high technology industry with strong economies of scope
and integration, the inefficiencies caused by suboptimal levels of
communication and cooperation can easily dwarf the traditional allocative
effect of factor cost differences.
The advent of major scale economies and increasing economies of
vertical coordination associated with Very Large Scale Integration added
further to these strategic processes and accelerated U.S. competitive
decline. By the late 1970s, increases in scale requirements, computer-based
automation, and device integration levels implied that semiconductor
production would become a capital intensive, systems intensive industry of
great strategic importance to downstream electronics sectors. The
diversified, vertically integrated, capital rich Japanese industry acted
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accordingly by importing U.S. technology, investing heavily, and mounting a
strong competitive challenge to the fragmented, entrepreneurial U.S.
semiconductor industry. The result was rapid U.S. decline and, frequently,
an intensification of shortsighted strategic contention within the American
arena, rather than the rationalization demanded by long term technological
and market trends.
The computer industry, conversely, initially suffered less. The
industry was relatively sheltered from both internal distributional conflict
and from foreign attack, in large part as a consequence of IBM's early
dominance and the switching costs imposed by the. compatibility requirements
of computer users. Even inefficient computer vendors were protected from
precipitous decline by virtue of the effectively captive market consisting
of their installed base. Hence within the computer industry, instability
and Japanese technology licensing were initially confined to declining
second tier firms such as Honeywell and Amdahl. (One result, however, was
large scale Japanese intellectual property theft.)
However, with the exception of IBM (which became the world's largest
semiconductor producer in order to meet its own needs), U.S. computer
producers came to depend primarily upon the open market semiconductor
industry for their commodity devices, though they developed small "captive"
(i.e. internal) operations to supply themselves with special purpose
circuits. Eventually, the presence of the merchant semiconductor
infrastructure, the open market availability of powerful VLSI devices, and
the U.S. tax system's subsidies to venture capital based startups diffused
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the regime of unstable entrepreneurialism and fragmentation further
downstream, into new markets for personal computers, peripherals, advanced
workstations, digital switches, multiprocessors, supercomputers, and fault-
tolerant machines. The behavior of the new firms in these markets strongly
resembles that of the merchant semiconductor industry. As I indicate below,
this facilitates Japanese technology extraction and competitive entry. In
addition, the increasing dependence of most U.S. computer vendors upon
Japanese semiconductor technology increasingly provides a source of leverage
for Japanese computer vendors, one already evident in arrangements between
Hitachi and Unisys, Fujitsu and Amdahl, and NEC and Honeywell.
The continuation of this regime would eventually destroy most of the
U.S. semiconductor industry and, in part by threatening the technological
competitiveness of captive semiconductor production, also represents a major
strategic threat to the U.S. computer industry. Indeed the fragmentation of
new U.S. computer markets, the increasing dependence of U.S. electronics
firms upon semiconductors supplied by Japanese competitors, the increasing
frequency of licensing arrangements with Japanese producers, and the lack of
backward integration by the U.S. computer industry can be regarded as both
indicators of, and contributors to, the emergence of competitive decline and
distributional conflict in downstream U.S. industries similar to that
observed already in semiconductor production. While some recent events
suggest that the U.S. industry is learning how to cooperate (e.g. agreements
between Sun and AT&T, DEC and Apple), the net trend would appear to be
negative. The U.S. has already become a $4 - 5 billion net importer of
computers relative to Japan (versus parity in 1982, and a net exporter
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previously), and the U.S. worldwide trade surplus in computers has declined
steadily since 1981, from a peak of roughly $7 billion to less than $3
billion presently.
In addition, increasing U.S. competitive difficulties in the
semiconductor and computer industries have progressed in tandem with a more
general internationalization of high technology competition, a process
resulting in the formation of globally integrated (though far from
homogeneous) competitive arenas. As a consequence of the fragmentation,
insecurity, short time horizons, and absence of internal cooperation which
characterize the U.S. regime, the United States is being integrated into
this emerging global system on strategically unfavorable terms.
Increasingly, the U.S. arena occupies a subordinate position as an
institutionally fragmented provider of marketized services to strategically
cohesive, vertically integrated foreign competitors. Partly as a
consequence, the U.S. is becoming a major net exporter of its expertise,
technology, and human capital, while increasingly an importer of commercial
products developed with them. Foreign firms with favorable strategic
arrangements and efficient manufacturing capabilities thereby appropriate
many of the social returns to U.S. technology-related expenditures. In
aggregate terms, this appears to constitute a process of U.S. societal
disinvestment which brings a one-time windfall to the present generation at
the expense of its successors.
Whether the U.S. regime can be changed sufficiently to arrest this
decline is unclear, and depends heavily upon prospective U.S. industrial
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coordination, national politics, and Federal policy. However, policies
which do not recognize these strategic and institutional forces may be
ineffective or even counterproductive. The U.S. structure, and its
competitive weaknesses, may owe as much to these strategic forces as to cost
or market forces of the sort typically described by neoclassical economic
theory, including newer models which incorporate simple oligopolistic
interactions and learning effects. Hence in addition to providing
resources, successful U.S. policy interventions would necessarily also
change the incentive structures which govern U.S. corporate strategy.
Policy must lengthen the time horizons of industrial actors, encourage
vertical cooperation, and favor enduring productivity gains rather than
distributional conflict or the pursuit of short term profits.
The prediction of further U.S. decline thus raises the prescriptive
question of policy alternatives and their consequences. The empirical
argument suggests that the economic importance of competitive information
technology sectors is large. In addition to serving as a test case for
theoretical models, the industrial complex comprised of the semiconductor,
computer, and related sectors is important on its own terms. Semiconductor
and computer technologies are diffusing widely; the technological and
competitive position of the United States is declining; and the sectors in
question are strategic in virtually every sense. Microelectronics and
computer systems are rapidly growing industries increasingly critical to
each other and to other major sectors including telecommunications,
aerospace, robotics, automobile, defense, and financial services.
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Semiconductors and Computers As High Technology Sectors
In fact, microelectronics is at the core of an industrial revolution
driven by rates of technical progress quite literally unprecedented in
economic history. The sectors which powered or benefited from earlier
industrial revolutions exhibited rates of growth and technical progress
ranging from five to fifteen percent annually. During the first industrial
revolution of the late 18th century, for example, British cotton consumption
grew 6.7% annually, and the cost of cotton yarn fell by about 1% per year. 1
During the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century, the
combined steel production of Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium grew 10%
to 15% annually. 2 Through the same period, the lethality and cost /
performance indices of armaments grew about two orders of magnitude, a
compound annual growth rate of less than 5%.
In contrast, the contemporary revolution in information technology has
displayed rates of growth and technological change ranging from fifteen to
forty percent per year for about thirty years, and is expected to continue
this trajectory for another twenty years or more.3 World computer shipments
have grown 20% annually in revenue terms over the past decade;4
semiconductor shipments have grown 15% per year for the last twenty years; 5
the price per bit of semiconductor memory has decreased 40% per year since
1971,6 while consumption has grown 25% annually in dollar terms;7 world
software shipments are growing about 30% per year;$ total installed computer
functionality doubles about every three years; and new 32-bit personal
computers are more powerful than the largest, most expensive mainframes of
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thirty years ago.
Recently, however, the American information technology sector has
deteriorated sharply relative to foreign competitors. This has been most
evident in the semiconductor industry. In the past decade, Japan's share of
world semiconductor markets has nearly doubled to almost 50%, while the U.S.
industry's world market share has declined from about 60% to 40%.9 Japan
has overtaken the U.S. in some measures of innovation as well; between 1975
and 1982, Japan's share of world integrated circuit patents rose from 18% to
48%, while America's share declined from 43% to 27% in the same period. 10
In the computer industry U.S. decline has thusfar been less severe, but it
is already noticeable. In 1982, the United States became a net importer of
computers relative to Japan. 1 1 Imported computers (including peripherals,
and including imports from foreign IBM plants) now hold about 30% of the
U.S. market, Japanese firms are constructing major U.S. factories, and it is
anticipated that the United States will become a net importer of computers
by the late 1980s.12 And if the analysis I advance below is correct, the
future - absent major structural and policy changes - will show further U.S.
decline, particularly relative to Japan and South Korea.
The consequences of this transformation are potentially vast. Over the
next thirty years, the cost / performance ratios of information systems will
improve another hundredfold, and the production of digital systems, already
a $200 billion industry,13 will become one of the world's largest industrial
sectors. Information technology industries such as semiconductors,
computers, and software are high-wage, high value-added sectors thought to
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generate unusually large economic benefits to host nations. Their output
will be responsible for a substantial portion of future productivity gains
in many other industries. Moreover, digital technology is becoming
increasingly critical to military power, so that the competitive and
technical performance of relevant national industries may have substantial
geopolitical and national security consequences. Hence the condition of
U.S. information technology sectors has recently become the focus of intense
policy debates.
These sectoral events have unfolded concurrently with two other
processes relevant to this essay. The first is the more widespread and
continuing deterioration of American economic performance, including
productivity growth and competitiveness. Over the past quarter century,
U.S. productivity growth has declined from over 3% annually to less than 1%
annually,14 and a seventy year long trade surplus became an enormous trade
deficit. 15 In several major industrial activities (e.g. steelmaking,
automobile production, machine tool production, and the use of flexible
automated manufacturing systems), the absolute or physical productivity of
U.S. industry has come to lag best world practice by large margins - in some
cases, by a factor of two or more.18
The same period has witnessed increasing contention between the
academic disciplines which seek to understand economic behavior. This
tension is found, for example, in the sharpening competition between various
schools within neoclassical economics, and between neoclassical theory
generally and other schools of thought competing to explain economic
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behavior and to structure the terms of policy debate. These competing
models include traditional neoclassical economics, emphasizing determinate
cost variables and competitive markets; new neoclassical models based upon
learning effects and imperfect competition, but which are usually still
determinate equilibrium, perfect information, noncooperative models;
population ecology models; and finally, the fundamentally different new
models based upon long run strategic and evolutionary processes, developed
from within several disciplines including evolutionary genetics, management,
and political science.
The differences between these competing theoretical visions, though
they may seem academic in the perjorative sense, may be of some importance
to economic policy. The economic effects and policy requirements generated
by American competitive decline, for example, depend fairly heavily upon
whether self-adjustment is automatic, and upon whether and how strategic
processes have a role in this decline. If American industry's performance
is the best possible given existing macroeconomic conditions, and if its
competitive decline is caused by high capital costs and macroeconomic
instabilities such as exchange rate shifts, then responses to these
conditions might be necessary and/or sufficient.17
But if strategic effects are important and strategic problems are
severe, matters are more complex. For example, conventional forms of
assistance may not help, because they might be wasted in strategic conflict.
Inefficiencies generated by dysfunctional strategic processes could be so
large that changing the arena's strategic incentives would be necessary
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and/or sufficient to produce substantial improvement in U.S. performance. I
argue that such strategic processes, both productive and destructive, are
quite important in the semiconductor and computer cases. They have
interacted with traditional economic variables such as capital costs, wage
costs, and economies of scale and scope in such a way as to nullify initial
American technological advantages and to magnify American disadvantages in
factor costs.
Indeed, one implication of strategic analysis is that certain
attributes of U.S. factor markets - high labor mobility, high capital costs,
and the extreme liquidity and arm's length relationships which characterize
U.S. financial markets - may be substantially more detrimental than
traditional neoclassical models would suggest. Suppose, for example, we
accept that U.S. capital costs are higher than Japan's. On a purely
neoclassical analysis, this would simply depress investment by the U.S.
semiconductor industry by some fraction. But on the more strategic view,
high capital costs would also have another important effect they would
raise the discount rate used in evaluating strategic interactions,
shortening the shadow of the future and shifting firms towards adversarial
strategic postures. For example, firms will avoid long term cooperative
relationships, particularly any which involve initial risks; if breaking a
commitment offers a short term gain, the commitment will be broken even if
it damages future relations with the other firm; and firms will tend to
become free riders in situations which include public goods dilemmas. In
other words cooperation, trust, and reciprocity are favored proportionately
to the extent that the future is valued.
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Similarly, if U.S. capital markets are characterized by liquidity and
high costs, investors will rationally have short time horizons as well, and
will avoid long term cooperation in their own way - by withholding funds
from temporarily troubled firms or during cyclical recessions. This will
raise the cost of funds to these firms yet further, thereby endangering them
even more. While it might well be in the collective, long term interest of
the populace to assure these firms a steady supply of capital, it is in the
individual, short term interest of any single capital supplier to act
otherwise. This expectation of "defection" by investors will oblige firms
to be more risk averse and to shorten their time horizons yet further,
affecting their propensity to cooperate with their own employees, with other
firms, and so forth.
For complementary reasons, I will argue later that it is neither
surprising nor coincidental that Japanese banks own stock in the firms in
their group to which they lend money, that these firms often own stock in
the bank, and that Japanese electronics firms have extremely close long term
relationships with suppliers and customers. The point in both cases is that
a traditional economic parameter (the risk-adjusted interest rate) has a
nontraditional role, namely that of regulating the degree of cooperation in
which agents are rationally willing to engage. If such cooperation and
information sharing are important, this strategic issue could overwhelm the
traditional allocative effect of altering investment at the margin. Much
theoretical research in strategic processes is therefore devoted to
elucidating the determinants of effective time horizons and of levels of
20
cooperation exhibited by self-interested actors.
And, in fact, I will argue that the strategic behavior and performance
of American information technology arenas, and perhaps others as well, have
come to be much influenced by short term calculations of narrowly individual
self-interest. The environment in which firms operate - an environment
which is in part their collective creation through their strategic choices -
has shortened the time horizons of actors (individuals, firms, sometimes
coalitions or interest groups) and led them to seek individual advantage
through collectively dysfunctional distributional struggles rather than by
competing within structural conditions and strategic norms which engender
maximum long run productivity growth. The evolution of arrangements which
would have yielded superior long run performance, while probably affected by
macroeconomic and aggregate factor supply considerations, has thus also been
impeded by strategic dilemmas and incentive structures which reduce the
individual attractiveness of those actions which would generate optimal long
run productivity gains.
Hence, background conditions of arena conduct led to individual
optimizations which lessened aggregate efficiency and also exposed the U.S.
arena to external strategic predation. These noncooperative, shortsighted
decisions then reacted back on the general environment, intensifying
tendencies towards shortsighted individualism.18 When the effects of this
regime showed later in deteriorating performance, this deterioration
rendered effective long range action yet more difficult as lifeboat ethics
has spread, and as remaining U.S. actors seek individual security -
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protectionism, alliances with foreign predators - in order to survive.
Similar strategic considerations also, in my view, increase the economywide
impact of U.S. decline in specific sectors, including semiconductors.
Therefore the empirical arguments regarding the strategic nature of
digital information systems competition have implications both for real
economic policy and for general theories of political / economic dynamics.
I argue that long run strategic processes are a significant force in
conditioning structure and performance, that they interact closely with
economic variables such as capital investment and labor quality, and that
any policy capable of reversing American decline must take these strategic
forces into account. And policy changes, I conclude, are indeed necessary.
Unless effective policy measures are undertaken, U.S. open market
semiconductor production will largely disappear by the mid-1990s, and much
of the digital systems sector will enter a serious, possibly irreversible
decline.
3. Implications and Generalizations
As already indicated, this sectoral and policy analysis is in turn used
to illuminate two more general issues: the declining relative performance
of the American economy, and the nature of theoretical models which might
best explain variations in the structure, strategic behavior, and
performance (say, productivity growth and/or competitiveness) of national
industrial sectors. The principal theoretical focus is upon comparing
neoclassical analyses and recent "population ecology" models with
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evolutiouary strategic models, both as descriptive accounts of industrial
dynamics and as prescriptive guides to decisionmaking. (Appendix 1 contains
a moderately lengthy theoretical comparison of these models.) My conclusion
is that neoclassical and population ecology explanations are useful but
limited, while emerging models of strategic evolutionary processes offer
considerable promise for improved understanding of microeconomic dynamics,
economic performance, and the political economy of industrial competition.
Neoclassical and Population Ecology Models
The underlying theme of neoclassical analysis is that the forces of
supply and demand, usually though not necessarily expressed in explicit
markets, provide fairly determinate, optimum economic outcomes. In the
microeconomic context, market structures and prices reflect optimal
responses to technology, cost, and demand conditions. In the macroeconomic
and international context, production and trade patterns follow factor
endowments and comparative advantage, while national growth paths follow
capital accumulation, aggregate technological change, and perhaps domestic
capture of increasing returns. In the most extreme version of a perfectly
competitive system, the only potentially useful roles for a government are
the regulation of pathological cases (e.g. natural monopolies), the
provision of public goods, and perhaps measures to regulate aggregate
macroeconomic incentives to save, invest, and consume.
At least implicitly, the neoclassical outlook hence presumes not only
that markets work when they exist, but that there is an implicit, yet
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efficient market for the production of markets and market structures
themselves. In other words, when there is a need for markets they arise,
and their structure is appropriate to economic efficiency. For example,
Nancy S. Dorfman's 1987 analysis, "Innovation and Market Structure,"
discusses traditional microeconomic parameters of the U.S. semiconductor and
computer industries in relation to Schumpeter's innovation hypothesis.
(Japan is mentioned perhaps ten times in 250 pages, and Korea and Taiwan are
entirely absent.) In this and other neoclassical analyses, features of
market structure (such as concentration, the success of small versus large
firms, levels of entry and exit, dominance of innovation by established
firms or entrants, and vertical integration) are explained as natural
reflections of technology, cost structures, and demand. The underlying
assumption and/or conclusion is that forces of supply and demand are
sufficiently strong that only efficient forms of behavior can survive.
Therefore observed market structures and strategic behaviors are
individually rational, relatively determinate, and collectively optimal.
Inefficiencies, if and when they occur, are chiefly the result of
excessive market power, government interventions, or both. Therefore
microeconomic sector studies, ranging from Almarin Phillips' "Market
Structure and Technological Change" (concerning aircraft production) to the
National Security Council's economic analysis of the semiconductor industry,
are principally concerned with how market behavior reflects technology,
demand, and/or distortions caused by interventions. The extant analyses of
the IBM and AT&T antitrust cases, and more generally of the computer and
telecommunications industries, are principally concerned with such
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questions. Brock and others have argued that IBM and AT&T possessed market
power; Fisher and others argued they did not.
Similarly, neoclassical treatments of international competitiveness and
trade patterns seek to explain patterns of production and trade through
reference to comparative economic endowments and international market
conditions, often as affected by government policies (such as exchange rate
manipulation or currency controls). Robert Z. Lawrence's "Can America
Compete?" and C. Fred Bergston & William Cline's "The United States - Japan
Economic Problem," for example, both cite such factors as exchange rates,
net savings rates, macroeconomic policy, and the Federal deficit as the
determinants of variation in competitiveness, the sources of relative U.S.
decline, and the correct foci of remedial action. In these and other
traditional economic analyses, politically generated macroeconomic
distortions are often held responsible for problems in otherwise roughly
competitive market processes which, if left alone, would generate more
satisfactory outcomes.
The more traditional neoclassical vision was predominantly restricted
to static analyses; and in international economics, most models and thinking
assumed perfect competition. For reasons of both formal and empirical
inadequacy, these models have now been partially superceded from within
economics. Recent neoclassical analysis has expanded into models involving
learning effects and network externalities in microeconomic behavior, and
the presence of increasing returns in international industries. This new
emphasis upon "imperfect" competition has given rise to a new neoclassical
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economics, including but not restricted to so-called strategic trade theory.
These more recent neoclassical models, and the empirical analyses drawing
upon them, certainly widen the scope of economics to include some important
forms of strategic interaction. However, the additions are incremental
rather than qualitatively new. Important forces remain unexamined, and many
questions of industrial behavior - e.g., why industrial structure, strategy,
and performance vary over time and across nations - remain unanswered.
In particular, international competitiveness - even at the level of
firms, but particularly at the level of industries or complexes of related
industries - appears to depend heavily upon multiple, concurrent, iterated
strategic processes. The aggregate outcomes of these processes depend upon
long run strategic behaviors which, in turn, derive from domestic as well as
international norms, institutions, and incentive structures. Hence models
which omit politics, or the interplay between national specificity and
internationalized activity, or the nondeterministic, evolutionary character
of much strategic decisionmaking, are unlikely to provide satisfying models
of international competition. For such reasons, the "strategic" models of
the new international economics19 offer only modest improvement over the
traditional theory of comparative advantage. For example, strategic trade
theory at present considers the effects of international strategic
interactions upon national industries without, generally, considering how
they might affect or be affected by domestic strategic interactions specific
to those national industries. Nor do they generally leave much room for
historical conjunctures which, in the presence of increasing returns, might
have substantial long term consequences.
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Yet a number of sector studies, including my analysis of the
semiconductor and computer industries, suggest that such processes are both
important and tightly coupled to international competitive, and specifically
to strategic, interactions. A number of considerations suggest that this
situation is more the rule than the exception. For example, the
determinants of the effective time horizons and strategic incentives facing
firms, and therefore in large measure their strategic propensities and
perhaps their long run competitiveness, are often found in incompletely
traded arenas (e.g. flows of venture capital, information, skilled labor),
government policies, or in nationally specific industry structures. The
strength and qualitative nature of various nations' responses to foreign
competition are therefore potentially, and also actually, quite different as
a consequence of domestic differences in structure and strategy.
More recently, "population ecology" models of market dynamics20 have
been developed in an attempt to explain distributions of organizational
types and sizes, and particularly nonuniform distributions which include
niche firms, over time and across industries. In these models, the
adaptability of various classes and populations of organizations to external
environmental conditions, and to changes in these conditions, determines
arena-level outcomes such as industry structure. While these models are of
some interest, in their current form they have limits (perhaps surprisingly)
similar to those of neoclassical economics. For example, "the environment"
is usually exogenously specified, and the potential importance of multiple,
continuing strategic interactions among players is left unaddressed.
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To put it more generally, existing models - traditional neoclassical
models, the new neoclassical economics, population ecology models - largely
continue to omit from consideration a variety of arenas, forces, and forms
of interaction which, while perhaps mathematically inconvenient, outside the
purview of economic theory and management science, and/or as yet
incompletely understood, are often critical to understanding actual
industrial conduct. 21 There is increasing agreement that there exist
learning effects, system economies of scale, public goods dilemmas,
opportunities for cooperation, and other strategic interdependencies in many
industrial activities - ranging from R&D to capacity rationing,
relationships with suppliers, personnel policy, lobbying the government,
assessing technologies, and, finally, traditional product market
competition. But, under some conditions, such interdependencies imply the
importance of several other issues relatively foreign, so to speak, to the
fields of economic theory and strategic management. 22
Two related examples of such issues are (a) the weight of increasing
returns, for example via the effect of sunk costs upon incremental decisions
and (b) the impact of uncertainty about the future upon the nature of
strategic decisionmaking. In the presence of learning effects and system
economies of scale, investments made at a given time and in a given way will
reduce the relative costs of continuing along that path in the future, and
therefore increase the costs of switching to any other. But this implies
that initially small effects arising from chance, uncertainty, or local
market imperfections can yield eventually major divergences - between
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different firms, different national industries or arenas, and/or between
optimal and actual practice. And while in traditional economic models the
assumption of increasing returns has been applied only to production
(through scale and/or experience effects), there is little reason to believe
it does not hold elsewhere as well. Firms can gain experience benefits in
R&D, competitive assessment, supplier relationships, political strategies,
and strategic styles as well as in cumulative output. And, therefore,
cooperation and information sharing between institutions with complementary
experience endowments and information might prove highly valuable.
Analogously for uncertainty. In the presence of unpredictable change,
actors may be unable or unwilling to make irreversible, risky strategic
commitments. Consequently strategic behavior will take the form of
repeated, short term decisions which can be revised in subsequent
interactions as a function of new information. But the new information will
include the strategic decisions made by others - such as whether they
cooperate or compete, or whether they have adhered to, or defected from,
prior strategic practices. Those with long time horizons will care more
about how others respond in future rounds of competition, and interdependent
actors will be able to cooperate most efficiently under such conditions.
Thus, paradoxically, long time horizons with respect to strategic
interactions may be most important when the ability to predict the future in
any specific way is very limited. This, for example, may explain Japanese
contracting practices which many U.S. businessmen have found puzzling.
Often, Japanese firms simply reach a vague agreement that one will develop a
product for the other. Because the firms involved typically have a variety
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of strong, long term interdependencies, there is little need for detailed
contracts covering unforeseen contingencies; both parties have confidence
that difficulties will be resolved cooperatively. (As we shall see,
however, Japanese - American technology licensing agreements are rarely
blessed in the same way.)
One common result of situations involving long term interactions under
conditions of uncertainty appears to be the development of identifiable
"regimes" of competition and cooperation through an evolutionary process,
the result of repeated strategic interactions and signaling. The
characteristics of these regimes - the degree of cooperation versus
adversarialism which come to dominate them, their average performance
levels, the kinds of strategies which succeed best - are precisely the
questions studied by Axelrod and others. The simplest and best-understood
formulation of the strategic problem is a symmetric, 2-player, iterated
prisoner's dilemma. More complex, less understood cases involve other,
asymmetric games such as "Chicken;" N-player games; and processes involving
multiple, concurrent, interdependent games.
Evolutionary Strategic Models
Such iterated strategic interactions - even in their simplest forms -
are now known to yield results quite different than those associated with
the assumptions and models of neoclassical economic theory, including recent
but still largely deterministic "new wave" or "strategic" models. 23 For
example Axelrod's mathematical analyses and computational simulations of
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iterated symmetric prisoner's dilemmas suggest that the existence and
characteristics of long run strategic processes are major determinants of
the levels at which public goods will be provided. Under some conditions
iterated processes give rise to widespread cooperation and positive sum
interactions, while under other structural conditions the result tends to be
pervasive defection and nonproductive distributional conflict.
Furthermore, the first, still very recent, attempt (by Fader and
Hauser) to use an evolutionary strategic model to simulate microeconomic
competition24 (an n-player pricing game) suggest that strategies which
recognize, respond to, and encourage coalition behavior exhibit greatly
superior long run performance relative to other strategies competing in the
same arena. Somewhat surprisingly, this was true even in quite "nasty"
environments in which friendly overtures had a two-thirds probability of
meeting with immediate betrayal. To be sure, the sensitivity of this result
to variations in individual and arena-wide discount rates was not
analyzed. 25 But even so, absolute performance (both individual and
collective) was substantially degraded by widespread nastiness relative to
nicer arenas.
In many kinds of long run strategic interactions, behavior can change
over time; Axelrod provides both historical and synthetic (i.e. computer
generated) examples, including the development and destruction of the "live
and let live" system in trench warfare during the first world war. This
system, in which opposing armies spontaneously evolved informal truces via
strategic signaling but without explicit coordination, was broken by higher
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commanders' introduction of, in effect, predatory entry: unpredictable
attacks and rotations of soldiers which eliminated the individual benefits
of long run cooperation. Hence while the warfare remained a long run
strategic process in the aggregate, with the rise of defection caused by
personnel shifts and predatory attacks it became impossible for opposing
armies and even individual soldiers to develop a history of strategic
signaling, or to count upon any cooperative response to their own restraint.
Hence the arena disintegrated into widespread defection, i.e. renewed real
warfare, just as the high command wished.26
One recently noted form of strategic interaction, involving multiple
linked games, deserves mention because it suggests an evolutionary,
strategic version of increasing returns and strategic lock-in: a process
whereby one strategy or form of behavior drives out others and persists even
when other, potentially superior, strategies are available. In a recent
article Axelrod investigated the evolution of norms, conceived roughly as
behaviors enforced by decentralized action rather than by law or central
authority. A single "norms game" produced indeterminate behavior; sometimes
a norm spread, but sometimes nobody heeded it. But then Axelrod introduced
an additional "metanorms game," which made the decision to sanction or not
sanction defectors from the norm into a separate and parallel strategic
process. When both games were played simultaneously, the evolution of the
arena uniformly produced lock-in: the norm always became universal.
While the particular game Axelrod chose is of questionable economic
relevance, a larger point is clear. If players must interact in several
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strategic Trenas simultaneously and their decisions are linked, strategies
and actors are rapidly forced into mutually exclusive equivalence classes,
and switching costs can be exceptionally high. Anyone who cannot afford to
pay those costs is locked in, and shortsighted actors will be least inclined
to pay them. Early events thus come to have large structural impact, and
strategic interactions can produce extreme behavioral rigidities.
That, I will argue, is exactly what happened to the American
semiconductor industry. More generally, our understanding of behavior under
conditions of repeated strategic interaction by now suggests that an
industry's efficiency and long run competitiveness might be substantially
affected by its strategic processes, and in a potentially wide variety of
ways. The behavioral and performance outcomes of these processes, it seems,
in turn depend upon the structure of arenas, the presence or absence of
rules enforced by a central authority, the nature of these rules or
incentives if they do exist, the effective time horizons of participants,
their subjective preferences, their strategic histories and behavioral
patterns, and the levels of information available to them. I will argue
below that precisely these factors - particularly time horizons and the
strategic forces affecting them - are critical to understanding the long run
problems of American high technology industry.
For example, the effects of so-called "strategic" trade policy as
described by the new neoclassical economics (i.e., national protectionism
designed to shift scale economies and experience to domestic producers in
order to give them advantages in foreign markets), far from being determined
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in advance by nations' eternal, fixed "reaction functions," would in fact
depend upon whether such a policy would evoke foreign retaliation, the
response to such retaliation, et cetera. The effect of such a policy would
similarly and simultaneously also depend upon whether, in the presence of
national protection, the domestic industry's strategic arrangements would
give rise to productivity growth, as opposed to rent-harvesting with
cartellistic stagnation. This in turn depends upon whether the home
government would penalize such cartellistic behavior, upon the interactions
between international and domestic strategic forces, and upon the specific
nature of the strategic regime governing individual industries in each
nation. Hence "strategic" protection of an industry may yield vastly
different results in the United States than elsewhere, and protecting some
industries may yield different results than protecting others. Nor is the
traditional criterion of cartellistic tendency,28 namely horizontal
concentration in product markets, very useful for the purpose of
distinguishing industries which would invest a windfall (in creating future
productivity gains) from those industries which would consume or waste it.
Assuming rational behavior, the most critical parameters would be time
horizons and the nature of the strategy played by the government.
I argue below that the specific strategic system which evolved in the
U.S. merchant semiconductor industry, superficially a model of efficient
market behavior, entrepreneurialism, and vigorous competition, in fact
discourages long range, collectively efficient investments relative to
consumption, distributional conflict, waste, and even direct transfers of
expected revenue streams to foreign competitors. This strategic pattern
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derives, I believe, from structural conditions and long run strategic
processes of the sort described above. For example, U.S. subsidization of
entrepreneurial new venture formation led to high rates of defection which
could not be effectively deterred by existing firms through any legal form
of strategic behavior. Personnel defection and firm-level instability
reduced cooperation and time horizons, which in turn led to reduced
aggregate efficiency and to individually rational, but shortsighted and
collectively self-destructive, technology sales to Japanese competitors.
Even during the period of U.S. dominance which endured until the early
1980s, these strategic patterns increased the costs of the U.S. industry, in
part by consumption (e.g., increasing the wealth of its professionals and
executives) and in part through waste (e.g., suboptimal levels of
procompetitive technical cooperation). But whereas in the earlier period
U.S. firms competed only against each other, which permitted them to impose
their inefficiencies upon consumers, their inefficiencies and strategic
deficits severely disadvantaged them in competing against the Japanese
industry. Since the U.S. domestic regime remains largely intact, the
utility of either conventional policy remedies (e.g. increased R&D funding)
or strategic protectionism of the new neoclassical sort is questionable.
Indeed, such measures might worsen U.S. decline unless they were accompanied
by other measures which altered strategic behavior.
Consequently the utility of instruments such as strategic trade policy,
to either Japan or the United States, depends upon an understanding of
linkages between international and domestic forces, upon preexisting
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domestic norms of strategic behavior, upon the results of repetitive rather
than one time interactions, upon interactions in arenas other than product
markets, and upon the ability of national policy and/or domestic industry to
generate appropriate incentive structures and patterns of strategic
behavior. Nor is strategic trade policy alone in this regard; analogous
statements hold for national educational and science policies, the political
strategies of firms, levels and routes of market entry and exit, the
governmental regulation of investment flows, the formation of relationships
between competitors, the development of norms of strategic conduct within
industries, or the relationships between firms and their employees.
All of these domains involve long run strategic processes with
potentially major effects upon long run economic efficiency, and in all
cases these processes and their efficiency consequences can at least in
principle be affected both by government policy and private strategic
choice. Some of the appropriate measures might be highly general, say in
the nature of tax-based policies to lengthen organizational time horizons;
others might be highly specific as a consequence of historical, national,
and technological particulars.
In a typical industry many interactions occur concurrently, and involve
the same set of actors. The same firms interact in seeking supplies,
technological advantage, skilled labor, distribution channels, political
favors, profits from current sales, and access to future global markets.
They may compete intensely, or cartellize, or adopt many behaviors between
those two extremes, in each of these regions of interaction. They may agree
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to stay qut of politics, or to enter the political arena only to seek
industrywide "public" goods, or they may compete viciously for individual
political favors. They may compete for long run technological advantage via
large R&D commitments while avoiding severe short term price competition, or
they may engage in unsustainable episodes of destructive competition which
leave even the survivors unable to finance future R&D. They might compete
directly by producing general purpose products targeted to the same large
market, or they may implicitly cooperate by engaging in more limited
monopolistic competition by carving out niches, thus producing specialized
products which compete with each other only at the margin.
All firms may employ the same strategy, or there may be a spectrum of
strategic behavior within a single industry. Some firms may respect the
niches of competitors, while others may attack competitors directly. Some
firms may respond ferociously to such attacks, while others may migrate away
to other niches. Firms may view the various areas in which they participate
strategically as being distinct, independent arenas, or they may view them
as comprising a single strategic environment. Hence some firms may respond
to a product market attack solely with a market counterattack, while others
might respond with an all-out assault in product markets, sourcing,
headhunting of competitor personnel, and political lobbying. The degree of
linkage between strategic behavior in various arenas therefore constitutes
yet another, and significant, variable in making strategic calculations.
Potentially, therefore, the spectrum of strategic behavior is extremely
wide. However, an industry's strategic environment, and the particular
37
choices made by actors within it, may lead to industrywide or arena-wide
regularities in strategic behavior, either in individual strategic
interactions such as product market competition, or in the entire collection
of strategic behaviors exhibited within an arena. For example, such
regularities might take the form of reciprocity in certain areas, or
industrywide bargaining with suppliers, or cartellization combined with
predatory pricing attacks on new entrants, or avoidance of shortsighted
optimization in favor of long term technological competition, or the
existence of generally respected guidelines regarding permissible versus
impermissible competitive conduct. As a function of various regulatory,
structural, and competitive conditions, these aggregate strategic
characteristics might be extremely stable, or might evolve gradually, or
might possibly be highly unstable. For example an established but voluntary
norm of industrywide public goods provision, for instance by the
participants in a concentrated oligopoly, might be stable and sustainable
only in the absence of entry by predatory free riders who would enjoy the
benefits of sectoral public goods without contributing to their provision.
Strategic Regimes As Alternative Behavior Paths
To the extent that considerations such as these prove important or
interesting, they suggest the need for new variables and units of analysis
in the study of industrial dynamics. In particular, I will describe the
course of Japanese - American competition in information technology in terms
of arenas in which there have evolved distinct strategic "systems" or
"regimes." By subarenas or arenas, I mean some collection of regions of
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interaction or potential cooperation and/or contention, such as economic or
political markets together with the incentive structures associated with
them. Some of these incentives might derive from microeconomic structure:
dominant firms or Stackelberg leaders have different incentives than
followers or new entrants. Some might derive from policies established by a
central authority such as a government: the tax system might subsidize
entry or discourage it, or might favor either taking of current profits or
long term reinvestment for growth.
Hence by a "strategic regime" I mean an identifiable distribution of
strategic behaviors, including industrywide strategic norms if any, which
evolve as actors compete, cooperate, enter, fail, merge, lobby the
government, and so on in the many subarenas in which their actions
potentially affect each other. At any given time, any given arena will have
a regime specified by the strategy vectors of its members. The principal
question is whether, under conditions of repeated interaction which
correspond to actual industrial behavior, regimes obey laws or exhibit
regularities which have material effects upon individual and industrywide
structure, conduct, and performance. My argument will be that the answer is
yes. Indeed, I would contend that arenas and strategic regimes roughly at
the level of national industry systems (e.g. individual sectors, complexes
of industries, business-government relationships, international markets) are
the units of analysis most appropriate to the understanding of contemporary
international competition.
Indeed, I would even venture to argue that national industrial sectors
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with similar factor endowments might evolve (as a function of policy,
incentive structures, and/or historical accident) very different strategic
regimes,2 9 and that differences in strategic arrangements can have major,
long run effects upon an industry's long run productivity growth and
competitiveness. Some arrangements promote productivity growth, strategic
exploitation of other systems, and stability in the face of external
strategic attack. Others promote distributional conflict, are quite
fragile, and in the face of attacks give rise to individual strategies of
lifeboat diplomacy which, collectively, actually transfer resources to the
attacker. And indeed, the competitive success of firms may, frequently, be
determined in large measure by the nature of, and interactions between, the
national strategic regimes in which they are embedded.
In the case of the semiconductor and computer industries, for example,
I will distinguish a "traditional" period in which there existed parallel
but largely independent Japanese and American systems, within which in turn
there existed several sectoral strategic regimes (e.g., a merchant industry
regime). For several decades, these systems evolved quasi-independently,
the primary interaction between them being Japanese technology imports (some
legal, others not). Since the late 1970s, however, the two systems have
begun to interact (and compete) more intensely. Technological and strategic
forces are causing a progressive interpenetration of the two national
regimes, gradually resulting in the emergence of a single, international
strategic regime (albeit one with many remaining nationally specific
elements). In discussing these matters, I will distinguish regimes of
shortsighted and unrestrained distributional conflict from regimes in which
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competition is structured, or conforms to norms, such that long run
productivity growth results. (As the treatment in Appendix I indicates,
much of this intellectual structure derives from the evolutionary strategic
models of Robert Axelrod, Kenneth Oye, Robert Keohane, and Duncan Snidal.)
These notions might be summarized by saying that strategic systems have
four major elements: the preferences (e.g. discount rates) of participants;
the structure of the arena (such as its concentration in the microeconomic
sense, and whether entry is permitted); the incentive structure facing
participants (induced by structure, by technological conditions, by demand,
and by regulations imposed by central authority); and the nature of
strategic behavior characteristic of the system (i.e. its strategic regime).
These may change over time or they may not, depending upon the case; one
clear lesson from the present study is that the velocity and predictability
of technological change are important variables in the stability of
strategic regimes. Hence the economically pertinent features of the
strategic systems I will consider here include but are not limited to the
traditional features of markets in neoclassical analysis: firms and market
concentration, factor costs and technology, levels of entry and exit, the
structure of payoffs to various alternative strategies and responses, the
strategies actually employed. They are richer than the neoclassical
conception of an industry or market, however, in several respects.
First, industrial strategic systems include institutions and agents
other than firms; governments, universities, and individuals are important
as well. Often their importance derives from aspects of their behavior
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which are governed by rules imposed by law, government policy, or industry
associations; these rules are part of the system as well. Second, these
strategic systems include many forms of iterated strategic interaction not
typically considered in neoclassical analyses, such as whether firms within
an industry engage in, or voluntarily refrain from, headhunting or hostile
takeovers. These systems also include the subjective goals and time
horizons of actors, and the strategic norms which have evolved in various
arenas - i.e. the behavioral resolutions of the long run strategic dilemmas
that actors face. These dilemmas include such matters as whether or not
firms buy from or sell to their competitors; whether takeovers, headhunting,
or defection to form new ventures are permitted; and whether firms share
technology or contribute to public goods provision.
This conception (that an important unit of economic analysis consists
in systems of institutions engaged in multiple long run strategic processes)
again raises the possibility that in questions of industry-level and/or
national competitiveness, the whole is quite different than the sum of the
parts. Industrial systems with multiple, concurrent, continuous strategic
interdependencies may behave, compete, and perform in ways which reflect not
only specific strategic processes but relationships between them. For
example, the Japanese industrial system is frequently described as
relatively closed, in contrast to the more open U.S. system. Much of this
difference arises not from protection or explicit coordination, but rather
from national differences in structure, incentives, and strategic behavior.
These divergent strategic practices range from investment strategy to the
nature of potential or actual markets for personnel, technology, capital,
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goods, and corporate control. Taken together, they result in distinct
national strategic environments. Moreover, some of these various
alternative strategic regimes interact more or less gracefully with high
rates of technological change. In some regimes, opportunities for
cooperation are exploited; in others, strategic conditions combined with
technologically generated instability to give rise to widespread defection
and betrayal.
My argument, essentially, will be that features of the Japanese
strategic system confer upon the Japanese semiconductor and computer
industries major long run advantages not captured by the U.S. regime, and
not accounted for in traditional economic models. These advantages are in
the nature of long time horizons, the relatively secure appropriability of
the returns to long term investments, even if they potentially generate
externalities to domestic competitors, freedom from many forms of zero-sum
distributional conflict, strong incentives to engage in external predation
against foreign industries and markets, and a strong bargaining position
relative to foreign organizations acting from within less cohesive national
strategic environments. Conversely the U.S. strategic system produces
behavior largely of the opposite kind: dysfunctional strategic patterns and
inadequate, suboptimally allocated investment flows caused by severe
appropriability dilemmas, distributional conflicts, internal predation, and
short time horizons. Hence, for example, the U.S. semiconductor industry
declined rapidly beginning in the late 1970s despite an initially large
advantage in its total stock of assets, technology, and experience relative
to its Japanese competitors.
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To the extent that this conclusion is generalizable to the U.S.
economy, it suggests that much of the decline in U.S. growth and
international competitiveness involves iterated strategic processes at
microeconomic levels (such as firm-level investment licensing policies, or
the evolution of sectoral behavioral norms in price competition or
technology exchange) which are heavily conditioned by time horizons. While
under appropriate structural conditions such strategic processes may be
generated by economywide forces, including conventional macroeconomic
effects, they differ in fundamental ways from the variables and mechanisms
modeled by traditional economic theory.30 These processes are determined
not by factor prices and market clearing behavior per se, but rather by
incentive structures, in which traditional economic variables may of course
play a role. Aggregate behavior is the long run result of many iterations
of individual strategic decisionmaking.
Such micro-level processes, under some incentive structures, might
conceivably produce long run, large scale results strikingly at variance
with neoclassical economic theory. These may include the competitive
failure and/or stagnant productivity of industrial sectors or complexes of
related sectors. Alternatively, concentrated industries displaying high
levels of strategic collusion can be more productive than fragmented,
competitive industries under some strategic conditions. For example the
presence of a strategically active, independent central authority and an
environment which favors long time horizons might shift oligopolists'
incentives towards future performance rather than current profits. If this
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view is correct, it follows that government policies, incentive structures,
strategic processes, and institutional arrangements are more important to
industrial performance than current economic models generally imply. The
argument also suggests the potentially large value of developing a more
complete theory of nonequilibrium (and particularly strategically driven),
nondeterministic evolutionary processes and their role in political economy.
4. Outline of the Essay
The essay is divided into six chapters, roughly in four parts. In
addition, the main body of the essay is followed by three appendices. The
first part of the essay consists of this introductory chapter. The second
is the substantive analysis of the semiconductor industry, including
associated sectors such as semiconductor capital equipment production.
Chapter 2 covers the development of the American semiconductor industry, the
institutionalization of its strategic dynamics, and the quasi-independent
development of the Japanese industry. Chapter 3 considers the
destabilization of these quasi-independent national arrangements by the
arrival of VLSI technology, and the decline of the U.S. industry upon the
arrival of Japanese competition. Chapter 4 discusses the logic governing
this process, and the relative explanatory power of neoclassical as opposed
to strategic models.
The third part of the essay considers the computer industry; the
gradual formation of a system including the semiconductor, computer, and
other information technology sectors; and the possible emergence of a global
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strategic regime general to high technology industries. This analysis
begins, analogously to the semiconductor discussion, with the evolution of
the computer industry. I then discuss the destabilization of the industry's
traditional U.S. oligopoly by new technology and cost structures, Asian
competition, and the spread of fragmentation and entrepreneurialism into the
U.S. systems sectors. I explain these developments, and the U.S. industry's
declining relative performance, in large measure through reference to the
same strategic processes described in the semiconductor case. I then argue
that this argument applies to high technology industries generally. As
these industries shift towards cost structures dominated by initial
knowledge and engineering investments whose returns are appropriable only
through open market sales, the United States is being integrated into a
global strategic regime on unfavorable terms.
The last part of the essay, Chapter 6, considers the implications of
the sectoral analyses for U.S. economic performance and policy. I conclude
that the social costs of continued decline would be large, that remedial
government policy measures could reduce these social costs, but that these
measures must be designed explicitly to interrupt the strategic processes
which have emerged as the dominant basis of U.S. economic and political
action in these sectors. Indeed the promotion of long run cooperation
within industry, and between industry and government, must now be counted as
a major policy goal unto itself.
Appendix I discusses the theoretical debate concerning industrial
dynamics, its relation to the manner in which I explore it here, and my
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conclusion that strategic processes (at both domestic and international
levels) are critical to understanding the information technology sectors. I
provide a very broad, perhaps even schematic, characterization of
traditional neocleassical economics, and then of newer neoclassical models
which emphasize imperfect competition and mechanisms such as learning
economies, various externalities, and strategic trade policy. These
neoclassical views are compared with an emerging model of evolutionary arena
dynamics which takes iterated strategic processes as the continuing,
pervasive rule rather than as one-time, isolated events. This discussion
draws heavily upon the work of Robert Axelrod among others.
Appendix 2 contains a highly technical discussion of relationships
between semiconductor capital equipment and materials, semiconductors, and
computer systems. These relationships, together with the comparative
structure of the U.S. and Japanese industries, indicate that strategic
technology denial by Japanese firms is a likely consequence of U.S. decline,
a proposition discussed throughout the essay in less technical detail.
Appendix 3 discusses the sources and methodology employed in the
research, particularly its reliance upon personal observation, confidential
interviews with participants, and market research firms such as Dataquest,
ICE Corp., and VLSI Research as opposed to more conventional statistical
sources.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
Until the late 1970s, the U.S. and Japanese semiconductor industries
evolved quasi-independently. Japan imported U.S. technology and capital
equipment,1 restricted both import penetration and direct investment by U.S.
semiconductor firms, 2 produced for the Japanese domestic market
(particularly the consumer electronics industry), but largely refrained from
export drives directed at either the United States market or the U.S.
industry.3 The U.S. industry sold technology and capital equipment to
Japan, generally acquiesced to closure of the Japanese market, but also
controlled the rest of the world market. At the apparent height of its
success in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. industry held 95% of its
domestic market, half of Europe's, and over 60% of the world market - but
only a quarter of Japan's. 4
The Japanese and U.S. national industries also diverged structurally.
The Japanese industry became a relatively stable oligopoly of diversified,
vertically integrated firms5 protected from foreign competition both by the
industry's structure and by national government policy. Imports were
controlled, and direct foreign investment was effectively prohibited.
Semiconductor production was dominated by six enormous firms for whom
semiconductors accounted for 5 to 25 percent of total revenues.6 These
firms used roughly a quarter of their semiconductor production internally,
52
and collectively sold roughly another quarter to each other, for use in the
electronics products which constituted their principal businesses. They
also dominated Japanese semiconductor capital equipment production and
maintained close, enduring relationships to their suppliers, the Tokyo city
banks, the national government, and often each other. 7 Frequently these
relationships included substantial equity cross-ownership and transfers of
personnel between firms.
Japanese firms also cooperated in R&D and pre-commercialization
standardization activities, even while simultaneously competing intensely in
both domestic and foreign product markets. Entry into the Japanese
semiconductor industry was relatively rare and came only through the
diversification efforts of other large industrial complexes (Kawasaki,
Sanyo, Sharp, Nippon Steel), rather than through the creation of independent
firms dedicated to semiconductor production. The industry also followed
typical Japanese personnel practices such as lifetime employment, reliance
upon entry-level hiring, and refusal to hire defectors from other firms, so
employee turnover was consequently low.
In the United States, by contrast, there evolved a different and more
fragmented industry. Semiconductor production itself was divided between
"captives" and "merchants." The few major and relatively stable "captives,"
such as IBM and AT&T, produced for their internal use but refrained from
market competition. Conversely the open-market "merchant" industry, which
at its peak accounted for 70% of U.S. production and dominated the world
market, 8 evolved into a less stable, more fragmented, highly entrepreneurial
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arena. 9 Most U.S. merchant producers were young, relatively small firms
whose semiconductor sales represented at least 40%, and often the entirety,
of their total revenue. 10 Market leadership, employee loyalties, and
supplier relationships were transitory; many semiconductor and capital
equipment producers rose and fell rapidly, and employee turnover averaged
20% across the industry."1 For twenty years this pattern of instability,
frequent mobility, and new venture formation was considered a critical
factor in the industry's success, 12 though by the mid-1970s the performance
of IBM, AT&T, and the Japanese industry should have suggested otherwise. 13
Equally striking, and analogous, is the contrast between the two
nations' semiconductor capital equipment, materials, and services sectors.
Once again, the Japanese industry is dominated by a relatively small number
of large, diversified firms, including the major semiconductor producers
themselves and other large firms with experience in relevant optical,
chemical, mechanical, or construction technologies - firms such as Nikon,
Canon, or Shimizu. And where the equipment producers themselves are small,
they are closely linked to larger electronics firms which consume much of
their output.1 4 The American capital equipment and services industry, in
contrast, resembles its semiconductor producing counterpart in its
fragmentation, instability, and entrepreneurialism.15 A few stable,
relatively large, established equipment firms (e.g. Teradyne and Perkin-
Elmer) coexist and compete with innumerable "startups" - newly founded
ventures such as Trillium, Master Images, Zycad, Micro Mask, and hundreds of
others. As of 1986, 55% of U.S. equipment and services vendors had annual
sales of less than $5 million.16 Nearly half are less than ten years old.17
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In fact, the Japanese and U.S. industries differ in other respects as
well - in their personnel policies, R&D priorities, competitive strategies,
patterns of capital investment, technical practices, and so on. It would be
difficult to find two more dissimilar national industries. This structural
and strategic divergence provides both a test case for alternative models of
industrial dynamics and, I will argue, an explanation for the declining
competitiveness of the U.S. industry. For both reasons, it will be useful
to examine the evolution of the U.S. and Japanese national systems, their
respective patterns of behavior, and the nature of their interactions, both
cooperative and competitive.
2. The Origins of the Industry
By the beginning of World War II, AT&T and other firms with substantial
involvement in electronics - for example RCA and General Electric - already
had a long and complicated history of strategic maneuvering based on R&D
efforts, control and/or exchange of patents and licenses, and market
segmentation arrangements. This strategic use and control of electronics
technology began with the development of a commercial radio technology at
the turn of the century and continued through the radio patents cross-
licensing agreements of 1920 and the contract revisions of 1926.18 At one
time, AT&T came remarkably close to controlling both the radio broadcasting
and sound motion picture industries. Its efforts were thwarted by alliances
of other firms and by antitrust actions. The result of this contest was a
stable distribution of markets and technical property rights which endured
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for twenty years. In this arrangement, AT&T dominated telephony, albeit with
some regulatory constraint following the passage of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, while firms such as RCA and the major film
studios dominated other communications media.' 9
World War II, however, led to the development of technologies,
government policies, and markets which fundamentally destabilized these
arrangements and reopened the possibility of AT&T's expansion into, and
domination of, new industries such as computers and novel electronic
systems. During the war, the Federal government subsidized both basic and
applied research towards the development of radar, new forms of
telecommunications, electronic control systems, and computers. A number of
research organizations developed substantial expertise in novel electronics
technologies and products; among them were laboratories run by AT&T,
Harvard, IBM, MIT, General Electric, and the Navy.20 While nearly all of
the earliest computers and other new devices depended upon vacuum tubes,
AT&T recognized two critical facts very early. The first was that there
existed important similarities between switching and other technologies used
in telephone networks, on the one hand, and computers and other new devices
on the other. Second, semiconductors were correctly thought by several
groups, of which AT&T was by far the largest, to have potentially important
and powerful applications in these new products and markets. AT&T
consequently embarked on a research project whose goal was the acquisition
of technological leadership and a strong patent position. It would then be
able to bargain with or exclude potential competitors in a variety of areas.
Perhaps the way would open to enter new businesses, supplementing the
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constraiaed monopoly of telecommunications it had enjoyed since creation of
the Federal Communications Commission.
AT&T's early effort was successful and culminated in the invention of
the transistor by Shockley, Bardeen, and Brattain in late 1947.21 Following
seven further months of secret effort, the acquisition of a strong patent on
transistors in 1948, and the continuation of a large research effort, AT&T
opened the transistor technology to licensees. The license terms included
five percent royalties on sales and an option to withdraw the licenses after
five years. AT&T clearly wished to have the waters tested: to discover
what markets and purposes transistors might have and what improvements in
the technology might be made. If the invention proved sufficiently
important, AT&T could tighten licensing, increase its investment levels, and
enter the market with the intention and capability to dominate it - or, if
necessary, to trade important licenses for secure markets, access to new
technologies developed by others, or protection from competition.
For several reasons this policy probably seemed, at the time, to be the
wisest course of action. First, in 1949 the Justice Department Antitrust
Division filed suit against AT&T for conspiracy in restraint of trade. The
focus of the lawsuit was the relationship between AT&T, Western Electric,
and the Bell operating companies. The government sought divestiture of
Western Electric and open bidding for equipment. AT&T, rather like IBM
twenty years later, may have decided to liberalize several policies in order
to render itself less vulnerable to the government's attack. Furthermore,
during the period that the antitrust action was pending, 1949-1956,
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transistor and semiconductor technology developed only moderately, and it
appeared that many eventual applications would be either military or within
the telephone system itself. Transistors remained no more than discrete
power devices. They were made from germanium, a rare and expensive element,
and were used only for specialized defense applications, hearing aids, and
other such limited purposes.
The first silicon transistor was made by Texas Instruments only in
1954, and it was not until 1956 that Bell Laboratories and General Electric
separately developed a diffusion process for transistor production based on
the common SiO2; this was one of several process innovations vital to the
transformation of semiconductors from exotic and expensive to pervasive and
almost free. However, these technical developments alone would not have
ensured the structural transformation of production that in fact followed.
The necessary further developments were legal, structural, and strategic.
The transformation of the American industry
First, competition was increasing. In part this was a consequence of
AT&T's liberal licensing policy; in part it also derived from American
personnel mobility, which permitted Bell Laboratories technical staff to
either join other companies or establish their own. In addition, following
AT&T's announcement of its technical developments and licensing policy, a
number of other large electronics firms - some of which had already been
working on semiconductor technology - undertook substantial transistor R&D
efforts. Several of the established electronics firms - GE, Raytheon,
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Motorola, RCA - rapidly reached the R&D frontier, made technical
contributions, and obtained noticeable shares of the (still very small)
transistor market.
At least throughout the 1940s and 1950s, most semiconductor innovations
were made by a relatively small number of these large firms. AT&T remained
the largest single actor, but major advances were made by others such as
General Electric and RCA. Of 13 major semiconductor innovations between
1951 and 1963 analyzed by Tilton, seven were made by AT&T, General Electric,
RCA, or IBM; one (relevant only to consumer electronics) was made by Sony.
Patenting activity was consistent with this picture. By Tilton's
accounting, in 1952 Bell Laboratories accounted for 56% of all new
semiconductor patents; other established electronics firms held 37%; new
firms held only 7%. By 1956 Bell Labs had declined to 26% of all patent
awards, while other established electronics firms accounted for 54%. It is
noteworthy that "new" firms still accounted for only 20% of semiconductor
patents awarded in 1956. Moreover, by far the largest R&D contributor among
these new firms was Texas Instruments, a geophysical services and
instrumentation firm with previous experience in electronics, and which
diversified into semiconductors in the early 1950s by hiring a senior Bell
Labs semiconductor research scientist as its semiconductor R&D manager.
Secondly, however, AT&T was forced to settle the antitrust suit several
years before the enormous importance of semiconductor production was finally
assured. AT&T was faced in 1956 with the possibility that its largest
sources of regulated monopoly profits might be eliminated by the long-
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simmering antitrust case, and that it would be forced to divest itself of
Western Electric, which manufactured virtually all of AT&T's equipment. In
that year, on the other hand, its transistor manufacturing and license
royalties brought in about two million dollars. The total transistor market
between 1954 and 1956 inclusive was only $55 million, whereas the market for
the still-dominant technology, vacuum tubes, was over $1 billion.2 2 All
electronics together came to $6.5 billion. So transistors were and would
long remain a small business compared to either electronics generally or to
AT&T's antitrust problems. For AT&T, therefore, semiconductors were
financially far less important than preserving the firm's monopoly on
telephone equipment and services, and its control of Western Electric.
Therefore AT&T offered to relinquish its external semiconductor
business as one of several concessions to the government in exchange for
retaining its telephone monopoly and captive supply arrangement. AT&T also
offered to refrain from entering the computer industry. The government
accepted. In the 1956 Consent Decree, AT&T agreed to refrain "from
engaging, either directly or indirectly..., in any business other than the
furnishing of common carrier communications services." This meant staying
out of open market computer and semiconductor manufacture and remaining only
in regulated or government markets. The company also agreed, quite
importantly for the future course of events, to license on demand all
semiconductor patents it then controlled. On the other hand, AT&T retained
the right to produce virtually anything it wanted, including semiconductors
and computers, for its own internal use. 23 The company also continued to
perform R&D, and to manufacture, for the military.
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Had the need to come to terms with the government been postponed for
another five years, this settlement would probably have seemed less
appealing. The first transistor radio had been produced in 1955, but this
was an analog application in a consumer market, and its importance may have
been unclear. Far more important, ultimately, was the increasing use of
digital technology. Second generation computers marketed by IBM and others
in the late 1950s were the first commercial products in which transistors
were used to replace vacuum tubes used as digital switches rather than
amplifiers. AT&T had significant expertise in both semiconductors and
computers, but the pressure from the Justice Department was immediate and
the potential size of the computer market - not to mention its later
intersection with the telecommunications business - was far from clear. So
AT&T gave away the semiconductor and computer businesses.
Third and finally, the 1950s saw a growing exodus of R&D personnel from
the established industry to newer, small firms. In part this seemed to
derive from the constraints placed upon AT&T by the antitrust case, both
while it was pending and following its settlement. In part, it derived from
fluid markets for capital, personnel, and technology licenses, which
facilitated the creation of new, small firms by defectors from the major R&D
performers. In part, however, it seems also to have derived from the
inability of some of the established electronics firms to appreciate and
exploit the innovations they had themselves generated.
The late 1950s also saw technical developments which greatly increased
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demand for semiconductor products. In a short transitional period lasting
from 1956 to 1962, the technological foundations of the industry were
enduringly transformed by three related innovations: the diffusion process,
the planar technique, and integrated circuits. These innovations permitted
inexpensive, relatively high volume batch production and initiated the
trajectory of miniaturization and increasing functional power that has
characterized semiconductor technology ever since. Furthermore, innovation
and production increasingly inclined toward logic and memory functions
(hence digital circuits) and away from power functions and analog circuits.
Consequently new and previously unimagined markets began opening after AT&T
abandoned the semiconductor business and opened its patent portfolio to all
interested parties.
During the same period that these developments eliminated AT&T from
competition, transformed the technology of production, and opened new
markets, the structure of the industry changed profoundly. The most
remarkable features of the new structure were the increasing market share
held by newly created firms, high rates of personnel mobility, the
continuous formation of new firms with each technology generation, and the
evanescence of market success. Collectively, the largest electronics firms
(GE, RCA, AT&T) gave way to relative novices, often newly founded
"startups." Startups repeatedly rose to prominence in state of the art
markets within a few years of their being founded, only to be displaced in
their turn by even newer firms and novel products. This pattern, when
combined with low barriers to entry, personnel mobility, and extraordinary
rates of growth and technical progress, had profound consequences for the
62
development of the industry.
Whereas prior to 1956 most semiconductor patents and production were
divided between AT&T, GE, and the vacuum tube firms, innovation and
production shifted thereafter towards such firms as Shockley, Fairchild, and
Texas Instruments, and later to yet newer firms such as Intel. By 1965, the
four largest open-market producers were Texas Instruments, Motorola,
Fairchild, and General Instrument; Transitron, second in 1960, had already
fallen to ninth. GE and RCA were fifth and sixth.
Usually, new firms were founded by, and/or obtained their technical
personnel from, established firms such as AT&T - or, later, from prior
generations of startups. William Shockley himself founded Shockley
Transistor in 1954, and he attracted a number of other scientists and
engineers from AT&T and other established firms. Transitron, which held 12%
of the transistor market in 1957, was founded by two brothers, one of them
previously a solid state physicist at Bell Labs, and recruited its early
personnel from Sylvania and GE. Like many startups, Transitron performed
essentially no long term R&D itself, and the company eventually failed.
Texas Instruments recruited Gordon Teal, an important figure in Bell Labs'
semiconductor research, to manage its semiconductor R&D. Texas Instruments
earlier (since the 1930s) had focussed on oil exploration surveys; but it
began work on semiconductors in 1949, and switched to the scientific
instruments and semiconductor businesses in the 1950s. Hence TI was not
entirely a "startup." Fairchild Semiconductor was founded in a manner to be
seen many times subsequently: through the defection in 1959 of eight R&D
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personnej from Shockley.
The aggregate behavior of the U.S. industry stabilized only in the
limited sense that a regular pattern of technological progress and market
structure emerged. Among the principal regularities, in fact, were
perpetually high employee turnover rates and repeated, catastrophic
generational upheavals. Nonetheless a measure of industry-level stability
appeared to have been established by the early 1970s. Firms continued to
come and go, but certain basic patterns of technology, structure, and
markets seemed to remain constant. These merit a brief exposition.
Aggregate regularities of the merchant industry era
One form of apparent stability was the merchant industry's nearly total
reliance on relatively (for the era) large-batch production of general
purpose commodity devices, in contrast to the relative emphasis placed on
custom circuits by most internal, or captive, semiconductor manufacturers
such as AT&T or Hewlett Packard. This form of stability was associated with
the development in the 1960s and early 1970s of commodity "medium scale
integration" (MSI) logic devices (adders, shifters, etc.) and then large
scale (LSI) semiconductor memories and microprocessors by the merchant
industry, on the one hand, and the expensive but significant customization
capabilities inherent in LSI, on the other. These technologies gave rise to
large civilian markets and products of general purpose functionality, which
broadened the industry's markets while reinforcing the dominance of
commodity products.
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In addition, the industry passed from its initial dependence upon the
military to a permanent condition of dependence upon industrial markets.
While during the early 1960s semiconductor markets were dominated by the
military, civilian markets increased rapidly and by 1975 accounted for the
majority of semiconductor production. As I indicate below, early military
purchasing policy subsidized learning which was transferred to subsequent
commercial production; but by the mid-1970s, commercial markets outpaced
military demand, which became financially less important and lagged behind
(rather than led) commercial technology. Semiconductor demand by end use
evolved as follows:
U.S. Semiconductor Sales by End Market, 1960-1974, Percent
Market 1960 1968 1974
Military 50 35 14
Computer 30 35 29
Consumer 5 10 24
Industrial 15 20 33
Sources: Texas Instruments; William Finan (NBER Working Paper 118, 1975),
cited in Charles River Assocs., Innovation, Competition, and Government
Policy in the Semiconductor Industry, 1980. Note: Statistics approximate.
This period of the industry's development also saw the rise of
"captive" (i.e., wholly internal) semiconductor production by large-scale
consumers such as IBM and Hewlett-Packard; total semiconductor production
came to be rather stably divided between "merchant" (i.e. open market) and
captive producers. Merchants produced commodity SSI/MSI (i.e. Small /
Medium Scale Integration) circuits and later, with the advent of LSI, began
production of powerful general purpose commodity circuits such as memories,
microprocessors, and controllers. Some merchant firms entered the custom
LSI business, but with a notable lack of success. Computer systems firms,
AT&T, and equipment manufacturers such as Hewlett-Packard developed
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semiconductor operations (research, design, and production) oriented to
their special needs, usually emphasizing custom LSI circuits specific to
their products and required in rather small quantities. These captive
producers generally did not sell on the open market, although with the
exception of AT&T there was no direct legal barrier to doing so.
Significant captive operations were also, paradoxically, largely the
result of LSI technology. With large scale integration, fairly complex,
powerful circuits of highly specific functionality became practical for the
first time. Systems firms found that optimal system designs required large
numbers of such special purpose circuits, each produced in small quantities.
These circuits were often vital to the market success of systems; therefore
any systems firm with a technical advantage was tempted to use captive
production as a means of preventing the diffusion of its technology. Such
circuits also tended to require technologies distinct from those used in
commodity circuits produced by merchant firms, or to require extensive
coordination between the technology of the circuit and that of the final
system of which it would be a part.
Frequently the merchant producers were therefore unwilling to
manufacture them; their design talent was a scarce resource and the
technology rendered production and testing of many short runs of complex
components much less remunerative than commodity mass production. At the
time, no technical -means existed to design application-specific circuits
rapidly or inexpensively. Thus by default as well as by strategic choice
the systems firms (and later other major consumers of special purpose
66
circuits such as aerospace firms) developed technology and expertise
appropriate to custom functionality circuits and their systems integration
requirements. Yet since the merchants adequately supplied general-purpose
circuits, captive producers tended to confine themselves to their parent
firm's special needs and, consequently, refrained from entering the open
market in competition with merchants. (Only the very largest consumers, IBM
and AT&T, were large enough to manufacture general-purpose devices
economically. Both refrained from entering the open market, for antitrust
and/or strategic reasons.) Captive production stabilized at a third of
total semiconductor production and continued to emphasize special-purpose
circuits. The phenomenal growth of the commodity market and its continued
domination by merchants remained unaffected.
Another regularity existed in the rate and pattern of aggregate
industry growth and technical change. After the merchant industry had
passed through several generations of integrated circuit products, it became
obvious that technical generations, and the transitions between them,
possessed several common features. Technical progress (as measured by
changes in integration levels and cost/performance) averaged thirty to
forty-five percent per year; the useful life of capital equipment was four
or five years; product life cycles were three to five years long. During
such a life cycle, costs and prices predictably declined along an
exponential decay path as a consequence of continuously improving
lithography, the accumulation of device-specific production experience, and
through erosion of the innovator's initial monopoly as imitators entered the
market. In addition, while sales of individual products rose and fell quite
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suddenly, the U.S. industry's trended aggregate growth remained about 15%
per year for all semiconductors, and 25% per year for digital integrated
circuits. With each generation, the industry gradually became more capital
intensive.
During its formative period, therefore, parts of the semiconductor
industry looked much as a conventional sectoral life cycle analysis would
have predicted. Operational scale gradually increased and became dominated
by mass production of general purpose devices - first SSI/MSI logic, then
LSI memories and microprocessors as well. Downstream firms with exceptional
and specialized requirements were the principal producers and consumers of
custom-functionality circuits. Custom LSI was bound by the same
technological and economic constraints as commodity LSI, so the technology
inherently favored mass production applications. Process technology favored
mass production of a limited variety of devices, and the relative
backwardness of design techniques rendered LSI device design expensive and
time-consuming. Hence custom design was justified only when the match
between a circuit and the system using it was critical, as with mainframe
computers. Merchant firms were successful only when they were designers and
producers of commodity devices.
Hence with respect to many external, aggregate indicators, the
semiconductor industry appeared to be maturing in the manner of many others
before it, including its largest single consumer, the computer industry.
But despite these aggregate regularities, the semiconductor industry
established unusual patterns of industrial conduct which have since spread
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to other-sectors, and particularly high technology sectors, of the American
economy. In its internal dynamics, and in the strategic behavior of its
member firms, the merchant industry was developing and enforcing upon itself
a system of perpetual adolescence.
The peculiar dynamics of American semiconductor production seem to have
had their origins in the 1950s, but were not fully developed and explicitly
understood within the industry until the mid-1960s. The resulting
industrial system endured up to the mid-1980s, but now shows clear signs of
strain; fundamental transformation is inevitable, and its signs already
visible. But for the moment it is the "classical" structure and dynamics
which I will consider.
3. Structure and Strategy in the Classical Merchant Industry
The structure was one of fragmentation, entrepreneurialism, and
relatively evanescent market success; it was associated with the apparent
absence of scale economies or entry barriers, abundant venture capital, the
absence of foreign competition, the apparently inevitable and rapid
diffusion of technology to competitors, extremely high rates of personnel
turnover, and the frequent use of personnel mobility to create and populate
new startups.
This industry pattern also included corporate strategies which
frequently emphasized short time horizons and high profitability
requirements, high levels of consumption relative to investment, relative
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neglect of manufacturing, an absence of either horizontal or vertical
cooperation and communication between firms, and an inattention to external
strategic assessment, particularly with respect to fundamental trends in
technology and foreign competition. By the mid-1960s, individual and firm-
level behavior reinforced these structural and strategic conditions through
incremental decisions based upon the assumption that these conditions were
beyond the control of any single firm. The resulting practices, and the
structures associated with them, gave rise to an industrial system which
reproduced itself for several generations of technology, products, and
companies.
Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the U.S. semiconductor
industry thus developed, and then institutionalized, several structural and
behavioral patterns which resulted in a specific industrial system, one long
held responsible for the industry's dynamism and success. As we shall see,
however, this is far from clear; indeed I will argue that quite the reverse
is the case. Hence this industrial pattern, or "regime," deserves a more
detailed examination.
3.1 The Structure of the Merchant Industry and the U.S. Environment
Vertical and Horizontal Structure: Extreme Fragmentation
Relative to other high technology sectors (e.g., computers,
telecommunications, aircraft, pharmaceuticals, chemicals) and, as we shall
see later, to its Japanese counterpart, the U.S. semiconductor industry has
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always been remarkably fragmented and unstable, both vertically and
horizontally. (The semiconductor industry's international competitiveness
has also deteriorated far more rapidly than that of these other technology
intensive sectors. Below, I will argue that this correlation is not
coincidental.) But the nature of the industry's fragmentation is not
captured fully by traditional economic indices.
Though the four-firm concentration ratio of the merchant semiconductor
industry has consistently remained about fifty percent for three decades,
the industry has been less stable and more fragmented than this statistic
alone would suggest. The rank order and market shares of merchant firms,
even the largest ones, has displayed extreme instability relative to other
U.S. sectors as well as to the Japanese industry. Texas Instruments and
Motorola are the only merchant firms which have consistently remained among
the largest four U.S. producers for even a single decade. TI, which ranked
5th in 1955, was the largest U.S. producer by 1960, and remained the U.S.
leader until 1985, when it fell to second. Motorola, the second stablest
U.S. firm, was 9th in 1955, 6th in 1960, 2nd in 1965, still 2nd in 1979, and
is now first, having displaced TI in 1985. TI and Motorola, the two most
consistently successful among the major merchants, have also been the two
largest merchant firms (in total revenues), the two most diversified, the
only two major merchants headquartered outside of Silicon Valley, and the
two oldest.
Hence even within the merchant industry, there is evidence that
chronic, unstable entrepreneurialism is less productive than stability in
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the long run. (If captive producers were to be included, these correlations
would probably be even stronger, since the two largest are IBM and AT&T.)
For example in 1979, US. merchant market rank correlated with
diversification as follows:
Rank 4  Company Semiconductor Sales as % of Total 25
1 Texas Instruments 36
2 Motorola 31
3 National Semiconductor 85
4 Fairchild 69
5 Intel 75
6 AMD 89
The younger, less diversified merchants have tended to be more volatile
and to fare worse over the long run. (Since several large, diversified
firms, particularly GE and RCA, also fared poorly, size and diversification
would appear to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for enduring
success.) This dynamic instability was not just a matter of shifting
competitive success within a stable set of major firms; firms ranking among
the largest merchant producers in any given year often had not even existed
a decade previously, or had not been among the top ten. In recent years,
market leadership among American merchants appears to have stabilized
somewhat with TI, Motorola, Intel, National, and AMD emerging as the five
largest American semiconductor producers, although National and AMD are
losing ground. (Below this level, the industry has remained severely
unstable. For example Mostek, founded in 1968, became the seventh largest
U.S. merchant by the early 1980s. Mostek closed in 1985 and was then
acquired by Thomson/CSF after suffering a precipitous 70% revenue decline
and large losses.)
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This recent quasi-stability among large U.S. producers is the combined
result of-newer, more capital intensive cost structures and of the massive
shift of competitive advantage to Japan. The data on the following page
illustrate the instability of market leadership during the classical period.
The U.S. semiconductor industry's structural fragmentation and
instability were vertical as well as horizontal. By the 1970s, both
merchant and captive producers were served by a complex upstream network of
independent capital equipment and materials producers, services firms, and
subcontractors. Both the U.S. semiconductor industry system as a whole and
the merchant firms within it consequently remained vertically disaggregated
in the extreme. Merchants and captives relied almost entirely on separate
industries for such functions as silicon ingot production; mask making;
manufacture of capital goods such as diffusion ovens, lithography equipment,
and testers; and even frequently factory maintenance, assembly, product
testing, and quality assurance. Among merchant producers, only Texas
Instruments and Fairchild manufactured test equipment. No merchant producer
manufactured lithography or automated assembly equipment; among captives,
IBM manufactures electron beam equipment, but no optical equipment, and
supplies itself alone. No merchant or captive firm has held a substantial
equity position in, or ever entered into a joint venture with, any
significant capital equipment, materials, or services vendor. Of course,
close informal cooperation could perhaps have substituted for explicit
vertical integration; but, as we shall see below, such vertical cooperation
was as rare as vertical integration.
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Leading U.S. merchant manufacturers ranked by share of world
market
Semi- Semi- Integra- Integra-
Tran- conduc- conduc- ted ted
sistors tors tors circuits circuits
Valves (1955) (1960) (1965) (1975) (1979)
RCA 1 7 5 6 8 9
Sylvania 2 4 10
General Electric 3 6 4 5
Raytheon 4 10
Westinghouse 5 8
Amperex 6
National Video 7
Ranland 8
Eimac 9
Landsdale Tube 10
Hughes 1 9
Transitron 2 2 9
Philco 3 3 8
Texas Instruments 5 1 1 1 1
Motorola 9 6 2 5 3
Clevite 10 7
Fairchild 8 3 2 5
General Instrument 4 7 10
Sprague 7
National Semiconductor 3 2
Intel 4 4
Rockwell 6
Signetics 9 6
American Microsystems 10
Mostek 7
American Micro Devices 8
Source: 1. M. Mackintosh, 'Large-scale integration: intercontinental aspects',
IEEE Spectrum, 15, 6 (June 1976) 54; Dataquest (29 February 1980).
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Though the total size of the industry's infrastructural sector (which I
will sometimes call the support industry for simplicity) was probably only a
quarter the size of the merchant industry, the horizontal structure and
strategic pattern of the U.S. supply sector were nearly identical to those
of the merchant industry itself. The capital equipment sector, in fact, was
probably the first industry to emulate the structural and strategic pattern
established by the merchants. The equipment industry was composed of small,
independent, venture capital funded startups which were often founded by
defecting executives from merchants or other equipment firms. Rates of
growth, employee turnover, and new venture formation were comparable to the
merchant industry.
Since the generational crises in the merchant industry were often
associated with progress in technology and capital equipment, it was not
surprising that the equipment industry, too, showed generational
instability: the useful life of most capital equipment was five years or
less because technical progress in microelectronics was so rapid. Hence
there were regular opportunities for new ventures to enter so long as
venture capital funding covered development costs. As with the merchants,
several larger firms emerged as relatively stable market leaders (Varian,
Teradyne, Perkin-Elmer). But, also in common with the merchant industry,
over half of U.S. equipment and services production occurred in small,
young, unstable firms dedicated to a single market. The data on the
following page illustrate both the fragmentation and generational
instability of the U.S. capital equipment sector.
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Corporate Membership, Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Institute
(SEMI), U.S. Firms. Source: S.E.M.I., 1986.
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
U.S. only
Range
Less than 100
100 - 499
500 - 999
More than 999
Not available
# of Co's
587
122
46
56
79
ANNUAL SALES
U.S. only
Ranfge
Less than Im
1 - 5m
5.1 - 10m
10.1 - 25m
25.1 - 50m
50.1 - 75m
75.1 - 100m
More than 100m
Not available
ESTABLISHED
YEAR
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Prior to 1960 - 246 Companies
S.E.M.. Corporate Members
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# of Co's
174
313
121
112
49
22
2
17
79
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
The Phenomenon of Entrepreneurialism in the Merchant Industry
By the late 1960s, the semiconductor and related industries exhibited
and then progressively institutionalized an extraordinary rate, and a quite
particular pattern, of entrepreneurial new venture creation. The merchant
industry, particularly in Silicon Valley, lived in intensive symbiosis with
the ingredients of new venture formation, such as supply infrastructure,
leasing organizations, headhunters, and venture capital markets. The
typical pattern which evolved was for experienced employees, often highly
valued technical personnel or executives, to defect from relatively
established firms in order to found new, independent, venture-capital backed
ventures. Usually, these ventures were established to exploit a single
technology or market at the state of the art, in a region not yet dominated
by any single firm. In some cases, new ventures were established to exploit
knowledge gained by founders and early recruits in order to compete with the
prior employer. In these cases, established firms found themselves
effectively in the position of financing the creation of competitors through
their own R&D efforts. There is some anecdotal evidence that this problem
has become so severe that it represents a significant disincentive to R&D
investments by established firms.28
As a result executives and firms planned their behavior with the
knowledge that starting new firms, and defecting to them, was
extraordinarily easy. They also knew that defections by others from their
own firms to such startups would inevitably occur, and could inflict serious
damage under certain conditions; often the founders of startups were the
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most valued employees of the firm from which they departed. Zilog, for
example, was founded by seven defecting Intel executives for the purpose of
producing Intel-compatible microprocessors. Intel was cofounded by Robert
Noyce, who had coinvented the integrated circuit while at Fairchild, and two
other valuable Fairchild defectors, Andrew Grove and Gordon Moore. Seeq was
founded by two defecting senior Intel employees from Intel's EPROM
operations (the business Seeq entered); Intel sued and the case was settled
out of court. When Seeq began losing money, one of its founders (Gorden
Campbell, formerly general manager of Intel's EPROM division) departed from
Seeq to found Chips & Technologies, which now reverse engineers Intel-based
IBM personal computers for PC clone producers, primarily Asian firms. LSI
Logic was founded in 1981 by departing Fairchild executives, including
Fairchild's ex-president, Wilfred Corrigan; LSI's vice president for
computer aided design had previously held a senior technical management
position within IBM's semiconductor design organization; and in 1985 LSI
Logic recruited the president of GE/Intersil, George Wells, to be its chief
operating officer. MOS Technology was founded by defecting Motorola
employees to enter the business of producing Motorola-compatible
microprocessors; Mips Computers, founded in the early 1980s to design and
market advanced microprocessors, hired a number of Intel microprocessor
engineers; Sequent Computers was founded by 28 Intel employees who departed
en masse.
To be sure, motivations for defection were not limited to creation of
new ventures; sometimes, relatively established firms courted defectors from
their competitors. Earlier in the industry's history, for example, Lester
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Hogan left Motorola for Fairchild, taking most of top management with him,
repeating a previous episode in which he had defected from General Electric,
taking 18 engineers with him to Motorola. Hogan received millions of
dollars to make these defections, both to established firms. Nonetheless,
new venture formation appears to be the largest source of senior personnel
defection, and has traditionally constituted the largest drain on the
managerial and technical resources of larger merchant firms. Hence in this
pattern of entrepreneurialism, the creation of new, venture-capital backed
independent firms came to be linked to, and indeed primarily driven by,
defections of valuable personnel from existing producers - often themselves
the entrepreneurial ventures of a previous technical generation. The data
on the following pages indicate the levels of venture formation exhibited by
the merchant and equipment industries over time, and provide a partial
lineage of senior-level merchant industry personnel defection. In the
industry's early years, the largest sources of defectors and founders were
Bell Laboratories and General Electric; later, the established merchants
themselves were the largest source of defection.
This pattern has continued through recent years, even as increasing
capital intensity, vertical integration requirements, and Japanese
competition have turned the fundamental, long run economics of semiconductor
production against small, independent firms. In 1985, the U.S. industry's
worst year in its history, 38 young semiconductor firms raised $270 million
in venture capital, up from $250 million the previous year.2 7 Over one-
third of these transactions were for early stage funds, i.e. for newly
founded firms. Also in 1985, young semiconductor capital equipment firms
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New semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley, 1955-762
1955 Shockley Transistor,b Clevite,b 1TT
1956
1957 Fairchild Semiconductorb
1958
1959 National Semiconductor, Rheem Semiconductorbc
1960
1961 Signetics,' Amelco,c Raytheon Semiconductor, H.P. Associates
1962 Siliconix,c Molectrob,c
1963 Stewart Warner Microcircuits,b General Microelectronicshc
1964 Union Carbide Electronicsb
1965
1966 Philco-Ford Microelectronics,b American Micro-Systems, Cal-Dakb
1967 National Semiconductor,cd Electronic ArrayS,b Intersilb
1968 Cermetek,' Monsanto Electronics, Avantek, Lab-Go, Integrated
Systems Technology, Nortec, Kinetic Technology,b Intel,c Computer
Micro-Technology,bc Qualidyne,bc Electro Nuclear Labs, Advanced
Memory Systems,bc Precision Monolithics,'
1969 Lithic Systems,b Communications Transistor Corp., Monolithic
Memories, Cartesian,' Advanced LSI Systems,b Signetics Memory
Systems, Advanced Micro Devices,' Four Phase'
1970 Litronix,b Integrated Electronics,' Varadyne,b International Com-
puter Modulesb
1971 Cal-Tex,b Exan, Micro Power, Intersil Memory, Standard Micro-
systems,b Antexb
1972 LSI Systems,b Nitron,b' Frontier Electronics,b Interdesign,b Light
Emitting Devices,b IC Transducers,6- Opto Ray,bc Optical Diodes,b
1973 Data General,' Synertekb.c
1974 Monosil, Zilog
1975 Mnemonics,b Maruman Integrated Circuits, Exonix, Semi Pro-
cessesb
1976 Supertexc Cognition,' Integrated Technology Corp.'
aSome firms have been renamed since their foundation.
bSince closed, dissolved, sold or merged.
cAt least one founder from Fairchild Semiconductor.
dReformed.
Source: Don C. Hoefler, Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Inc.,
Mountain View, California, 1979.
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U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR COMPANIES FOUNDED BETWEEN 1966 AND 1976
Company Name/Date Founded
American Microsystems (1966)
National Semiconductor
Electronic Arrays (1967)
Intersil (1968)
Avantek (1968)
Integrated Systems Technology (1968)
Nortec Electronics Corp. (1968)
Intel (1968)
Precision Monolithic (1969)
Computer Microtechnology (1968)
Qualidyne (1968)
Advanced Memory Systems (1968)
Communications Transistor Corp. (1969)
Monolithic Memories (1969)
Advanced LSI Systems (1969)
Mostek (1969)
Signetics Memory Systems (1969)
Advanced Micro Devices (1969)
Spectronics (1969)
Four Phase (1969)
Litronix (1970)
Integrated Electronics (1970)
Varadyne (1970)
Caltex (1971)
Exar (1971)
Micropower (1971)
Standard Microsystems (1971)
Antex (1971)
LSI Systems (1972)
Nitron (1972)
Frontier (1972)
Interdesign (1972)
Synertek (1974)
Zilog (1974)
Maruman (1975)
Supertx (1976)
City
Cupertino
Santa Clara
Mountain View
Sunnyvale
Santa Clara
Santa Clara
Santa Clara
Santa Clara
Sunnyvale
Sunnyvale
San Carlos
Santa Clara
Carrollton, TX
Sunnyvale
Sunnyvale
Richardson, TX
Cupertino
Cupertino
Mountain View
Sunnyvale
Santa Clara
Hauppauge, NY
Cupertino
Newport Beach
Sunnyvale
Santa Clara
Cupertino
Sunnyvale
Sunnyvale
Previous Employment/
Number of Founders
Philco-Ford (4)
Fairchild (3)
Philco-Ford (4), Bunker-Ramo (2)
Union Carbide (3)
Applied Technology (4)
Philco-Ford (3)
Philco-Ford (2)
Fairchild (3)
Fairchild (3)
Fairchild (3)
Intersd (1), Fairchild (2), Leher (1)
Fairchild (1), IBM (2), Motorola (1),
Collins (1)
National Semiconductor (3)
IBM (1)
Nortec (1)
TI
Signetics (2), IBM (2), HP (1)
Fairchild (8)
TI
Fairchild (6), General Instruments (2),
Mellonics (1), other (1)
Monsanto (1)
Fairchild (2)
TI (2), Nortec (4)
Signetics (3)
Intersil (2)
Four Phase (1), Electro-Nuclear
Lab* (1), Nitron (1)
Caltex (1)
Signetics (1)
CMI (3), AMI (4), Fairchild (1)
Intel (2)
National Semiconductor (2)
Fairchild (1)
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Source: U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Iuduggriel Technology (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 91.
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raised $70 million in venture capital, of which over 40% went for early
stage financing. 28
Defection, Turnover, and Compensation Structures
Annual employee turnover in the U.S. semiconductor industry has been
twenty percent since the late 1960s. By contrast, turnover rates in IBM,
AT&T, DEC, and in Japanese firms are typically less than five percent.
Turnover is highest in young, small firms, as the following data indicate:
Exempt Employee Turnover Rates, U.S. Electronics Industry, 1979
By Number of Employees Per Firm and Industrywide
1-100 101-250 251-500 501-1,000 1,000+ Industry
28% 27% 24% 25% 15% 19%
Source: American Electronics Association, 1980, cited in Okimoto,
Sugano, and Weinstein, Competitive Edge, 1984, p. 61.
Even in the larger and more stable merchant firms, turnover is high
enough to be a major source of difficulty. National Semiconductor's
turnover rate has averaged 15% or more throughout its history. Intel,
considered the most progressive and stable employer in the merchant
industry, still has a turnover rate of 8%. These high turnover rates appear
to have three major sources. First, firms have often assumed high turnover
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to be inevitable, and consequently employed policies which perpetuate it,
for example using mass layoffs during recessions, 29 and declining to invest
in the long term training of their employees. Second, the continuous
creation of new ventures increases defection from established firms. And
third, the instability of merchant firms' market success caused frequent and
rapid shifts in employment and hiring patterns.
As a result, experienced semiconductor executives have often worked
for, or even been founders of, half a dozen firms during their careers. The
same is true of engineers, programmers, and other professional employees.
Furthermore, executives and high level professionals in the merchant
industry have an extraordinary reputation for aggressiveness, individualism,
and independence often bordering on ruthlessness. Throughout the industry's
history, they have perceived themselves, often correctly, as scarce
commodities readily marketable elsewhere; many are exceptionally and self-
consciously blunt in personal conversation. Management practices reflected
this style, and have tended to be idiosyncratic. As one would expect in an
industry constantly repopulated by new firms, managers have tended to be
permanently inexperienced with major investments and large organizations.
Furthermore, managers absorbed the aggressive, individualistic ethic which
dominated the industry generally; the instability of the industry and its
high rate of new venture creation implied that the cost of leaving a firm
was small. It has been common for professionals and managers to resign or
be fired as the result of internal disputes. Some departing executives have
responded by founding competitors of their prior employer, sometimes taking
other employees with them when they depart.
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The hiring and compensation practices of the industry have reflected
and perpetuated these characteristics. Professional salaries are high and
based less on seniority than perceived merit. Favored employees receive
large raises and tax favored stock options. By the early 1970s stealing
employees was an art form, and innumerable professional and executive search
firms had sprouted in the Valley. Some firms began offering their employees
thousand dollar rewards for referring new hires. And defection to startups
was further encouraged by the lower effective cost of compensation enjoyed
by new ventures relative to established firms.
Founders of startups typically hold large blocks of stock which, often
as a precondition of obtaining venture capital investment, they cannot
liquidate for several years except under controlled conditions. As startups
grew, early white collar employees - the first several dozen, sometimes the
first several hundred or even thousand - received substantial and heavily
tax advantaged stock options (Incentive Stock Options, or ISOs) which
uniformly vested over a four-year period, twenty-five percent annually.
Early employees of successful startups were therefore often able to sell
their stock shortly after the firm's initial public offering (IPO). Under
pre-1987 law, ISOs were taxed neither when granted nor when exercised, but
only when stock was sold, and capital gains rates applied. Hence they
offered both income deferral and favorable treatment when eventually taxed.
Often subsequent options (usually taxable Non Qualified Options, or NQOs)
were added for valued employees.
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But at the same time, everyone recognized the transitory nature of
allegiances. Semiconductor firms raided other companies, and recognized
that they would inevitably be raided in turn, particularly by new startups.
ISOs could only be granted once per employee; hence as startups grew larger
and older, their effective costs of compensation rose, and approached those
of established firms.
Corporate Life Cycles and Self-Limiting Success
Throughout the merchant industry's history, new and/or second-tier
merchant semiconductor firms displayed a characteristic. life cycle in
matters such as technical leadership, financial success, growth rates, and
turnover. The cycle began with creation of a new company focussed on a
single emerging technology or market opportunity - 1K memories for Intel,
microprocessors for Zilog and MOS Technology, electrically erasable memories
for Seeq, gate arrays for LSI Logic. Executives defected from an
established firm and created a new one. One to three rounds of venture
capital, in some cases totalling up to $50 million, were obtained while the
new firm raided larger and more established firms, including the founders'
previous employer(s), to obtain high-quality technical talent. After one to
three years, the firm's initial products were successful enough that the
firm had operating profits. At this time or shortly thereafter, the firm
would announce its initial public offering (IPO), which usually generated
$25 million to $75 million in cash. (LSI Logic's IPO, the most successful
in the industry's history, generated $160 million.)
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After several further years of rapid growth, however, firms began to
encounter difficulties. Typically, they experienced a generational crisis
as early products became obsolete, they became dependent upon current
revenue to finance themselves, and fully vested employees began to defect to
other, newer firms. Because startups rarely could (or even tried to) invest
in the creation of a strong, long term, diversified technology base, and
because they were typically focussed on a single market, they were extremely
sensitive to technological change which demanded R&D, technology, or
customer relationships with which they were inexperienced.
Often the qualitatively different organizational requirements of a
larger, more structured firm strained the abilities of managerially
inexperienced founders. The firm's growth rate slowed as these problems,
and the problem of sustaining growth in the face of them, reduced its
competitive advantage. Some firms such as Texas Instruments and Motorola
were able to maintain high growth and innovation levels - at or above the
industry average - through several product generations. But continued
success was only one of three possible paths. The second was failure, and
the third was acquisition. A number of firms were acquired upon meeting
with difficulty, sometimes by larger companies with no previous experience
in electronics. Most of these acquisitions fared badly, as the best
employees abandoned the acquired firm for newer ventures and the firm's
technology obsolesced. Examples of ailing merchants being acquired include
Zilog (acquired by Exxon), Mostek (acquired by United Technologies),
Synertek (acquired by Honeywell, but later defunct anyway), Intersil
(acquired by GE), and Fairchild (acquired by Schlumberger).
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Hence as their problems mounted, aging startups succumbed either to
competition by the few enduring, stable merchant firms (TI, Motorola,
perhaps now Intel), subsequent generations of startups, or (more recently)
Japanese competition. As they decayed, their executives and most valuable
technical personnel departed for newer firms. Transitron, 2nd among
merchants in 1960, sank to 9th by 1965 and then disappeared altogether.
Mostek's revenues rose from $220 million in 1982 to $467 million in 1984,
only to decline to $110 million in 1985. During this period, Mostek's CEO
was a defector from IBM. One of Mostek's original founders, Bob Palmer,
departed in 1985 is now a vice president at DEC. Fairchild ranked 3rd among
U.S. merchants in 1977, but had fallen to 6th by 1985. Fairchild was
falling further when it was sold to National in 1987 for $122 million, after
an earlier attempt to sell the company to Fujitsu met political resistance.
Fairchild's former president, Wilf Corrigan, departed in 1981 to found
LSI Logic. He took with him some of Fairchild's best talent, and also
borrowed from other firms (IBM, Intersil, Synertek) as well. LSI Logic rose
to 15th among U.S. vendors by 1986 with revenues of $190 million. Seeq's
revenues rose from $9 million in 1983 to $53 million in 1984, only to
decline to $31 million by 1986. Unofficially, Seeq has apparently been for
sale. One of Seeq's two founders, Gordon Campbell, had previously been
general manager of Intel's EPROM division; Seeq specialized in related
products, and was sued by Intel. Campbell then departed to found Chips &
Technologies, whose revenue was running approximately $60 million per year
as of mid-1987. Chips & Technologies specializes in reverse engineering
83
circuits produced by established firms, particularly those used in IBM
compatible personal computers. An even more extreme case was Micron
Technology, whose naivete and nearly complete dependence upon the memory
market led to a rapid ascent followed by an equally rapid decline. Micron
Technology's revenues rose from $5 million in 1982 to $117 million in 1984
(the year of the firm's IPO), collapsing to $36 million the next year.
This remarkable instability, though perhaps diminishing somewhat with
the continuing growth of scale economies and Japanese competitive pressure,
appears nonetheless to be continuing to a degree vastly greater than seen in
Japan. With the industry's cyclical upturn in mid-1987, Intel reported such
rapid growth (55% over the prior year, with earnings of $81 million on
quarterly revenues of $501 million) that it may soon overtake National as
the third largest merchant firm. Conversely, for the same quarter AMD
reported far slower revenue growth (14% over the year-ago period) and a huge
loss ($54 million on revenues of $261 million). 30 Hence the structural
forces of the U.S. system appear to be such that even the largest merchant
firms continue to face instability greater than that of the U.S. industry as
a whole, and far greater than that faced by Japanese producers.
Technology Diffusion, Turnover, and Licensing
Innovation and technical leadership in the merchant industry have been
associated with large but evanescent advantage. The technology, coupled
with twenty percent annual employee turnover, made reverse engineering and
imitation relatively easy, while simultaneously the existing legal regime of
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intellectual property rights was largely useless to the industry. Indeed by
the late-1970s there existed firms (such as Mosaid, or more recently Chips &
Technologies and Phoenix Technology) which specialized in "documenting"
products for clients considering imitation or reverse engineering.
Furthermore, many large consumers (IBM, the Defense Department) routinely
required second sources for important products made by small firms of
dubious stability. The practice of requiring second sources, of course,
also perpetuated instability by denying firms any guarantee of a stable cash
flow, and conversely providing a means by which newer cash-poor entrants
could obtain designs and business.
Beyond these specific considerations, there was also the awareness that
success, particularly for the smaller firms, was probably transitory.
Consequently merchants realized by the 1970s that proprietary technical
advantage was difficult to maintain for long periods of time, and planned
accordingly. Typically, innovators would enjoy a brief period of monopoly
profit-taking and would then enter a period of extreme competition, wide
technology licensing, or both. In this subsequent period, innovators hoped
to retain some competitive advantage by being further down an experience
curve permitting them to be first to market with "shrinks,"3 1 redesigns, or
successor products. But given the transitory nature of market success, the
high levels of turnover within the merchant industry, and the relative
absence of effective legal protection, firms rarely expected to maintain a
profitable, definitively superior position in any single product or
technology for a long period. There was rarely any doubt that imitative
and/or competitive products would rapidly appear whether or not licensing
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occurred; it was simply a question of time. For devices of simple design,
imitators often entered within six months; for very complex devices,
imitative entry might be delayed by perhaps two years.
Licensing to Japanese Competitors
As the VLSI era arrived, however, the cost of both design and process
development escalated enormously, and technology ownership became more
valuable and important. Wide licensing continued, particularly to Japanese
firms, for three reasons. First, large customers continued to require
second sources, in part precisely because the industry's instability made
large users nervous about dependence upon a single, small merchant firm.
Second, the merchants became cash constrained, and any individual cross-
licensing agreement reduced their initial cost burden by permitting them to
obtain immediate cash and/or another firm's designs or technology. And
third, the Japanese market remained substantially closed to direct U.S.
penetration, rendering licensing attractive over the short term as a method
for an individual firm to obtain revenue from the Japanese market and/or
process technology from large Japanese firms.
In this environment, licensing and second sourcing often seemed
preferable to unlicensed imitation because innovators could at least auction
off licensing rights and technical knowledge, and could sometimes thereby
negotiate for development and cross-licensing of complementary products with
licensee firms. As costs escalated, licensing could provide either quick
cash or some useful technology or both. These licensing agreements,
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therefore, rarely constituted long term cooperation or joint activity. To
the contrary, they were simply the method by which acknowledged enemies
dealt with each other and their surrounding environment.
Indeed, miscalculations involving license agreements have been a major
source of market share loss. By 1985, for example, Intel held less than
half the world market for its own microprocessors; authorized Japanese
second sources held nearly half, with authorized U.S. and unauthorized Asian
producers holding the remainder. Motorola held slightly over half of its
own microprocessor market; about one third was held by Hitachi.3 2
Similarly, Toshiba now competes directly with its contractual technology
supplier, LSI Logic, in the ASIC market. 33 Earlier, in the late 1960s,
Texas Instruments licensed its patents to the Japanese industry in return
for the right to build a factory in Japan. Other major license agreements
with Japanese producers include Zilog (microprocessors and
microcontrollers), Motorola with Toshiba (32-bit microprocessors), and MIPS
Computers (reduced instruction set microprocessors). These license
arrangements were concluded despite the fact that Japanese firms have a
strong reputation for reverse engineering, manipulation of licensing
agreements, and rapid entry of markets previously dominated by U.S.
licensors. In part, this represented naivete on the part of inexperienced
merchant firms; in part, however, it represented a perception that U.S.
firms had no alternative. Japanese firms sometimes stole what they could
not license, and usually could find at least one U.S. firm willing to
provide the desired technology.
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Indeed it appears that between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
direction of technology transfer was almost entirely from the U.S. to Japan.
Recently technology importing has also been widely practiced by South Korea.
Micron Technology, for example, was founded in the early 1980s, went public
in 1984, and collapsed in 1985 when DRAM prices fell rapidly. In 1985
Micron licensed its technology to a Korean competitor, Samsung, for less
than $3 million. A partial list of recent licensing, sourcing, and/or
equity agreements between American and Korean firms is as follows. Goldstar
has arrangements with AT&T, LSI Logic, Zilog, Texas Instruments, AMD, and
Fairchild; Hyundai, with International CMOS Technology, the Western Design
Center, and Texas Instruments; and Samsung, with Exel, Micron Technology,
Intel, National, and Zytrex. In all cases technology transfer is one-way
from the U.S. to Korea; and AT&T is the only American firm have a major
equity position in the licensee firm.34
Japanese licensing has most recently focused upon microprocessors,
digital communications, and ASICs. Agreements concluded over the last five
years include Toshiba with Motorola, LSI Logic, and possibly Sun
Microsystems; Ricoh, with VLSI Technology and Custom MOS Arrays; Fujitsu,
with Fairchild, Texas Instruments, and Ungermann-Bass; and Kawasaki Steel,
with LSI Logic. 35 In most cases Japanese firms are trading cash and/or
process technology, in which they have and will maintain superiority, for
CAD, product designs, and design technology 36 - which, to anticipate
somewhat, are the sole areas in which the United States still leads Japan.
Related to these considerations, and in part derivative of them, was a
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specific pattern of decisionmaking with respect to production strategy, one
which strongly affected firms' entry into, and exit from, product markets.
Merchants, particularly firms such as TI and Intel who were innovative
leaders, frequently abandoned markets as soon as their current ROI fell
below some target rate. Until the early 1980s, for example, Intel
explicitly maintained a 20% pretax profit target and exited any market
failing to meet it. As a result, Intel abandoned production of several
generations of its own microprocessor devices before demand for them even
peaked.3 As Japanese competition intensified, Intel found that with each
generation its period of high profit near-monopoly became shorter -
eventually so short that rising development investments could not be
recouped unless the firm could either restrict imitation or greatly reduce
costs.3 8 For similar reasons, the entire merchant industry (with the sole
major exception of TI) abandoned the DRAM business within five years of the
onset of Japanese competition, despite the fact that the memory market is
expected to grow 25% per year for another decade or more. The general
tendency of the merchant industry has been to seek differentiated, safe,
high ROI niches rather than to remain in seriously contested markets. 39
Interfirm Structures: Relationships Within -the U.S. Industry
The frequency of arms' length licensing agreements, as opposed to
enduring joint development efforts, and of short term ROI calculations in
corporate strategy, both exemplified a wider pattern. Just as the U.S.
industry was fragmented and unstable in its formal structure, and just as it
emphasized short term optimization in production decisions, it was also
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nearly devoid of long term, close interfirm relationships. Rather,
relationships between firms, their customers, and their suppliers were arms
length and contractual, often hostile, and often unstable and/or of short
duration. Merchants played capital equipment suppliers off against each
other, bargaining for lower prices; customers did the same with merchants;
firms in each category withheld much information from the others.
This general absence of vertical and horizontal cooperation has been
visible in several forms. Joint ventures, enduring cooperative R&D
activities, and systematic exchanges of personnel or information within the
U.S. industry have been extremely rare. Multiple firm horizontal
cooperative R&D relationships were literally nonexistent prior to the
formation of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation, the
Semiconductor Research Corporation, and Sematech in the 1980s. One to one
vertical relationships - e.g., cooperative development of capital equipment
involving a semiconductor producer and a capital equipment firm - have been
slightly more common. IBM has a substantial history of collaboration with
Perkin-Elmer in lithography, and with Teradyne in testers; not by chance,
these firms are also by far the largest and most stable U.S. producers of
semiconductors and capital equipment respectively. More recently IBM has
also entered into substantial development and technology exchange agreements
with Intel, once again the largest and most stable producer in its major
markets (microprocessors and EPROMs).
These relationships, however, have been both exceptional in the
American industry and less intimate than the interfirm relationships
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characteristic of Japan. Aside from IBM's investment in Intel, no major
U.S. semiconductor consumers hold, or have ever held, equity positions in
major semiconductor producers; and the same is true of both semiconductor
consumers and producers in relation to major capital equipment or
infrastructure firms. Nor is there, or has there ever been, a single major
joint venture among such firms. Even individual instances of technical
cooperation, such as codevelopment of a specific new product, have been the
exception rather than the rule. Far more common has been decisionmaking
based upon immediate, one-time considerations of price, availability, and/or
current product characteristics.
This vertical disaggregation extended to relationships with the
producers of skilled labor and fundamental research, namely universities and
national laboratories. While larger systems firms such as IBM, DEC, and
Hewlett Packard, merchants and equipment firms had enduring, sometimes close
relationships with universities (via internships, equipment donations,
educational leave programs, and sometimes cooperative research), merchants
rarely developed such relationships. Even Intel, a relatively stable firm
dependent upon advanced technology, does not permit employees to take
educational leave. 40
Most cooperative agreements, therefore, have been bilateral,
horizontal, and limited to cross licensing. And even when horizontal
agreements have been negotiated, they have sometimes collapsed when one firm
fails or competitive conditions change. For example, Intel and AMD
negotiated a 10-year cross licensing agreement in the early 1980s, only to
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have the agreement disintegrate in 1986. Intel alleged that AMD had failed
to fulfill its obligations to develop peripheral circuits; in return, AMD
alleged that Intel had simply decided that retaining a monopoly over its 32-
bit microprocessors would be more profitable than sharing the market with
AMD. As of 1987, the matter is in arbitration. In other cases, firms have
found themselves orphaned when their partners went bankrupt, switched
technologies, cancelled major development projects, or found themselves
unable to meet demand.
3.2 The American Industry in the International System
During the period of its global dominance, the international conduct of
the American industry (like that of many other U.S. industries in the first
several decades of the postwar period) was largely determined by its
internal dynamics and by domestic cost conditions. There were three
significant exceptions to this rule, one of which - the industry's
relationship with Japan - was to have major long run consequences. These
three exceptions were low wage offshore assembly operations; European
manufacturing to secure access to the EEC market; and the sale of capital
equipment and technology, rather than products, to Japan in the face of
Japanese protectionism and strategic coordination.
Within the U.S. industry (equipment and captive producers included),
most high value-added, capital intensive, technologically advanced
activities such as headquarters services, R&D, capital equipment
development, wafer fabrication, and advanced education occurred largely in
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the United States. International flows consisted principally of small but
noticeable imports of skilled labor, particularly European and Asian
engineers; low-wage offshore assembly operations, principally in Asia;
manufacturing and marketing operations in Europe; exports of semiconductor
products and some technology to Europe; and, quite importantly for the
subsequent course of events, exports of capital equipment, licenses, and
technology (not products) to Japan. International operations consisted of
offshore assembly and operations within the EEC, but a nearly total
exclusion from Japan.
Manufacturing: Labor Intensity and Offshore Assembly
The American merchant industry grew during a period in which domestic
wages were high by world norms, particularly the norms of Asia and/or less
developed nations. Hence while the U.S. remained the preferred location for
activities where advanced technology and human capital were required, it
became noncompetitive, at least in short run simple cost terms, as a
location for semiskilled, labor intensive activities such as semiconductor
device assembly. (As we shall see below, Japan, with a highly educated
general workforce but until recently far lower wage costs, was attractive
for both kinds of activity but was unavailable to U.S. firms.)
In the merchant industry, furthermore, short term costs were a major
consideration. Therefore production was separated from other functions
(R&D, design, marketing, headquarters services), and assembly was sent
offshore to low-wage regions. The preferred workforce consisted of young,
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unmarried, illiterate women paid twenty-five cents to a dollar an hour,
often at piece rates; the resemblance to garment production was striking.
Texas Instruments established plants in El Salvador and several Asian
nations; by the 1970s, nearly half of National Semiconductor's worldwide
labor force - over twenty thousand employees - was located in Southeast
Asia; Intel's assembly was concentrated in Malaysia, the Philippines, and
(until recently) Barbados. Many firms established plants in Indonesia and
the Philippines. Dependence upon low-wage offshore labor increased until,
by the late 1970s, 80 percent of merchant assembly was conducted outside the
U.S. Sometimes it was even performed by short-term subcontractors rather
than in merchant-owned plants; LSI Logic, for example, still used a
Philipine subcontractor in 1985.
Europe: Merchant Dominance by Direct Foreign Investment
For very different reasons, Europe and Japan were both important to the
evolution of the merchant industry. The European market was, nearly from
the first, dominated by the larger American merchant firms.4 ' The extent of
this dominance, in combination with national divisions within the EEC and
the strong European presence of large U.S. semiconductor consumers, was such
that the European industry never became a major force in world markets.
Indeed, Europe's share of world semiconductor markets declined from over 15%
in the early 1970s to approximately 10% by the early 1980s; even now, the
merchant industry still holds about 50% of the European market. The
Japanese response to the growth of the U.S. industry, however, was far more
coherent, and stronger, than that of Europe. While European nations
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sometimes protected against imports, they permitted and even encouraged
direct foreign investment. Japan severely limited both imports and foreign
investment, and used market access strategically in order to extract
technology and intellectual property rights from the U.S. industry. By
1974, for example, the merchant industry operated 45 factories in Western
Europe but only 6 in Japan, despite the fact that the Japanese semiconductor
market was already larger than that of Europe. 2
A major contribution to the disparity between Japan's maintenance of
autonomy and Europe's penetration by American producers was and remains the
contrast between Japan's coherent government technocracies, closely linked
to financial and industrial management, and the very different relationships
between political and economic integration in Western.Europe. Western
Europe is nationally divided in policy, industrial structure, and production
but economically integrated in that the EEC is a unified market at least
theoretically devoid of internal trade barriers. EEC nations had divergent
interests which were partially subordinated to the presumed economic returns
to intraEuropean free trade. Integration of EEC markets was coupled with
substantial external barriers on most finished goods and relatively
permissive attitudes regarding U.S. direct foreign investment.
This situation suited the larger American semiconductor firms
perfectly. In the 1960s and early 1970s they performed all R&D, facilities
engineering, and prototyping in the United States, where they also
standardized processing through experience acquired in the military market.
Subsequently commodity production was transferred to Europe, often in low-
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wage areas, in order to circumvent the tariff barrier. This procedure
sometimes also allowed the American firms to play off various European
governments against each other when choosing production locations. American
firms held strong bargaining positions because of their technical lead,
because direct foreign investment was widely permitted, and because
international operations were more stable and concentrated than were
American domestic industry and its markets. The concentrated, oligopolistic
character of American firms' international operations - which were dominated
by TI, Motorola, and later National and Intel - facilitated at least weak
forms of coordination. Conversely the national interests of European
governments made effective cooperation among them difficult; for example,
support for "national champions" resulted in redundant operations
effectively limited to national markets.
In contrast, three factors made it possible for the American merchants
to display less savage competitive postures towards each other in European
markets than in the United States. First, the merchants's European
operations were largely restricted to manufacturing and marketing mature
products. Hence the intense supply side competition found in the U.S. - for
R&D talent, government contracts, new technology - did not exist in Europe.
Second, defection from European operations to start new ventures was next to
impossible. Europe simply did not possess the venture capital markets,
technical infrastructure, and defection incentives found in Silicon Valley.
Third, major international operations were one of the few areas in which
relatively major economies of scale and stability were to be found.
Entering the European market required dealings with several foreign
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governments, transfers of technology to foreign factories, and mass
production for relatively large, mature markets. Almost by definition,
young startups were excluded. This further reduced defection pressures and
also resulted in a far more concentrated structure than the one prevailing
domestically.
In part because venture capital and startups were rare in Europe, labor
mobility also failed to provide effective technology transfer to European
producers. This barrier was increased by the fact that most merchant R&D
occurred in the United States, and European production was generally kept
one to three years behind the state of the art. Moreover, many of the best
European engineers were recruited by American firms, and frequently
emigrated to the United States to advance their careers. One of the project
leaders for TI's Schottky TTL development was a French emigre taken from
TI's French operations, now a second line manager at DEC; Wilfred Corrigan,
once the CEO of Fairchild and now the CEO of LSI Logic, is English; George
Wells, formerly President of Intersil and now COO of LSI Logic, is Scottish.
For such reasons, the American industry maintained a dominant
technological and market position in worldwide semiconductor activities,
with the exception of Japan. From this position came further scale and
learning benefits, and the emergence of relatively stable structures of
European production and marketing, within the largest merchant firms. This
international strategic equilibrium had self-sustaining characteristics as
strong as those driving the domestic equilibrium of disaggregated
innovation. The larger American merchants, such as Texas Instruments,
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National Semiconductor, and Motorola (jointed later by Intel and perhaps yet
more recently AMD), typically developed products based on a new technology,
acquired experience through early domestic sales, and then commercialized
the mature product in Europe once the technology was well understood and
devices could be produced there on a commodity basis. Hence research,
development, prototyping, advanced fabrication, and the most significant
forms of learning occurred in the United States.
So long as the American firms retained a technological lead on the
order of years over European and Japanese firms, this strategy was viable.
The world could be viewed as a commodity market to be exploited through a
particular strategy: local production using standardized technologies and
products a generation behind those used commercially in America. Once
established and successful, such a strategy generated a stable equilibrium
and was self-sustaining; it would fail only if indigenous foreign producers
could somehow break the grip of the American firms, construct internal
capabilities secure from merchant competition, and eventually eliminate the
merchants' technological lead and market power. This is what Japan was able
to do in the 1960s and 1970s, and what South Korea may be doing now.
The U.S. Industry and Japan: Technology Transfer to a Closed System
In Japan, the American industry's principal exports to Japan were
capital equipment and technology, some fraction of which were "exported"
involuntarily. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese industry's
imports of capital equipment and licensed technology roughly equalled
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imports of U.S. semiconductor products in absolute terms, an extraordinary
condition by world standards. In addition, many of the semiconductor and
capital equipment architectures, technologies, and products developed by
Japanese firms were unlicensed imitations, sometimes legal and sometimes
not, of U.S. counterparts. Licensing was facilitated not only by the size
and structure differentials between U.S. and Japanese producers, but also by
the long time horizons required to enter the Japanese market, the general
closure of the Japanese economic system, the protectionism of the Japanese
government, and the propensity of Japanese firms to imitate or steal that
which they could not buy. Unlicensed imitation was facilitated by many of
the same forces, and additionally by the delays associated with litigation
and the disarray of intellectual property law.
Consequently until the early 1980s the United States provided nearly
all of the capital equipment used by Japanese semiconductor producers, and
much of -their technology as well. U.S. firms - including such major patent
holders as TI, IBM, and AT&T - granted licenses to Japanese producers for
process patents, product designs and patents, the major U.S. microprocessor
families (including those of Intel, Motorola, and Zilog), a variety of other
major product designs (e.g. gate array masterslices), and software systems
such as university-developed circuit simulators and LSI Logic's CAD systems.
In addition to their licensed activities, Japanese firms also directly
copied, reverse engineered, or otherwise imitated a wide variety of U.S.
architectures, processes, and products. These included the architecture of
Sentry memory testers (copied by Takeda Riken, now Advantest), Motorola's
68000 microprocessors (reverse engineered in CMOS by Hitachi, which also
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licensed the original device), Intel's 16 bit microprocessors (copied,
allegedly illegally, by Fujitsu), Intel's microprocessor microcode
(allegedly copied illegally by NEC), the microcode of an important National
Semiconductor Corp. communications circuit (allegedly copied illegally by
Toshiba), TI's memory technology (allegedly copied illegally by all 6 of the
major Japanese memory producers), and a variety of other objects pertinent
to semiconductor operations. Taken together, these actions represented an
enormous transfer of knowledge, technology, and property rights from the
United States to Japan.
Conversely, American penetration in Japanese operations and product
markets was very small, in part because it was carefully regulated. Imports
were controlled both by government action and by the strategic decisions of
the principal consumers (who were also, in large measure, the principal
producers). Until 1975, direct foreign investment in the Japanese
semiconductor industry was formally restricted as well, and in fact was
essentially prohibited both by government policy and by the structure of
industry and asset markets. Hence not only was the U.S. industry precluded
from operating within Japan and from securing a strong market position, it
was also unable to gain access to Japanese capital or personnel. In
contrast to the European situation, virtually no Japanese personnel
emigrated to the United States to work in the merchant industry.
The sole exception was Texas Instruments, but even the exception
largely proved the rule. In 1968, TI - then by far the largest open market
semiconductor producer in the world, and possessing both a significant
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technology lead and a strong patent position - was permitted by MITI to
establish Japanese operations, first through a joint venture with Sony and
later as exclusive owner. In return, however, TI was required by the
government (and agreed) to restrict itself to a small fraction of the
Japanese market and to license its then-current patent portfolio to the
entire Japanese industry.
During the period that the American merchant and equipment industries
were institutionalizing themselves, therefore, the Japanese semiconductor
and equipment industries were developing in parallel but not in open market
competition with them. While the U.S. industry was prohibited from major
participation in the Japanese market (aside from technology transfer), the
Japanese industry also refrained from export drives directed at the United
States until the late 1970s. As late as 1977, annual U.S. imports of
Japanese semiconductors totaled less than $50 million. Five years later,
they exceeded $1 billion.4 3
Rather, the Japanese industry concentrated upon process development and
efficient manufacturing of products required by Japanese electronics
exporters. Hence by the late 1960s Japan already accounted for a third of
total world production of linear integrated circuits, most of which were
incorporated into Japanese consumer electronics products, a high proportion
of them manufactured by the same firms which produced the semiconductors.
(By the late 1960s, Japan had obtained large shares of world markets for
"transistor" radios, televisions, and high-fidelity equipment.) And by the
mid-1970s, Japan had essentially reached parity with American technical
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practice, at least in process technology. Therefore as a consequence of the
combination of Japanese protectionism, specialization for domestic
semiconductor markets, and increasing technical prowess, American firms
never held more than a quarter of the Japanese semiconductor market, even at
the height of American technical superiority and world market penetration.
In short, the Japanese system behaved quite differently than either the
fragmented but collectively dominant U.S. industry, or the nationally
organized but penetrable European system. These differences deserve some
further elaboration.
4. Structural and Strategic Development of the Japanese Industry
The development of the Japanese semiconductor and equipment industries
in large measure followed the general patterns of the Japanese economy.
Semiconductor production was undertaken through the diversification and
backward integration of larger electrical and electronics equipment firms,
most of which were in turn members of even larger industrial groups
affiliated with Tokyo banks and global trading companies. Semiconductor
producers thus adhered to, and derived much of their character from, the
structural and strategic norms prevailing throughout Japanese business. As
in other sectors of the pre-1980s Japanese economy, capital was supplied
(and rationed) by these large firms and the Tokyo city banks. Independent
venture formation, personnel defection, and hostile acquisitions were so
strongly discouraged that they were nonexistent, and no organized venture
capital market existed. Until the 1980s, even entry via diversification by
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other large industrial firms was rare after the semiconductor industry's
principal firms began operations in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Japanese
industry's international activities, too, conformed to the norms of the
Japanese manufacturing sector in use of domestic closure, technology
acquisition, investment, market selection, and choice of competitive
strategy.
The Structure of the Japanese Industry
Relative to the American industry, the Japanese industry has displayed
very high levels of diversification, vertical integration, structural
stability, and indeed homogeneity. All of Japan's four largest
semiconductor producers had begun semiconductor operations by 1954; all of
the largest eight, who account for 90% of all Japanese production, had begun
semiconductor operations by 1962." With the exception of the relative
decline of Sony and the rise of Fujitsu, their identities and even rank
order have stayed virtually unchanged for the last fifteen years.
Remarkably, this is true not only of these firms' semiconductor production
but also of their participation in other, related, markets. The largest
semiconductor producers are NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Fujitsu in that
order; the same four firms in a different order (Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi,
Toshiba) are Japan's four largest computer manufacturers. In yet a
different order (NEC first), they are Japan's largest telecommunications
equipment producers. Together with the fifth and sixth largest
semiconductor producers (Matsushita and Mitsubishi, whose semiconductor
revenues are roughly $1 billion each), the same leaders in semiconductor
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production also account for a majority of Japan's consumer electronics
industry. (Sony, whose semiconductor production is less than $300 million,
is the only major exception.) Not surprisingly, therefore, the largest
Japanese semiconductor producers are also, collectively, the largest
.-miconductor consumers.
All the principal semiconductor manufacturers, furthermore, display the
same structural pattern. All are very large, highly diversified firms. For
example in 1986, 35% of NEC's revenues of approximately $16 billion derived
from communications equipment, 39% derived from computers, 7% from home or
consumer electronics, and 19% derived from electronic devices (mostly
integrated circuits). In that year, NEC exported 32% of its total
production.4 5 Fujitsu, probably the least diversified of the major
semiconductor producers, derived 72% of its 1986 revenues of over $12
billion from computers, 16% from communications equipment, and 12% from
semiconductors; Fujitsu's export ratio was 22%.
In earlier years, of course, these firms were smaller; but they have
been highly diversified throughout the postwar period, and by the late 1970s
Japan's six largest semiconductor producers all had total corporate revenues
of $5 billion or more, not counting affiliated subcontractors,
unconsolidated partly owned subsidiaries, or other members of larger
industrial groups. By the mid-1980s, the smallest of the six, Fujitsu, had
annual revenues of over $12 billion; NEC's revenues were over $15 billion;
Hitachi and Matsushita's revenues were roughly $30 billion each. Together,
the same six producers have consistently accounted for over 80% of Japanese
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semiconductor production.
Furthermore, all sell semiconductors both internally to themselves and
to the market. Within Japan, all of the major producers buy from and sell
to each other; these cross-purchases are comparable in size to their
internal consumption. (Intra-Japanese purchases are and have always been
larger than imports.) All of the major producers now also export
semiconductors, though none of them exported at significant levels until the
late 1970s. All produce a wide variety of devices including commodities
such as DRAMs, SRAMs, and EPROMs. All of the largest four have long
produced microprocessors second-sourced, licensed, or copied from U.S.
architectures: Toshiba has used Zilog's designs and more recently has
licensed Motorola's, NEC and Fujitsu have used Intel's, Hitachi used
Motorola's. Fujitsu and NEC depended upon allegedly illegal copying for
their microprocessors.
Indeed, all have pursued essentially similar production and market
strategies. The Japanese industry developed through licensing and imitation
of U.S. architectures and products, followed by low-cost, low-price, high
quality mass production in their mature markets. As the Japanese industry
accumulated experience with complex devices and its process technology
reached parity with the merchant industry, the interval between U.S. design
innovation and imitative Japanese market entry shrank. By the early 1980s,
the Japanese industry had acquired market dominance and even innovation
leadership in commodities requiring advanced processing but simple design,
such as memories.
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As the Japanese industry gained in sophistication and size, it
continued its backward integration into capital equipment, materials, and
infrastructural activities such as clean room construction. Once again,
entry occurred either through direct backward integration by the producers
themselves, through their creation of closely linked firms, or through
cooperative arrangements with other large, diversified firms in relevant
technologies. For example, Fujitsu owns 22% of Advantest (test equipment),
NEC owns 50% of Ando (testers), and Hitachi owns Hitachi Electronic
Engineering (various products). NEC and Fujitsu manufacture their own
robots for semiconductor and computer production; Hitachi and Matsushita
manufacture their own automated assembly equipment; Toshiba and Hitachi
produce electron beam machines used both for semiconductor production and
for making masks, the blueprints for integrated circuits. Dai Nippon and
Toppan lead in maskmaking, Hoya and Shin-Etsu lead in production of mask
blanks, Canon and Nikon produce advanced optical lithography equipment,
Shimizu and Ohbayashi lead in high technology plant construction. As in
other sectors of Japanese industry, relationships between capital equipment
suppliers, manufacturers, and the government are extremely close. It is
commonplace for NTT R&D personnel to work in the facilities of firms
developing new products, for personnel from equipment suppliers to work
semi-permanently in users' factories, and for contractual relationships
between closely linked firms to be informal, fluid, and of long duration.
As with semiconductors themselves, these efforts in supporting
industries were heavily concentrated in a small number of firms, and
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independent startups were nonexistent. Once again, many of these efforts
originated through imports, imitation, and/or reverse engineering of U.S.
technology, followed by import substitution. And, again as with
semiconductor and systems production, the Japanese semiconductor equipment
industry was far more stable and concentrated than its U.S. counterpart.
For example, two firms (Nikon and Canon) account for over 90% of Japanese
optical lithography equipment production; two other firms (Advantest and
Ando) account for over 90% of Japanese production of automatic test
equipment.46
Concomitantly, Japanese production of semiconductors themselves
progressed from mature to state of the art technologies and devices. By the
early 1970s, the Japanese industry held over 20% of the world semiconductor
market, primarily through domestic sales of mature commodities (such as
linear circuits for consumer applications). By the mid-1970s, however,
Japanese production was already rapidly shifting from linear to digital
products, towards higher integration levels, and even in some cases towards
proprietary versus purely imitative designs. By the late 1970s, Japan had
reached parity with the merchant industry in manufacturing, exports began,
and Japan's share of the world market began to rise sharply.
By the mid-1980s, the Japanese industry dominated many commodity
markets, possessed superior process technology, clearly superior
manufacturing and quality control skills, and had reached near parity with
the merchants even in advanced design. By 1987, most of the major Japanese
firms were testing 6 MIPS, 20 MHz, proprietary 32 bit microprocessors based
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upon 1 micron CMOS technology, i.e. devices near or even at the
technological frontier.47 And, to anticipate somewhat, a similar trajectory
(from imitative manufacturing of mature products to proprietary technology)
is being employed in the Japanese industry's (i.e. these same firms') recent
entry into world markets for semiconductor intensive digital systems
products such as computers and telecommunications equipment.
This strategic development path possessed several noteworthy features.
One was that its success depended strongly upon favorable environmental
conditions not only in the Japanese semiconductor industry, but in the
Japanese and U.S. political and economic systems. In particular, the growth
and strategic conduct of the Japanese industry depended heavily upon massive
imports of American technology, upon the closure of the Japanese domestic
arena, and upon the absence of any American strategic response to Japanese
closure.
Japanese Closure: Structure, Strategic Behavior, and Government Policy
The closure of the Japanese high technology system included but was not
limited to closure, or strategic regulation, of the domestic market. During
the embryonic period of the Japanese industry, MITI exercised considerable
control over both foreign penetration and the activities of domestic firms,
for example via its power to grant or deny import licenses. Not only did
such licensing requirements restrict U.S. market penetration, they also
provided a means to influence the Japanese industry - by selectively
permitting imports of needed inputs such as capital equipment, while
108
simultaneously providing a coercive tool via the threat to open a market to
foreign competition.
However, Japanese closure also included and depended upon a variety of
other government policies and structural characteristics of the Japanese
economic system which made Japanese operations difficult for U.S. firms, and
particularly unpleasant for relatively small, undiversified, and/or unstable
firms with short time horizons. For example, asset markets widely open in
the United States (such as markets for experienced professional labor,
corporate control, capital, or university graduates) were either nonexistent
in Japan, or closed, or accessible only through persistent, long term
efforts. The market for corporate control was essentially nonexistent;
mergers and acquisitions were rare and never hostile, in part because a
large fraction of most important firms' equity was held by other firms in
their industrial group and their affiliated bank. These holdings rarely
changed hands. For example, the largest shareholders of NEC, a member of
the Sumitomo group, ranked as follows in 1986:48
Shareholder % ownership
Sumitomo Life Insurance 7.1
Sumitomo Bank 5.0
Sumitomo Trust 4.1
Nippon Life Insurance 3.1
Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance 2.9
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance 2.8
Sumitomo Electric 2.4
Sumitomo Corp. 2.3
Moreover, patterns of ownership unthinkable in the United States
supplement the cross-selling patterns discussed above in facilitating
communication and industrywide cohesion. A number of the largest Japanese
banks and insurance companies (a majority of them affiliated with one of the
109
six major keiretsu) hold substantial equity positions not just in one, but
in several, of the largest electronics producers. In 1986, for example,
Nippon Life not only held 3.1% of NEC but also 1.6% of Fujitsu, 3.9% of
Hitachi, 4.1% of Matsushita, 4.0% of Mitsubishi, 3.9% of Toshiba, and 5.9%
of Sharp. Sumitomo Life Insurance held not only 7.1% of NEC (the major
electronics producer in the Sumitomo group), but also 3.7% of Sharp and 4.6%
of Matsushita. Sumitomo Bank, in addition to holding 5.0% of NEC, also held
4.6% of Matsushita. Dai-Ichi Mutual Life, a member of the DKB industrial
group which includes Fujitsu, held not only 2.9% of NEC (see the table
above) but also 2.8% of Hitachi, 4.7% of Toshiba, 2.0% of Mitsubishi, and
6.0% of Oki. The Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) held 2.5% of Hitachi and
2.6% of Fujitsu. And in addition to direct equity positions, financial
institutions generally hold large loans outstanding to the major producers,
as Japanese industrial firms are highly leveraged, far more so than U.S.
firms.49
Moreover, these same financial institutions, together with the major
producers themselves, also hold large equity positions in the principal
firms in the support industry. This is true not only of the major producers
of semiconductor capital equipment mentioned above but for a wide array of
semiconductor related capital goods, materials, and services providers. For
example Fujitsu owns one quarter of Fanuc, a $2 billion firm which is
Japan's largest producer of industrial robots, and whose operations are
concentrated in the Mt. Fuji foothills near many of Fujitsu's. Or consider
Toshiba Ceramics, which in 1986 was Japan's fifth largest silicon wafer
producer, and which also produces other semiconductor materials such as
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quartz and ceramics. In 1986, Toshiba Ceramics' principal shareholders were
as follows: 50
Toshiba Corp. 50.2%
Sumitomo Trust Business Dept. 2.6
Mitsui Trust 2.6
Yamagata Bank 2.5
Toyo Trust 1.6
Nippon Life 1.1
Daiwa Bank Annuity 1.1
Or consider Hitachi Chemical, a $2 billion chemicals firm, over 40% of
whose revenue derives from electronic parts and materials. In 1986 Hitachi
Chemical's largest shareholders were Hitachi Ltd. (55.6%), Nippon Life
(2.9%), Sanwa Bank (2.6%), Fuji Bank (2.6%), Toyo Trust (2.3%), Industrial
Bank of Japan (2.2%), Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank (2.1%), Dai-ichi Mutual Life
(1.6%), and Yasuda Trust (1.5%). Hitachi Cable, to consider one final
example, is a $1.5 billion producer of wires, cables, semiconductor
leadframe materials, optical fibers, and gallium arsenide, 11% of whose
revenue derives from sales to Hitachi. 51 In 1986 Hitachi Cable's largest
shareholders were Hitachi Ltd. (52.3%), Nippon Life (2.2%), Meiji Mutual
Life Insurance (2.0%), Sanwa Bank (1.9%), Dai-ichi Mutual Life (1.7%), Toyo
Trust (1.3%), and Daiwa Bank Annuity (1.2%). (Notice the common minority
ownership between the Hitachi and Toshiba affiliates. In .addition, Dai-ichi
Kangyo Bank and Dai-ichi Mutual Life, which both hold minority positions in
both Hitachi Chemical and Hitachi Cable, are members of the DKB group which
includes Fujitsu.) Nor are these examples exceptional. Each of the major
producers has several dozen consolidated and unconsolidated affiliates in
whom it owns at least a substantial interest, and often the firm's
competitors or members of competitors's larger groups hold a minority
interest in the same firm. 52 And, as I indicated earlier, these firms often
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forward personnel to each others' plants, engage in cooperative R&D, and
have close R&D and/or procurement relationships with NTT.
A different, but related and equally powerful, set of norms and
structures inhibited independent personnel mobility and thereby both
prevented U.S. firms from effective recruiting and prevented the formation
of independent startups. Japanese lifetime employment policies, as nearly
uniformly practiced by the major electronics firms (though not their
subcontractors), implied that choice of an employer by new graduates was
essentially a one-time, lifelong decision. Consequently the established
strength and long run prospects of prospective employers were far more
important than in the United States. Given my earlier description of the
dynamics of the U.S. semiconductor industry, it is hardly surprising that
Japanese graduates did not find merchant firms desirable employers, even
when the merchants were sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the system.
Moreover, university recruiting often depended upon long term relationships
between firms and senior faculty members who exercised considerable
influence over the decisions of students. U.S. merchants, of course, had no
such relationships upon first entering the Japanese arena.
Finally, the internal norms and strategic density of the Japanese arena
effectively prevented U.S. entrants from hiring experienced personnel from
Japanese firms. Japanese firms reacted strongly when any such attempts were
made, and the degree of concentration and vertical integration of the
Japanese industry implied that U.S. firms were highly vulnerable to such
intervention. Given the structure of Japanese civil society, so were
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employees themselves; and even in the late 1980s, defections from major
Japanese firms remain quite rare (although they are increasing). This
immobility is not simply because Japanese firms are kind, benevolent
employers; it also derives from the fact that independent new venture
funding is difficult to obtain, and that in Japan, attempted defection can
be a very painful experience.
In 1987, for example, I interviewed a Japanese defector, D., whose
motives for leaving his company included an unusual personal and familial
history of linkages with the United States. 53 In his youth D. had travelled
widely, obtained an advanced degree from an elite American university, and
worked in the United States before returning to Japan upon accepting an
offer from the research division of a large Japanese electronics firm, J.
After several quite successful years at J., D. decided in the early 1980s
that he wanted to leave, in part so that he could have further contact with
the United States. Knowing that no other Japanese firm would hire him,
particularly if he expressed an interest in working in the United States, he
solicited offers from U.S. firms. Several firms expressed interest and
sympathy but declined to make offers; finally, IBM offered D. an attractive
position in the United States, and he notified J. of his intention to leave.
Upon receiving notice from D., J. at first made exceptionally generous
counteroffers. When these were declined, however, D.'s managers at J. spoke
to his parents, his wife, his wife's family, his friends, his coworkers, and
his former university professors, asking that they persuade D. to
reconsider. J. also approached IBM directly, at high levels. After six
months of discussions, IBM withdrew its offer. Only after a considerable
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period did D. secure a position with his current employer, another large
U.S. firm.
In recent years, Japanese employment norms have come under increasing
stress, and they may someday weaken substantially. For example,
overcapacity in mature export sectors such as the steel industry has
recently created substantial pressure on the lifetime employment system, and
upon the ability of Japanese firms to credibly guarantee employment
security. The increasing value of the yen is also forcing Japanese firms to
shift capacity, contracting, and personnel to other nations. But during the
formative period of the Japanese industry, these norms clearly operated
quite strongly, and in growing sectors they continue to do so. The barrier
to Japanese operations, and/or market penetration, presented to unstable
U.S. firms with short time horizons was therefore formidable. This shifted
the incentives of U.S. merchants and equipment firms away from direct market
penetration or political pressure and towards the sale of technology,
knowledge, and intellectual property rights.
Closure, Technology Extraction, and Learning
Until the early 1980s, Japanese producers depended very heavily upon
American capital equipment, most of which they simply purchased and
imported, some of which they also reverse engineered. They also depended
heavily upon American product designs, which they licensed, reverse
engineered, or directly copied. Their ability to extract technology and
collectively protect their domestic market both depended heavily upon
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Japan's high degree of strategic coordination and closure relative to the
U.S. industry. Otherwise, technology embargoes by the U.S. industry,
political pressure, direct U.S. investment, and/or cheating by Japanese
firms might have been employed to increase American penetration into the
Japanese arena, causing strategic disruption which might have proved fatal
to the later growth of the Japanese industry.
However, I will argue below that the combination of oligopoly, partial
strategic coordination, and national protectionism did not lessen
competitive discipline or performance incentives to improve within the
developing Japanese industry. To the contrary, in combination with the long
time horizons, pressure for long term coexistence with competitors and the
requirement to provide partly captive, domestic production yielded extreme
incentives for improvement. One reason for this was that semiconductors
were inputs to other products which faced international competition and
which were the semiconductor producers' principal source of revenue. If
anything, the strategic concentration and vertical integration of the
Japanese arena thereby increased effective competitive discipline. Each
major firm possessed internal capabilities with which the vendors linked to
competitors were forced to compete, and these internal capabilities deterred
suppliers from exercising market power. Collectively, furthermore, Japanese
semiconductor suppliers and users depended upon competitive semiconductor
technology to compete in export markets for final goods.
Indeed, there was mounting evidence of rapid Japanese progress even
before Japan entered world semiconductor markets. As early as 1971, a
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publicly available study (Tilton's "The International Diffusion of
Technology: The Case of Semiconductors") indicated clearly that the
Japanese industry was reducing its lag relative to world standards.
Tilton's study demonstrated that the Japanese industry exhibited strong
barriers to entry, that it depended upon technology imports, and that its
technical practice had surpassed Europe's. Tilton concluded that the U.S.
industry's lead relative to Japan, as measured by lags between U.S.
innovation and Japanese adoption of critical technologies, had declined over
the prior decade to about one year (versus a three year U.S. lead relative
to Europe).
Hence the growth and success of Japanese semiconductor production was
substantial, despite the fact that the Japanese industry differed from the
American in virtually every conceivable respect, and despite the fact that
it depended heavily upon strategic arrangements generally considered, at
least in neoclassical economics, to reduce efficiency. Moreover, the
rapidity and strength of the Japanese industry's export drive beginning in
the late 1970s, and the equally rapid decline of the U.S. industry, were
striking even by the standards of troubled U.S. sectors such as the
automobile industry. Whereas prior to the late 1970s Japan's share of world
semiconductor markets had remained at 20 - 25 percent for a decade, between
1978 and 1986 Japan's share of the world market nearly doubled.
In large part, these developments arose from strategic and
institutional forces analyzed below. However, a major reason for the timing
and suddenness of Japan's entry into international competition in
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semiconductors was technological. Very Large Scale Integration, a family of
technologies ironically developed almost entirely within the United States,
doomed the classical merchant industry by vastly increasing the scale,
scope, vertical coordination requirements, and initial costs of
semiconductor production. The nature of VLSI technology was such that its
arrival presented Japanese electronics firms simultaneously with large
opportunities and deep threats. The implicit bargain by which the Japanese
and American industries had coexisted previously, i.e. American technology
exports and acquiescence to Japanese closure in return for Japan's absence
from international markets, was destined to end.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. As recently as 1980, Japan imported two-thirds of its capital
equipment requirements, at a time when imports of semiconductors
themselves had already declined to less than a quarter of Japanese
consumption.
2. Semiconductor imports were subject to severe formal
restrictions until 1975, and are still restricted in practice through
a combination of government and industrial practices. Direct
foreignn investment, once explicitly prohibited, is now increasingly
common, though a joint venture with a local producer is usually a
practical necessity. Texas Instruments was granted exceptional
permission to establish a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary, at a time
when TI had leverage through its possession of critical patents. As
a condition for entry, TI was required by MITI to license its patents
to the entire Japanese industry, which it did, and to restrict itself
to a small fraction of the Japanese market. This latter condition
proved very easy for TI to meet.
3. U.S. integrated circuit imports from Japan were less than $50
million in 1977. In 1984, they. were over $1.1 billion. Source:
U.S. Industrial Outlook, U.S. Department of Commerce, various years.
4. Dataquest Corp. For Japanese data, BA Asia Ltd., "The
Japanese Semiconductor Industry," 1980 and 1982.
5. The identities and rank order of the principal Japanese
semiconductor producers have remained extremely stable. In contrast,
market leadership changed hands repeatedly in the U.S. industry. For
market share data, see Dataquest and BA Asia Ltd.
6. BA Asia Ltd., op. cit. See also M. Borrus, J. Millstein, and
J. Zysman, "Trade and Development in the Semiconductor Industry," in
J. Zysman & L. Tyson (eds.), "American Industry in International
Competition," Cornell University Press, 1983.
7. Company annual reports; Dodwell, "Industrial Groupings in
Japan" and "Key Players in the Japanese Electronics Industry,"
Various years; Japan Company Handbook, various years.
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8. Semiconductor industry statistics are notoriously uncertain,
and captive production is difficult to estimate precisely because
captives rarely disclose production information, and because their
production is not sold competitively. However, fairly reliable
estimates of captive production have been constructed. IBM is the
largest captive by far with worldwide production of $4 billion.
Other major captives are AT&T, GM/Delco, Hewlett-Packard, and DEC.
Estimates for captive production are those of Dataquest, ICE Corp.,
and the author. Estimates for merchant production are those of
Dataquest.
9. For extended descriptions of U.S. merchant industry behavior,
see Ferguson, op. cit., and E. Braun & S. Macdonald, "Revolution In
Miniature," 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1984, particularly
chapter 10.
10. Dataquest; company annual reports. See also Chase
Econometrics, "The U.S. and Japanese Semiconductor Industries: A
Financial Comparison," commissioned by the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry Association, 1980.
11. For information regarding turnover in the U.S. industry, see:
Braun & Macdonald, op. cit., particularly pp. 132 ff.; for
industrywide statistics, see the surveys of the American Electronics
Association. The author has also gathered proprietary information
from industry sources.
12. For discussion of the U.S. industry's fragmentation and
instability, see Braun & Macdonald, op. cit., particularly p. 123 for
the evanescence of market leadership; Ferguson, op. cit.; and, for
concentration ratios, U.S. Industrial Outlook (1986), p. 32-3.
13. IBM was among the first, if not the first, to produce
semiconductor memories and use memories (of its own manufacture) in
computers in the early 1970s, and also developed elaborate testing
and packaging technologies in the same decade - for example Level
Sensitive Scan Design (LSSD) and Thermal Conduction Modules. AT&T
has been a technology leader throughout the industry's history. And
as early as 1971, there existed a public study (J. Tilton, "The
International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of Semiconductors,"
Brookings, 1971) which suggested that the Japanese industry was
rapidly closing on the U.S. industry. By the mid-1970s, Japanese
practice was less than a year behind the U.S. industry in most
technologies.
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14. Statistical data are taken from company reports; Dodwell, op.
cit.; VLSI Research Inc., a U.S. market research firm covering the
semiconductor equipment industry; the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "A
Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing
Equipment Industry," 1985. Assessments of supplier - customer
relationships and comparative technological strength are derived from
confidential industry and government sources. Considerable effort
has been devoted to these questions.
15. VLSI Research; S.E.M.I.; Dataquest; and company reports.
16. SEMI membership data.
17. SEMI membership data.
18. See Gerald Brock, "The Telecommunications Industry," Harvard
University Press, 1981, particularly chapter 6.
19. Ibid.
20. For two pertinent histories, see AT&T, "A History of Engineering
and Science in the Bell System," volume 2 ("National Service in War and
Peace, 1925 - 1975"); and Herman Goldstine, "The Computer from Pascal to Von
Neuman," Princeton.
21. See Braun & Macdonald, chs. 3 - 5.
22. Ibid.
23. See Brock, "The Telecommunications Industry," ch. 7.
24. Source for market rank is Dataquest Semiconductor Industry
Service, 1986.
25. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
rasnational Corporations in the International Semiconductor Industry,"
-New York: United Nations, 1986, p. 209.
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26. Personal interviews. Several executives have reported to me that
they consciously consider the likelihood that R&D investments will be
appropriable, and that dealing with potential defections both raises the
cost, and lowers the real quantity, of corporate R&D activities. However,
this is a difficult matter to quantify.
27. Venture Economics, Inc., "Trends in Venture Capital,' 1985
(annual), p. 99.
28. Ibid, p. 100.
29. Fairchild and National Semiconductor were particularly well known
for having extremely ungenerous attitudes towards employees. They also had
very high turnover rates. Fairchild spawned more startups than any other
firm of its size.
30. New York Times, October 10, 1987, p. 46.
31. This term refers to the re-implementation of an existing product
using smaller design rules, permitted by advancing lithography. This makes
the device smaller, hence less expensive, and also faster, hence more
attractive.
32. Dataquest, 1986.
33. Company annual reports and product literature describe the
products and technologies made available to Toshiba by LSI Logic,
particularly the LDS computer aided design system. Toshiba supplies
process technology in return, but not processing hardware or
training. Confidential industry interviews have indicated that the
competition between the two companies is quite fierce.
34. New York Times, July 15, 1985, from Dataquest data.
35. Dataquest, 1985. For Kawasaki Steel, personal communication. For
Motorola's agreement with Toshiba, confidential interviews.
36. Dataquest; confidential interviews.
37. Confidential interviews, senior Intel employees.
38. Confidential interviews, Intel personnel.
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39. See William G. Egelhoff, "The U.S. and Japanese Microelectronics
Industries: Two Different Strategies for Competition," draft, Center for
Science and Technology Policy, New York University, February 1986, for a
discussion of Japanese firms' use of direct, cost-based competition versus
the merchants' retreat into niches.
40. Personal interviews, current and former Intel employees.
41. For accounts of the European market see E. Sciberras,
"Multinational Electronics Companies and National Economic Policies," JAI
Press, 1977; and Franco Malerba, "The Semiconductor Business," University of
Wisconsin Press, 1985.
42. Braun & Macdonald, 2nd ed., p. 157.
43. For trade data, see Dept. of Commerce, "U.S. Industrial Outlook,"
various years; and U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment,
"International Competition in Electronics," 1983.
44. See Tilton, p. 138 ff., for exact dates.
45. Japan Company Handbook, 1986, p. 618, plus corporate annual
reports.
46. VLSI Research, Inc., 1986.
47. Personal interviews, Japan, 1987.
48. See Japan Company Handbook, First Section Firms, 1986, esp. Heavy
Electric Machinery section.
49. See Flaherty & Itami's contribution to "Competitive Edge" for a
discussion of the sources of funds for Japanese versus U.S. firms.
50. Japan Company Handbook, First Section Firms, 1986, p. 405.
51. Japan Company Handbook, 1986, p. 494.
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52. Dodwell's provides the most comprehensive survey of these
relationships available in English.
53. Minor details have been concealed or changed. The major elements
of this episode, however, have not been altered.
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CHAPTER THREE
DESTABILIZATION: VLSI AND GLOBAL COMPETITION
1. Technological Pressure: The Advent of VLSI
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) is a technology family defined by
high integration levels (100,000 to 10 million transistors per circuit) and
demanding process technology. Advanced VLSI permits the single circuit
implementation, mass production, and low cost sale of digital systems which
would have been implemented as room-size, million dollar machines three
decades ago. VLSI's novel requirements and capabilities favored Japanese
industrial strategies relative to the American merchant regime, and also
forced Japan to intensify its semiconductor development efforts. VLSI in
fact placed extreme pressures upon both the classical merchant industry
equilibrium and upon the delicate bargain which had previously kept the
peace in international markets. Future developments associated with Ultra
Large Scale Integration (ULSI), synchrotron based X-ray lithography, and
possibly wafer scale technologies in the 1990s will probably intensify these
pressures yet further.
We have seen that during the period of American dominance which
persisted until roughly 1980, the merchant industry grew rapidly both
technologically and economically, but without fundamental change in its
pattern of disaggregated, innovative, but inefficient entrepreneurialism.
Individual firms and product families came and went with generational
transitions, but the general characteristics of the merchant sector and its
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world economy sufficiently to render it an attractive strategic target. By
1980 world semiconductor sales neared $15 billion, and it appeared that by
1990 they would reach $50 billion. The direction of technology also implied
that much of this growth would occur through the substitution of VLSI for
more traditional technologies, both electronic and mechanical, and that
advanced VLSI would become increasingly critical to success in mass
production industries such as consumer electronics. At the same time as
this reduced the significance of the American military in financing
technological change and production experience, it induced Japan's large and
vertically integrated electronics firms, in conjunction with the Japanese
government, to initiate ambitious programs for the development of VLSI
technology and products.
Furthermore, the particulars of the technology became relatively more
favorable to Japanese as opposed to American strategies, production systems,
and markets. In fact, technological progress was the fundamental source of
the industry's sudden strategic destabilization, globalization, and emerging
structural transformation. Its direction strongly favors large industrial
complexes over unstable entrepreneurs. Though large infusions of venture
capital in the early 1980s temporarily masked this trend in the United
States industry (and thereby worsened the subsequent shock), it is now
generally acknowledged to be a critical determinant of the industry's
future. New microelectronics technologies (VLSI and beyond) are deeply,
inherently incompatible with the merchant strategic regime whose decay we
are now witnessing. This incompatibility has two closely related sources,
namely VLSI product capabilities and process technologies respectively.
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Consider product technology first. VLSI initiated the forced merger of
device design and system design, which had formerly been distinct activities
carried out by different industrial sectors (and therefore, in the United
States, by different firms). This was a straightforward consequence of
achievable integration levels, and of the fact that communication within a
chip is (and has always been) faster and much less expensive than
communication between chips. Crudely speaking a VLSI device is any circuit
with at least 100,000 transistors on it. Current VLSI circuits, many of
which have over 500,000 transistors, have capabilities several hundred times
greater than the most advanced circuits of 1970. Furthermore, such
integration levels increasingly invite the implementation of major
subsystems or even entire systems on a single integrated circuit.
Motorola's and Intel's 32 bit microprocessor families, for example, include
not only single-circuit 32 bit CPUs rated at several million instructions
per second but also single-chip coprocessors and peripherals such as
floating point processors, graphics controllers, memory management units,
and input/output controllers. The MC68020 microprocessor circuit, priced at
less than a hundred dollars, has the complexity and power of a 1970
mainframe CPU costing perhaps a million dollars. The same underlying forces
transformed custom and semicustom logic, greatly increasing their
importance. It is now possible to design and implement major custom
functions using single circuits containing 100,000 logic gates, sometimes in
as little as two weeks.
When circuits become systems to this degree, circuit design and
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performance become closely coupled to a multitude of complementary systems
products and to strategic decisions formerly of concern only to downstream
firms. The design of microprocessors, for example, now requires
consideration of interactions with coprocessors, peripherals, and systems
software products which reach the machine level (e.g. development systems,
operating systems, and compilers), as well as compatibility with earlier
product generations. This in turn implies rising integration requirements
between semiconductor and systems design, and far closer coupling between
VLSI device design and final market requirements.
For example, microprocessor design and production decisions now have
extremely strong implications for the market possibilities of systems based
upon them. These implications range from the strictly technical
determinants of performance - efficiency in data management versus
scientific applications, virtual memory support, etc. - to those involving
the more general development of business strategy over the life cycle of a
product family. Systems firms ranging from Apple to Sun to IBM are now
critically dependent upon the migration paths and improvement rates of
microprocessor families, and upon the continued strength of their vendor /
designers.
Uncertainty, delay, or inappropriate design on the part of the
microprocessor supplier passes through directly to the systems business;
users of Intel 432, Zilog Z8000, and MOS Technology 6502 processors have
discovered this the hard way. The Intel 432 failed to develop a large
installed base, as a consequence of its unorthodox architecture; Zilog has
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failed to develop successor products for the Z8000, now nearly obsolete; and
MOS Technology went bankrupt, resulting in a decade of delay before the
Western Design Center produced a successor for the 8-bit processor used in
the Apple 2. Furthermore, the power of circuits to act as systems produces
strategic interactions previously seen only in the computer market, for
example the rise of PCM competition. NEC has developed processors
compatible with Intel's; Hitachi and Signetics have developed Motorola-
compatible processors; and even Zilog's early Z80 was compatible with
Intel's 8080 device.
Nor are these interactions limited to microprocessor families. They
also operate strongly in other VLSI logic markets - in areas such as LAN
controllers or signal processing circuits, ASICs such as standard-cell or
compiled logic, and in emerging markets for Semi-Standard Logic (SSL). It
has been reported, for example, that IBM's token-ring LAN efforts were
delayed by Texas Instruments' problems in design and production of the five
VLSI circuits which control the network. Indeed it was the power presented
by VLSI devices which led to the rapid growth of these new product markets
and of application-specific circuit design by end-users. Largely as a
consequence of VLSI's functional power, application specific markets are
expected to increase from one sixth of total IC markets in 1980 to one
quarter by 1990.
The availability of VLSI devices also, therefore, intensified the
destabilization of downstream industries by permitting digitization of
previously analog systems, which frequently led to novel functionalities
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and/or redefinition of industry boundaries. To mention one major example,
the rate of digitization of telecommunications, and therefore its
convergence with computing, is a function of progress in microelectronics,
and secondarily photonics, technologies. Other affected sectors include
various office automation markets (publishing, facsimile), consumer
electronics, industrial automation, military electronics, and - quite
importantly - microelectronics itself.
For several years it has been evident that VLSI-based electronics are
increasingly critical to the cost and performance of a wide variety of
systems. At the same time, VLSI devices eliminated the formerly clear
distinction between general-purpose commodities produced by merchants, on
the one hand, and special purpose logic produced by captives, on the other.
This distinction was replaced by a continuum ranging from specialized, high
performance devices (say, a custom signal processor) to specialized
"standard" logic (say, a one-chip Fast Fourier Transform) to general purpose
devices such as microprocessors whose flexibility resulted in reduced
performance for any specific application. A correspondingly broad spectrum
of design strategies, process technologies, and cost tradeoffs came into
existence as a result. Consequently merchant and captive production became
increasingly similar - and therefore competitive. Concomitantly, logic
markets became increasingly dominated by system-level performance and
strategic considerations, rather than the narrow calculus of switching
speeds and unit costs of otherwise identical commodity components which
dominated the formative period of the American merchant regime.
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VLSI memory devices, conversely, remain primarily general purpose
commodities. Current markets for circuits such as DRAMs, EPROMs, or static
RAMs, superficially resemble traditional markets because competitive
advantage is based upon the same general product characteristics: being
first to market, price competitiveness, product reliability, and sometimes
device speed or power consumption. Nonetheless these advanced commodities
and their potentially huge markets (MOS memory markets, $5 billion in 1984,
may reach $20 billion by 1990) have been as profoundly affected by VLSI as
systems-level logic markets. This is a consequence of the fact that
competitive advantage in memory markets requires extremely high quality,
efficient manufacturing. Required capabilities include not only mass
production but also flexibility in rapidly switching production to match
demand, automated testing of a complex product mix, and device specific
error analysis and correction (e.g. through laser trimming of defective
memory cells).
In short, VLSI fabrication is becoming one of the world's most
expensive, complex, and capital-intensive technologies; it is no longer a
garment industry analogue in which competitive advantage can be obtained by
paying Salvadoran or Indonesian women thirty cents an hour. This is one of
several transformations in VLSI process technology whose effects (on both
memory and logic production) are arguably as important as those deriving
from the power of VLSI products themselves.
VLSI process technologies
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The entire VLSI technology cycle and value chain (R&D, design,
fabrication, assembly, testing, and marketing) increasingly displays several
characteristics never seen in American microelectronics before 1980. First,
advanced VLSI is an extremely capital intensive, high fixed cost business.
Minimum efficient scale and initial cost requirements have escalated at an
astonishing rate; a world-class plant now costs over $250 million, a tenfold
increase since 1975. As a consequence, capital expenditures by American
merchants increased from six percent of revenues in 1974 to twenty percent
in 1984.1 (Japanese capital expenditures, however, rose from six percent to
twenty-eight percent of revenues during the same period. 2 ) Product design
costs have escalated correspondingly. As lithography continues to improve,
device densities rise, and the economically optimal power and complexity of
circuits continually increases, the cost and complexity of system and
circuit design are becoming ever larger considerations. The currently
reported cost of designing a 32 bit microprocessor chip set is now over $50
million. The cost of developing a new generation of process technology has
escalated similarly. Intel reportedly spent over $75 million between 1986
and 1988 to develop its 1-micron CMOS process. 3 DEC reportedly maintains
two permanent CMOS development teams, operating in parallel on staggered 4-
year development schedules, with each team cycle costing about $40 million.
Moreover, similar transformations overtook many capital equipment and
services markets, albeit at lesser absolute scale in most cases. The
capital investment required to establish an efficient-scale maskmaking
operation, for example, increased from roughly $2 million in 1975 to $15
million presently. This was largely the result of the crossover from
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$250,000 optical systems, which fail below 2 micron geometries, to computer-
driven electron beam systems and laser based defect removal systems which
can resolve submicron geometries but which cost $3.5 million each.
Development and manufacturing in areas such as electron beam direct write
systems, precision lasers, direct steppers, integrated computer control
systems, and automatic testers are now capital intensive systems processes
unto themselves. Product development costs for capital goods frequently
exceed $20 million and continue to increase.
Furthermore, as geometries continue to shrink, extreme precision and
cleanliness become critical not only in semiconductor fabrication but
throughout the capital equipment and services sectors. As these
requirements increase, so do capital and fixed costs; and high precision,
high purity manufacturing environments are inherently expensive. So are
products suited to such environments. Consequently, the average unit costs
of semiconductor capital equipment have increased sharply since the arrival
of VLSI. Consider the following data:
Average Unit Selling Prices of Semiconductor Capital Equipment,
1977 - 1983, In Thousands of Dollars, and CAGR in Percent
1977 1983 CAGR
Wafer Exposure Equip. 51 563 49
Automatic Test Equip. 125 405 22
Assembly Equip. 10 47 31
Source: VLSI Research, Inc. (1986), Table 2.1.2-4
At the same time, the qualitative characteristics and integration
requirements of semiconductor processing have radically changed. VLSI
technologies are now systems-intensive, highly automated, and heavily
dependent upon other high technology, electronics-intensive sectors which,
as indicated above, are themselves increasingly automated, systems-
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intensive, and capital-intensive. This has two principal results. The
first is that firms must increasingly view semiconductor processing as an
integrated, computer-controlled process rather than a succession of disjoint
steps. The entire sequence of design, tooling, fabrication, and testing
processes are increasingly automated, computer-controlled, and linked by
information systems and robotic cassette-to-cassette materials handling
systems. Computer control and the rise of Application Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASICs) have produced intense pressure to employ low-inventory,
rapid-turnaround techniques with which Japanese producers are far more
experienced than merchant firms. (Some ASIC vendors now provide fabricated,
tested products within two weeks of their design by customers.) These
fabrication conditions place great pressure on yields, inventory reduction,
and capacity utilization. These pressures make Just-In-Time and low-defect,
low-testing production strategies highly attractive. These techniques,
however, require a skilled and stable workforce, close supplier
relationships, and integration of the entire production process.
Relatedly, VLSI processing requirements - like VLSI products - have
increased the interdependence of the semiconductor, equipment, and computer
systems sectors. Computer systems and software for CAD, process control and
testing are now a substantial portion of semiconductor capital spending.
These products, of course, are in turn heavily dependent on electronics and
computer systems themselves, and therefore on VLSI circuits. Hence just as
VLSI technology destabilized downstream sectors, it also destabilized
itself. VLSI products became so complex that expensive systems were
required for design and testing; the scale, complexity, and fragility of
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VLSI processing invited VLSI-based automation, which increased scale and
integration economies even further.
Those who can most readily transfer and coordinate employees,
technologies, knowledge, and resources between semiconductor and systems
operations are thus heavily favored. It is therefore unsurprising, for
example, that the manager of Hitachi's 32-bit microprocessor development
efforts was formerly a technical manager in Hitachi's computer division; or
that IBM and Intel cross-licensed their CAD, packaging, and microprocessor
technologies. To the contrary, the great puzzle posed by the advent of
VLSI, and one to which I return below, lies in the failure of most of the
U.S. industry (including many consumers) to act in the manner obviously
favored by technological requirements.
Implications
Even in the absence of large-scale Japanese entry, the economics of
VLSI would have gradually forced structural change in American semiconductor
production. VLSI technology was incompatible with the merchant strategic
regime in several respects. First, the extreme vertical and functional
disaggregation of production was incompatible with growing system
integration requirements. Second, the strong centrifugal forces
contributing to horizontal disaggregation and domination of innovation by
small firms was incompatible with an industry characterized by extreme scale
economies and by high initial and fixed costs of design, training, and
facility construction. And third, the emergence of novel VLSI logic
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technologies eroded the previously clean distinction between commodity
merchant producers and custom captive producers.
VLSI therefore posed both large problems and opportunities for Japanese
producers. It represented a potentially threatening generational change in
a technology critical to export markets. As we noted earlier, VLSI makes
possible the digitization of previously analog systems and offers radically
novel functionalities. By the mid-1980s, for example, nearly all newly
introduced consumer electronics products - VCRs, compact disk players,
digital audio tape systems, high definition televisions - already depended
heavily upon VLSI microelectronics. Continued American dominance of this
technology would therefore put Japan's export position in downstream sectors
at risk. Conversely, Japan already led the United States in technology
transfer, manufacturing automation, high quality mass production, and
robotics. This strength, together with the potentially large size of VLSI
markets, led naturally to a strategy of developing VLSI capabilities in
order simultaneously to displace American merchants in commodity
semiconductor markets and preserve competitive advantage in electronics-
intensive downstream markets.
In what follows, I therefore describe and analyze the relative
performance of the U.S. and Japanese industries in the new era of
international competition. First I will discuss the evidence for, and the
detailed structure of, Japanese ascendency in semiconductor technology and
markets. Then I will consider alternative explanations for the comparative
structure, conduct, and performance of the Japanese and American
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semiconductor industries, and of the industry's international competitive
system taken as a whole. My argument will be that although the Japanese
industry certainly benefited from favorable economic conditions of the
traditional sort (lower labor and capital costs), structural and strategic
forces were the primary locomotive of international competitive performance;
and indeed strategic variables affected even the traditional economic
variables.
2. Competitive Decline
Introduction
Upon the advent of VLSI and the Japanese industry's attainment of
world-class manufacturing capability, Japanese firms directly attacked the
U.S. industry in world markets, forcing the globalization of the industry
and bringing the formerly independent paths of the two national sectors into
direct conflict. The subsequent decade has seen the decay of the
traditional U.S. industry and the beginning of a new strategic system, one
which retains specifically national components but which is both more
globally integrated and increasingly dominated by Japan. The remainder of
this chapter considers the nature and extent of U.S. decline since the onset
of global competition.
Aggregate Measures and Market Shares
Whereas the world market shares held by the Japanese and U.S.
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semiconductor industries remained roughly constant for fifteen years prior
to the late 1970s, they have shifted dramatically since the advent of VLSI.
Using one Dataquest time series 4 (the usual warnings regarding semiconductor
market statistics apply), the world market shares of the leading
semiconductor producing regions evolved as follows between 1970 and 1979:
World Semiconductor Market Shares, Excluding U.S. Captives
U.S.A. Europe Japan
1970 56.5 16.1 27.1
1974 62.3 16.3 20.7
1977 60.0 14.2 25.6
1979 60.9 13.2 25.6
The statistical uncertainties notwithstanding, it seems clear that no
dramatic shifts in market performance were evident prior to the late 1970s
or early 1980s. But when the Japanese industry entered international
competition, its rise (and the concomitant U.S. decline) was far more rapid
than the competitive reversals suffered by other declining U.S. industries
(steel, automobiles, textiles, etc.). In 1979, the Japanese semiconductor
industry held roughly 26 percent of the world semiconductor market. By
1982, it had slightly more than a third; by 1985, about 40 percent; and by
1987, about 50 percent (in dollar terms). American producers' share of the
world market, conversely, dropped from over 60 percent to about 40 percent
between 1978 and presently. (Europeans' market share fared even worse,
declining from over 15 percent to less than 10 percent of the world market.)
During the same period, Japan's share of world semiconductor capital
equipment markets rose from approximately 10 to 35 percent.5 Furthermore,
Japanese growth and American deterioration are probably more severe than
these aggregate statistics indicate. American deterioration is occurring
most rapidly in some of the most advanced and important markets and
technologies, and includes R&D for future technology generations as well as
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current performance. Let us begin by considering recent world and regional
semiconductor market share estimates for Japanese producers over the last
eight years:
Japanese Semiconductor Industry Market Shares by Region, 1978-1985
Year N.America W. Europe Japan ROW World
1978 2 2 80 25 28
1982 12 7 87 35 35
1985 15 12 89 46 41
Note: numbers approximate. Sources: author's estimates; Dataquest;
Semiconductor Industry Association; New York Times, various issues.
Since 1985, furthermore, the U.S. industry has continued to lose market
share rapidly, at least in dollar terms. Given that Japan now (in 1987)
supplies over 90 percent of its own market while holding about 25 percent of
America's, trade deficits are to be expected. The bilateral U.S.-Japan
trade balance in integrated circuits broke even early in the decade; in 1983
the deficit reached $355 million, and in 1984 it rose to $917 million; in
1985 it declined to about $500 million, primarily as a consequence of weak
U.S. semiconductor demand. (In 1982 the U.S. - Japanese trade balance in
computers and peripherals also turned negative.) Relative to Japan, the
U.S. is now a major net importer not only of dynamic and static RAMs, the
products most commonly mentioned, but also EPROMs and ROMs (-$105 million in
1984) and microprocessors (-$52 million in 1984).
Now, consider compound annual growth rates (hereafter, CAGRs) for
Japanese versus U.S. production in various technology categories. The
newest, most important, highest growth technology families are precisely
those in which Japanese advantage and market share growth are greatest:
Comparative CAGR, Shipments by Region, 1974-1984, in Percent
Category N.America Japan
All semiconductors 14.3 21.0
Integrated circuits 18.9 30.9
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MOS integrated circuits 24.0 37.5
CMOS integrated circuits 31.6 62.5
Source: Dataquest Corp. (1985).
Since CMOS-based products, which already account for roughly 40 percent
of MOS integrated circuit production, are expected to account for over 60
percent of all MOS production by the early 1990s, these growth rate
differences are of nontrivial importance. Even the aggregate statistics,
then, indicate a major and still-continuing transformation of competitive
advantage in Japan's favor.
Furthermore, the observed pattern of development indicates a high
standard of sophistication and foresight in strategic planning within the
Japanese industry. The successive phases of Japanese VLSI technology
development and market penetration systematically coincide with the probable
future course of structural change in the technology base requirements,
capabilities, and uses of advanced microelectronics. The Japanese
technological effort is riding two wavefronts simultaneously. The first,
whose technical description is beyond the scope of this essay, is the
careful use of the processing / product cycle both within and across
technology generations. This cycle involves commencing with memory and/or
other mass produced products of simple or standardized design, using these
as process technology drivers to optimize design rules and fabrication
technologies, and proceeding to more design-intensive circuits. By the
early 1980s, massive Japanese investments in this strategy had already
denied important scale economies and learning to the American industry, even
on the assumption that the U.S. industry would otherwise have obtained or
used such benefits.
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The second trend exploited by Japanese producers concerns large scale,
long run trends in microelectronics technology. Japanese penetration of
successive markets has followed the Japanese industry's increasing
sophistication, and the growth of Japanese expertise has rationally followed
the expected direction of technological change, particularly as regards the
role of microelectronics in large downstream industries. Japanese market
penetration began with DRAMs, then with more complex memories such as static
RAMs and EPROMs, then licensed microprocessors, and is finally progressing
to ASICs, proprietary architectures, and custom devices. Not
coincidentally, the world is between an era dominated by conventional
integrated circuits (which from the point of view of downstream industries
are essentially commodities) and one in which advanced microprocessors and
application-specific VLSI logic will play an increasingly important role.
The evolution of Japanese research, investment, and production reflects
this progression. The Japanese industry has already, in large measure,
obtained control of world markets for dynamic RAMs; it will soon control
static RAM, EPROM, and EEPROM markets; it dominates 4 bit and 8 bit
microprocessor / microcontroller markets and is entering 16 bit and 32 bit
markets; it has now entered ASIC markets, particularly for gate arrays and
standard cell products; and it is now (in 1987) entering markets for
proprietary 32-bit microprocessors. Hence while Japanese producers entered
commodity memory markets first, they did not stop there. Having mastered
memory technology, they used memories, and successive logic generations, as
process and design drivers in order to enter advanced VLSI logic markets.
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They also used their stability and market success to extract further
technology transfers from the weakened U.S. industry. Consequently I will
describe Japanese advance and American decline across a variety of product
markets and technology categories, beginning with memories.
Memory Markets
The total 1984 world market for semiconductors was approximately $25
billion, of which approximately $20 billion was accounted for by integrated
circuits. Of this amount almost a quarter, or nearly $5 billion, came from
MOS memory shipments.6 The largest single category within the MOS memory
market consists of dynamic Random Access Memory, or DRAMs. Other major
markets include static RAMs (SRAMs) and various erasable, electrically
erasable, and/or programmable Read-Only Memories, or ROMs. The DRAM market
is the oldest and best understood; it was started by Intel's 1K product in
1971, though IBM was actually the first producer (for captive use within its
370 series mainframe computers). Because DRAMs are geometrically regular,
relatively easy to design, and produced in extremely large volumes, they
usually employ the highest process technology available when introduced.
Consequently they have been used as a proving ground for technology and a
source of scale economies in addition to representing a large market per se.
(Although current and future developments in semiconductor technology appear
to be reducing the importance of this so-called "technology driver" role, 7
it is agreed to have played a substantial role in the 1970s and early
1980s.) The long run CAGR of the MOS memory market is approximately 25
percent; that of DRAMs is slightly less, but still higher than that of
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integrated circuit markets as a whole. 8
The American merchants have now been eliminated, for all significant
purposes, from world DRAM markets, as the statistics below indicate. First
the Japanese industry defeated in merchants in direct competition; later (by
1986) most of the merchants, and all of the major firms except for TI,
simply abandoned the market. While the protectionism afforded by the
semiconductor trade agreement and its "Fair Market Value" (i.e., price
floor) provisions may slightly increase U.S. market share, the effect is
likely to be minor and the long term trend is unambiguous. In the
statistics below, the year indicated is the year in which the newest
technology generation entered commercial mass production by several firms;
at any given time, two to three product generations will be in production at
varying volumes. The market share indicated is for the new product
generation only; total Japanese market shares in any given year are slightly
less, since penetration has increased with each new generation. Market
share statistics are as follows:
Japanese MOS DRAM World Market Share, Percent
Year Integration Level J. Market Share
1970 1K Zero
1974 4K 5
1978 16K 40
1982 64K 70
1985 256K 85
Est. 1988 IM Est. 90+
Sources: Dataquest; Hambrecht & Quist; SIA.
As CMOS technology has improved, it has displaced NMOS in DRAM markets
and, simultaneously, stimulated SRAM markets for reasons associated with the
low power consumption of CMOS devices. Japanese producers, who clearly
possess the world's best CMOS process technology, increased their share of
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total world SRAM markets from approximately 25 percent in 1980 to over 50
percent currently, and appear to hold nearly 90 percent of world CMOS SRAM
markets. 9 Since CMOS devices will soon dominate SRAM markets, Japan's
market share will increase yet further.
Recently EPROMs, EEPROMs, and other varieties of erasable and
programmable ROMs, a smaller but rapidly growing market, have similarly
become the focus of Japanese effort. Major Japanese entry into EPROM
markets resulted in an unprecedented 80 percent decline in prices in 1985,
and the U.S. became a substantial net importer. As Japanese market share
increased and a Hitachi memorandum instructing salepeople to undercut
Intel's prices was made public, three American firms filed trade petitions
in order to obtain domestic market protection. These firms - Intel,
National, and AMD - were simultaneously experiencing severe financial
problems, as we shall see below. These trade cases, together with the
Commerce Department's DRAM antidumping case, were suspended as part of the
semiconductor trade agreement reached in 1986, and which specified price
floors in both DRAM and EPROM markets.
Microprocessors and microcontrollers
The world microprocessor market grew from $890 million in 1980 to $1.9
billion in 1983, and is expected to grow 30 to 35 percent annually through
the early 1990s. 10 The market will be divided between the U.S. and Japan;
European firms are no longer involved, with the possible exception of Inmos.
If recent trends continue, Japanese producers will control the world market
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by about 1990. The likelihood of this result, however, remains
insufficiently appreciated. As recently as last year, several university
and even private sector analyses predicted that Japanese producers would
find microprocessor and related markets difficult to penetrate due to their
advanced design requirements. Unfortunately, the penetration has already
occurred, and is rapidly spreading to even the most advanced product
categories. While early Japanese entry was based upon second-sourced
designs for mature products, it is increasingly derived from proprietary
products, even for relatively current product technologies. As the
following statistics indicate, the Japanese effort began two to four years
after memory market penetration and resulted in extremely rapid market share
growth. Consider first Japanese and U.S. world market shares for all
microprocessors (measured in units, not revenue):
MPU World Market Shares, 1980-1985, Percent
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Japan 10 16 22 27 30 41
U.S. 88 81 75 68 63 52
Source: Dataquest, 1986.
Microcontrollers (MCUs) are essentially one-chip systems containing a
microprocessor plus associated interfacing and control logic on a single
circuit. They tend to employ microprocessor designs one generation behind
current markets because a less complex MPU design leaves space for other
logic to fit on the chip. Microcontroller market shares, also measured in
units, have evolved as follows:
MCU World Market Shares, 1980-1985, Percent
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Japan 31 51 60 63 60 62
U.S. 69 48 38 34 34 30
Source: Dataquest, 1986.
These statistics are, of course, susceptible to the criticism that they
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might overstate Japanese market share because mature, low technology,
inexpensive products are a high fraction of unit production but a low
fraction of revenue. There is some truth in this argument, but not much.
First, Japan has already penetrated several advanced markets, as I will
indicate shortly; and second, the detailed structure of Japanese market
penetration, together with recent product announcements, imply that this
penetration will intensify. Japanese entry and market share growth are
strongly correlated to market size. Japanese producers' past strategy has
consistently been to maintain a general process technology advantage, and
then to enter and rapidly dominate product markets when they reach a size
which justifies mass production. Consider first the following data:
Japanese Share of World MPU Markets by Generation & Size, 1980-1985
Shares in percent, Total Available Market (TAM) in Millions of Units
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
8 bit share 11 17 23 28 33 45
TAM 22 34 48 68 75 48
16 bit Zero 7 11 13 16 17
TAM 1 2 4 7 10 8
Source: Dataquest, 1986.
The evolution of MCU markets shows a similar pattern:
Japanese Share of World MCU Markets by Generation & Size, 1980-1985
Market Shares in Percent, TAM in Millions of Units
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
4 bit share 35 60 72 79 79 79
TAM 96 134 158 172 193 181
8 bit 16 20 27 31 36 43
TAM 22 35 54 91 165 159
Source: Dataquest, 1986.
Furthermore, Japan's generational lag appears to be declining while its
design efforts are steadily maturing. Five to ten years ago, most Japanese
microprocessor production was based upon second-sourced American designs for
quasi-obsolete products. But Japanese efforts have smoothly progressed
through successive phases of more advanced product licensing, unauthorized
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copying, pure reverse engineering, reverse engineering with additional
proprietary effort, and now - reportedly - proprietary designs. By the
early 1980s, several Japanese firms had licenses for advanced American MPUs
such as the Intel 8088, 8086, and the Motorola MC68000. In the last two
years, however, a potentially critical shift has occurred. Japanese
producers have successfully progressed from licensing and pure imitation to
reverse engineering, plug-compatible redesign, and significant proprietary
design of advanced 16 bit, 16/32 bit, and 32 bit microprocessors.
Several years ago Toshiba designed and began producing, thusfar only
for its internal use, a wholly proprietary 16 bit microprocessor.
Conversely several other Japanese firms have entered the arena through other
routes. NEC and Hitachi have used their reverse engineering skills and
process technology advantage to directly challenge Intel and Motorola
respectively. NEC designed and is now shipping production quantities of two
CMOS microprocessors, the V20 and V30, whose instruction sets are upward
compatible with Intel's 8088 and 8086, and which offer superior
performance."1 In addition, NEC announced that these MPUs are the first of
a family of compatible CMOS processors which will include advanced 16 bit
and 32 bit products. By early 1987, NEC had already developed and
distributed prototypes of a 16/32 bit device which is compatible with Intel
processors at the 8086 level, but of proprietary architecture at the 32 bit
level; NEC has also developed, and in mid-1987 began sampling, a pure 32-bit
microprocessor rated at 6.5 MIPS, once again compatible with both Intel and
NEC devices at the 16 bit level, but compatible only with NEC devices at the
32 bit level. NEC has begun designing this device into its
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telecommunications equipment, though still using Intel devices in NEC
personal computers. 12
Intel sued NEC, claiming that copyrighted microcode was illegally
employed in the 16 bit products; NEC retaliated by offering to indemnify
other firms and signed a second source agreement with Zilog, a small
American producer owned by Exxon. The litigation, however, is probably of
secondary importance in the long run. It is unlikely that Intel will
prevent distribution by NEC of these (or if need be, re-engineered)
products; indeed the NEC devices are already, reportedly, selling well
throughout Asia. After several court rulings favorable to Intel, NEC was
able to suspend the litigation in 1987 by alleging that the sitting judge
should be disqualified for conflict of interest because he was a member of
an investment club which owned two (2) shares of Intel stock valued at less
than one hundred dollars.
What is primary is the fact that NEC has entered strategic warfare with
Intel in advanced markets, and that it has the technical ability to do so.
NEC's initial strategy was strongly imitative and based more on process
technology and device performance than on architectural superiority. But
NEC did not directly copy Intel's design (microcode aside); rather it
redesigned a compatible product, behaving as a classical PCM competitor.
Moroever its 32 bit product is nearly completely of its own design. If NEC
acquires a large market share and sufficient design experience to come to
market roughly as fast as Intel in future generations, NEC will switch from
PCM (i.e. compatibility based) competition to standard stealing, possibly
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using its own microprocessors in its systems businesses. (NEC is the
leading vendor of both personal computers and telecommunications equipment
in Japan.) In this case NEC's subsequent products will retain internal
compatibility but grow progressively less compatible with Intel's designs.
Thusfar NEC's actions have provoked purely hostile responses from
Intel, which has categorically refused to license its 32-bit 80386 circuits
to Japanese firms. Motorola initially behaved somewhat differently towards
Hitachi, though its more recent behavior, and the long term result, will
likely be similar. Some years ago, Hitachi became a second source for the
MC68000. In addition to manufacturing it, however, Hitachi proceeded to
compete very aggressively with Motorola through price reductions, 13 and to
reverse engineer the device and re-implement it in CMOS. Hitachi rapidly
acquired roughly one-third of the Motorola-compatible microprocessor market.
In 1985, Motorola agreed to become Hitachi's second source for the Hitachi
CMOS product.
Motorola's subsequent response to Hitachi's aggressive competition was
to enter into a joint venture agreement with Toshiba in 1986. Under this
agreement, Motorola secures rights to Toshiba's CMOS process technology
immediately, and provides future licensing rights for its microprocessor
family as a function of the joint venture's success in the Japanese
market. 14 In addition, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Fujitsu announced in early
1987 that they will standardize upon Hitachi's instruction set for advanced
conventional 32-bi't microprocessors. Hitachi's device was already being
sampled in mid-1987, and operates under both UNIX and the TRON operating
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system architecture developed at the University of Tokyo.
While many American technical experts consider the TRON architecture to
be of poor quality, 1 5 several Japanese firms have also undertaken aggressive
UNIX efforts and are devoting increased attention to advanced
microprocessors based upon reduced instruction set (RISC) architectures.
Toshiba has concurrently entered into manufacturing agreements with Sun
Microsystems, a producer of high performance UNIX workstations whose first
generation products are based upon the Motorola architecture. (Sun's
successor products, introduced in 1987, are based upon the SPARC RISC
microprocessor, designed by Sun but implemented in Fujitsu technology; the
circuit is both manufactured by and licensed to Fujitsu. Sun has no
semiconductor manufacturing capability of its own.) Also in 1987, Japanese
firms (albeit diversifying machinery firms, not existing computer vendors)
purchased substantial minority equity positions in Dana Systems and MIPS
Computers, two Silicon Valley startups developing advanced RISC workstations
and RISC microprocessors. MIPS already used Matsushita for fabrication of
its microprocessors and peripheral circuits. Once again, therefore,
strategic warfare with leading American microprocessor producers (and soon,
in a computer market as well) is on the horizon.
These efforts are too recent to permit assessment of their market
impact, though the 16-bit NEC devices are reportedly selling well and many
Japanese firms have announced 32-bit engineering workstations. 16 But more
generally if history is any guide, the Americans are in trouble. The
combination of a demonstrated capacity (by the Japanese industry) to reverse
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engineer advanced devices, continuing licensing by both estabished and newly
created U.S. vendors, the architectural simplicity of emerging RISC designs,
and superior Japanese process technology and financial resources, are likely
to prove formidable problems for merchants such as Intel and Motorola. And,
once again, these developments demonstrate that Japanese producers need not
and will not limit themselves to mature, commodity, or low-margin markets.
Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)
With the possible exception of 32 bit microprocessors, ASIC and related
semistandard logic (SSL) markets will grow more rapidly than other IC
markets for the next five to ten years, rising from 18 percent of IC markets
currently to perhaps 25 percent by the early 1990s.17 1983 worldwide ASIC
production was estimated to be $3.9 billion, of which $2.2 billion was
captive and $1.7 billion was open-market. The unusually high proportion of
captive production reflects the traditional division between custom captive
producers and commodity merchants. However, ASIC technologies and markets
will soon become critical to the competitive performance of a wide variety
of electronics-intensive industries, most of whose member firms (at least in
the United States and Europe) cannot afford efficient-scale captive
facilities. Hence ASIC production, formerly the preserve of captive systems
producers, is already shifting towards open market production and will
continue to do so for the forseeable future.
ASICs and semistandard devices such as custom CPUs, signal processors,
and microprocessor based customized circuits will displace obsolete
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small/medium scale standard components and even, possibly, significant
portions of the standard microprocessor and microcontroller markets.1 8 The
resulting transformation, whose first phase is already visible, will
represent a generational upheaval likely to cause serious damage to firms
dependent upon mature standard logic. The major U.S. firms most likely to
be affected are probably Texas Instruments, National Semiconductor, and (if
defined as American) Signetics. Conversely the growth of ASIC markets in
recent years was associated with a wave of startups, one of which - LSI
Logic Corporation, founded in 1980 and with expected 1987 sales of $300
million, was the world's largest ASIC vendor until Fujitsu superceded it in
1987. However, this transformation will increasingly require highly
automated, flexible, and capital intensive fabrication lines analogous to
mechanical Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMSs) and capable of high volume
but extremely heterogeneous production. Major Japanese firms are far more
experienced with these technologies than U.S. entrepreneurs.
As with microprocessors, many analysts have argued that ASIC technology
and markets would pose substantial obstacles to Japanese producers. Four
reasons are generally given. First, ASIC production nearly by definition
involves relatively small batches of distinct circuits, and therefore
precludes the high quality mass production strategies typical of Japanese
firms. Second, ASIC design requires extremely advanced software, an area in
which Japan supposedly lags U.S. firms. Third, many ASICs are user-designed
and consequently require an extensive service organization, including
customer design centers, training, and consulting services. Fourth, ASICs
embody proprietary information often relevant to Japanese producers (because
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keiretsu are diversified), and Japanese producers have a reputation,
partially deserved in the author's experience, for large-scale illicit
imitation.
These difficulties are real, but it is also clear that they are far
from insurmountable. Extensive R&D, employee training, and computer control
in fabrication can remove many difficulties related to custom production,
and (as indicated above) may in fact give Japanese producers an advantage
over Americans. NEC's enormous Kyushu factory in Kumamoto, for example, now
produces over 2,000 distinct circuits in any given year, and over 1,000 in
any given month, using roughly 100 distinct processes.19 Some ASIC
technologies, such as gate arrays, can be structured to permit commodity
mass production up to a final customization step. Software can be
developed, imitated, or licensed; indeed LSI Logic licensed its design
systems to Toshiba in 1981, only to find Toshiba become a competitor whose
ASIC revenues now substantially exceed LSI Logic's. Service organizations
can be constructed, and have been, as will be seen shortly. Encryption and
security schemes can provide users with some degree of confidence in the
privacy of .their work.
And as with microprocessors, Japanese capacities and success in ASICs
until recently remained underappreciated. While highly accurate statistics
cannot be obtained, the best available estimates of worldwide ASIC market
shares do not support the proposition that Japan cannot succeed. Japanese
vendors apparently already hold at least 25 percent, and possibly over 30
percent, of world ASIC markets. In some of the most important and rapidly
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growing markets, Japanese penetration is even greater. The world market for
MOS gate arrays, for example, will exceed $500 million market this year, and
will probably grow 50 percent annually through the decade. Consider the
following data:
MOS Gate Array Shipments, 1979-1985, Millions of Dollars
Region 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
U.S. 12 18 29 53 116 223 384
Japan 1 4 13 30 92 195 290
Europe 1 3 8 16 28 41 60
ROW 0 0 0 1 4 4 6
World 13 24 50 100 239 463 740
Source: Dataquest, 1986. Data approximate.
Even allowing for the fragility of the data, Japanese producers clearly
increased their world market share from nearly zero to nearly 40 percent
within a six year period. The MOS gate array market, furthermore, is
extremely dependent upon advanced CAD software and a large customer design /
service infrastructure. Its fabrication process is split between a
preliminary mass production phase (masterslice production) and a small-batch
personalization (i.e. metallization and packaging) phase. This market
therefore provides a strong test of the entry barriers presented by design,
customization, and service requirements, and suggests that such barriers are
rather weak. By early 1984 Japanese gate array producers operated 25 design
centers inside Japan, had opened approximately 30 foreign design centers,
and planned to open over 30 more foreign centers. Although definitions of
the term "design center" differ, it appears that Japanese vendors now
operate nearly as many centers worldwide as do American vendors.
Over the next five to ten years, gate arrays - currently the leading
semicustom technology - will be superseded by other technologies such as
standard cells, compiled logic, and sophisticated semistandard products
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embodying multiple technologies, standard and application specific, on a
single circuit. Japanese producers are preparing for this transition,
apparently as aggressively as the U.S. industry. Fujitsu already markets
standard cell products, albeit in low volume, in both Japan and the United
States. Toshiba, NEC, and other Japanese firms have reported prototype
semistandard devices based on standard MPUs plus custom control logic.
Corporate Performance
Consider now some indicators of the financial and technical strength of
Japanese producers relative to the American industry, beginning with the
market performance and financial condition of the major American merchants.
Since Japanese strategic entry in the late 1970s, the .major merchant firms
have grown less rapidly than the total world market, while the large
Japanese producers have significantly outpaced it. Japanese firms have
already displaced American merchants to the extent that four of the world's
six largest semiconductor firms are Japanese. In dollar revenue terms, in
1986 NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba were first through third worldwide. Texas
Instruments, which had been first worldwide in 1983 and for many years
before, was sixth.
This transformation is quite robust, and it should be emphasized that
it transcends recent currency fluctuations. The graphs at the end of this
chapter, prepared by M. Suzanne Peterson of First Boston Corp., show growth
by product line for the four largest U.S. and Japanese firms from 1979
through 1983. The results reflect not only the aggregate growth of Japanese
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producers, but also the extent of Japanese growth, and American weakness, in
areas usually regarded as under American control - microprocessors, for
example.
Moreover, this information, striking as it is, understates the problem
for two reasons. First, the position of the American merchants has worsened
since 1983, as the data above has suggested and as I demonstrate shortly.
Second, the aggregate growth statistics leave out another variable:
stability. As the strength of the Japanese industry increased, American
producers found themselves losing not only market share but also their
ability to predict, and hence plan for, the future. Japan rapidly became
the core of the industry and the Americans its periphery. Japanese firms
acted while the merchants reacted; and risk factors such as cyclical
variation in demand became concentrated in the American merchant sector. In
the last two years this phenomenon, evident since roughly 1980 in RAM
markets, has become so pervasive that it is now a major variable in the
merchant industry's condition. In 1984 the merchant industry, unprepared
for rapid growth, struggled to meet demand by increasing production and
investment. The industry perceived 1984 as an excellent year because its
growth was abnormally high (over 40 percent), even though Japanese growth
was greater (55 percent) and the U.S.-Japanese bilateral trade deficit in
integrated circuits tripled to over $900 million. In 1985, the market
collapsed and the American merchants absorbed a disproportionate share of
the contraction.
The result was the worst recession in the industry's history. While
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world semiconductor sales declined approximately 18 percent in 1985, sales
by U.S. firms declined 22 percent. 20 The semiconductor revenues of the
leading U.S. merchants declined by 25 to 60 percent while Japanese revenues
remained approximately constant. The American decline, furthermore, is not
limited to producers of commodity memory devices. Relative to the same
period in 1984, Motorola's semiconductor orders declined 55 percent in the
first half of 1985. Nor did matters greatly improve in the third quarter of
1985. On October 1, 1985 Motorola reported a third quarter loss of $39
million. Total corporate revenues declined 6 percent, but semiconductor
revenues declined 32 percent and new semiconductor orders declined 44
percent relative to the previous year. AMD reported a 50 percent decline in
corporate revenues ($127 million versus $257 million) for the quarter ending
in September 1985. In that quarter AMD also reported an operating loss of
$29.5 million, partially offset by tax credits. At one point, AMD
reportedly had less than $10 million in cash."
Intel reported its first loss since 1971, an operating loss of $23
million partially offset by tax credits and interest income, and a 28
percent decline in revenues, $312 million versus $432 million, relative to
the same quarter of 1984. Simultaneously with reporting these results Intel
announced that it was abandoning the DRAM market, which it had created in
1970. National Semiconductor reported a net loss of $53 million, and a 25
percent revenue decline, for roughly the same period. Texas Instruments has
also suffered large losses in its semiconductor operations, and reported a
corporate-wide net loss of $82 million for the third quarter of 1985.
Mostek closed entirely in October 1985 after sustaining 1985 losses
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totalling $330 million, and then was sold to Thomson-CSF for a fraction of
its book value. A number of smaller firms such as Micron Technologies,
Seeq, Synertek, and Signetics, also reported large losses and revenue
declines. Several entered bankruptcy or were sold.
These financial difficulties, furthermore, have resulted in severe
contractionary measures including plant closings, permanent layoffs,
reductions in spending for R&D and capital investment, product
cancellations, and withdrawal from markets. Temporary layoffs in the
merchant and supporting industries exceeded 60,000. I estimate that
permanent U.S. layoffs exceeded 10,000. Merchant capital spending probably
declined by 50 percent.
Once again, however, the sharp recessionary contraction merely
accelerated the progress of a secular trend. Since the late 1970s, the
Japanese industry's R&D and capital equipment expenditures have consistently
increased more rapidly than those of the merchant industry, both absolutely
and as a percentage of revenues. The graphs at the end of this chapter show
these trends for the largest five U.S. merchants and Japanese producers.
Even before the extreme instabilities which have characterized the industry
since 1984, Japan was outperforming the United States.
3. Technological Decline
Manufacturing, Process Technology, and Equipment
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Concomitantly with their direct penetration of semiconductor markets,
Japanese firms have increased their manufacturing efficiency, technical
autonomy and scope. Since approximately 1980, Japanese producers have
obtained technical equality or even superiority in several categories of
fabrication equipment, and large market shares in a variety of equipment and
services sectors. They have also obtained superiority in manufacturing
efficiency and product quality; indeed this strength probably leads, rather
than lags, Japanese penetration of capital equipment markets. Since the
early 1980s, Japanese firms have possessed a one to three year lead over
American merchants in CMOS technology and manufacturing as measured by new
commodity product introductions, design rules, yields, and costs.2 2 Since
CMOS is expected to increase from approximately 30 percent of MOS IC
production currently to over 60 percent by 1990, this is a technical .
advantage of some significance. In commodity markets such as DRAMs and
SRAMs, it translates directly into market dominance. In addition, Japanese
semiconductor producers have diversified into semiconductor capital
equipment production. They have also formed close relationships with other
emerging Japanese equipment, materials, and services firms which have often
entered by diversification themselves - firms such as Toppan, Dai Nippon,
Canon, Nikon, Hoya, and JEOL.
Excellence in capital equipment translates both into improved
semiconductor fabrication and into direct revenue. Between 1975 and 1984,
Japan's share of world semiconductor capital equipment markets grew from
less than 15 percent to over 30 percent,23 and has probably increased
further since. Moreover, with the probable exception of CAD systems,
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control software, and equipment developed internally by IBM and AT&T, it
appears that Japanese equipment is generally equal or superior to U.S.
equipment in technical capability and reliability. In some cases, Japanese
equipment may now be superior to the best manufactured in the U.S.
Automatic processing, assembly, and memory testing equipment made and/or
used by Japanese firms is considerably more advanced than equipment used by
American merchants. The most striking differences appear to be in
maskmaking, certain categories of optical and X-ray lithography equipment,
high performance automatic testing equipment (ATE), and in automatic or
robotized assembly equipment. As I indicate below, electron beam direct
write equipment markets will probably also soon be dominated by Japan. Some
of this Japanese equipment appears to be less than completely accessible to
the U.S. industry. This in turn appears to result from a combination of
deliberate withholding and from the lesser development of Japanese
producers' marketing, distribution, and maintenance infrastructure in the
United States.24
Manufacturing
The hypothesis of substantial Japanese superiority in manufacturing is
supported by several forms of evidence. The first is the consensus of the
trade. Among semiconductor technologists and executives who have visited
Japanese firms and/or who purchase semiconductors, there is now nearly
universal agreement that the technology levels, product quality, and
manufacturing efficiency of current Japanese production are well beyond the
average level of major U.S. producers. Several reports have indicated that
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average yields in major Japanese plants are nearly twice as high as those
obtained in roughly equivalent merchant facilities. IBM, DEC, and other
large U.S. users continue to find that U.S. merchant produced semiconductors
require far more testing, and are less reliable, than Japanese-sourced
devices. 25 A vice president of one major user told me in 1987 that
merchant-produced memories constituted less than 5% of his firm's
semiconductor purchases, but over 20% of its incoming semiconductor quality
problems.
Additionally, there is Japan's generally superior CAD/CAM and robotics
technology and practice. It is widely agreed that Japanese robotics is
superior to America's; half of the world's industrial robots are produced
and used in Japan. Japanese commercial operations are already more capital
intensive than those of the merchant industry. Whereas as recently as 1980
approximately eighty percent of American-made circuits were assembled in
low-wage, labor-intensive Asian factories, the comparable statistic for
Japan was ten percent.26 In part this simply reflected the smaller
differential between Japanese and East Asian wages, but in part it reflected
investments in organization and automation. Furthermore, Japanese
production has been growing steadily more capital intensive since the early
1970s, and has been more capital intensive than U.S. production for some
years. And finally, the Japanese industry appears to employ both more
effective technical practices - such as advanced contamination control
techniques and Just-In-Time production - and more highly trained workers
than U.S. firms. The resulting efficiency difference has by now become
substantial, though once again precise statistics are unobtainable for the
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semiconductor industry. One computer executive estimated that U.S. products
required five times as much incoming quality control processing as Japanese
products in the 1980s. 2 7
Japan generally excels in the manufacturing techniques appropriate to
advanced, flexible manufacturing, not only in semiconductor production but
in other sectors. A recent study by Jaikumar, for example, analyzed the
usage of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMSs) in Japan and the United
States. 28 Jaikumar surveyed the installed base of such systems in both
nations, and then specifically studied 35 U.S. systems and 60 Japanese
systems. First, Jaikumar found that 40% of the world installed base of FMS
systems resides in Japan. But second, Japanese systems enormously
outperformed their technically equivalent U.S. counterparts. System
development time averaged 2.5 to 3 years in the U.S., but 1.25 to 1.75 years
in Japan. U.S. systems produced an average of 10 different parts
concurrently; Japanese systems produced 93. U.S. systems produced 88 units
per day on average; Japanese systems produced 120. U.S. systems handled an
average of one new part introduction per year; Japanese systems handled 22.
The average utilization rate of U.S. systems was 52%; of Japanese systems,
84%. No U.S. systems operated unattended; 18 Japanese systems did.
Moroever, Jaikumar's study found that the workforces showed the same
patterns which have been noted, less systematically, in the semiconductor
sector. In the Japanese plants, 40% of the workforce was made up of college
educated engineers; the the U.S. plants, the comparable statistic was 8%.
Training time used for skill improvement was three times longer in Japan
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than in the United States. Jaikumar wrote of one U.S. user, '... management
prevented workers from making process improvements... .The technology was
applied in a way that ignored its huge potential for flexibility and for
generating organizational learning."
Capital equipment, materials, and services markets
Through penetration of semiconductor capital equipment and services
markets, Japanese producers are causing upheavals in the equipment sector
similar to those seen in the merchant industry itself. The pattern of entry
is also similar: Japanese firms, often with linkages to major semiconductor
producers, invest heavily and enter markets in which high quality, capital
intensive, high initial cost activities confer advantage. They have a
quasi-assured internal market, while in world markets they typically face a
disaggregated American sector composed of smaller, self-financed startups.
Whereas in 1984 the Japanese equipment industry (as defined by one market
research service) contained 108 firms, the U.S. industry contained over 500
firms. And whereas most of the U.S. firms resembled merchant semiconductor
producers in that they were recently established, independent, small firms
with narrow product lines, many Japanese producers are subsidiaries of
semiconductor producers themselves or of other major industrial enterprises.
Examples of the latter include Canon, now a $6 billion diversified optical,
industrial, and office equipment vendor, and Shimizu, a $7 billion
construction and engineering services firm. Below, I discuss several
categories of equipment in more detail.
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Consider first automatic test equipment (ATE). Ando, half owned by
NEC, and Takeda Riken (now called Advantest), 22% owned by Fujitsu, compete
against established American firms such as Fairchild/Sentry, Teradyne,
Genrad, and Varian, plus a considerable number of smaller startups such as
LTX, Trillium, and the like. By the mid-1970s, Japan's open market
participation in ATE was rapidly increasing. Between 1975 and 1980, Japan
increased its share of total world ATE production from 4% to 10%, while
increasing its share of world ATE consumption from 7% to 16%.29 Its
participation in semiconductor ATE markets progressed even more rapidly.
Between 1975 and 1980, Japan's consumption of all semiconductor ATE rose
from 13% to 26% of world consumption, while its world market share rose from
zero to 16%. Japanese semiconductor ATE production rose by 56% in 1980,
while non-Japanese production rose by 25%. By 1985, Japan held over one
third of the world ATE market.
Finally, Japanese participation showed large increases in the most
advanced sectors: memory and VLSI testing. By 1980 Japan consumed 23% of
world VLSI ATE and 32% of world memory ATE.30 Japanese producers' world
market share in all ATE increased from 18% in 1975 to 25% in 1980. By 1985,
Japanese producers held approximately half of the world memory ATE market.
In the last several years, moreover, Japanese technical advantage and market
penetration appears to have increased yet further. The recent technical and
financial performance of many U.S. firms, furthermore, has been poor.
Varian, Genrad, and others announced losses and major layoffs in 1985.
Teradyne, the leading U.S. ATE firm, is generally considered well managed,
but it faces severe competitive pressure. U.S. demand for memory testers, a
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major product line, has nearly disappeared with the exception of IBM.
Teradyne's world market share appears to be roughly constant.
Electron beam (E-beam) equipment is required for advanced mask and
reticle manufacture, and is increasingly desirable for high-density
lithography (1.5 microns and below). E-beam technology, however, is
extremely complex and capital intensive; product development requires $40
million or more, and each machine costs over $3 million. Six competing,
independent American firms undertook R&D efforts in order to enter this
market. By May of 1985, five of the six (Varian, GCA, Veeco, General
Signal, and CDC / Microbit) had cancelled their efforts, writing off total
losses in excess of $100 million. 31 Other than IBM, which reportedly spent
$50 million developing a system it uses internally and does not sell, only
one American firm - Perkin Elmer - remains active in the area. Conversely
three Japanese suppliers - JEOL, Hitachi, and Toshiba - have major
development efforts and are expected to dominate future markets. JEOL
already markets a system in the United States. Hitachi and Toshiba, of
course, are major semiconductor producers.
Also in 1985, several Japanese firms rapidly increased their presence
in the U.S. maskmaking market, rapidly taking a large share of the market
from about 15 underfunded American startups. Semiconductor markets have
become more mask-intensive due to the rapid growth of application specific
markets involving large numbers of designs. Mask quality, furthermore, has
a significant effect on production yields, and rapid delivery is important
to reduce production cycles. As lithography has improved, E-beam etching
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equipment and precision laser-based defect removal systems have become
nearly obligatory, and the minimum efficient scale of capital investment has
risen from roughly $2 million five years ago to $20 million presently. Some
further scale economies appear to exist at even higher capitalizations.
Recently three Japanese firms - Dai Nippon, Toppan, and Hoya - entered the
maskmaking market after investing heavily. Dai Nippon and Toppan now have
annual maskmaking revenues exceeding $50 million, whereas the largest
American firm had 1984 revenues of $16 million. Micro Mask, Master Images,
and others reported operating losses in 1985. There is now wide agreement
that the Japanese suppliers offer faster delivery, higher quality, and lower
price. In early 1985 Intel, for example, reportedly switched from using
seven U.S. suppliers to using two Japanese and two American suppliers, with
the Japanese firms supplying roughly half of Intel's requirements. 3 2
Maskmaking also requires extremely high-quality quartz or glass; the
dominant supplier in the 1970s was Corning Glass. Now, however, Hoya and
Shin-Etsu together hold 90% of the world market. 33 (Hoya now also competes
in maskmaking.) This appears to be part of a more general pattern of
emerging Japanese superiority in base materials capabilities - GaAs crystals
and wafers, high purity silicon, highly purified gases, high quality
ceramics, and other exotic materials required for increasingly demanding
technologies. Several U.S. studies have now concluded that Japanese
producers now hold a significant technical advantage over the U.S. in
production of highly purified, defect-free electronic materials.
Lithography tools, like masks and materials, are critical to
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semiconductor manufacturing quality and yield. Nikon and Canon now hold
strong positions in world markets for direct steppers and projection
aligners. Between 1979 and 1984, Canon advanced from the 18th largest
semiconductor equipment supplier worldwide to the 10th. Nikon was not even
a producer in 1979; in 1981 it was 51st worldwide; in 1984 it was 7th. 3s
Nikon has also developed an X-ray stepper. 3 6
Hence, with the probable exception of CAD software, it would appear
that Japanese technical practice and capital equipment, materials, and
services capacities are equal or even superior to those of the United
States. This appears to be even more strongly true for the most advanced
materials and process technologies, such as GaAs wafers and X-ray
lithography tools.
Research and Development
Finally, an increasing fraction of Japanese technology derives from
indigenous development rather than imitation, and in many areas Japanese
semiconductor R&D now compares favorably with that of the United States.
Several recent general assessments, including one each by the Defense
Science Board 7 and the National Research Council, 8 support this
conclusion. So do the available statistical indicators of R&D. Between
1975 and 1982, the U.S. share of world integrated circuit patent activity
declined from 43% to 27%, while Japan's share rose from 18% to 48% in the
same period.39 By the mid-1980s, over 40% of papers accepted for
presentation at the IEEE Solid State Circuits Conference were of Japanese
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authorship (versus zero in the early 1960s).10 R&D spending by the Japanese
industry now exceeds merchant industry spending both absolutely and as a
percentage of revenues, and will exceed total U.S. spending (including
captive and government R&D) by the early 1990s at the present trend. In one
area important for future lithography at 0.4 microns and below (X-ray
lithography), Japanese efforts include cooperative construction and use of
several synchrotrons by NTT, the Japan Agency for Science and Technology,
and major Japanese producers - efforts far larger and more coherent than
those of the United States.4 ' Japanese firms also have substantial R&D
programs in laser-based lithography, including affiliations with U.S.
startups, and in 3-D semiconductor technology, which may become commercially
important by the early 1990s. Japanese efforts in 3-D technology, which are
concentrated in several R&D consortia involving the major producers, appear
to be several years ahead of United States research.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ECONOMICS, STRATEGICS, AND THE LOGIC OF MERCHANT DECLINE
I. Alternative Explanations for Semiconductor Industry Behavior
The semiconductor case raises serious questions as to the adequacy of
existing models of industrial dynamics such as those provided by
neoclassical economics and relatively similar population ecology
descriptions. On the other hand, modeling the industry's behavior as a
vector of linked, long term strategic interactions suggests explanations of
its otherwise puzzling behavior. Concomitantly, this approach leads to new
units of industry and market analysis, such as consistent strategy sets,
strategic trajectories, and equilibrium strategic regimes. Applying them to
the semiconductor case suggests that while traditional parameters such as
factor costs and returns to scale have certainly played major roles in the
industry's development, their role has been neither determinative nor of the
kind assigned to them in neoclassical models.
In particular, it appears likely that the most important role of factor
costs and changing cost structures has been to affect strategic behavior via
their impact upon the time horizons of strategic actors such as firms. In
both the U.S. and Japan employees, firms, and governments continuously faced
multiple, concurrent strategic interactions with each other, confronting
them with alternatives such as whether and for what purposes to cooperate
with one another. In significant measure as a consequence of time horizon
differences (induced by factor costs among other signals), Japanese and U.S.
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actors made widely divergent strategic choices. These decisions eventually
led to the evolution of stable, self-reinforcing patterns of strategic
behavior which had profound effects upon the two industries' structure,
conduct, and competitive performance. Traditional economic effects
associated with factor costs, high initial costs (e.g. for R&D), and/or
increasing returns, such as the pure technical scale advantages enjoyed by
the better capitalized industry, appear to have been of secondary
importance. Indeed, some strategic effects acted in directions contrary to
conventional economic signals, and seem to have overriden them. Hence, for
example, the U.S. industry failed to rationalize when cost structures and
technological change should have dictated that it do so.
As a result, many of the structural, behavioral, or performance results
predicted by neoclassical theory have failed to appear in this industry.
Much the same can be said of population ecology models, to the extent that
they implicitly or explicitly accept the existence of "selection" mechanisms
independent of endogenous strategic interactions. The same is also true of
several other proposed explanations of Japanese behavior and/or U.S.
decline, such as hypothesized failures of U.S. management, manufacturing,
and so forth.
This is an important point. Both for analytic reasons and as a result
of the place occupied by economics in modern debates concerning industrial
behavior and economic policy, any explanation which does not directly rely
upon neoclassical categories must still answer to neoclassical logic. So if
the dynamics of an entire industry are to be explained through some singular
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variable (e.g., "management failure") rather than by economic categories
such as factor endowments, then some very large market "imperfection" must
have interfered with competitive equilibrium - or, if you prefer, with
natural selection and population adaptation. To put it simply, if something
other than macroeconomics - something specific to the industry - was wrong,
then one must explain why it was wrong throughout the entire industry, and
why the market didn't efficiently select against it. In the semiconductor
case, one must for example explain why the U.S. industry often displayed
self-destructive behavior despite a history of rapid growth coupled with
fierce marketplace competition, conditions which should have provided ample
rewards to superior performance and equally severe discipline for failures.
I will therefore discuss some of the anomalies raised by existing
models, particularly neoclassical economics, and consider how to account for
them. My conclusion is that much of the divergence between neoclassical
prediction and actual industry behavior involves different Japanese and
American choices in response to a similar set of iterated, i.e. long term,
strategic problems. I will describe a set of linked domestic and
international strategic processes to which, for fairly straightforward
reasons, firms in the two national sectors responded differently. I will
further describe how the aggregate effect of individual decisions was to
create and cement an entire structural and strategic system which imprisoned
its members.
These long run strategic interactions, in combination with the
semiconductor industry's high initial costs, increasing returns,
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unpredictability, and the presence of potential or actual government
policies affecting strategic incentives, account for the evolution of both
domestic and international structure, conduct, and performance. Similar
considerations suggest how many industries, and most strikingly high
technology industries, might frequently depart from textbook competition.
Furthermore, such analyses of strategic forces, and the factors
affecting strategic choice, also provide a natural way of explaining
divergent national industry trajectories. They also strongly imply that
major, sector-specific government policy interventions can be critical to
sectoral performance. But, in contrast to neoclassical economic models
which restrict potentially beneficial government actions to public goods
provision, in strategically dense systems policy interventions can promote
success as well as failure. Far from being inherently disadvantageous
sources of market distortions, policies with appropriate effects upon time
horizons and strategic incentives might, at least in principle, produce
benefits which more than compensate for handicaps in traditional assets such
as capital. Conversely, inappropriate interventions with counterproductive
incentive effects might worsen industrywide performance far more than a
strictly neoclassical analysis would predict.
In game-theoretic terms, this amounts very roughly to saying that the
long run aggregate difference in payoffs between optimal and suboptimal
strategic outcomes is large relative to the effect of factor inputs upon
payoff size. Or to put it another way, ensuring productive patterns of
cooperation is far more useful than simply throwing resources around, while
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conversely distributional conflict can easily nullify large initial
advantages in wealth or factor costs. Theoretical models based upon such
effects might, therefore, shed light upon such questions as the efficiency
benefits of organizations and the reasons that some poor nations with
interventionist governments grow rapidly while others do not.
The strategic argument summarized
Now, consider a restatement of the issue posed by the semiconductor
industry case and the manner in which the strategic analysis will address
it. We want to understand the Japanese and American industries' counter-
conventional structural, behavioral, and efficiency differences; the
rigidities which apparently prevented the U.S. industry from responding
appropriately both to the implications of VLSI and to Japanese competition;
and finally, the rapidity of U.S. decline. The explanation will rely upon a
set of linked strategic problems faced by both sectors domestically, and
another set of strategic choices faced in international competition.
First, I will argue that domestic interactions, which proceeded
independently in the two sectors for several decades, led to the formation
of characteristic national regimes. Owing to their differing nature and to
the protectionist support of the Japanese government, the choice to initiate
international interactions was nearly entirely Japan's. Once initiated,
these international strategic processes proceeded on favorable terms as a
result, again, of nationally specific conditions.
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The rigidity of the U.S. regime derived from essentially three sources.
The first, ironically, was its having a structure and degree of market
fluidity which, on a neoclassical interpretation, would maximize its
adaptiveness. This fragmentation and its strategic concomitants implied
that many forms of corrective action had public goods characteristics;
therefore any firm undertaking them would, at least for some period, be
helping its competitors as much as itself. No potentially dominant "arena-
maker" existed who could appropriate enough private benefits to have
rational incentives for socially optimal investments. Secondly, the various
strategic decisions faced by actors were strongly interdependent. This
raised the initial cost of changing behavior, forcing strategic action to
march in lockstep. And third, there also existed traditional economic
increasing returns and switching costs associated which each strategic path.
Thus the noncooperative fragmentation path led to elaborate, decentralized
networks, headhunters, subcontractors, service providers, and a host of
complementary internal firm-level choices. Moving to a different strategic
regime became more and more expensive as institutional experience and
investments accumulated, and as alternative strategic pathways grew further
and further apart.
With this hypothesis in mind, let us begin the detailed sectoral
analysis by considering neoclassical explanations and their problems.
2. Economic Explanations of the Semiconductor Case
The difficulties associated with neoclassical interpretations of the
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semiconductor case involve not only international competitive performance,
i.e. explaining why in the 1980s the U.S. industry collapsed, but also
industry structure and strategic behavior. In fact, the neoclassical
hypotheses which would most naturally be invoked to explain the industry's
structure and behavioral characteristics would be largely inconsistent with
those necessary to explain the course of its international and competitive
performance. Let me begin, therefore, by considering structural
characteristics, both as they are in fact and as neoclassical analysis views
them.
Industry Structure
The neoclassical analysis of industrial market structure, whether as
summarized in Scherer's standard text or as extended in more recent
"strategic" neoclassical treatments, 1 generally considers variables such as
levels of entry and exit, cost structures such as scale and learning
effects, industry concentration, oligopolistic interactions in output levels
and pricing, product market segmentation, and occasionally the impact of
R&D, innovation, or technological progress. The majority of neoclassical
analysis is devoted to the relationship between costs, industry
concentration, and product market behavior (largely output and price
levels). Occasionally diversification, multinational operations, network
externalities, and vertical integration are now considered as well. Not all
structural issues, however, have received substantial treatment. The
presence or absence of markets, the boundaries of firms, and the prevalence
of external purchases and open market sales (versus purely captive
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production of intermediates) by vertically integrated firms, are rarely
considered; similarly for the degree of (horizontal and/or vertical)
technical cooperation among firms; and possible interactions between
multiple, concurrent technological and structural forces receive less
attention still.
So a number of important issues in industrial structure have simply
been neglected by neoclassical analysis. For present purposes, the most
important of these is probably the extent of "procompetitive" technical
cooperation among firms, either between suppliers and users or among
competitors. A second, related issue is whether vertically integrated
competitors will trade in intermediates, versus producing only for their
internal use. Both issues are of major importance to the semiconductor
industry, and in both Japanese practice differs from American.
But in addition, the semiconductor industry contradicts neoclassical
models even in well explored areas such as horizontal industry structure and
levels of entry and exit. There are large-scale, persistent differences
between the structure of the U.S. and Japanese national industries which
cannot be readily accounted for in neoclassical terms. Very broadly
speaking, neoclassical models imply that national industries producing
similar products with similar technologies, and competing in similar or
globally integrated markets, should display roughly similar structural
characteristics.
These models also generally imply that structure follows technology:
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that industry structure will, for example, become more or less concentrated
as scale economies and entry costs increase or decrease. National
divergences could arise if, for example, one nation has very different
factor endowments, or possesses more cumulative experience, or holds
technical leadership while the other is a follower. However, these various
caveats do not apply in the semiconductor case, as I will shortly indicate.
In fact, the most natural neoclassical explanations of these national
structural differences present the additional difficulty that they have
additional implications for strategic behaviors and/or performance opposite
to those we actually observe.
We can begin by considering the following broad summary of the
structural characteristics of the Japanese and U.S. industries in the 1970s
and early 1980s, as described in the previous chapter:
Variable U.S.
Horizontal concentration Medium, declining
Stability of firm market share Medium to low
Major new entrants Several annually
Entry by new ventures 5 - 30 annually
Exit by major firms Frequent
Diversification of firms Medium to low
Size of principal open
market producers $O.IB - $SB
Semiconductor % of firm revenue 35% - 100%
Large captive producers 2 - 5
Major domestic vertical
equity linkages 1 (Intel/IBM)
Major foreign owned producers 3 - 8
Mergers and acquisitions Common
Vertical integration of firms Low
Open market producers' share
of domestic consumption 5 - 10%
Open market producers' share of
domestic downstream markets 5 - 10%
Offshore assembly (% of total) 80%
Personnel mobility
individual discretion High
corporate discretion None
Japan
High, increasing
Very high
Zero
Zero
Zero
Very high
$5B - $30B
10% - 25%
Zero
All firms
Possibly 1 (TI)
Extremely rare
Very high
50 - 80%
50 - 80%
10%
None
High
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As also indicated in the previous chapter, a similar set of structural
observations can be made with respect to the two national capital equipment
industries. Thus the broad picture is of two very different national
industry structures. One, the Japanese, is a fixed, closed, and purely
domestic structure with little entry or exit, and dominated by a handful of
very large, diversified, vertically integrated, stable industrial complexes,
all of which produce semiconductors internally for themselves, for sale to
each other, and for the general market. The other, the American industry,
is a vastly more fluid, permeable, fragmented and pluralistic structure
dominated, particularly in open market production, by relatively small,
narrowly focused, independent, and unstable firms with arms' length
marketplace relationships to their sources of capital, suppliers,
competitors, customers, and even employees.
This picture suggests at least three questions. The first is why the
Japanese and U.S. industries had such dissimilar structures for at least a
decade before the advent of VLSI and the onset of global competition. The
second is why the U.S. industry's structure remained the same in the face of
dramatic technological changes which, as the prior chapter indicated,
greatly increased the importance of structural rationalization, scale,
capital intensity, mass manufacturing skill, organizational stability, and
vertical technical coordination. The third question is how this structural
picture correlates with the U.S. and Japanese industries' other attributes,
in particular their strategic behavior and relative competitive performance.
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It is exceedingly difficult to account for the two industries'
structural differences in neoclassical terms, except as economically optimal
responses to noneconomic market distortions, such as might (on neoclassical
views) be induced by government policy. The properly neoclassical
mechanisms, such as differences in national asset endowments or traditional
forms of strategic behavior, simply do not fit well. For example, one
neoclassical argument holds that U.S. possession of an extremely advanced
R&D labor force versus Japanese emphasis upon mass engineering education
might affect the optimal choice of technique or market niche by the two
industries; or, the Japanese industry's status as a latecomer and imitator
might affect its structure. Such differences might, for example, lead to
Japan's emphasizing imitative manufacturing over product R&D, by inference
generating a more concentrated horizontal structure. But that hardly
accounts for the absence from the Japanese scene of new entrants, mergers,
acquisitions, foreign owned firms, imports, or personnel mobility; nor for
the vertical integration and diversification of Japanese producers.
Furthermore, for most of the industry's history, the merchant industry's
manufacturing labor costs were actually lower than Japan's, because nearly
half of the U.S. merchant industry's worldwide labor force consisted of low-
wage offshore assembly personnel (Indonesian, Filipino, Malaysian), whereas
the Japanese industry used domestic labor.
Another possibility which would explain a somewhat higher fraction of
the Japanese industry's structural profile would be that the Japanese sector
had somehow evolved a cartel with impressive stability characteristics. And
indeed the cartel hypothesis is paradoxically closest, among traditional
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economic explanations, to the alternative model I will propose - the
evolution of a stable strategic regime with both cooperative and competitive
elements. But the paradox is that the traditional version of the cartel
hypothesis fails completely. First, it still cannot account for certain
aspects of the Japanese structure, e.g. the similar structure of all the
major producers or the absence of personnel mobility or offshore production.
But more importantly, in neoclassical models the structural cartel
hypothesis has strong implications for conduct and performance; and the
Japanese industry did not behave like a neoclassical cartel.
Successful neoclassical cartels ration output, maximize joint profits,
and tend to stagnate. The Japanese semiconductor industry certainly
displayed strategic coordination, but its coordination did not prevent (and
probably even contributed to) intense intramural competition in product
markets, rapid technical progress, rapid response to change, and a strong
preference for investment and growth over profits. And, to anticipate
slightly, the competitive performance of the Japanese industry is precisely
the inverse of that expected of a cartel.
Neoclassical models also hold that cartels tend to be unstable,
particularly where technical barriers to entry are modest, where the
rapidity and unpredictability of technological change continuously
destabilizes existing arrangements, and where there exist formidable
external challengers, so that in the long run the market wins and the cartel
disintegrates. In this case, however, there existed a noncartellized U.S.
industry which controlled 60% of the world market and which for decades held
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world technical leadership. Until the appearance of VLSI, both technology
and U.S. behavior indicated that purely technical barriers to entry were
minimal. Yet the Japanese industry's structure remained essentially
unchanged for decades. Even if the original source of this structure was
the formation of a traditional cartel, how could this cartel establish and
perpetuate itself? Government protectionism and intervention (in both the
financial sector and the real economy) is the best candidate answer.
Within the neoclassical context, then, we are left with explanations of
Japanese / U.S. structural divergence which rely upon the economic
consequences of political interventions in the industry. And while
government interventions certainly played a major role in the genesis of the.
two national structures, we shall see that here, too, straightforward
neoclassical interpretations cannot be sustained. The interventions were
certainly massive, but they frequently did not have the structural,
behavioral, or performance consequences neoclassical theory would expect of
them. Moreover as government interventions became less important over time,
even in Japan but particularly in the United States, the divergence between
the two national industries if anything increased.
To be sure, U.S. government actions favored structural fragmentation,
while those of Japan did not. In the U.S., antitrust pressure directly
created one captive producer (AT&T), possibly influenced the behavior of
another (IBM), and indirectly subsidized the formation of new producers by
eliminating AT&T's competition and patent advantages in 1956. Department of
Defense purchasing subsidized the early merchant industry, while DOD second
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sourcing requirements also tended to increase the industry's fragmentation.
Tax expenditures such as loss carryforwards, the R&D tax credit, and
favorable treatment of both stock options and capital gains also subsidized
startup firms dependent upon venture capital finance. Conversely in Japan,
the government protected the domestic industry from foreign competition,
restricted imports, strictly regulated the financial markets, and
differentially assisted a relatively small number of favored firms, for
example through NTT R&D efforts, government procurement, and MITI subsidies
of cooperative R&D.
In general, therefore, government activity did act to produce a more
fragmented U.S. industry and a more concentrated Japanese one. Yet once
again, these interventions do not seem to account for several of the most
persistent, massive, and basic divergences of national structure, for
example the extreme instability of merchant firms' market shares and the
absence of vertical integration within the U.S. Furthermore, neoclassical
analysis would predict that political interventions such as massive Japanese
protectionism and entry restrictions would lessen competitive discipline,
cause allocative distortions, generate rent harvesting, reduce incentives to
expand internationally, and reduce the Japanese industry's efficiency. Thus
the political explanation for structural divergence, while probably correct,
would predict competitive outcomes different than those we have observed.
Perhaps most striking, however, is the failure of the U.S. industry to
rationalize itself in response to the advent of VLSI. By the late 1970s the
U.S. industry's persistent fragmentation required more explanation, from the
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vantage point of economic rationality, than the Japanese industry's
concentration and vertical integration. Supposing that the earlier
discussion of the technology and economics of VLSI microelectronics was
roughly accurate, the U.S. industry's continuation of its prior structural
pattern for the subsequent decade is exceedingly puzzling from the point of
view of either a neoclassical or population ecology analysis. It would
appear to imply not only that the managements of U.S. firms failed to
appreciate the industry's trends, but also that market processes failed to
reward and punish appropriately.
Rather than ask what mechanisms prevented entry, exit, and so forth, we
must therefore ask what in the United States prevented the concentration and
vertical linkages implied by optimal technical practice. This is all the
more anomalous given that American firms were disciplined by entry, by
markets for personnel, and by foreign competition as well as by competition
from existing domestic producers, whereas Japanese firms were disciplined
only by each other. Hence U.S. firms should have faced strong incentives to
invest appropriately, and they should also have understood the nature of the
new technology. Since until the 1980s American universities and R&D
organizations dominated advanced research. U.S. firms held 90% of the world
capital equipment market, 60% of the world semiconductor market, and over
half of world markets for the relevant semiconductor-intensive systems
products, U.S. firms should collectively have possessed the information and
resources to make any necessary structural changes prospectively and well in
advance of the Japanese industry.
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In addition American merchants were subject to a market for corporate
control, and were available for acquisition by foreign as well as domestic
firms, whereas Japanese firms were exposed to neither possibility. And
conversely, for precisely the same reasons American firms therefore
possessed far more flexibility in allocating their assets, at least in the
senses considered by neoclassical theory. They could hire and fire
personnel, both experienced and inexperienced, with relative ease; they
could merge with, purchase, and/or divest other companies and business
units; they could invest abroad and employ offshore labor, even short term
subcontractors, where it was appropriate to do so. They could always
purchase materials, components, consulting services, and capital equipment
from whoever had the best at the time, rather than using suppliers because
they were internal or associated with a parent industrial group; they could
also create or purchase a supplier if that were the optimal course. Yet,
for the most part, the American industry failed to evolve a more mature
structure. It remained unstable and both vertically and horizontally
fragmented.
These observations, in turn, bring us to the question of how structural
conditions relate to the strategic behavior of the U.S. and Japanese
industries.
The Two Universes of Japanese and American Strategic Conduct
Japanese semiconductor producers displayed extensive strategic
reciprocity and coordination in dealing with inputs, assets, and sectoral
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public goods (long term R&D, personnel, capital equipment, government
policies, premarket product standardization, generic technology), while
competing fiercely in most product markets. U.S. firms, in general,
exhibited no substantial reciprocity or coordination in any of these areas.
Japanese producers also appear to have adhered with near uniformity to
national and/or sectoral strategic norms, such as preference for Japanese
rather than American suppliers once domestic products were available. In
contrast, U.S. firms frequently relied upon or sold technology to Japanese
firms without apparent regard to nationalistic criteria. Similarly, the
Japanese industry possessed a closer, more cooperative, and more unified
relationship with the national government than did the U.S. industry.
Japanese firms exhibited a strong preference for growth relative to
profitability. Japanese firms spent a higher fraction of revenue on R&D and
capital investment than U.S. firms; they accepted lower profits to gain
market share; they rarely abandoned a growth market even if they temporarily
lost money in it. U.S. firms behaved in precisely the opposite way.
Perhaps relatedly, Japanese firms optimized over longer effective time
horizons than U.S. firms, and - not necessarily the same thing - engaged in
longer term, more deeply interdependent relationships with their domestic
suppliers and customers than did U.S. firms. These long term, stable,
vertical domestic Japanese relationships included not only technology and
products but also personnel transfers and the supply of capital - frequently
through banks, other financial institutions, and other industrial firms in a
larger industrial group.
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Japanese firms offered and required lifetime employment commitments,
depending upon the strategic reciprocity of other domestic firms to enforce
them and to permit them to hold down wage costs. Conversely only the
larger, more stable U.S. merchant firms offered any employment security at
all, and even the largest resorted to large layoffs in recessions. Labor
moved fluidly, resulting in U.S. turnover rates five times higher than
Japanese, and leading U.S. firms to offer financial incentives - salary
increases, stock options - in order to reduce turnover and retain valuable
employees.
Altogether, then, the two national industries' strategic behaviors were
as strikingly, and systematically, different as their structural profiles.
Japanese firms optimized over long time horizons, emphasized growth, and
behaved nationalistically while still competing intensely with each other;
American firms optimized over short time horizons, emphasized current
profitability, and behaved individualistically, generally without regard to
national or sectoral goals. To what extent can neoclassical analysis
account for this strategic divergence, for its national specificity, and for
its correspondence with the national structural divergence described above?
Two neoclassical mechanisms - one associated with newer "strategic"
models, the other quite traditional - initially seem to explain at least
some aspects of the two industries' strategic behavior, most particularly
the higher levels of investment within Japan versus the emphasis upon
profitability within the U.S. sector. However, we shall see that even with
respect to this behavioral variable, the neoclassical explanation is
193
incomplete; and other behavioral differences remain entirely unexplained.
The strategic mechanism concerns dynamic scale economies, a.k.a.
learning effects. If the Japanese industry was nationally protected and
structurally concentrated, each firm within it would appropriate a greater
fraction of experience benefits than would be the case within the more
fragmented American industry. The result might be a relatively greater
Japanese emphasis upon increasing production a way of increasing experience,
which would in turn lead to increased competitive advantage in future
generations of production.
This behavioral result, however, is not altogether determinate.
Indeed, more traditional neoclassical models would predict that a
concentrated, protected, partially coordinated industry would be far more
likely to harvest rents and to adhere to short term profitability criteria
than a less concentrated, unprotected, non-coordinated, highly
entrepreneurial sector. Furthermore, the technical desirability of
obtaining dynamic scale economies presumably applied to U.S. firms as much
as to Japanese firms. Therefore, the higher degree to which the Japanese
industry sought them would seem to imply that the Japanese industry had a
lower discount rate than the merchants.
This appears, in fact, to have been the case, and this issue brings us
to the other, more traditional, neoclassical mechanism alluded to earlier:
factor costs. Although there is some dispute as to the statistical
evidence, it appears that the Japanese industry has benefited from capital
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and skilled labor costs substantially lower than those paid by the U.S.
industry. In an industrial sector in which competitive success and growth
require incurring high initial and/or fixed costs (for R&D, design, capital
investment), higher factor costs in areas pertinent to these activities
translate into slower growth, less investment, and shorter time horizons,
for example a preference for short term investments with immediate payback. 2
National factor cost differentials (for both capital and professional
labor) do seem to have played a substantial role in shaping the U.S.
industry's behavior and competitiveness. For decades prior to the recent
rise of the yen and of Japanese living standards, American salaries for
professionals and managers were far higher than those prevailing in Japan.
In part this fact reflected economywide differentials in living standards
and income distribution; but it also, perhaps, reflected the nature and size
of the two nations' investments in engineering education. In part, American
salaries were high because appropriately trained personnel were relatively
scarcer. Consider the following data:
Total Electrical & Electronic Engineering Degrees (BS, MS, & Ph.D.)
Granted in the United States and Japan, 1969 - 1979
Year United States Japan
1969 16,282 11,848
1974 15,749 17,419
1979 16,093 21,435
Roughly similar trends hold for other engineering disciplines as well.
By 1978, all engineering graduates (all fields and at all degree levels)
represented 4.2% of their age group in Japan, versus 1.6% in the United
States.3 And while the strict comparability of the absolute numbers is
doubtful because educational standards differ, the trend is not. Since
professional wages typically account for half of a semiconductor company's
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costs, such a differential in supply surely imposed some cost penalty upon
U.S. firms. And, in fact, professional salaries were until recently far
higher, and tended to escalate more rapidly, in the United States than in
Japan. For front-end costs with long gestation periods (e.g. high risk
R&D), these differences could be a substantial fraction of life cycle costs,
particularly for any actor with a high discount rate. And many professional
wage costs are indeed incurred as such initial and/or fixed costs which can
be recovered only in the long run, so this cost penalty shortened U.S.
firms' effective time horizons. Several studies have indicated that capital
costs faced by U.S. firms generally, and by U.S. semiconductor producers in
particular, were substantially higher as well. The Chase Econometrics study
for the Semiconductor Industry Association, for example, concluded that
capital costs for U.S. merchant semiconductor producers were nearly double
those faced by the Japanese industry.' Since the semiconductor industry has
become dramatically more dependent upon initial engineering costs and far
more capital intensive since the mid-1970s, such capital cost differentials
presumably shortened the U.S. industry's time horizons and shifted its
investment strategies, at least relative to Japanese behavior, even if the
two industries were structurally identical. The expected effect would be to
shift U.S. investment towards marginal expenditures yielding secure short
term profits rather than aggressive, high initial cost, and/or long payback
investments.
But acceptance of this neoclassical mechanism as an explanation for the
industry's actual behavior generates further questions, and in some respects
makes the two industries' structural and strategic characteristics (and
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differences) much more puzzling than before. In particular, the negative
effect of factor cost differences upon the U.S. semiconductor industry's
investment levels and resultant international competitiveness appears to
have been increased by the industry's own behavior. If professional labor
was scarce as a result of the failure of government policy and the
educational system to provide sufficient numbers of engineers, the U.S.
industry should presumably have responded with extensive internal training
programs (more extensive than in Japan), use of Japanese engineering labor,
and/or structural change in favor of large, stable firms. The Japanese
industry and large U.S. firms such as DEC and IBM have invested in human
capital, investments which in the author's experience produce a substantial
fraction of these firms' technical labor forces. Conversely, the merchant
semiconductor industry has invested far less in its workforce and
organizational systems than either large U.S. firms or the Japanese
industry; merchants rarely even permitted employees to take unpaid
educational leave. Similarly, DEC's stock options vest over a ten year
period, while the norm in the merchant industry is four years.
Similarly if capital intensity, capital costs, and the appropriation of
dynamic scale economies were growing in importance, the U.S. industry would
rationally have become if anything more coordinated, vertically integrated,
and concentrated than the Japanese. Just as high energy prices stimulate
conservation efforts, high factor costs should have caused rationalization
in the U.S. industry. Instead, industry fragmentation and instability
persisted, and probably even increased. This not only resulted in
straightforward scale disadvantages, but further raised the capital costs of
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U.S. firms through their obligation to pay risk premiums for funds and to
maintain greater relative liquidity to cushion against external shocks such
as recessions or exchange rate shifts. In addition, merchant firms'
instability and liquidity requirements reduced their ability to invest
aggressively in future growth because as capital intensity grew, the
potential consequences of mistakes made at efficient scale became
unacceptably large.
For example, by 1980 an efficient-scale semiconductor factory cost well
over $100 million, and efficient production demanded both considerable
organizational sophistication and vertical technical coordination,
particularly for capital equipment and computer systems expertise. By some
estimates, minimum efficient plant scale has now escalated to $200 million
or more. If X-ray lithography behaves as anticipated, its commercial use
could raise plant level MES to $400 million by the mid-1990s. Similar
forces have transformed capital equipment and materials technologies. Yet
U.S. venture capital financed startup creation actually accelerated in the
early 1980s in both the semiconductor and equipment industries,5 and
sectoral rationalization is coming only through competitive crisis and
decline, rather than through foresighted strategic decisions. While the
Japanese industry's concentration and stability increased in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, that of the U.S. industry actually decreased.6
Steinmueller's estimates, from ICE Corp. data, are that between 1978 and
1984, the five-firm concentration ratio of Japanese domestic integrated
circuit production increased from 65% to 76%, and the ten-firm ratio
increased from 86% to 96%.
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In contrast, the U.S. ratios appear to have stayed roughly constant or
even declined slightly, and the U.S. industry remained far less concentrated
than Japan's. Steinmueller's estimate for the 1984 U.S. five-firm ratio is
58% including IBM's captive production, but only 47% for the merchant
industry alone. Commerce Department estimates of U.S. concentration, using
somewhat different definitions, arrive at similar concentration estimates
and also conclude that the U.S. merchant four-firm and eight-firm
concentration ratios declined about 5% in the 1980s.7 And Japanese firms
continued to form R&D collaborations, while the U.S. industry continued to
shun them.
Hence the persistent instability and fragmentation of the U.S. system,
in contrast with the integration and concentration of the Japanese system,
becomes even more mysterious if one accepts the importance of factor cost
differentials. Even if one accepts dynamic scale effects and factor price
differences as important, they cannot by themselves explain the primary
anomalies of the two national industries' behavior. They do not explain the
persistence of U.S. fragmentation after the advent of VLSI, or the deep
structural differences between the two national industries. Neither do such
considerations explain the simultaneous, asymmetric combination of Japanese
supply-side strategic coordination and American individualistic, narrowly
self-interested optimizations. Nor, and here possibly is the heart of the
issue, can factor costs, exchange rates, or other neoclassical variables
explain the characteristics and remarkable speed of the U.S. industry's
decline upon the onset of worldwide competition from Japan.
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Competitive Performance
Though in neoclassical analysis "performance" usually refers to
allocative market efficiency and the presence or absence of monopoly rents,
here I will consider a rather wider set of issues including national market
shares, dynamic effects (e.g. rates of technological progress), and
technological capabilities both within the semiconductor industry and as
delivered to users. By all of the relevant measures, the U.S. has fared
very poorly since the late 1970s: its world market share declined by one-
third, it suffered huge financial losses, and it ceded technical leadership.
To what extent can economic analysis explain this enormous shift in national
comparative advantage as measured by world market shares, trade balances,
operational efficiency, technological capacities, and ability to deliver
technology to users?
In general, economic theory offers four explanations for a national
industry's performance in international competition, and/or changes therein.
They are: factor costs; differential appropriation of increasing returns;
exchange rate shifts; and market distortions which affect allocative
efficiency, such as might be induced by government interventions. In the
semiconductor case, none of them work.
We have already noted one problem with the factor costs explanation:
the more force it has, the more inexplicable the remainder of the American
industry's behavior becomes. But there are other problems, as well. The
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U.S. industry showed signs of inefficiency and competitive decline at a time
when its aggregate R&D, capital spending, and resources still dwarfed
Japan's, and prior to the dollar's rise in the early 1980s. Even if U.S.
resources cost more, U.S. allocations were so much larger than Japan's that
the merchants should have been capable of delivering superior products. As
early as 1978, Japanese producers captured 40% of the world market for 16K
memories. Furthermore, the difference was not simply a matter of price;
Japanese products were judged superior in quality to those of the U.S.
merchant industry.8 At the time, the U.S. held over 90% of the world
capital equipment market, also held the majority of the Japanese capital
equipment market, and accounted for the vast majority of world semiconductor
R&D; U.S. merchant capital spending was more than double Japan's. Even if
U.S. factor costs were far higher than Japan's, one cannot account for
Japanese firms' success simply by saying they outspent the Americans.
Indeed by the next generation (64K devices first marketed in 1981)
Japanese firms led the U.S. industry in product introductions, and Japanese
production yields and quality levels were again reported to be higher than
those of the U.S. industry. And, as in several other U.S. industries
experiencing competitive difficulty, the available evidence suggests that
U.S. semiconductor producers consistently operated capital equipment less
efficiently than Japanese competitors. In fact, it would appear that factor
price effects have weighed more heavily in the mid-1980s than during the
period in which the first clear signs of U.S. decline appeared.
For somewhat similar reasons, explanations based upon learning effects
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are also dubious, at least as primary rather than secondary forces. Once
again, they render the U.S. industry's behavior ever more puzzling; and once
again, they do not account for the particulars of U.S. performance. Even
with its stability, concentration, and closure, the Japanese industry's
cumulative production experience was dwarfed by that of the leading U.S.
merchants at the time of Japan's initial successes against them. In the
late 1970s, the U.S. domestic market was enormously larger than the
protected Japanese domestic market, and U.S. firms held 50% of the European
market as well. Moreover, as important as operational efficiency was and
remains, the Japanese industry's gains also depended upon large scale issues
such as the willingness of U.S. firms to license proprietary designs, close
cooperation within the Japanese industry, and the propensity of U.S.
consumers to switch rapidly from merchants to Japanese suppliers. Japanese
producers frequently obtained large shares of world markets for merchant-
designed devices despite the fact that they had been created, and their
early production had been monopolized by, U.S. firms. For example, until
the early 1980s Intel licensed, and abandoned production of, many devices
whose profitability fell below the company's 20% pretax profit target.
During this period Intel also explicitly practiced "value" pricing to
maximize its current profits rather than its market share.9
Exchange rates have often been cited as major causal forces in
declining U.S. competitiveness, in analyses of the semiconductor industry as
well as more generally. In principle, exchange rate shifts derived from
macroeconomic sources differentially affect the competitiveness of some
classes of industries, causing large shifts in world market shares which are
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independent of real productivity or efficiency. Unfortunately, exchange
rates shifted in precisely the wrong directions to explain the semiconductor
industry's behavior. Between 1975 and 1980, the period in which Japanese
penetration of U.S. markets began, the yen appreciated against the dollar by
nearly one-third; by 1985 it had declined only about 15 percent from its
1980 level. 10 Then, between 1985 and 1987, the yen nearly doubled, while
Japan's semiconductor world market share rose slightly and the U.S.
semiconductor trade balance continued to deteriorate. Conversely between
1980 and 1985, the dollar nearly doubled against the European currencies -
and yet the U.S. semiconductor industry's market share in Europe stayed at
roughly 50 percent, versus 9 percent in Japan. Moreover, some of the most
important real performance indicators show changes which dwarf exchange rate
shifts. Over the last decade, for example, Japanese production of CMOS
devices has grown at a compounded annual rate 30 percent higher than U.S.
production (growth of over 60 percent annually versus roughly 30 percent).
Finally, we have a fourth possible explanation: distortions induced by
cartellization, government intervention, or other forces which reduce the
competitive discipline and allocative efficiency of the market. And indeed,
Japan employed virtually every practice neoclassical theory considers
antithetical to competitive success, while the merchant industry by
comparison was a model of competitive market efficiency.
And this, once again, should have produced a stagnant cartel in Japan
and a vibrant, successful, competitive industry in the United States. Or,
if the Japanese industry "succeeded" in semiconductor markets, neoclassical
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analysis would anticipate that this success would simply represent
uneconomic, massive subsidies rather than real competitive superiority. On
this view, semiconductor producers should show enormous inefficiencies and
Japanese semiconductor consumers - i.e. the same firms - would suffer in
downstream markets such as the computer industry. Yet, to state the matter
conservatively, this has not come to pass. The Japanese industry is
technically capable and aggressive, and its success in both semiconductor
markets and semiconductor intensive industries is growing rapidly. The
American industry is in retreat and in danger of permanently losing its
technical competitiveness.
Altogether, then, economic theory fares poorly in explaining this
industry's behavior. The question therefore arises as to how and why the
two national industries actually did diverge structurally, strategically,
and competitively. The answer, I will argue, lies primarily in chronic
strategic dilemmas which were resolved differently in the two nations, i.e.
in national divergences in what I have called "strategic regimes."
3. The Japanese and American Strategic Regimes
The Japanese and U.S. strategic regimes which evolved prior to the
onset of internationalized competition represented opposed solutions to a
similar set of strategic dilemmas. In the following exposition, I will
first briefly review the relevant national structural and environmental
conditions, then describe the strategic choices to which they gave rise, and
finally consider how the sum of these choices constituted strategic regimes
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with binding consequences for the semiconductor industry's dynamics. These
strategic interactions and national strategic regimes will be described in
game theoretic terms - as groups of concurrent, linked, iterated strategic
dilemmas between governments, firms, and employees. Two broad classes of
strategic dilemmas will be examined: those arising within each of the two
nations, and those arising between them. The style of the discussion, and
the model guiding it, are in large measure derived from theoretical work by
Axelrod, Arthur, and others concerning evolutionary processes driven by
iterated nondeterministic (usually strategic) decision problems. (In the
following analysis, I will assume considerable familiarity with this work; a
summary and review is found in Appendix 1.) However, unlike most of the
extant theoretical analyses and computer simulations, the complexity of
interactions in this industry (and I suspect in most industries) renders a
single iterated strategic dilemma inadequate as an explanatory model.
Rather, it proves most useful to consider clusters of related strategic
processes, and the aggregate characteristics of the strategic behavior they
induce; hence the idea of a strategic regime.
In applying this model to the semiconductor industry, government
policies and macroeconomic conditions (particularly factor costs and
discount rates) can be regarded as steering or guidance mechanisms which
affected the differing strategic choices made in the two nations. Their
direct role in conditioning performance (i.e. the role attributed to them in
neoclassical analysis) was probably modest, but they tilted agents within
the two national industries into different strategic choices; and these
choices led to the formation of strategic regimes which did determine
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structure and performance outcomes. Two interesting examples of arenas in
which initially small forces lead to widely divergent large scale outcomes
are found in an article by Brian Arthur and, more recently, in Robert
Axelrod's "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." Arthur demonstrated how
increasing returns (such as learning effects) magnified initially small
variances and produced divergent end results. All of the endpoints of the
process, however, were economically "locked in" by accumulated sunk costs.
Similarly, Axelrod's article exhibited a class of games in which
iterated strategic interactions will always reinforce one pattern of
behavior to the eventual exclusion of all others, but in which the identity
of the favored behavior pattern is neither ex ante determinate nor
particularly likely to be optimal. In Axelrod's example, the mechanism
which forced eventual strategic conformity involved a metagame which
included a propensity to punish not only nonconformists, but even other
conformists who had failed to punish nonconformists in prior interactions.
(For example, a law might both punish smoking in public AND the failure of
any nonsmoker to inflict such punishment.) In single-game arenas, this is
not a terribly plausible condition. But we shall see that if an arena
involves multiple, concurrent strategic processes, and if choices in some
games have implications for choices in others, the same result is produced.
Effectively, the system restricts long run viability to a subset of
distinct, internally consistent, mutually exclusive classes of strategic
choices - feasible strategy sets. Others are internally inconsistent.
Among those which are feasible, some may be collectively stable in the face
of external challenges, while others may not.
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This is essentially the form of the argument I will make below: the
forces which governed competitive strategy in the semiconductor industry
derived not only from conventional economic signals such as factor costs but
also, and perhaps primarily, from strategic interactions in which factor
costs and other nationally specific environmental conditions promoted
certain strategies over others but did not determine outcomes. Given that
firms had to make multiple concurrent choices, and that some of these
choices were interconnected, each decision pushed the system towards a
certain regime - an internally cooperative, productive one in Japan, a
noncooperative inefficient one in the United States. Each was internally
stable. This will explain, for example, why technological and competitive
signals were insufficient to rationalize the U.S. industry: by the time
VLSI arrived, a strategic regime inimical to structural and strategic
rationalization was already entrenched. Hence the cost of rationalization
was no longer simply the cost of, say, purchasing or constructing the
required facilities; it was the cost of reversing the behavior patterns of
an entire industry. But while change from within the U.S. industry might
have been difficult, its displacement by Japan was not.
Hence the argument begins with the assertion that although the two
national systems faced similar strategic choices, a variety of governmental,
structural, and macroeconomic conditions facilitated the appearance of
differing strategic behaviors in the two nations. These strategic behaviors
then spread through their national arenas and led to the evolution of
stable, self-replicating strategic regimes. One of them - the Japanese
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regime - was at least to a first approximation a "collectively stable
regime," analogously to Axelrod's definition of a collectively stable
strategy: one which cannot be disrupted by any other, in the sense that its
members would continue to outperform the invader.'" However, the other
regime - the American one - was only internally stable: it replicated
itself stably only until an external predator assailed it, whereupon its
practitioners facilitated each other's demise. The stability
characteristics of the system, many of which derived from nationally
specific economic and policy conditions, were sufficient to prevent domestic
production of more than a few "nonconformists," i.e. practitioners of
productive long term cooperation. The U.S. regime was such that any
individual U.S. firm seeking to deviate would find itself becoming a public
service provider to its domestic competitors.
But a protected, efficient foreign industry was another matter. The
American system's fragility derived both from its native inefficiency and
from purely strategic features which made it vulnerable to exploitation from
outside. In other words, it appears that even product market competition
alone from an efficient external competitor would have eventually destroyed
the U.S. industry and/or its regime. But the additional pressure generated
by the strategic predation which consituted a major element of Japanese
competitive strategy both hastened U.S. decline and severely reduced the
prospects of internal reforms within the U.S. system.
In both nations, the dominant strategic regime became a major force in
the competitive environment faced by firms prior to the onset of
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international competition. It exercised great influence over their
potential efficiency, bargaining power, and effective time horizons. But
Japan's regime improved efficiency, lengthened the time horizons of domestic
firms, and increased their bargaining power in international strategic
interactions. America's regime had precisely the reverse effect. Because
for perhaps two decades the deficiencies of the American regime governed and
were shared by all domestic participants, the regime appeared viable, and
survived, as long as the American industry faced no foreign competition.
But the American industry, and the regime by which it lived, were destined
to fail when challenged by a system not hobbled by these strategic deficits.
Japanese and American Arena Structures and Their Strategic Effects
Let us take the description of the Japanese and U.S. systems provided
earlier to be roughly accurate. The Japanese system had and has an
interventionist, protectionist, developmental government; the U.S. system,
an aloof one. The Japanese system is dominated by a handful of diversified
industrial complexes, protected even from domestic entry; conversely in the
U.S. system antitrust policy, tax expenditures, and industrial fragmentation
facilitate and even promote entry. At the macroeconomic level, lower
Japanese capital costs and mass engineering education shift Japanese firms
towards somewhat more aggressive investment strategies and longer time
horizons than American firms would employ, everything else being equal. And
so forth. Given the general nature of semiconductor technology and demand,
how might these distinct national environments have affected strategic
interactions, and how might strategic choices have been made?
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In what follows, I will seek to answer this question by describing and
analyzing eight iterated strategic dilemmas facing the industry, their
relations to each other, and the differing choices made by various U.S. and
Japanese actors. Four of these strategic dilemmas are largely internal to
national systems, while another four are international strategic dilemmas in
which Japanese and American actors (governments and firms) confront each
other. In somewhat simplistic but broadly accurate terms, each situation
involves a choice between cooperation and adversarial behavior, though some
interactions permit intermediate choices. All have significant implications
for the efficiency and welfare of individual actors and the wider arena.
Some are Prisoner's Dilemmas; others are closer to the games of "Stag Hunt,"
"Chicken," or "Bully."'2
These other games, like Prisoner's Dilemma, all make adversarial
behavior tempting in the short term, but under different conditions. Stag
Hunt strongly favors cooperation unless distrust or information problems
make defection by another likely. Chicken is just that, and in iterated
versions it is highly unstable because each player has a strong incentive to
prove his/her willpower and determination, even to the point of
irrationality. But with slight changes in payoff structure - one player
faces Chicken while the other defects all the time - the result is Bully.
Note that the madman theory, and extreme theories of deterrence, consist in
one player's seeking to convince an opponent that he/she can or will outlast
the other. If one player really has more short term resilience than the
other, in a long term game this can be highly attractive. For example, it
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is an excellent rationale for dumping or other forms of unsustainable price
competition.
In each case described below, one of these games is involved. And in
each case, national systems and the positions of actors within them will be
shown to condition their choices of strategy, and these strategic choices
will be shown to react back upon the larger industry's structure, conduct,
and competitive performance. The systemic factors to which I will ascribe
causal roles in conditioning choices of cooperative versus adversarial
strategies adhere very closely to those elucidated by the theoretical
literature: payoff structures; concentration of the arena (or "number of
players," as Oye puts it); time horizons; and the distribution of
information and communication regarding others' behavior.13 Equally
important, I will argue that in this case the various individual strategic
interactions under discussion are heavily interdependent; each strategic
choice in one process affects decisionmaking in the other interactions. The
result will be the coalescence of clusters of mutually reinforcing strategic
choices which cumulatively generate an entire, binding strategic environment
within an industry: its strategic regime.
Strategic Actors in Semiconductor Industry Arenas
At the most general level, there are only three classes of actors in
each nation: the national government, domestic firms, and employees.
(Occasionally in the American context it may prove useful to distinguish
another class, investor / executives, as having interests distinct from
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those of either firms or employees.) In the Japanese arena we can for the
most part regard all of the principal firms as diversified, vertically
integrated oligopolists with, in game theoretic terms, essentially identical
payoff matrices in all pertinent interactions.
In contrast, it will prove necessary to distinguish several different
categories of U.S. firms. First, the industry is vertically divided into
users and/or captive producers (systems firms), semiconductor vendors
(merchants), and suppliers (capital equipment firms). Second, it will also
prove necessary to distinguish core established firms (IBM, DEC, etc.) from
new startups (MIPS, LSI Logic); and finally, it will be useful to
distinguish strong firms from weak ones. There are intermediate cases: the
larger merchants are intermediate between startups and core firms, and also
probably between strong and weak firms. Most or all U.S. startups can be
regarded as weak firms for the purposes of considering their strategic
interests, while all major Japanese firms can be regarded as strong. The
differing payoff structures facing different classes of firms, together with
the fragmentation of the U.S. system, will turn out to have a major effect
upon strategic dynamics.
The Domestic (or Internal) Interactions
The four "domestic" strategic dilemmas are as follows:
1. Government - Industry: the industrial social contract game. In
this game, a government either provides strategic bargaining services,
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protectionism, and sectoral public goods to an industry or a firm within it
(Cooperation) or fails to provide such goods (Defection). A domestic
industry or a firm within such an industry, conversely, either optimizes its
domestic investment growth and technological progress (Cooperation) or it
uses whatever market power it possesses to harvest rents and stagnate
(Defection). Note that if either the industry is growing or monopoly power
cannot last forever, the industry's decision will be conditioned by its
effective time horizon - or, as Axelrod and Oye put it, by the length of
"the shadow of the future."
Consider now how this game was played in the two nations. For reasons
beyond the scope of the present analysis, Japan appears to have consistently
played Tit-For-Tat (TFT), or Reciprocity, throughout the postwar period.
With some exceptions, the Japanese industry did so as well, with the result
that a relatively consistent pattern of government - business cooperation
emerged. The Japanese industry's strategic choice was facilitated by the
structure of the iterated game and by the Japanese economic environment.
Because the government played Cooperation whenever the industry did, and
furthermore did so by means which reduced players' discount rates (e.g.
providing public goods and making low-cost capital easy to obtain), long
time horizons and major investments became favored relative to static rent
extraction as the preferred strategies of a coordinated industry. Moreover,
the government was powerful and was certainly not going to disappear; hence
the shadow of the future cast by future rounds of interaction was maximally
long. The cooperative strategy in the government's side of the social
contract, furthermore, included consistently playing Defection in the
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international game of strategic trade behavior, i.e. pursuing a highly
strategic international economic policy. So long as trading partners such
as the United States did not respond, the result was substantial
opportunities for export growth. Hence the favored, though not determinate,
result of this interaction was a pattern of reciprocal cooperation in which
the Japanese industry used its internal strategic relationships to promote
growth and external predation.
By contrast, in the American case the government's strategy, once again
for reasons beyond the scope of the present work, might be whimsically but
rather accurately described as Random, perhaps biased towards Defection.
This is particularly true of the past decade, when U.S. competitive
difficulties have been noticeable and increasingly acute. In areas ranging
from the strategic trade policy game to antitrust reform to intellectual
property protection to engineering education to monetary policy, the U.S.
government failed to provide a consistent flow of strategic and/or
infrastructural benefits to the relevant U.S. industries. Moreover, it has
appeared that the government's "strategy" was nearly independent of the
industry's behavior. It is worth noting, however, that to some extent the
government's inattention derived from other dysfunctional strategic
behaviors within the industry itself. Because the industry's fragmentation
and short time horizons biased it against industrywide interest aggregation,
collective action, and long term planning, the merchant industry in
particular made no attempt to educate the U.S. government (or even itself)
as to the nature of Japanese strategy and the threat it posed.
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Therefore, as a result of the U.S. government's failure to act as a
strategic agent, the U.S. industry's strategic choices (in regard to
promoting long run national productivity versus short term, individualistic
rent taking) were disciplined only by other elements of its strategic
environment, not by the provision of any governmental assistance or
punishment. And the other elements of the strategic environment were not
favorable to optimal efficiency, collective action, or long run growth
strategies, as we shall now see.
2. Industry One - Industry Two: the vertical cooperation game. In
this game, an industry or a firm within it either commits itself to
substantial relationships such as technological codevelopment with its
suppliers and/or customers (Cooperation), or declines such cooperation and
betrays its business partners whenever a superior short term opportunity
arises (Defection). Here, moreover, there is a related but somewhat
distinct game which we might call National Verticalism: a firm or industry
can either commit to using domestic vertical partners (Cooperation) or can
switch at will to foreign vertical partners (Defection). Presumably,
reciprocated cooperation brings substantial long run productivity benefits
through information sharing, coordination of complementary activities,
rationalization of investments, and so forth. Some of these benefits are
purely bilateral, while others (such as technology transfer to an open
market supplier) generally create positive externalities. In this case, the
pattern of strategic choice also determines the degree to which
externalities are generated, and also their national and sectoral
distribution.
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On the other hand, opportunities for defection can be very attractive
over the short run. Note, for example, that as defined here it would be a
Defection for a firm to switch to a foreign supplier. In turn, Industry Two
faces the same strategic dilemma.
Consider now how the Japanese industry faced this dilemma. First, the
vertical integration of the Japanese industry implied that in many cases
vertical interactions were contained within the same firm; in this case,
following Williamson, we can agree that no bilateral bargaining problem
exists. In many other cases, the same structure of diversified, marketized
vertical integration implies that domestic vertical interactions occur
between different units of competing firms, say between Hitachi's materials
producing subsidiary and Toshiba's semiconductor operations, and vice versa.
In this case, even though the relationship is vertical rather than
horizontal in the strict sense, the strategic problem is exactly the same as
that involving potential cooperation between two competitors. In the
Japanese industry, strategic conditions favor at least a moderately
cooperative solution. There are few players, because the industry is
concentrated; there is little or no new entry, so failed relationships
cannot be easily escaped; the government sometimes uses coercion to ensure
technical cooperation among competitors; failure to cooperate could result
in reciprocal action by the other business units of the competitor.
Since these firms are large and stable, the shadow of the future is
once again long. Moreover, in rapidly growing industries in which a high
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fraction of incremental sales are either captive or come at the expense of
foreign competitors, even the direct cost of assisting a competitor in a
generic supply technology (e.g. capital equipment) is not likely to be high.
Even if such vertical agreements resulted in technology "leakage" to other
domestic competitors and therefore to some extent constituted sectorwide
public goods provision, this revenue structure plus the concentration of the
Japanese arena implied that, at least following Mancur Olson's classic
analysis of the problem, significant individual returns would accrue to the
provider. Therefore although strategic indeterminacy still existed, it was
attenuated, more closely approximating a game of Stag Hunt than an extremely
sharp and painful Prisoner's Dilemma.
Hence in the Japanese arena the favored though not determinate result
of this iterated game would logically be TFT, and hence a stable history of
mutual long term vertical cooperation, even to the extent of sectoral public
goods provision, at least up to the extent they made economic sense for the
Japanese sector as a whole. Since the economics and technology of VLSI
imply that such vertical coordination is in fact extremely important, this
result was presumably of substantial benefit; and, in fact, we observe
essentially this behavior within the Japanese industry.
Now consider the American industry's strategic problem. In the
American case it will be necessary to distinguish relatively stable
oligopolists (IBM, Perkin-Elmer and Teradyne in equipment, possibly in some
cases the largest merchants) from unstable minor firms and entrepreneurial
startups. Stable firms faced some of the same incentives to vertical
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cooperation which characterized the Japanese arena, and in fact such firms
cooperated far more than any others within the American system. (We have
already noted, for example, that IBM has a substantial history of long term
cooperation with Perkin-Elmer, Teradyne, and Intel.) Stable firms
cooperating with each other could, once again, appropriate substantial gains
even if they were effectively providing public goods; and their stability
implied that the shadow of the future was long. However, in the U.S. arena
such decisions regarding vertical cooperation versus defection, even among
the stablest firms, had less echo in the strategic decisions of other firms,
because of the vertical disaggregation and fragmentation of the arena
generally. So IBM collaborating with Teradyne had no interdependence with
any potential collaboration between an IBM capital equipment production
organization and another systems firm, whereas in Japan cooperating with
Advantest would really, in significant measure, be cooperating with Fujitsu.
Similarly, the benefits of public goods were more widely dispersed; even IBM
is only about 10% of U.S. capital equipment consumption. Therefore there
existed less gain for individual providers, less pressure for reciprocity in
the U.S. system, and consequently weaker incentives for cooperation even
among the largest, stablest firms.
Probably more importantly, however, there were strong incentives for
defection, or more precisely for avoidance of long term cooperation, in the
rest of the system. First, all the smaller players were arena takers, which
shifted them towards "free rider" (Defection) positions in dilemmas
involving sectoral public goods provision. Nor did there exist any central
authority such as MITI capable of punishing a firm's failure to contribute
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to such public goods. Second, the possibilities of proprietary vertical
cooperation were limited by personnel turnover, including defections to
startups, and by the instability of existing firms.
Third, the financial fragility of small firms reduced their effective
time horizons, at least with respect to investments with high initial costs
and long paybacks. Therefore cooperation requiring such investments was
disfavored even in a straightforward economic way, independent of strategic
interactions; but there was a strategic effect as well. If for whatever
reason (financial condition or otherwise) a firm's time horizon is short,
the shadow of the future is less long and the propensity to play Defection
is increased. This had an effect both upon firms insecure about their own
futures and upon those observing difficulties in their vertical partners.
Hence, for example, small Silicon Valley firms often abrogated technical
agreements in mid-course. Since both participants were small portions of
their markets, retaliatory punishment was infeasible and defections
therefore went undisciplined.
This behavior was analogous to a pattern Axelrod noted in connection
with failing commercial firms: "...once a manufacturer begins to go under,
even his best customers begin refusing payment for merchandise, claiming
defects in quality, failure to meet specifications, tardy delivery, or what
have you. The great enforcer of morality in commerce is the continuing
relationship, the belief that one will have to do business again with this
customer, or this supplier..."14 In the U.S. industry, this enforced or
expected continuity was diminished not only by failure but also by the
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continuous stream of new venture backed entrants, whose product technologies
were often competitive with those of established firms for several years.
This continuous entry reduced pressures to reach accommodations with
existing firms. Hence the favored strategic result among small firms and
startups was to defect as soon as payoff structure made defection attractive
even in a single period of interaction, because the expected force of
subsequent bilateral interactions was small. This mechanism would also lead
to defection even by large stable firms when dealing with small, unstable
ones; and indeed the industry's history includes many episodes in which
large firms turned upon their small partners.
The result of these interactions was the evolution of a strategic norm
of pervasive distrust and defection, once this pattern became both
widespread and explicitly recognized by participants. This pattern, it
should be emphasized, not only reduced access to the technical benefits of
coordination but also reduced firms' effective time horizons yet further,
because they could not trust any dependence upon the nature or membership of
future arenas, much less upon reciprocity. This not only had behavioral
consequences, but structural and performance implications as well. First,
it fostered the widespread developoment of captive semiconductor production,
which might be defined as the production of anything requiring vertical
trust and technical coordination. But, of course, few downstream firms
could produce the desired number of such products at efficient scale even in
the case of semiconductors, and certainly not in the case of capital
equipment, materials, and so forth. Consequently many of the returns to
long term vertical coordination and reciprocal sectorwide public goods
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provision were lost, and U.S. performance chronically suffered accordingly.
This performance effect is difficult to measure, but the evidence
suggests that it is substantial. Consider, for example, how vertical
noncooperation between merchants and consumers interacts with backlog and
purchasing management to the disadvantage of both. Merchants are secretive
about their backlogs, while consumers are secretive about their purchasing,
but each needs the other's information for capacity and production planning.
This yields the following vicious circle. When cyclical upturns begin,
purchasers fear that merchants will become capacity constrained, causing
mounting backlogs and delayed shipments. The merchants' estimates are known
to be unreliable. Hence purchasers place multiple orders, often with
different firms, in order to reduce their queueing time. Merchants, unable
to judge the real size of demand, either overexpand or generate huge
backlogs, while purchasers unexpectedly cancel redundant orders when their
demand is met elsewhere. The result is further instability which increases
the strength of the cycle. In some cases, the Japanese industry is able to
increase its market share substantially by soaking up backlogs and providing
accurate delivery information. This phenomenon appeared in the 1975 U.S.
recession and also contributed to the merchants' plight in 1984 and 1985.
The cycle punishes both merchants and consumers relative to cooperating
firms and/or integrated industrial complexes such as IBM, AT&T, and the
Japanese.
3. Firm One - Firm Two: the horizontal cooperation game. Here,
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competing firms in the same industry decide whether to cooperate with versus
attack each other. Note firstly that horizontal interaction actually, in
most cases, includes several related games. Firms can cooperate or defect
(compete, fight) in product markets (cartellization versus competition),
foreign technology sales (declining to sell technologies to foreign
competitors, versus playing Defection by engaging in such sales), political
strategy (seeking joint protection or special favors), research and
development (sharing the costs of generic technology or going their own
way), supplying each other with complementary technologies or intermediates
(agreeing to cross supply versus refusing to do so), in hiring and human
capital policy (hiring from each other's workforces or agreeing to avoid
predatory hiring in favor of internal training), and bidding for inputs or
assets (agreeing to avoid bidding wars, or alternatively engaging in them).
As with Industry One - Industry Two, there is also a related but distinct
National Cooperation game: firms can either cooperate only with domestic
firms (Cooperation) or they can cooperate at will with foreign competitors
(Defection).
Some of these decisions are matters of degree rather than purely binary
matters; firms can collusively fix prices, or compete by pricing at average
cost, or engage in unsustainable destructive competition by pricing below
marginal cost (a game described below). Note finally that once again
decisions in these games are closely related to decisions in others. For
example, if an industry plays a strategy of Cooperation in the industrial
social contract game (#1 above), it is probably precluded from cartellistic
cooperation in product markets, at least in the domestic market. Similarly,
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playing Cooperation in the social contract game probably implies playing
Cooperation in the Firm I - Firm 2 game with respect to foreign technology
sales. Interestingly, playing Cooperation with respect to hiring and human
capital policy may depend upon the government playing Cooperation in an
unusual way: by restricting entry into the industry which would lead to
employee defection and personnel turnover. The same may be true of the
final domestic game I will describe, Companies and Employees, which likewise
affects levels of human capital investment and labor productivity.
Now, consider how the Japanese industry evaluated the various strategic
dilemmas presented by horizontal interdependency. Much of the above
discussion of vertical cooperation will apply, since the relevant firms,
industries, and structural conditions are the same. Hence once again a
substantial degree of domestic coordination could be expected. However in
addition to the usual strategic issues raised by bilateral vertical
interactions, horizontal coordination raised one further issue of great
importance: would the Japanese industry coordinate in order to stagnate
profitably, or in order to grow and become more productive? For example,
would the industry collude to fix prices and become insensitive to costs, or
would it collude to maximize its efficiency? In short, would the Japanese
industry coordinate internally by playing Cooperation in the social contract
game, or by playing Defection?
While once again the process was not determinate, three factors shifted
Japanese strategy towards efficiency-maximizing, farsighted coordination as
opposed to rent harvesting. First, the Japanese government appeared fully
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capable of playing TFT, punishing the industry if it failed to perform
rather than supporting it through protectionism and subsidy. In other
words, the nature of one iterated strategic process had a substantial effect
upon another. Second, environmental conditions gave the industry incentives
to possess long time horizons; for example, capital costs were low and so,
too, were other initial costs pertinent to time horizons, such as R&D wages.
And third, a variety of cost and strategic conditions suggested that the
Japanese industry could eventually become internationally competitive,
through a combination of high efficiency and strategic advantage in dealing
with the U.S. industry. Therefore (at least if this proved correct) an
extremely high fraction of the incremental revenue derived from a Japanese
firm's increased competitiveness would be taken not from other Japanese
firms but rather from the U.S. industry, which initially held 60% of the
world market. Hence strategic reciprocity of the long-run-growth variety
offered the likelihood, at least over the long term, of being a positive sum
game, rather than the nearly zero sum game which would have characterized
the Japanese domestic market alone.
Interestingly, the extraordinary strategic intensity of Japanese
strategic reciprocity is indicated by Japanese performance in mature sectors
in which product market competition has, in fact, become a zero sum game
(such as the steel and shipbuilding industries). The role of the state, the
long run strategic interactions of the industrial groups, and the effect of
defection upon future recruitment have exerted such force that Japanese
firms have avoided unsustainable competition, mass layoffs, or other forms
of defection.
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Consider now the contrasting American situation. Once again, many of
the observations pertinent to vertical strategic interactions carry over to
the horizontal case, and so within the U.S. industry defection prevailed for
the same reasons. In addition, the U.S. government played a strategy
somewhere between randomness and defection in the social contract game,
which hardly helped matters. Hence in general, horizontal cooperation was
not favored either in product markets or in supply-side activities with
efficiency-increasing potential, such as joint R&D. Hence the prevailing
behavior (horizontally) within the U.S. merchant and equipment sectors was
rather general defection. Only the largest merchants had any incentive to
coordinate with each other, and even their coordination incentives were
limited by the continuous appearance of new, predatory startups.
It was therefore unsurprising that when the industry's first serious
attempt at coordination was finally made, in the form of the 1986 Sematech
proposal for joint manufacturing R&D, it was originated by IBM and came only
after a deep crisis had finally evoked the beginnings of government support
for the industry's, survival, independence from Japanese control, and
technological health. Even so, several merchants who felt their positions
differentially threatened by the Sematech proposal, such as Texas
Instruments, provided little or no initial support.
4. Companies and Employees: the human capital game. In this game,
employers can either assist, train, trust, and invest in their employees
(Cooperation) or alternatively exploit and distrust them, for example by
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declining to train them and firing them at will (Defection). Conversely,
employees can either work for the long run success of their employers
(Cooperation) or can use their positions and/or accumulated knowledge to
personal advantage by betraying the employer, for example by producing
minimal work or defecting to a competing firm (Defection).
In Japan, this game was played with a striking combination of
cooperation and coercion, suggesting that the game had a payoff structure
similar to Bully. Because Japanese firms and industrial groups cooperated
horizontally in refusing to hire defectors from each other's employ, and
because government protectionism prevented the presence of Americans who
might have engaged in predation, Japanese employees had far less opportunity
than Americans to play Defection. And to some extent, they were exploited
accordingly; wages and near term wage increases were kept very low relative
to American norms, though long term wage growth rates have compared very
favorably. However, the game was not, and would not rationally be, a purely
exploitive one.
Recall that Japanese firms were playing a long-term-growth strategy,
one dependent upon and oriented towards maximal efficiency and eventual
international competitiveness. In addition, the Japanese industry's
institutionalization of lifetime employment and of unionization at the firm
(rather than craft or industry) level implied enforced repetition of
interactions, and hence (following Axelrod) the optimality of long term
reciprocity, at least to the extent that employee defection would reduce
productivity.
226
.............
Therefore Japanese firms invested heavily in the training and
socialization of their workforces, hoping that employees would seek to
qualify for such investments and secure that the most extreme form of
employee defection was impossible. Employees reciprocated, knowing that the
firm's success affected theirs, and that their individual career prospects
depended upon recognition within one firm. Many observors (e.g. Dore,
Jaikumar, Clark) believe these patterns of human capital investment and
worker-firm reciprocity have contributed substantially to the success
achieved by the Japanese industrial system. Recently, the system has come
under some duress as mature industries have initiated some layoffs and
decreased protectionism has permitted more American predation; but at
present, the system remains largely intact.
Yet again, the American contrast is striking and instructive. U.S.
employees defect frequently, and U.S. firms return the favor. While a few
large captives and downstream firms (IBM, DEC, AT&T) have turnover rates of
5% or less, turnover in U.S. electronics averages more than 15%. Even
Intel, among the stablest of the merchants, has a turnover rate of 8%. And
in addition to the equilibrium turnover rate, there are layoffs. While once
again a few large U.S. firms avoid involuntary layoffs, they are common in
the U.S. industry. In the 1985 industry recession, temporary U.S. layoffs
totaled 60,000, and about 10,000 employees were permanently terminated. In
Japan, no layoffs occurred, even in firms whose semiconductor revenues
declined substantially.
227
The U.S. industry is also, in large measure, locked into this
situation. Any attempt at horizontal coordination to reduce turnover would
probably violate the antitrust laws, would be difficult to achieve as a
consequence of the industry's fragmentation, and would fall victim to
predation by startups. Startups with risky futures, short time horizons,
and immediate human capital needs serve as permanent spoilers in the system.
Aside from a very few firms (IBM is one), hiring persons who have defected
multiple times from previous employers is an accepted practice, considered
necessary to obtain skilled labor. It is also notable that in high-turnover
systems, employees' incentives to give the firm their best efforts are
weakened by the knowledge that they can go elsewhere. Hence stagnant firms'
condition is worsened by the departure of their best, leaving only those not.
marketable elsewhere.
The U.S. shortage of trained technical labor, in combination with
turnover rates, appears also to have led to bidding up of professional
salaries. This not only raised costs per se but also reduced the time
horizons of firms with respect to investments to which labor is the
principal input, such as long range R&D. In addition, training is
disincented by turnover. Most comparative studies have concluded that
Japanese firms train their employees far more than U.S. firms. Jaikumar,
for example, found that Japanese users of FMSs trained their employees three
times longer than U.S. firms, despite the fact that the Japanese workforce
already possessed far more formal education than the American.
And, quite apart from providing disincentives to training, excessive
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turnover through layoffs and defections reduces an industry's long run
productivity. 15 Many times in the semiconductor industry's history, entire
R&D groups or design teams have defected in the midst of important projects.
AT&T, General Electric, Motorola, Fairchild, and Intel among others have
been the victims of mass defections which have caused severe operational
disruptions. More generally, learning effects of several kinds are widely
considered critical to competitive advantage in the semiconductor industry.
Under conditions of high turnover, many learning opportunities are lost.
Two Domestic Regimes: Behavior and Stability Characteristics
We have now described a series of long run strategic interactions in
which U.S. and Japanese firms, governments, and employees played different,
nationally specific strategies as a consequence of government policy,
industrial structure, and macroeconomic conditions. Assuming for the moment
that the two national systems interacted weakly or not at all (roughly true-
until 1980, save for Japanese technology buying), we can consider the
behaviors to which these strategic practices gave rise. Two issues are of
particular interest first, the implications these strategic behaviors had
for economic structure, conduct, and performance; and second, the extent to
which these behaviors were stable. The two questions are closely related;
if a set of practices formed a stable equilibrium, forces such as
technological change would not result in optimal structural or behavioral
adjustments. Firms would be incented away from socially optimal choice of
technique, and even those seeking to adopt best technology would be
constrained by the network of strategic interdependencies and behaviors
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dominating the arena.
Once again assuming that the characterizations provided above are
accurate, the strategic picture indicates that even without international
strategic interactions (product market competition or otherwise), the U.S.
regime was severely disadvantaged precisely because it was highly stable.
(Note that stability was an attribute of the regime, not most of the firms
within it.) Consider specifically the plight of a U.S. merchant, systems
producer, or equipment firm attempting to respond to the technical,
structural, and competitive imperatives of VLSI. Major increases in
investments in external vertical linkages were unlikely to be appropriable.
Except for the small number of stable firms, the partner presented a high
risk of defection or failure; and turnover ensured technology leakage. -
Purely captive operations were becoming progressively more expensive, and
are now prohibitively so for most U.S. users. Open-market sales to justify
efficient scale operations (i.e., adoption of the Japanese corporate
structure of diversified vertical integration) would also present severe
difficulties, because the logical customers would be competitors in upstream
and/or downstream markets, and the entire remainder of the regime favored
defection over cooperation among competitors. Massive internal investments,
particularly in training, would also benefit competitors through turnover.
Paradoxically, then, the U.S. industry institutionalized itself in a
manner which condemned its participants to perpetual instability. Once
corporate instability, high turnover, and the continuous formation of new
ventures became accepted facts within the American industry, subsequent
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activity both within and surrounding the industry came to assume and thereby
reinforce this behavior. In Silicon Valley, a large infrastructure of
venture capitalists, consultants, headhunters, subcontractors, equipment
producers, service firms, and leasing companies arose in response to an
industry constituted of young, unstable, cash-limited, entrepreneurial
firms. Business practices came to assume instability, discouraging
efficient scale investments and long term commitments; for example, users
required merchants to license second sources, which subsidized further entry
and fragmentation. Firms paid thousand-dollar rewards to employees who
recruited personnel from other firms, including their previous employers.
Stock options, which vested over four year periods, became essential to the
recruiting and retention of talented employees until a public offering made
founders, venture capitalists, and valued employees wealthy. (Thereafter,
performance incentives and loyalty often waned considerably, and firms
frequently became net victims of headhunting rather than predators.)
Regional concentrations of high technology firms, factor markets, and
infrastructure - such as Silicon Valley - grew rapidly, reinforcing
fragmentation by providing locally the ingredients for new ventures.16
Moreover, high levels of turnover and new venture formation produced
agency problems: differences between executive incentives and decisions
optimal for long run firm-level growth. For example, consider technology
sales to Japanese competitors, a game discussed below. Even if the practice
of technology sales damaged the firm in the long run, the combination of
executive personnel mobility and the industry's collective growth implied
that such damage had little personal relevance to decisionmakers unless it
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became visible quite rapidly - say, in less than five years. Otherwise,
their stock options would already be vested, and they might even have moved
to another firm.
Therefore although chronic pressure might well have eventually forced a
gradual rationalization of the U.S. system, it would have come far more
slowly than long term optimizations based upon technology and economics
would have dictated. Indeed, the stability of a regime dominated by
pervasive defections and internal instability was surely dysfunctional long
before Japanese competition destroyed it. But the regime's problems
remained submerged for two reasons. First, the United States had an
enormous accumulated stock of technological and economic strength; it was
exhausted, or fully converted into personal consumption, only recently. And
second, as long as no external competitor existed, the U.S. system remained
in aggregate internal equilibrium, its aggregate long run deficits shared by
all participants and therefore apparently invisible.
Altogether the U.S. system fairly well approximated the condition
Axelrod describes as "All D," meaning that all players defect all the time.
Such a strategic environment, in the case of a single strategic interaction
in which all players face identical payoff structures, has been
theoretically shown to be "collectively stable," again in Axelrod's sense:
it cannot be successfully invaded by a single player with any other
strategy. On the other hand, and unlike an arena dominated by Reciprocity,
a defection-dominated arena CAN be successfully invaded either if another
player has a different payoff structure, or if the invasion comes not from a
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single player but rather from a group of players who cooperate with each
other. In fact, both theoretical and simulation results indicate that high-
defection, low-efficiency arenas can be invaded and defeated even by
surprisingly small numbers of mutually cooperating agents. The reason is
that their cooperation with each other generates higher payoffs than are
ever available to agents who defect against each other as well as against
the invaders.
What is remarkable is that this simple model approximates so closely
what happened between the Japanese and American semiconductor industries.
While the actual course of events was considerably more complex than a
simple invasion of a homogeneous arena and "all D" regime by another
strategic player (and some of the differences are important), even the
sparest and simplest model tells a great deal. In Japan, longer time
horizons and denser relationships generated intranational cooperation which
gave Japanese firms enormous advantages when competing against fragmented,
shortsighted, mutually defecting Americans. When the combination of its
strategic advantages and growing technical prowess elevated the Japanese
industry to parity with its American counterpart, the Japanese industry
abandoned its prior self-restraint and "invaded" the world market generally
and the U.S. arena in particular.
4. The Nature of International Strategic Interactions
Therefore, it will be useful to consider international strategic
interactions in analyzing the sources and course of the Japanese strategic
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"invasion." Four games will be considered here which, though not all are
inherently international, have played significant roles in the international
interactions, including market competition, witnessed by the semiconductor
industry over the past decade. They are:
1. Government One - Government Two: the strategic policy game. The
one-period version of this game encompasses the strategic models of the new
international economics, for example the models of Brander, Spencer, Dixit,
Krishna, Krugman, and Helpman. In the iterated game, of course, behavior is
potentially quite different. In this game, a government can either play by
pure liberal, neoclassical free trade rules (Cooperate) or it can
differentially promote a domestic industry, whether through strategic
protectionism, subsidies, encouragement of intellectual property theft by
domestic firms, or differential domestic procurement (Defect). The other
government faces the same choice. Note that playing Defection in this
international game is a form of Cooperation (not the only possible one,
however) in the domestic social contract game.
Japan has consistently acted strategically throughout the postwar
period, and continues to do so, although the need for overt government
protectionism has declined as the power of the Japanese industry has
increased. The United States, however, has not reciprocated. Early in the
industry's history - until the late 1960s - U.S. military procurement, which
was limited to domestic firms, was a sufficiently large fraction of total
semiconductor production to constitute, albeit unintentionally with respect
to trade issues, a form of strategic policy. Since the early 1970s,
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however, military procurement has ceased to exercise any substantial effect
upon the industry, and now probably constitutes a slightly negative one.
Recently, in the wake of the 1985 semiconductor recession, the U.S.
government began to reciprocate Japanese defection to a small degree. The
1986 semiconductor trade agreement, aside from specifying price floors which
increased costs for the U.S. computer industry, did contain an informal
understanding that merchant firms would double their share of the Japanese
market to 20%. When the agreement was violated, high tariffs were imposed
upon Japanese imports valued at $300 million; at this writing, they have
been partially rescinded. Given that the world semiconductor market now
exceeds $30 billion, grows 15% annually,-and is critical to electronics
markets totalling $1 trillion per year in sales, Japan's rational
calculation would be to continue its defection until more serious U.S.
reciprocity was forthcoming.
At present, Japan's defection is continuing, and further U.S.
reciprocity appears unlikely. Furthermore, the continuation of Japanese
strategic nationalism is important for reasons far beyond such relatively
traditional matters as scale and learning effects. Much of the strength of
the Japanese domestic regime described below depends upon the absence, or at
least the relative rarity, of strategic disarray such as might be caused by
U.S. firms operating in Japan in violation of U.S. strategic norms. Just as
I will argue that U.S. startups cause strategic disarray in the United
States, U.S. firms would be dangerous to Japanese strategic coherence,
particularly if they began to cooperate among themselves.
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Therefore the greatest virtue of strategic protectionism may have been
its utility in preventing domestic strategic disarray in factor markets, and
of retaining the other forms of coordination important to the Japanese
arena. If the merchant industry had significantly penetrated Japan, it
would probably have brought along its strategic norms of defection,
shortsightedness, and instability. If this penetration surpassed some
minimum level, the appropriability of Japanese human capital (and other)
investments would have declined. If norms of defection had spread
sufficiently, Japanese producers might thereby have been pulled into the
regime of inefficient, shortsighted instability which dominated the merchant
industry. They might have begun to defect relative to each other; and
defections by employees could not have been punished, because defectors
would have been accepted by merchants even if Japanese firms continued to
decline to employ them.
2. Innovator - Predator the technology and assets extraction game.
Supposing for the present that any given innovation, product, market, or
distribution mechanism is first developed within one national industry,
other national industries will seek to obtain it. In the resulting game, a
firm in the innovating industry can either decline to license the innovation
(Cooperation) or it can proceed with foreign licensing (Defection).
(Licensing is not the only possibility; equivalently, a firm might sell a
controlling interest in itself, as Fairchild sought to do with Fujitsu, or
provide turnkey systems and training services, as others have done.) Note
that here I have arbitrarily defined Cooperation and Defection domestically;
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in the specifically international component of the game, I will refer to the
two decisions available to the innovator as Proprietary versus Licensing.
Conversely, the predatory or follower sector can either leave the innovator
in relative peace (Cooperation) or can attack it fiercely (Defection). As
we shall see, this is not a symmetric game in the case of Japanese -
American semiconductor competition; as a consequence of the fragility of
U.S. firms, its international payoff structure is usually more like Bully
than Prisoner's Dilemma. In other words, Japanese imitators defect whether
they receive cooperation or not, and insecure U.S. innovators may feel they
have to play License even when they know this.
Several forces induced U.S. firms to license technology to Japanese
competitors. First, the Japanese market was closed; license royalties were
frequently the only possible way of obtaining revenue from Japan. If U.S.
firms had all cooperated in declining to license, it is possible that Japan
could have been forced to open its market at least partially. But precisely
because defection was prevalent within the U.S. arena, and new U.S. startups
continually appeared, and most U.S. firms had short time horizons, such a
strategy was unlikely to evolve.
For example, a number of startups arose specifically to provide
imitations of the architectures of then-leading firms (Zilog's first
microprocessor was compatible with Intel's Z80, for example). For such a
predatory startup, licensing represented an enormous potential increase in
revenue, achieved primarily (in the short run, that is) by cutting into the
inframarginal rents of the leader. Hence leaders were pressed to license
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preemptively. Perhaps more importantly, Japanese firms frequently stole
what they could not license, so license royalties frequently were limited by
the cost of imitation. Because Japan was playing Cooperation in its
national social contract game while the United States was playing Random or
Defection, such systematic theft was effectively unpunishable. And finally,
the Japanese government made wide licensing a precondition of investment in
the one case in which a U.S. firm, Texas Instruments, did try to use its
bargaining leverage to obtain market access. Hence even before Japan
entered international competition and thereby increased its ability to
retaliate against U.S. firms, merchants were strategically disadvantaged by
their fragmentation, habitual defection, and lack of goverment support.
U.S. firms also tended to sell technology or other assets when they
were failing, and this exit strategy may have substantial incentive effects.
The behavior of Micron Technologies and the Fairchild - Fujitsu episode are
two examples. Micron, a minor firm wholly dependent upon the memory market,
suffered enormous losses in the 1985 semiconductor recession. On the verge
of collapse, the company licensed its memory designs (which are considered
excellent) to Samsung for $3 million. Fairchild too was faring badly, and
similarly possessed several technologies and distribution channels of
potentially large value to Fujitsu. Rather than continue competition,
Schlumberger and/or Fairchild decided to sell. There followed a heated
policy debate as to whether the acquisition should be permitted. Most of
those opposing the sale focused either upon national security issues or upon
the direct value of Fairchild's technology.
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But in discussions with U.S. policymakers, I suggested another reason:
permitting the sale would send a signal to other U.S. semiconductor
executives that they could divest to Japan more profitably than they could
operate, a signal which would lead to an avalanche of similar and
progressively more important Japanese acquisitions. I was even malicious
enough to suggest that some U.S. merchants had lobbied for the semiconductor
trade agreement not because it would assist them in retaining long run
technological viability, but because it increased Japanese incentives for
foreign investment and therefore raised the price merchants could charge to
Japanese firms when disinvesting. And indeed, after Fujitsu withdrew its
offer under U.S. government pressure, Fairchild was sold to National for
$122 million (Fujitsu's agreement had offered $250 million for 80% of the
company), and subsequent large consolidations (AMD and MMI, for example)
have avoided Japan. Licensing and minority equity investments, however,
have continued because they are less visible and more difficult to regulate.
Therefore the U.S. arena continues to offer a competitive market in
technology to a Japanese industry which possesses considerable monopsony
power, and uses it.
3. Global Competition or Autarky: the globalization game. National
industries with existing spheres of influence, say their domestic markets,
can either content themselves with their existing markets (Cooperation) or
they can attack the markets of others (Defection). In this game, defectors
have strong incentives to engage in at least limited forms of dumping, since
by aggressive pricing in newly entered foreign markets they destroy the
inframarginal rents of foreign competitors more than their own. Note that
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the consequences of playing Cooperation versus Defection depend upon the
strategies played in other games, for example the strategic trade policy
game and the industry social contract game.
Prior to the critical junctures of the late 1970s - the advent of VLSI,
Japan's achievement of parity in semiconductor manufacturing, and Japan's
initiation of global competition - Japan in a sense played Cooperation. The
Japanese industry largely refrained from competing against the U.S. in
foreign markets even where it might plausibly have done so, say in linear
and discrete devices. On the other hand, through both private and
governmental action the Japanese domestic market remained protected, and
remained the only large semiconductor market in the world not controlled by
the American industry. During this period, the government's role was
probably critical; the Japanese industry, despite its structure and
strategic cohesion, would probably have fared badly if U.S. firms had been
permitted full access. One indicator of the degree to which this strategic
effect was important was the enormous disparity between Japan's nearly total
dependence upon the United States for capital equipment and its modest
imports of semicondutors themselves.
It is not entirely clear whether the United States industry played
Cooperation in return, because given its regime and the strength of Japanese
protectionism there was little effective difference between cooperation and
defection. To create such a difference would have required internal
strategic coordination within the U.S. system, whether through a
decentralized strategic regime or through a central authority such as the
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government. Hence the state of this strategic dilemma has been, and
remains, a function of other strategic interactions such as the domestic
social contract game and the game of intraindustry coordination.
4. Market Control: the unsustainable competition game. In this
game, a firm or national industry either competes "normally" (Cooperation)
or targets a foreign adversary by engaging in highly aggressive competition
such as dumping or predatory pricing (Defection). The opposing national
industry faces the same choice. Note that even with "normal" competition
(both sides playing Cooperation) a more efficient industry will eventually
drive out a less efficient one. Note also that if an industry can wait long
enough, it may eventually win by playing Cooperation even when another
industry is Defecting, because prices are unsustainably low. In other
words, if even one side is playing Defection, this is a waiting game, an
instance of Chicken. Only with permanent subsidies can anything but normal
competition be sustained. Aside from its specifically international
definition, this game is an instance of Firm 1 - Firm 2. But its
international component is important; for example, the success of an
industry playing Defection may depend upon the status of the social contract
game or the willingness of foreign buyers to betray their vertical
relationships by playing Defection in Industry 1 - Industry 2.
In an iterated game, extreme boldness in games of Chicken has a
potentially strong deterrent effect; and if one of the players can sustain
more damage over several generations than another, or for whatever reason
has a longer time horizon, a demonstrated willingness to sustain damage can
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be very useful. In a way, it is an industrial version of the "madman"
strategy in diplomacy. And the Japanese industry has repeatedly
demonstrated an extreme willingness to engage in aggressive, possibly
unsustainable competition. In combination with its manufacturing excellence
and low factor costs (and therefore, frequently, real cost advantage) in
commodity markets, the Japanese industry's preference for defection led
merchants to exit from markets soon after Japan entered them. In contrast,
merchant firms rarely if ever initiated Defection in unsustainable price
competition, and certainly never continued it for long. Hence the presence
of many iterations and the Japanese industry's greater staying power turned
a long run game of iterated Chicken into, effectively, a short term game of
Bully or something similar. Therefore, for example, most U.S. merchants
exited the DRAM, SRAM, and EPROM markets within two product generations of
Japanese entry.
This pattern has also reacted back on the Licensing game, increasing
U.S. firms' propensity to license because of theeir prospective fear of
being caught in unsustainable competitions. The knowledge that they would
lose in that game shortened their time horizons with respect to other
decisions. For such reasons, many U.S. startups are now actively seeking
licensing agreements and equity investment from Japanese firms, in some
cases even before introduction of their first product. They seek both to
capitalize their expected revenue stream in advance of direct Japanese
competition, and to increase the probability that when the larger ship
begins to sink, they will have a reserved place on the lifeboat.
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For example, one merchant executive noted to me that for one period in
the early 1980s, a Japanese licensee was selling an important microprocessor
for less than the unit royalty fee.17 But his firm still at least received
the royalty fee, while other U.S. second sources simply lost money.
Ironically, then, the threat of Japanese competitive attack led weak U.S.
firms to become more prone to defect relative to each other and to cooperate
with their Japanese competitors. Only a few merchants with strong positions
and considerable sustainability - e.g. Intel, with leadership in the
microprocessor market, cross-licensing and long term purchasing agreements
with IBM, and $300 million in cash - have principally reacted to Japanese
attacks with reciprocal defections such as refusals to license, rather than
capitulations such as increased licensing and market exits.
Now, given this description of the semiconductor industry's
international strategic interactions, consider what led to the particular
forms of international competition we have observed, and how they affected
the two domestic regimes characterized above. First, the pre-VLSI "bargain"
between the Japanese and U.S. industries - technology for autarky -
represented a U.S. domestic non-cooperative strategy in the face of Japanese
internal cooperation. Even though the U.S. industry possessed collective
technical superiority in the pre-VLSI era, it could have defected in the
globalization game (i.e. forcibly penetrated the Japanese market) only
through domestic coordination or through the agency of a central authority.
For different reasons - industrial fragmentation in the one case, failures
of government policy on the other - both routes were unavailable. As a
consequence, the option of playing Defection in the globalization game
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rested permanently and uniquely with Japan, which exercised it only when its
technology extraction activities, domestic strategic regime, and tolerance
for severe price competition together enabled it to enter international
competition with a high prospect of success.
Now consider what happened when the Japanese industry did finally play
Defection, and globalized competition by penetrating the U.S. industry's
sphere of influence. The nature of the Japanese industry's strategic regime
continued to insulate it from invasion by the U.S. regime of defection,
while the U.S. regime was highly vulnerable to invasion from cooperating
predators. Therefore, the increased competitive pressure felt by most U.S.
firms shortened the shadow of the future yet further and led to more, rather
than fewer intramural defections, and similarly led to more, rather than
less, capitulations in international bargaining. Hence the U.S. industry
not only failed to reciprocate Japanese defections successfully, it actually
became more docile.
However, the crisis of 1985 resulted in the development of limited
domestic coordination. Some of its most visible forms were parochial and
counterproductive, as when semiconductor producers and users lobbied against
each other with respect to dumping cases. But the U.S. government finally
began to show strategic reciprocity, IBM and a few large merchants initiated
coordinated actions, and it became clear that most U.S. firms would not be
able to disinvest profitably. At that point, limited forms of productive
coordination (such as the Sematech proposal, government reaction to the
Fujitsu / Fairchild acquisition, and U.S. sanctions on Japanese firms
244
related to market access) eventually appeared. Thusfar, however, the
strategic discipline imposed upon Japan has been trivially small relative to
the size of the long run contest, and the principal forms of Japanese
domestic coordination and international defection appear to be continuing
unabated. Indeed, some forms of Japanese strategic activity, such as the
systematic exploitation of the U.S. startup sector in progressively earlier
phases of technology life cycles, are accelerating.
Conclusions, Implications, and Further Questions
To the extent that the foregoing analysis is correct, it suggests
several strong conclusions. First, neoclassical industry analysis must
become a subset of the exploratory analysis of iterated strategic processes
if we are to model industrial dynamics effectively. Traditional
neoclassical analyses, which have either minimized the importance of
strategic interactions or made arbitrary assumptions concerning their
character, can lead us seriously astray when politics, technology,
production, and competition imply major strategic interdependencies. The
strategic regimes which arise in response to these interdependencies can
exercise as much influence over structure, conduct, and performance - for
either good or ill - as traditional variables such as factor endowments; and
indeed even the status of these traditional variables themselves may be
determined by strategic processes.
Second, the potential deficits of various arena structures and
strategic regimes appear to have two major substantive implications for
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policy. The first is that concentration ratios and other such traditional
indices are in fact quite poor indicators of long run, or even static, arena
efficiency. Under appropriate and apparently reasonable arena structures
and payoff conditions, strategic issues dwarf conventional allocative
efficiency as a determinant of real performance. The other implication
suggested by regime analysis is that government policy, or more generally
interventions by central authority, can be far more beneficial, and more
widely relevant, than traditional models indicate.
Third, the idea of a strategic regime as an equivalence class of
strategic behaviors, and as an endpoint of strategic evolution, would appear
to provide a useful point of departure for the devlopment of new models of
industrial dynamics, of which most existing neoclassical models would be
one-period local approximations. The explicit recognition and investigation
of long run strategic interdependencies would permit equally explicit
analysis of questions heretofore beyond the reach of economic analysis, for
example the effects of widely divergent subjective preferences, discount
rates, arena structures, technologies, strategic behaviors, and centrally
imposed incentive systems upon industrial organization and international
economic behavior. The natural tools in such investigations would be a
combination of empiricism, theoretical analysis, and - perhaps most
importantly - exploratory computer simulation. As Axelrod has noted,
emerging highly parallel computer architectures are ideally suited to the
investigation of these problems.
As Axelrod has also noted, iterated strategic processes are inherently
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evolutionary in character. Therefore the internaly dynamics of these
processes, the internal stability of strategic regimes, and the external
stability of regimes (when they are attacked or brought into interaction
with other regimes) are potentially of as much interest as the analysis of
particular iterated games per se. In the above analysis, we have considered
how two national regimes evolved independently, how their performance
characteristics as independent regimes compared, and then how they behaved
when one of them unilaterally decided to compete against the other. The
structural and performance anomalies which preclude a neoclassical
explanation are thus seen as consequences of the nature of these two
regimes, and later of their interactions.
But regimes not only can defeat one another, they can spread from one
arena to another. What follows is an example of that phenomenon. By virtue
of the some of the same technological and strategic forces which transformed
the semiconductor industry, the merchant strategic regime is moving
downstream into the U.S. computer industry, until recently a concentrated
oligopoly, where the consequences of fragmentation and chronic startup
formation for growth and international competition are already evident. The
following chapter chronicles this process, though in a less detailed way
than the preceding discussion of the semiconductor industry. Did Japanese
bureaucrats and executives read Thomas Schelling and Robert Axelrod, does
Robert Axelrod read Japanese, or do great minds think alike?
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. For newer "strategic" treatments, see particularly Alexis
Jacquemin, "The New Industrial Organization: Market Forces and Strategic
Behavior," MIT Press 1987, originally published in 1985 as "Selection Et
pouvoir Dans La Nouvelle Economie Industrielle," and Joseph Stiglitz and G.
Frank Mathewson (eds.), "New Developments in the Analysis of Market
Structure," MIT Press 1986, and Hal Varian, "Microeconomic Analysis,"
Norton, particularly the discussion of information and uncertainty in the
third edition.
2. For a discussion of this issue and a direct comparison of U.S. and
Japanese conditions, see Ralph Landau and George N. Hatsopoulos, "Capital
Formation in the United States and Japan," in Landau & Rosenberg (eds.),
"The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth,"
National Academy Press, 1986. Hatsopoulos, it should be noted, is a strong
proponent of the position that Japanese capital cost advantages are large
and important.
3. See U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, "International
Competitiveness In Electronics," 1983, p. 306.
4. See the Chase Econometrics report for an analysis specific to
the semiconductor industry. For more general treatments, :see for
example Data Resources, Inc., "The DRI Report on U.S. Manufacturing
Industries," McGraw-Hill, 1984, pp. 28 - 34.
5. Dataquest. See also Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 19 - 28; and
Braun & Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 124 - 128.
6. For U.S. concentration statistics, see Dataquest's estimates of
U.S. production by firm. See also U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "U.S. Industrial
Outlook," various years. For both U.S. and Japanese estimates, see
"Status," the annual publication of the Integrated Circuit Engineering
Corporation, and W. Edward Steinmueller, "Industry Structure and Government
Policies in the U.S. and Japanese Integrated Circuit Industries," Stanford
Center for Economic Policy Research, 1986.
7. See U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1986 and 1987, for U.S. semiconductor
industry production, revenue, and concentration estimates.
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8. For market shares, the source is Dataquest. For quality
data, see for example U.S. Office of Technology Assessment,
"International Competitiveness In Electronics," 1983, pp. 247 - 249,
for data drawn both from Hewlett-Packard and from OTA consultants.
9. Personal interviews, Intel executives, 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986.
10. See "Economic Report of the President," February 1986, p. 373
(Table B-105), "Exchange Rates, 1967 - 1985."
11. See Axelrod, "The Evolution of Cooperation," p. 56 ff.
12. For a typology of the relevant 2 X 2 games and discussion of the
impact of iteration upon player behavior, see Kenneth Oye (ed.),
"Cooperation Under Anarchy," (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1986,
particularly chapter 1.
13. See Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" and Oye's
introductory article in "Cooperation Under Anarchy" for discussions of these
matters. See also Appendix 1 of this essay.
14. Martin Mayer, "The Bankers," 1974, p. 280, cited in Axelrod, "The
Evolution of Cooperation," p. 60.
15. In order to indicate the feelings held by some regarding
venture capital based startups and their effect upon turnover, let me
quote the CEO of one of the industry's largest firms: "The best
thing that could happen to this industry would be if every tenth
venture capitalist was arbitrarily shot."
16. See Braun & Macdonald, chs. 7, 8, and 10.
17. Confidential interview, 1986.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXTENSION AND GENERALIZATION: THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL COMPETITIVE REGIME
1. Are Strategic Regimes Frequently Important?
On the argument outlined above, the behavior of the semiconductor and
related equipment industries has been influenced significantly by strategic
processes, and by various related phenomena such as the evolution of both
national and international strategic regimes. Is the semiconductor case
aberrant, or do systems of long run strategic interaction exercise wide
influence over industrial dynamics and comparative performance? Here, I
consider the applicability of strategic analysis to the computer industry,
and then (briefly) yet further to international high technology competition
generally. My conclusion is that far from being an isolated case, the
semiconductor industry illustrates a broadening pattern in global high
technology competition. The fragmentation and systemic shortsightedness
characteristic of the U.S. arena, in combination with the strategic cohesion
of Japan, suggest that global market integration is now generating an
internationalized but asymmetric strategic regime. The combined effects of
strategic asymmetry and the life cycle cost structures characteristic of
high technology industries are such that this new, internationalized regime
may become quite pervasive.
In this emerging regime, the fragmented United States system
"specializes" by default in the provision of services (e.g. basic research,
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market prototyping, advanced training, sales and maintenance) whose long run
economic benefits differentially accrue to more coordinated foreign
competitors via their control of concentrated, and competitively superior,
engineering and manufacturing systems. Japanese industry selectively uses
U.S. services and assets such as university education, basic research, and
technologies developed by startups, and then enters commercial markets as
they mature. Since the social returns to U.S. provided public goods must
generally be obtained through commercial competition, the Japanese system
both maximizes the appropriability of domestic efforts generally, and
invests differentially in the development of appropriable assets. Hence the
Japanese system enjoys both free rider benefits and increased productivity
as a result of its internal arrangements, which increase the appropriability
of returns to even those investments which, in the United States, would be
public goods. Such areas include R&D in basic process technologies,
investments in employee training, and manufacturing capability. Only when
Japanese firms reach the innovative frontier need they invest in proprietary
innovation themselves, since until that time the fragmented U.S. system
makes these innovations available. But before making the general argument,
I will consider the computer industry.
2. The Development of the Computer Industry
The computer systems industry had its genesis in a variety of
university and government efforts which culminated, towards the end of World
War II, in the development of primitive, vacuum-tube based, but programmable
calculating machines. By the mid-1950s, there arose a substantial industry
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dominated by established manufacturers of office and industrial equipment.
As with the semiconductor industry developing more slowly alongside it, the
early computer industry was heavily influenced by the military. By Kenneth
Flamm's accounting, defense contracts (such as the SAGE air defense system
and the STRETCH high performance computer) accounted for 35% of IBM's R&D
budget in the 1950s.1 Also as in the semiconductor case, the Federal
government's role gradually declined as government procurement became a
smaller fraction of the total market and also fell behind commercial demand
technologically.
While some early entrants were independent firms founded by technical
innovators, these soon disappeared through failure or absorption into larger
companies. By the late 1950s, the industry was dominated by firms which
diversified into computers from earlier positions in the office equipment
industry. IBM was previously a manufacturer of punched card tabulating
equipment; other relatively early entrants who grew into major vendors
included Burroughs, Remington Rand (which eventually became Sperry), and
National Cash Register (NCR). Several large firms which tried to enter the
market at various times failed; probably the largest failures were those of
RCA and General Electric. AT&T, which might plausibly have become a major
force in the industry, ceded its right to participate in the market in 1956,
as part of the same antitrust consent decree which led to its withdrawal
from the semiconductor market.
By the late 1950s, IBM had become the industry's clear leader through
superior marketing and wise use of military contracts which provided R&D
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funding and early experience with advanced technology. This leadership was
consolidated and guaranteed for another twenty years by the introduction in
the early 1960s of the 360 series, the first family of compatible systems to
use a modular computer architecture. The upward compatible version of this
architecture, 370/XA, still defines the world's largest single computer
market. Though IBM's dominance gradually declined, by most accounts it held
half the entire world computer market until the early 1970s, versus about
30% presently. 2
Three further facts about this earlier (pre-VLSI) period are salient
for our present purposes. First, and as with the semiconductor industry,
U.S. firms overwhelmingly dominated technological leadership and world
markets. Although some excellent early research was produced in England and
occasionally other nations, most basic research and nearly all commercial
technology came from the United States. Until the mid-1970s, U.S. firms
accounted for more than two-thirds of total world computer production, and
held at least half of every major national market, including Japan's. 3
Second, the industry did not initially depend upon microelectronics; the
integration of the two technologies was forseeable, but its realization is
quite recent. Only in the late 1950s did semiconductor technology even
begin to impinge upon the computer industry; the first two generations of
commercial machines were based entirely upon vacuum tube and magnetic
technologies. CPUs were made with vacuum tubes until the late 1950s, when
transistors were substituted; main memory was made with magnetic core
devices until the early 1970s, when IBM and then other firms introduced
semiconductor memories. Then, with the arrival of VLSI microprocessors in
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the 1980s, implementation of entire CPUs and subsystems passed to the level
of single semiconductor devices. By the mid-1980s, the semiconductor
content of computers reached 6%, and was still increasing steadily.
Third and finally, between the 1950s and the late 1970s the computer
industry - unlike the merchant semiconductor industry - was structurally
stable, despite its continuously rapid growth and technical progress. Its
recent behavior thus differs remarkably from the structure and strategy
which characterized the 1960s and 1970s. The market shares and product
strategies of the principal firms changed only very gradually. For largely
technological reasons, the majority of demand was for mainframes - large,
expensive capital goods. System software was supplied by computer vendors,
who understood their machines; applications software was supplied by users,
who understood their own particular needs. Because most software was
necessarily specific to a single machine architecture, vendors with large
installed bases held a secure market; within their installed bases, revenues
were determined by technological progress and the price elasticity of
demand, both of which were high. Hence IBM remained the industry's leader,
technical standard setter, and dominant mainframe producer; producers of IBM
compatible machines (Plug Compatible Manufacturers, or PCMs) disciplined IBM
within the 370 standard, while simultaneously reinforcing the dominance of
that standard; other producers engaged in limited monopolistic competition
by marketing their own products and serving their own installed bases.
Gradually, and largely as a result of technological progress in
microelectronics and magnetic storage technology, the stability generated by
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installed bases declined as new architectures became feasible, and as the
fraction of systems embodied in open-market semiconductors increased.
Minicomputer firms, led by DEC (which was founded in 1957, but became a
major force only in the 1970s), secured a rapidly growing but comparatively
small niche market for sophisticated users of smaller machines, while CDC
dominated the high-end scientific market. Then, in the late 1970s, the
advent of open-market VLSI devices and microprocessor-based systems produced
an explosion of new architectures and rapidly growing new markets: personal
computers, technical workstations, fault-tolerant and redundant systems,
mass markets for commodity software, multiprocessors, database machines,
networked and distributed systems, array processors, supercomputers, and so
forth. Newly formed, venture-capital financed startups could and did
dominate most of these new markets. In other words, new computer markets
are divided between the newer portions of the U.S. computer industry, which
resemble the merchant semiconductor industry as much as the traditional
computer industry, and those more established firms - principally IBM and
DEC - which have been able to remain strong, innovative, and flexible.
But during their earlier "classical" periods, the U.S. computer and
semiconductor industries evolved quite different internal structures and
strategic patterns. From the early 1960s until the late 1970s, each
industry maintained its characteristic behavior over several product
generations. The semiconductor industry was characterized by fragmentation,
low entry barriers, small scale production, venture capital funded
entrepreneurialism, and evanescent market success. Collectively, the
semiconductor industry acted as a non-competing, non-integrated supply
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sector which provided commodity components to the computer sector.
Conversely the computer industry exhibited large scale economies, entry
barriers, and switching costs which stabilized it. While new firms could
enter new markets, in aggregate terms the industry remained stably divided
between IBM, the second tier mainframe firms (the so-called BUNCH), and a
growing but (then) limited competitive fringe led by DEC.
The Japanese Industry
Japan's response to U.S. dominance of world computer markets was
largely similar to its response in the semiconductor industry. The
principal differences consisted in IBM's strong leadership position and
consequent ability to penetrate the Japanese market. Unlike the merchant
semiconductor industry, the computer industry's stability (and, possibly,
IBM's unique capabilities) enabled leading firms, and IBM especially, to
drive a stronger bargain than Texas Instruments. IBM was able to establish
a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary and, until the 1970s, held a higher share
of the Japanese market than the entire Japanese industry; but even IBM was
forced to license many of its patents, and its market share began declining
substantially in the mid-1970s. In most other respects, however, the
structural conditions and strategies found in the Japanese computer industry
are virtually identical to those described above in relation to the
semiconductor industry.
Thus, for example, the Japanese computer industry is composed of the
same vertically integrated strategic competitors that dominate the Japanese
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semiconductor industry. The computer industry, in fact, is even more
concentrated. In 1984, the four largest Japanese computer producers, who
are the same as Japan's four largest semiconductor producers, accounted for
over 70% of all Japanese computer production (including production by
Japanese subsidiaries of U.S. firms), and for about 80% of all computer
production by Japan-based firms.4 In addition, in Japan computer systems
firms account for 70% of all system software sales, versus 45% in the United
States.5 The Japanese computer industry's evolution and strategic behavior
are also similar to those seen in the evolution of Japanese semiconductor
production - governmental protectionism and sponsorship of R&D
collaborations, private strategic coordination, large long term R&D
investments, U.S. technology imports, progression from imitation to
proprietary design, and rapid export drives in maturing markets upon
reaching technical parity.
And, also in common with the semiconductor industry, Japanese
government strategic interventions, private strategic coordination, patterns
of strategic interaction (particularly regions of cooperation versus
competition), and incentive structures favoring long time horizons combined
to generate a strong, oligopolistic industry from an initial position of
weakness. The Japanese government protected the domestic infant industry
from both imports and IBM Japan, and also provided considerable subsidies to
the industry. MI sponsored long term R&D efforts in which pairs of major
Japanese firms collaborated in developing mainframe systems based upon
licensed, stolen, and/or imitated U.S. technology. Following a series of
abortive licensing and codevelopment agreements between Japanese firms and
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second-tier U.S. producers such as RCA and GE, MITI forced rationalization
of the Japanese industry.
Beginning in 1971, Fujitsu and Hitachi jointly developed IBM compatible
machines, NEC and Toshiba worked together on GE/Honeywell machines, and
Mitsubishi and Oki collaborated on projects which ultimately failed in the
market. In 1972, Fujitsu purchased equity in Amdahl and obtained its IBM
compatible hardware technology. By purchasing equity, Fujitsu also obtained
Amdahl as a distribution channel; as Fujitsu's technology surpassed
Amdahl's, this function came to predominate. Amdahl, a U.S. startup founded
in 1971 by Gene Amdahl, a defector from IBM, is now 49% owned by Fujitsu and
sells $1.5 billion worth of IBM 370-compatible systems, most of them Fujitsu
machines, annually. (Mr. Amdahl subsequently departed to found Trilogy
Systems, which raised $200 million in the early 1980s but went bankrupt
before marketing a product.) NEC licensed Honeywell's architecture and
technology, from which its current mainframes are derived. By 1976, IBM was
beginning legal action to curb Fujitsu's copying and reuse of IBM system
software, a case which has been repeatedly settled and re-opened as Fujitsu
continued, allegedly, to massively violate the terms of the settlement. The
case was submitted to binding arbitration; in 1987 the arbitrators announced
that Fujitsu would be able to continue marketing the software, but would
have to pay IBM "substantial" damages. IBM took legal action against
Hitachi as well for similar alleged violations, a case settled in the early
1980s. NEC has continued to develop machines based upon Honeywell's
architecture, and now resells them to Honeywell.6
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Both protectionism and direct financial support began in the 1960s, but
have continued until quite recently. By one accounting, between 1976 and
1981 alone direct Japanese government assistance to the domestic computer
industry totaled Y206 billion (roughly $1.03 billion). Indirect assistance
was even larger. Most indirect support came from subsidized loans provided
through the Japan Electronic Computer Company (JECC), jointly operated by
the government and the major Japanese computer producers. (Every president
of the JECC since its creation in 1961 has been a retired MITI official, and
the JECC obtained most of its funds from the Japan Development Bank via
loans at subsidized rates.) Including such indirect sources, government
support during the 1976-81 period totaled Y748 billion, or nearly $4
billion. Direct assistance represented 25% of private expenditures for R&D
and capital investment during this period; total support including loans
equaled 92% of private sector investment. 7 In earlier periods the relative
size of such subsidies was even larger; direct assistance equaled 52% of
private sector investment during the 1960s.8
In addition, the Japanese government preferentially purchased machines
from domestic producers. In 1982, 91% of the government's installed base
came from domestic producers, versus 56% of the total national installed
base. In that year the government represented 18% of total Japanese
computer demand.9 In earlier periods, the government's role was even more
important. In the 1960s, MITI forced IBM to license its hardware patents,
and prevented other U.S. firms from establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.
Perhaps equally important, however, was the internal strategic regime
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of the Japanese industry, which once again reflected the same behaviors as
the semiconductor industry, as indeed one would expect given that the same
firms were involved. The industry's time horizons were once again long;
although the Japanese industry lost money for nearly the entire decade of
the 1960s, it continued to invest. Firms supplied themselves and each other
with technology and subsystems; other firms in producers' keiretsu showed
considerable favoritism towards their family firm in computer purchases,
despite the short term penalties associated with using what until the late
1970s was clearly inferior equipment.
Once again, the analogy with the semiconductor case is striking.
Frequently, firms cooperated in attacking established U.S. firms and
markets. As mentioned above, Hitachi and Fujitsu cooperated in developing
IBM compatible mainframes until they became significant and commercially
successful competitors, whereupon they became less cooperative. More
recently 13 Japanese vendors standardized on a single specification for IBM
PC AT compatible machines, enabling sharing of subsystems and designs. All
major producers also invested heavily, and over long time periods, in the
semiconductor and systems software technologies critical to mainframe
systems, typically starting with licensed, imitated, and/or illegally copied
U.S. systems. Once again employee turnover was low, entry via independent
entrepreneurialism was rare and of minor importance, and the industry
avoided export drives until it reached approximate technical parity with the
United States.
So once again the U.S. and Japanese industries developed relatively
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independently (with the exception of IBM's presence in Japan) until the
Japanese industry unilaterally decided to enter global competition.
Japanese technology extraction and protectionism proceeded, but with the
exception of the progressive displacement of IBM from its dominance of the
Japanese domestic market, the Japanese industry avoided direct challenges to
the U.S. industry.
3. Strategic Destabilization and Japanese Competition
Destabilization (A): The Merchant Regime in the Computer Industry
By the late 1970s, a complex mix of technological, strategic, and
political processes began to erode the stability and global dominance of the
United States industry. Their result has been that with the exception of a
few vibrant large firms (particularly IBM and DEC), the newer segments of
the U.S. computer industry increasingly resemble the merchant semiconductor
industry. And, yet again in common with that industry, this fragmentation
increased at precisely the point at which technological and strategic logic
favored increasing size, scope, vertical integration, and industrywide
cooperation. Consequently the computer industry is increasingly prey to
strategic risks similar to those which I described above with respect to
semiconductors.
Clearly, the condition of the U.S. semiconductor industry contributed
to the increasing fragmentation of computer markets. As VLSI caused
semiconductor and systems technology to merge, the vertical split between
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the merchant semiconductor sector and its downstream systems customers,
including the computer industry, became progressively more important and
dysfunctional. Since the strategic dynamics described above prevented
rationalization of the semiconductor industry and its downstream
relationships in this area just as in others, the result was that the
computer industry was increasingly influenced by the fragmentation,
instability, and decay of the merchant industry. Computer firms dependent
upon merchant suppliers therefore suffered accordingly. In part, also, this
increasing fragmentation derived from the fact that VLSI produced a deep
change in the computer industry by making possible radically new
architectures, shortening computer product cycles and opening huge new
markets.
Consider, for example, the technical competition between mainframes and
personal computers. Although elaborately cooled mainframe CPUs (which are
composed of hundreds of high-speed bipolar circuits connected by dozens of
layers of ceramic packaging) remain far more powerful than the individual
VLSI microprocessors used in personal computers, they are proportionately
much more expensive. Therefore where continuous use of shared resources is
not critical, the decentralized use of small computers now proves far more
cost-effective than a single large one. The personal computer is the result
of this technology trend. The IBM RT PC, for example, uses a 4 MIPS 32-bit
CMOS reduced instruction set microprocessor; it is a personal workstation
priced at ten to twenty thousand dollars. A 75 MIPS mainframe, conversely,
costs several million dollars, yielding a price/performance ratio at least
an order of magnitude worse. With the arrival of commodity 32 bit personal
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computers such as the Sun 3, the Apple Macintosh II, the IBM PS2 model 80,
and other IBM-compatible systems using the 80386 microprocessor, the
relative advantage of personal machines is even larger. It is generally
agreed that this difference will continue to increase for many years;
mainframe cost/performance ratios continue to improve, but less rapidly than
those of personal computers.
Furthermore, highly concurrent systems built up from new VLSI
microprocessors may soon challenge or at least supplement mainframes in high
performance computing. The new systems markets made possible by VLSI
included not only personal computers but also mass market software, fault
tolerant systems, local area networks, reduced instruction set systems,
multiprocessors, highly parallel supercomputers, database machines, and
technical workstations. U.S. commodity software markets have grown over 35%
annually since 1980, totalling over $10 billion in 1985. And the need for
personal computer users to communicate with each other and with mainframe
computers similarly created demand for computer networks which, in turn,
were made economically possible by VLSI network control circuits. The
market for local area networks (LANs), for example, has grown over 40%
annually since 1980.
Since all of these markets were new, and most of the required hardware
could be designed with openly available VLSI devices, entry barriers were
initially low. The installed bases of the existing firms provided no
protection in these new markets, and incremental computer demand rapidly
shifted from conventional mainframe architectures to novel VLSI-based
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systems and associated software. And, of course, the U.S. system contained
none of the entry barriers which operated in Japan. To the contrary, the
same decentralized infrastructure and subsidies to entrepreneurialism that
maintained the merchant industry regime operated equally in the new segments
of the computer industry.
But the evidence suggests that this is not the entire explanation for
the stagnation of the traditional computer industry and the concomitant rise
of entrepreneurialism in novel markets. For reasons which remain at least
partly mysterious, by the mid-1970s most of the established U.S. industry
displayed an ossification which reduced its propensity and ability to
develop and exploit new technologies. This process seems increasingly to be
affecting IBM, but its effect upon the remainder of the established firms
which had entered the industry - firms such as RCA, GE, Honeywell, NCR,
Burroughs, and Sperry - was far more severe.
A possible explanation for this stagnation, to which I will return
later in discussing the industry's strategic regime, involves three factors.
The first was the collective dominance of the American industry, which
lessened external discipline just as it had in the semiconductor case. The
second was high U.S. factor costs (once again for capital and skilled
labor), also as with the semiconductor case. This condition, once again,
both raised the effective cost of R&D, capital spending, and other costs
associated with innovation, and also shortened the industry's time horizons.
Finally, there were the switching costs associated with the mainframe
market, which permitted rent extraction at least over the short run and
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protected even decaying firms from rapid decline. In addition, IBM
maintained a high price umbrella which protected its lesser competitors from
extreme competitive pressure. (IBM also, however, continued to invest
massively in R&D, training, and technology assessment, while most of its
lesser brethren did not.)
So the established industry - even IBM, but more severely its
competitors - gradually lost its innovativeness and efficiency, and clearly
did so well before, and independent of, the external shocks generated by
Japanese competition or recent macroeconomic distortions. The principal
symptoms of this stagnation, which apparently was underway by the late
1970s, were two. First, most established firms invested and grew more
slowly than the industry as a whole. They became progressively more
dependent upon outside suppliers, often Japanese competitors, for critical
inputs such as semiconductors, displays, printers, storage subsystems, and
recently entire computers. (For example, IBM is the only U.S. firm which
produces more than 20% of the semiconductors it uses, and the only one to
possess its own world-class packaging technology.) Research efforts
stagnated, investments became progressively more incremental and risk-averse
in character, and growth decelerated. For example, between 1975 and 1986
IBM's sales grew 73% in constant dollars, and DEC's sales grew 600% in the
same period. But NCR's constant dollar sales grew only 10%, and Honeywell's
sales actually declined. Total U.S. constant dollar production of CPUs and
peripherals roughly tripled. 10
Second, new computer architectures and markets (made posssible by cost
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performance improvements and then, most spectacularly, by the advent of
VLSI) were colonized principally by startups. Aside from IBM, no
established firm obtained substantial shares of the minicomputer market,
which is now led by DEC and IBM. Aside from IBM (and DEC and/or HP if we
count them as established firms by 1980), no established firm has produced
new computer architectures, designed major proprietary microprocessors, or
obtained major shares of new markets for microprocessor based systems.
Consequently newer, non-mainframe systems markets have become increasingly
fragmented. In these newer product markets - which already account for
nearly half the world computer market - the earlier established firms are
essentially absent. Rather, these newer markets are dominated by IBM; a few
entrepreneurial firms which may have reached the critical mass needed for
success beyond a single product generation (e.g., DEC, Apple, perhaps Sun);
smaller firms which rise and fall in waves similar to those of the merchant
industry; and increasingly, as we shall see shortly, the Japanese industry.
Therefore whatever its original sources, the effect of the established
industry's stagnation was to open a vacuum filled largely by the regime of
unstable, noncooperative entrepreneurialism which dominated the merchant
semiconductor sector.
The startups which now initially colonize new computer markets are
single product firms dependent upon each other and other industries
(particularly the semiconductor industry) for inputs, subsystems,
manufacturing services, and capital goods. They have also displayed
generational instability at least as extreme as the merchant industry. Not
only do new products and technologies routinely displace others only a few
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years old, but such changes are often accompanied by drastic shifts in
market share leadership and firm level profitability. In personal
computers, Osborne Computer grew from an idea to a $125 million firm in two
years, only to go bankrupt;11 Visicorp, vendor of the Visicalc spreadsheet,
suffered the same fate; other firms which declined in varying ways include
Eagle, Kaypro, Morrow, Digital Research, Sorcim, and many others. Even
Apple, which may now have reached the status of a major competitor, holds
less than 20% of the personal computer market, remains a single market firm,
and is entirely dependent upon external sources, including increasingly the
Japanese industry, for its semiconductors.
Apollo, the first firm to market an advanced workstation in 1981, has
already been displaced as the leader in that market by Sun Microsystems, and
both firms face increasing competition from IBM, DEC, and the Japanese
industry. Apollo's founder, Jim Poduska, left Apollo in order to found yet
another workstation startup, Stellar. Cray Research similarly pioneered in
the supercomputer market, and now finds itself similarly threatened by IBM,
by newer "minisupercomputer" startups such as Alliant and Convex, and
perhaps most seriously by Japanese firms. When Cray cancelled a major
development project in 1987, its chief engineer, Steve Chen, departed almost
immediately to start a new firm partly financed by IBM. Tandem marketed the
first fault-tolerant computer system in 1977, and its revenues now exceed
$700 million. By 1984, at least eight other U.S. startups had entered the
market (August Systems, Auragen, Autech, Parallel Computers, Sequoia,
Stratus, Synapse, and Tolerant Systems). Several have already failed, while
one (Stratus) may challenge Tandem's leadership; by 1986, Stratus' revenues
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exceeded $130 million. Stratus' machines, like most of the other startups
which followed Tandem, were heavily based upon open market technology:
Motorola microprocessors, the UNIX operating system, and open market
semiconductors. 12
Perhaps the most extreme case of this phenomenon was the Winchester
disk drive market. Between 1977 and 1984, venture capital firms invested
$400 million in 43 U.S. startup producers of Winchester hard disk drives for
personal computers.13 Stock offerings raised another $800 million. By
1983, there existed 63 U.S. and foreign suppliers of Winchester drives.14
Many of these firms were founded by defectors from Memorex and IBM. Then,
in less than a two year period (1983-84), the valuation of the 12 largest
publicly traded startup firms declined 75%. Many failed as mass production
became essential, competition intensified for OEM contracts, entrepreneurial
customers failed, entrants with newer technology appeared, IBM began
manufacturing a higher fraction of its own requirements, and Japanese firms
entered aggressively. As one analysis noted, "The only barrier to vertical
integration and to massive foreign entry was the fact that a large,
standardized market had not yet been proved to exist....Few [of the startup]
companies could afford the luxury of pursuing a second generation product
while the first generation was as yet unproduced."15
The result has been a segmentation of the U.S. computer industry into
three categories of firms: a small number of successful established firms,
all of whom are globalized and vertically integrated; a set of decaying
established firms reduced to servicing their installed bases; and an
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unstable arena of entrepreneurial firms in many novel markets. The relative
deterioration of most of the established industry, together with the advent
of open market VLSI microprocessors, the nature of the merchant industry,
and the systemic incentives associated with new ventures, have introduced
the semiconductor industry's strategic regime of unstable entrepreneurialism
into the U.S. computer industry. And as noted above, the semiconductor
industry's condition contributed to this result as microelectronics merged
with systems technology.
But in addition, other forces were transforming the computer industry
during this period as well. The long term direction of technological change
favored increasing automation, capital intensity, globalization, and
interindustry convergence. Thus even as the U.S. system generated
fragmentation in novel markets, the fundamental forces driving the industry
implied the necessity of increasing concentration, vertical integration, and
capital depth. The advent of competition from Japanese and Korean
industrial complexes intensified these requirements. In the face of these
forces, the fragmentation of the U.S. computer industry and its
institutionalization of the merchant industry's noncooperative, shortsighted
strategic equilibrium therefore imply declining U.S. competitiveness as
strategically coordinated Asian competitors harvest open market U.S.
technologies and enter global competition in maturing markets, just as in
the semiconductor case.
Destabilization (B): Technological and Structural Pressure
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Future generations of digital technology imply continued increases in
levels of interdependency and competition among various systems sectors such
as computers, copying and imaging equipment, consumer electronics,
telecommunications services, data processing networks, and switching
equipment. Their technology bases, markets, and coordination requirements
will converge much as those of microelectronics and computer systems did
with the advent of VLSI. This convergence is already visible, for example,
in the increasing use of computers to control data communications networks,
and of data communications technology within computers. Similar laser-based
optical technologies are employed in compact disk players, optical memories,
and fiberoptic digital transmission systems. Copying is merging with
computing; combined laser printer / copiers and CCD-based fully digital
copiers are already being marketed, as are CCD-based electronic cameras.
In time, this trend will also increase their interpenetration with
certain information intensive sectors such as publishing and financial
services. Advanced electronics and optics will also bring digital
information technologies into competition with currently favored analog or
physical technologies such as broadcasting and mail. Some of these trends
are already visible in product markets, and it is widely anticipated that
(given the velocity of the technology) major changes in interindustry
structure are only a decade away. Although predictions are hazardous, it
appears increasingly likely that the eventual result will be a large,
tightly integrated information technology sector dependent upon a technology
base of microelectronics, materials science, digital optics and photonics,
magnetics, and pure system science.
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The transformation of technology and product markets induced by the
advent of VLSI is therefore a specific case of a wider, long term process
underway in the entire digital systems sector. This general transformation
of systems production and markets might be described as one of continually
increasing returns to scale and scope. While occasionally and temporarily
this concentrationist trend will be counterbalanced by the appearance of new
product markets with initially low entry barriers, there will be continuous
increases in capital intensity, minimum efficient scale, and vertical
coordination requirements.
The technology and cost structure of the systems industry is witnessing
a long term shift in favor of capital intensive flexible automation, high
initial design costs, lower marginal production costs, and high fixed costs
of research, development, capital systems engineering, and customer service.
Much of this transformation derives from the interaction of two trends: the
increasing power of systems and their concurrently increasing complexity.
Their combined result is the ability, but simultaneously the growing
necessity, of using highly capital intensive, but ever more flexible,
systems-based automation as a means of managing the complexity and improving
the functionality of systems products themselves. The exploitation of
computer-based flexible automation in production may shift product markets
somewhat towards specialized functionality by reducing the cost penalty of
low volume production of customized products, but will do so primarily
through increasingly flexible mass production rather than small scale
specialization. We have already noted these trends, for example, in the
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semiconductor market. As semiconductor technology continues to progress and
the semiconductor market grows, integrated circuits are becoming more like
systems. Initial design costs are increasing; fabrication is increasingly
capital intensive, computerized, and automated, yet more flexible as well.
The result is increasing concentration of production combined, somewhat
paradoxically, with increasing product differentiation.
The same now holds true for computers and even, increasingly, for
software. With the rise of large networks and personal computers, software
is increasing in importance relative to hardware. Two generic technologies
have arisen in response. The first, developed in the United States, is
Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE): the use of high levels of
computer-based automation in support of advanced software methodologies,
primarily for new product development using very high level languages. The
second, developed in Japan, is the software factory. Japanese software
factories and their products, which have been studied in detail by Cusumano
and by several U.S. companies, appear capable of producing extremely high
quality, low cost products in well-defined domains (IBM compatible system
software, for example). They are highly automated, large (several use over
2,000 professionals), and capable of highly varied output within their
specified product domains. Flexible automation appears, then, to be an
extremely robust trend.
Finally, the systems industries are internationalizing - in sourcing,
production, markets, technology development, and interfirm alliances. This
process of internationalization derives from several sources, some common to
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many industries now more global than previously, others particular to
information systems. One, of course, is the rise of foreign demand and
competition in product markets formerly dominated by American production and
consumption. Another is the increasing capital intensity of the systems
industry and the progressive shift of its cost structure towards initial and
fixed costs. Global marketing, if successful, reduces long run average
costs by permitting large investments to be averaged over large markets.
Moreover, the increasing internationalization of other industries which
consume systems tends to increase the comparative advantage enjoyed by those
able to provide globally uniform products, standards, and service. This
consideration also operates within the systems industries: as each
globalizes, the others tend to do so in response.
Hence the major systems sectors - semiconductors, computers, digital
communications, and software - show similar trends in technology, cost
structures, and market behavior. All are becoming heavily dependent upon
high initial cost, low marginal cost, capital intensive, computerized, and
highly flexible technologies. Marginal and direct labor costs will decline
in importance, often to insignificant levels. Concomitantly, the boundaries
separating various systems product markets will change and often blur.
Hence for eample we find Sony entering the workstation market, Canon
entering the market for integrated digital copiers and facsimile machines,
AT&T entering the computer market, and IBM purchasing ROLM (a producer of
digital telephone switches).
The rise of architecture and other initial costs appears linked to the
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progress of globalization. With assets such as product designs, technology
licenses, and software, the specifically transnational costs of replication
and transportation are effectively zero. Use of highly architectured
modular systems also has a further advantage in multinational operations,
namely to reduce the costs of labor immobility and/or training. Replicating
standardized, capital intensive systems requires less personnel transfer,
and the overhead costs of managing multiple facilities are similarly
reduced. Consequently production will tend to be multinational and/or
globally integrated; and where production is marketized, the market will
tend to be global as well.
Related tendencies favoring the same result seemingly arise from the
continuous broadening of digital systems applications. Systems technology
is becoming pervasive and inexpensive. Demand will therefore increase in
nations whose income levels previously limited their consumption of digital
systems. In many cases this demand will be for relatively homogeneous
products such as digital switches, microprocessors, controllers, or personal
computers. Furthermore, an increasing fraction of demand will be accounted
for by goods and services which invite global provision. I noted earlier
that VLSI favors digital networks. As multinational organizations invest in
large-scale personal computing and networking, they seem to find themselves
increasingly desirous of globally standardized systems and services.
Since the decreasing prices for digital communications may reduce the
cost of multinational operations, this tendency may prove self-reinforcing,
particularly within the information technology sectors themselves. As
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decreasing communications costs and pervasive networking combine with the
increasingly systematic use of modular, hierarchical architectures, global
partitioning of activity becomes feasible. For example, it is now fairly
routine for major software efforts - at least within firms such as DEC, IBM,
and large banks - to be cleaved into architectural components which are then
developed separately. This provides a variety of advantages. One is global
workload and capacity balancing. Another is functional specialization which
permits local concentration of personnel according to enduring technical
categories. For example, IBM centralized much of its worldwide graphics
software expertise in Hurseley Park, England. Research is centralized in
Yorktown Heights, San Jose, and Zurich. IBM's $4 billion in semiconductor
production occurs almost entirely in six sites - three in the northeast of
the U.S., two in Europe, and one in Japan.
Or consider another example: the vertical partitioning of the
semicustom logic business across both national and corporate boundaries.
Vendors such as Fujitsu and LSI Logic provide design software, engineering
services, and fabrication services. Customers either purchase software for
use on their own computers or use local vendor design centers (LSI Logic has
a dozen in the U.S., Europe, and Japan; the worldwide total for all vendors
exceeds one hundred). Data General, for example, primarily designs gate
arrays with Fujitsu software on its headquarters systems in Massachusetts.
Completed design files are transmitted to Japan by satellite link, where
circuits are fabricated in Fujitsu's domestic facilities. The circuits are
purchased by DG Japan and transshipped as necessary. 6 LSI Logic has
similar arrangements with customers in Asia, the U.S., Europe, and Latin
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America. Latin American transactions are slowed by the absence of suitable
digital communications infrastructure, which obliges reliance upon couriers
who deliver magnetic tapes.
The increasing concentration, capital intensity, and globalization of
the systems sectors are already evident in their aggregate economics. The
semiconductor industry has already been discussed, but a few statistical
indicators deserve review here. According to U.S. Commerce Department
data,17 U.S. semiconductor shipments (i.e. SIC 3674) rose at an 18.5%
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) between 1977 and 1982. However, total
employment grew only 7.9% annually in the same period, and the CAGR of
production employment was even lower (5.1%). Conversely, capital
expenditures rose at a CAGR of 33%. The industry also continued its
internationalization: for example, both imports and exports rose more
rapidly than shipments. Other statistical series, for example those
compiled by Dataquest and by an M.I.T. economist,18 support these
propositions, as do more recent statistics. The M.I.T. series, for example,
indicates that the capital - labor ratio of U.S. based semiconductor
production rose by 33% between 1980 and 1984. Available statistics indicate
that Japanese capital intensity has risen even more rapidly.19
Computer markets show similar behavior. While once again statistics
must be regarded as approximate, the general trend is clear, and all
statistical sources appear to agree. According to U.S. Commerce Department
data, 20 between 1972 and 1982, U.S. computer shipments grew from $6.5
billion to $36.7 billion, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19%. But
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production workers' total employment grew at a CAGR of only 8% (from 65,000
to 140,000), i.e. less rapidly than shipments, while capital expenditures
grew at a CAGR of more than 27%. Capital expenditures grew from $213
million (or 3.3% of shipments) in 1972 to $2.37 billion (or 6.5% of
shipments) by 1982. Another statistical series compiled by NBER and Steve
Kamin of MIT,21 primarily based upon Commerce Department data, indicates
that between 1980 and 1984, the capital - labor ratio of the U.S. office
equipment sector (SIC 3570-9) grew 54%. While aggregate statistical
indicators of plant level scale are not available, the evidence suggests
large and increasing minimum efficient scale in many systems activities.
Japanese software factories have workforces of over 1,000 and whose computer
systems and software capital costs sometimes exceed $200 million. IBM's
disk drive assembly facility in San Jose produces over $5 billion in
revenue; NEC's Kyushu semiconductor plant produced $1.3 billion in 1986; IBM
produces roughly $4 billion in semiconductors at only six facilities.
One very partial, crude index of globalization might be constructed by
considering total product trade (imports plus exports) as a fraction of U.S.
shipments. Using Commerce Department data, this fraction rose from 22% of
U.S. shipments in 1972 (all exports, incidentally) to 31% in 1982 (about 80%
exports). Between 1982 and 1985, this index rose again to 42% (only 65%
exports). Another simple index which captures multinational operations is
simply the percentage of firms' revenue derived from outside the United
States. IBM now derives over half its revenues from foreign sales, DEC more
than one-third, and the Japanese industry over 40%. In addition another
indicator of internationalization, digital communications traffic, appears
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to be increasing far more rapidly than either GNP, the computer industry, or
conventional voice communications traffic. For example AT&T's data
communications revenues are growing 30% annually, and an increasing fraction
is international.2 2 IBM, AT&T, DEC, Hewlett-Packard, and several other
firms already maintain large, private, global computer networks considered
vital to their corporate operations.
Asian Competition
The Japanese industry's competitive success is already substantial.
Japanese producers now dominate their domestic market, and supply large
quantities of semiconductors, subsystems, and entire computers to second-
tier U.S. and European firms. In some cases, these firms have begun to
market their systems directly in foreign countries. Japanese mainframe
systems are now roughly comparable technically to IBM's, and all three
mainframe producers have also developed proprietary, and technically
impressive, supercomputers. In addition, the U.S. industry has already been
marginalized in the Japanese market; U.S. firms now hold about 20% of the
Japanese market, and their share is declining. IBM's share of the Japanese
market has declined to approximately 15%. DEC, which now holds
approximately 7% of the world computer market, has been unable to increase
its Japanese market share, which is now 1.6%. With each technological
generation, U.S. share in new markets has declined. For example while U.S.
firms still hold a substantial fraction of the mainframe market, their share
of the Japanese personal computer market is trivially small. (NEC is the
market leader, with a 40% share.)
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In 1980, Japan became a net computer exporter; and in 1982, Japan
became a net exporter of computers to the United States. 23 Between the 1979
and 1984, Japanese computer exports to the United States rose from Y27
billion to over Y652 billion (roughly $4 billion), while imports rose very
gradually to Y174 billion in 1984.24 And by 1984 Japan generated roughly a
$5 billion worldwide trade surplus in computers, versus a slight deficit in
1979. In contrast the United States' worldwide trade surplus in computers
peaked at $7 billion in 1981, and declined to $3 billion in 1987. By one
accounting, 25 world market shares evolved as follows:
Share of World Computer Market (Top 100 Companies Worldwide)
1978 1986
United States 77 69
Japan 12 18*
Europe 10 13*
*Siemens, BASF, and ICL were counted as European despite the fact
that all three now remarket Japanese computers. By a more accurate
accounting, Europe's absolute market share and growth rate would be lower,
while Japan's would be higher.
By 1984, Japanese computer production exceeded $15 billion (versus
roughly $50 billion for the United States26 ); 45% of total 1984 output was
exported, versus 12% in 1979.27 While some of this increase derives from
increased exports by IBM Japan, the relative increase in exports by domestic
Japanese producers has been even larger. Computer and total revenues of the
major Japanese producers have evolved as follows:
Computer Revenues of Largest Japanese Computer Vendors ($B)
1978 1986
Hitachi 1.83 4.73
Toshiba 1.63 2.61
Fujitsu 1.25 6.58
N.E.C. 0.67 6.33
Total (Top 4) 5.83 20.24
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JAPANESE COMPUTER INDUSTRY TRADE BALANCES, 1975 - 1985
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While these statistics already show Japanese gains, they probably
understate the progress of the Japanese industry. Firstly, Japanese
progress has become markedly stronger since roughly 1981. Secondly, the
foreign sales of Japanese firms and their affiliates, have been increasing
rapidly for several years. Amdahl, which is now 46% owned by Fujitsu and
increasingly markets Fujitsu systems, reported revenues of $659 million for
the first six months of 1987, an increase of 60% over the first six months
of 1986.28 Similarly for National Semiconductor Corporation's Information
Systems Group (ISG), which is dominated by National Advanced Systems, which
markets Hitachi systems including IBM-compatible mainframes and
supercomputers. National's ISG revenues rose from less than $450 million in
fiscal 1983 to over $890 million in 1987. Hitachi product sales contributed
the vast majority of this growth, and continue to accelerate; sales of
Hitachi products by National rose over 60% in fiscal 1987.29 (In fact
National's remarketing of Hitachi systems now accounts for over half the
company's revenues and essentially all of its profits, leading some to
wonder how long National will remain a U.S. merchant semiconductor
supplier.) Honeywell, which now remarkets NEC machines, also reported its
strongest financial results in recent memory.
Conversely the recent performance of the U.S. industry has been less
than stellar. While several major firms have performed well (particularly
DEC, Apple, NCR, and HP) most of the established industry has not, and many
smaller firms encountered serious trouble. For 1987 IBM reported a 6%
revenue increase, all of which derived from currency shifts. Subtracting
currency effects, IBM's revenues declined 1% in 1987, following a decline of
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7% the previous year by the same measure. (For 1987, DEC reported 25%
revenue growth; Apple, 57% to nearly $4 billion.) Unisys reported increased
earnings in 1987, but they came primarily from cost reductions; revenues
grew about 10%, mostly from currency shifts. In July 1987 Data General
announced a quarterly loss of $65 million, a 3.6% revenue decline relative
to the same quarter of the previous year (to $314 million from $325
million), and 950 layoffs.30 Data General's losses totalled $104 million
over the previous nine months. Also in July 1987, Control Data reported a
quarterly loss of $5.5 million and a 5% revenue decline (to $786 million
from $828 million) relative to the same quarter in the previous year, when
the company lost $7.8 million.31 On the other hand, in the quarter ending
December 1985 Control Data lost $298 million.32
As with semiconductors, Japanese displacement of U.S. firms began
through licensing, imitation, and theft of technologies appropriate to
mature markets - initially the mainframe market, and primarily the IBM 370-
compatible and Honeywell compatible markets. But as the Japanese industry
has developed and U.S. fragmentation has progressed, the intervals between
U.S. commercialization, Japanese technology acquisition, and Japanese
competitive challenges have decreased. To some extent, the same is true of
Korea and Taiwan, particularly with respect to IBM-compatible personal
computers. Concomitantly, the U.S. industry's dependence upon its Japanese
competitors for semiconductors, subsystems, and manufacturing services has
greatly increased, as has the tendency of U.S. startups to license their
technologies to major Japanese firms. Established U.S. firms such as Unisys
and Honeywell are now extremely dependent upon Japanese semiconductors, high
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speed CPU components, disk drives, and (increasingly) entire computers. As
their financial condition worsens, this dependence tends to increase; and
several of these firms are already in substantial financial difficulty.
The evolution of the personal computer market is one of the sharpest
and most important examples of the industry's new cycle of initial U.S.
fragmentation, self limiting entrepreneurial success, rapid Asian entry, and
consolidation. Among established firms, only IBM successfully entered the
first generation of the PC market. The microprocessor-based personal
computer market as we now know it was created by startups such as Apple,
though IBM had actually marketed a commercially unsuccessful personal
computer nearly a decade earlier than Apple.33 In 1980, however, IBM
entered a rapidly growing market dominated by 8 bit machines (some, like
Apple's, with half screen displays) such as the Apple 2, Osborne, Molecular,
and Compupro.
IBM marketed a 16 bit machine using the Intel 8088 microprocessor and a
full screen display. IBM's open architecture encouraged the further short
run fragmentation of the industry by explicitly permitting others to produce
not only complementary products (e.g. software and peripherals) but also
competing, imitative products (IBM compatible machines, or "clones"). Such
clones indeed appeared as firms such as Compaq, Eagle, and others entered
the market. However, neither IBM nor the U.S. startups predicted the
astonishing rapidity with which Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese
multinationals entered the market. By 1986 IBM had slightly less than half
of the IBM-compatible market; U.S. imitators held perhaps a quarter; the
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other quarter was held by Asian imports, whose market share was growing
rapidly. Several established U.S. firms, e.g. Sperry, entered the personal
computer market simply by marketing Asian PC clones. After severe market
share erosion, IBM introduced the PS2 series in 1987, using a proprietary
bus architecture and graphics interface, thus abandoning most of the low end
of its own market to intense commodity price competition. Apple has been
able to perform well, and uses a proprietary architecture open to external
connection but not direct imitation. But Apple will soon face the challenge
of integrating single machines into enormous corporate networks, an area in
which the firm has no experience. Furthermore, it now appears that open
architectures - IBM PC and PS architectures, plus UNIX - will hold most of
the mature personal computer market. At least eight Japanese firms have
already entered the UNIX workstation market, whose intersection with mass
personal computing is just beginning.
In addition to existing commodity markets, then, Japanese penetration
of U.S. markets is extending into relatively new markets displaying rapid
growth and in which U.S. fragmentation facilitates Japanese technology
extraction and market targeting. The largest important of these areas of
Japanese technology acquisition, U.S. fragmentation, and incipient Japanese
entry is probably, in fact, the market for high performance UNIX
workstations, currently a $2 billion market growing over 70% annually.
Japanese licensing and use of U.S. startups in this area already includes
the UNIX operating system and related objects such as C compilers (most
major vendors), IBM 5080 graphics terminal emulation (NEC via Phoenix
Technologies), the X windowing system (Sony from M.I.T.), reduced
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instruction set microprocessors and workstations (Kubota via Mips and Dana,
Fujitsu via Sun Microsystems), desktop publishing software (NEC and Fujitsu
via Adobe Systems), and a wide variety of established packages such as
Lockheed's CADAM system. Fujitsu, NEC, Canon, Sony, and Sanyo already sell
UNIX workstations, and have used workstations of their own design internally
for several years.
In addition, the Japanese industry appears to be making increased use
of the U.S. university system. For example, Sony uses the recently
developed X system from MIT's Project Athena and several Japanese UNIX
workstations include Berkeley UNIX enhancements, which were developed by the
University of California, Berkeley, and are available to any UNIX licensee
for a minor fee. One of the two professionals I interviewed at NEC's Fuchu
works was a young computer scientist who had just returned from a one-year
visiting scientist appointment at M.I.T.'s Laboratory for Computer Science,
where he had conducted a survey of reduced instruction set architectures and
microprocessor based artificial intelligence systems. The three largest
Japanese vendors all send technical personnel every year to U.S. research
universities as paid visiting scientists. One has an internal examination
administered annually to select thirty employees for one-year and two-year
stays as graduate students and visiting scientists.34
And finally, internal Japanese technical capabilities, particularly
those related to commodity technologies and high quality manufacturing, are
increasingly impressive. One major U.S. firm purchases 22-layer printed
circuit boards from Fujitsu, while Fujitsu is already using 40-layer boards
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in its own products.3 5 Surveys by Cusumano, as well as confidential studies
to which I have had access, indicate that Japanese software factories now
produce software systems for standardized or mature functionalities (such as
mainframe compilers and factory process control systems) of far higher
quality and with higher productivity than U.S. vendors. 36 Japanese
supercomputers and IBM compatible mainframes are now considered technically
comparable to IBM and Cray products. Japanese high resolution graphics
displays and laser printers are generally considered superior to U.S.
products, and already lead in world markets.
Statistical indicators and several surveys confirm this general
picture. The JTECH panel on computer science summarized its assessment in
1984 by stating that Japan was far behind the United States in basic
research; somewhat behind in advanced development; but pulling ahead of the
United States in product engineering. 37 Between 1975 and 1981, U.S. patents
granted to U.S. inventors in the field of office, computing, and accounting
machinery declined slightly from 993 to 977, while U.S. patents granted to
Japanese firms rose from 192 to 282. In the same field and over the same
period, U.S. R&D expenditures rose 12% in real terms while Japan's rose
191%, albeit from a small base.38 Though more recent comparable data is not
yet available, the recent evidence which is available - primarily corporate
data derived from annual reports - suggests that these trends have
accelerated. Since the early 1980s, total R&D spending by Japanese computer
vendors (including their non-computer R&D) has increased far more rapidly
than R&D spending by the major U.S. computer firms.39
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The sum of these various forces - increasing U.S. fragmentation,
technological change in favor of capital intensive integrated operations,
Japanese access to marketized U.S. technology, and increasing Japanese
competitive effort - is likely to produce further U.S. decline in accordance
with the strategic arguments described above for the semiconductor case.
While I will not provide a similarly detailed analysis for the computer
case, it appears that essentially the same arguments apply, for example in
understanding the absence of long term cooperation between semiconductor,
systems, and software firms or the growth of licensing by startups to
Japanese firms as their competitive strength grows.
A Brief Regime Analysis
Consider now a brief assessment of long run strategic processes and
strategic regimes in the computer industry. We can suppose that the
domestic regime of the Japanese industry was largely the same as in the
semiconductor case. What of the domestic U.S. regime, and of the
international strategic interactions between the two systems?
Consider first the domestic U.S. system. The early established
industry led by IBM cooperated implicitly in extracting rents, while not
cooperating strategically in negotiations with Japan or procompetitively in
R&D or technology sharing. Among established firms, only IBM provided
public goods in substantial quantities, and even IBM was able to do so in a
manner which produced largely private benefits; for example, large
university donations of IBM equipment trained students on IBM systems rather
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than competitors'. Once again aside from IBM, U.S. computer firms failed to
invest in semiconductor technology. The industry also failed to cooperate
vertically with the volatile merchant sector, and was highly exposed to
entry in emerging systems markets by entrepreneurs exploiting novel VLSI-
based technologies and architectures.
Hence the result has been a "re-merchantizing" of the previously stable
computer industry, and a balkanizing of interests and territory within it.
Increasingly, the systems sector has resembled the merchant sector, though
IBM and DEC do remain clear leaders. Hence the U.S. regime is, to a large
extent, one of mutual defection and U.S. firms do, frequently, license their
technologies to Japanese competitors. They also, frequently, exit markets
in which unsustainable price competition appears; even IBM has done so to
some extent.
The relative stability of the industry did, however, imply that human
capital investments were appropriable; IBM and to some extent its second
tier rivals did have substantial training programs and low personnel
turnover. IBM largely still does; DEC and Hewlett Packard also have low
turnover levels and large training budgets. This however, was the major
beneficial difference between the semiconductor and systems sectors'
internal strategic regimes. Ironically, the stability and leverage given to
established computer firms by switching costs and lock-in during the
classical mainframe period seems to have performed a strategic function
equivalent to the merchants' perpetual instability: it permitted all firms
to compete from a similar basis of inefficiency and/or shortsighted rent
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harvesting. New architectures and open-market VLSI then shifted the U.S.
computer industry towards the merchant strategic regime.
Consequently, Japanese strategies similar to those seen in the
semiconductor sector (licensing, technology imports, illegal imitation,
market closure, and commodity market entry) became attractive - to the
extent that international strategic interactions between Japanese and U.S.
actors resemble those of the semiconductor sector. To a large extent, they
are. The largest difference, probably, arises from IBM's leadership,
including the fact that IBM obtained a far stronger position in Japan than
did the merchant sector. To succeed in a maturing IBM market is more
difficult than snatching one from a merchant semiconductor firm. But many
other elements of Japanese semiconductor strategy - such as licensing from
smaller new firms - could be transferred directly to the post-VLSI computer
market. Furthermore, the combination of IBM's general, albeit gradual,
relative decline in the world market and the strong actions taken within the
Japanese arena has gradually reduced the impact of IBM's leadership and
initially strong Japanese position.
And in most other respects, the U.S. computer sector faces an
international environment rather similar to that faced by the merchant
industry. The U.S. government is similarly passive; long term violations of
intellectual property rights go unpunished; little government support for
the commercial industry is forthcoming; Japanese protectionism and strategic
closure permit Japanese firms to exercise unilateral, asymmetric control
over the areas, timing, and terms of the industry's globalization.
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Therefore it appears that the merchant semiconductor industry was not a
wholly anomalous case, in two senses. First, the particular strategic
processes which have plagued it have appeared elsewhere; and second,
strategic processes are, in fact, important. Indeed, I will now argue that,
on the available evidence, much the same analysis holds for the U.S. high
technology system generally, including the university system and other high
technology industries such as the genetic engineering sector. As Japanese
competition grows and technology intensive industries globalize, a new
international strategic regime is being created; and the United States is
being integrated into this regime on unfavorable terms.
4. The New International Regime
Globalization With American Strategic Disadvantage
The internationalization of technology intensive competition, driven in
part by progress in digital information systems, is leading to the formation
of a new, globally integrated industrial system, particularly in high
technology industries themselves. As a consequence of domestic
institutional decline, strategic fragmentation, and a variety of
environmental conditions which shorten the effective time horizons of U.S.
strategic actors, the United States has increasingly become a fragmented
provider of knowledge, services, and markets to strategically coordinated
foreign competitors.
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This process is further evidence that productivity and competitiveness
may not depend only or even primarily upon factor costs or classical
determinants of the terms of trade, but rather upon how well economic
systems can control, and respond to, strategic incentives. Moreover, the
international system now emerging involves more than trade, foreign
investment, and product markets. It comprises global production, transfers,
and usage of institutions, information, services, human capital, and
technology as well as capital and final products. Indeed some of the most
important benefits obtained from the United States by foreign multinationals
appear to be in these nontraditional categories. 40
Consider, therefore, some aggregate indicators of American and Japanese
specialization in the international regime of high technoloy competition,
beginning with generic research. The United States has long been, and
remains, by far the largest producer of basic research. In 1973 the U.S.
produced 38% of the world's scientific and technical literature.41 By 1982
the percentage had declined only modestly, to 35% of world research
output.42 Aside from substantial declines in biology and pure mathematics,
U.S. shares changed very little in the 8 areas of natural science and
engineering research surveyed by NSF.43
In contrast, patenting activity tells a very different story. U.S.
shares of world patenting activity are declining, and far more rapidly than
basic research output. Between 1975 and 1982, the U.S. share of world
patent activity declined from 27% to 23%." Moreover, the U.S. roughly held
its share or improved it in only two high technology areas surveyed by NSF,
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drugs and microbiology. In five others, U.S. shares declined steeply.
Between 1975 and 1982, the U.S. share of worldwide new patent activity
declined from 28% to 14% in robotics, from 47% to 30% in lasers, from 43% to
27% in integrated circuits, from 27% to 22% in telecommunications, and from
26% to 21% in internal combustion engines.45
In contrast, Japan's aggregate share of world patent activity rose from
15% to 20% during the same period. 46 Its share of integrated circuit
patents rose from 18% to 48%; of laser patents, from 11% to 37%; of robotics
patents, from 9% to 13%; of telecommunications patents, 11% to 37%; of
drugs, 16% to 20%.47 Japan declined only in microbiology, from 47% to
34%.48 Moreover, it is unlikely that Japan's rise can be attributed to any
artifact of the Japanese domestic patent system, as has occasionally been
suggested. Between 1969 and 1982, Japanese foreign patent applications rose
55%, while those of the United States declined 50%.19
Yet the U.S. trade surplus in license royalties - i.e. net technology
exports from the U.S. to other nations - remained very wide, and actually
rose in both absolute and ratio terms. Between 1972 and 1982, the U.S.
ratio of royalty receipts to royalty payments rose slightly from 8.7 to
9.9.50 In contrast, Japan's ratio of receipts to payments rose slightly but
remained less than 0.7 - i.e. Japan remained a net technology and license
importer.51 The fact that U.S. net license exports were increasing even
while the U.S. share of world patenting activity was declining rapidly
suggests that the United States sells technology more freely than other
nations, and that in fact its propensity to sell technology rather than to
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use it has recently been increasing. The same is not true, however, of
Japan. Japan's royalty revenues remained less than one-eighth as large as
those of the United States in 1982, and Japan's net technology trade was
improving far less slowly than its patent position.
And finally, U.S. exports of technology have increased rapidly while
U.S. exports of high technology products have not, while again the converse
is true of Japan. Between 1972 and 1982, the U.S. trade surplus in high
technology products grew rather slowly, from approximately $7 billion to
roughly $11 billion (in constant 1972 dollars), and has since become a
deficit.5 2 Japan's high technology trade surplus grew from $3 billion to
nearly $15 billion in the same period, and has continued to increase rapidly
since. 53 It is exceedingly unlikely, moreover, that a positive U.S. trade
balance in technology could ever compensate for trade deficits in high
technology goods.54
Hence the picture presented even by the most general, highly aggregated
statistics is of two very different national systems. The United States
maintains an advantage in basic research; is losing its advantage in
innovation; sells its inventions readily; and is losing its comparative
advantage in commercial competition. Japan, on the other hand, performs
relatively little university or basic research; is rapidly increasing its
commercial innovation levels; purchases large quantities of technology from
the United States but sells little of its own technology; and is
increasingly successful in high technology markets.
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Other trends in the functional distribution of activities, and in both
horizontal and vertical market structure, are consistent with the
proposition that investment patterns and incentive structures encourage
commercial appropriability in Japan more than in the United States. Not
only is a higher fraction of U.S. (versus Japanese) R&D devoted to basic as
opposed to applied research, a far higher fraction is also military as
opposed to commercial. While there is considerable controversy as to the
commercial spinoff of military R&D, military R&D is surely on average much
less effective for commercial purposes than explicitly commercial effort.
Between 1971 and 1983, United States non-defense R&D rose from 1.7% of GNP
to 2.0%.55 But Japanese non-defense R&D rose from 1.8% of GNP to over 2.6%
of GNP during the same period. 56 Since Japanese GNP grew far more rapidly
than U.S. GNP during this period, absolute Japanese expenditures grew very
rapidly indeed.
Furthermore, the fraction of nondefense R&D which takes place in
universities is larger in the United States than in Japan, where a higher
fraction occurs in large firms. This generic U.S. research and human
capital production base is highly available to Japanese firms, while
Japanese corporate applied R&D is subject to far more strategic control.
Moreover, Japan has systematically provided itself with the capacity to use
U.S. institutions, research, and knowledge. For example, between 1972 and
1983 the number of Japanese citizens studying in U.S. universities rose from
less than 5,000 to approximately 13,000.57 In contrast, there are fewer
than 1,000 U.S. students in Japan. Less than one tenth of one percent of
U.S. technical professionals speak Japanese, and I have not encountered a
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single U.S. CEO who speaks Japanese.
The past decade has also witnessed much fragmentation of American high
technology industry, once again in notable contrast to Japan and Korea.
Japanese and Korean high technology production remain dominated by core
oligopolies of industrial complexes. While new firms are often created,
they are usually created by, or with the assistance of, core multinationals
which hold substantial equity positions, and also often supply executive
personnel and working capital.58 The production levels and world high
technology market shares held by these diversified industrial complexes have
increased more rapidly than U.S. and world production. In contrast, and
with a few notable exceptions, established U.S. high technology firms have
experienced relative decline.
Rather, the U.S. has seen rapid growth of new venture formation.
Between 1974 and 1984, annual total venture capital commitments to new U.S.
firms rose from $250 million annually to over $3 billion.59 Venture capital
committed to high technology industries behaved similarly. Between 1975 and
1983, annual venture capital commitments to high technology manufacturing
firms rose from $75 million to $1.6 billion.*5 Between 1976 and 1983, the
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of U.S. high technology companies
rose from 4 to 141, and the total amount raised in such offerings rose from
$12 million to $1.5 billion.61 A substantial fraction of these high
technology startups and IPOs, probably almost one half, were semiconductor,
computer, and software firms.
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As I argued with respect to the semiconductor industry, this
fragmentation probably reduces the ability of the United States economy to
appropriate the returns to domestic R&D, and increases the likelihood that
technology will be sold rather than used by U.S. firms. Personnel turnover
has similar effects. One recent survey indicated that the expected tenure
of middle managers in U.S. industry has declined from 13 years to 7 years
since 1970.62 Personnel turnover in startups is even higher. Not
surprisingly, surveys of Japanese business consistently report lower
turnover levels, and higher levels of internal corporate training, than are
found in the United States. For example Jaikumar's study of flexible
machining systems found that Japanese workers received three times as much
training as their U.S. counterparts, despite the fact that their average
formal educational level was already far higher.63
Hence, a substantial and increasing fraction of U.S. research,
development, training, and technology generation is either explicitly open,
is not appropriated by the performer, and/or is conducted by small startup
firms with little experience in multinational competition. Moreover, the
United States is also becoming a net exporter of advanced degrees. Over
half of all U.S. engineering Ph.D.s are now granted to foreign citizens, and
over half of these Ph.D.s return to their home country." In contrast,
Japan produces far fewer engineering Ph.D.s, but produces more engineering
bachelor's degrees than the United States, and exports very few of them.
In many respects, furthermore, the university system mirrors the
fragmentation of the startup sector. And indeed as Japan's interest in
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advanced research increases, it has begun to use U.S. universities through
industrial affiliate programs, employee rotations as visiting scientists in
university research laboratories, university research support in return to
access to new research results, technology licensing, and donations of
Japanese equipment. For example about 25% of all members of M.I.T.'s
Industrial Liaison Program are now Japanese, and Japanese firms are widely
agreed to be the Program's most sophisticated and aggressive users.
Similarly for other services; in 1986, one MIT summer course in VLSI design
had more Japanese than American enrollees.
For example, several large software systems for VLSI circuit design and
related functions - Crystal, SPICE, Macpitts, Magic, others - were developed
at Stanford, Berkeley, CMU, and MIT and are now standard tools in many
commercial firms.65 Berkeley UNIX, developed by U.C. Berkeley with DARPA
funds, is available to any UNIX source code licensee for a trivial fee.66
The X Windowing system developed at MIT has recently become an industry
standard for UNIX workstations, and MIT's NuBus architecture is also
increasingly popular. The 1984 JTECH Panel report on computer science in
Japan noted that BSD 4.2, the then-latest release of Berkeley UNIX, was
already widely used in Japan. Several recently announced Japanese
engineering workstations employ Berkeley code, including its networking
support and file system improvements.
A number of software technologies (languages, software development
techniques) and novel machine designs have also originated in American
universities. Many other architectures and standards were developed by U.S.
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government agencies, private firms, or standards bodies such as the American
National Standards Institute. Most of these are now openly available
worldwide, as a consequence of U.S. government procurement policies,
standardization conventions, intellectual property law, and industry
structure. For a large fraction of the computer and software markets, these
standards in effect constitute product specifications available to any
imitative manufacturer. In some cases, the U.S. government requires
compliance with these public standards as a precondition to bidding for
government contracts.
Hence, from the point of view of a Japanese or Korean multinational, a
wide variety of activities - personnel defections from major U.S. firms,
licensing from U.S. startups, advanced education, and university research
efforts themselves - increase the technology portfolio available on the open
market in the United States. And because these activities do not penetrate
the Japanese or Korean arenas, they represent little direct risk to
potential competitors, either through market competition or domestic
strategic disarray in R&D, technology control, personnel training, or
government policy arenas.
So by nature of their subsidized efforts, institutional incentives, and
fragmented structure, American startup and university sectors collectively
provide R&D, technology assessment, and market research services as
worldwide public goods. They also provide access to the technologies and
markets themselves, skilled labor, and a variety of information services for
would-be strategic entrants. Startup activities collectively characterize
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novel markets, their potential size, and relative demand for various product
attributes. Entrepreneurial instability lasts until an internal leader
emerges, large firms enter, or both. In either case, however, major firms
can observe the entire distribution of startup activity.
Then, as the market reaches substantial size, the U.S. and Asian
multinationals enter and compete for the mature market; but U.S. firms must
contend with the startup sector and the fragmentation of the American arena
as well as with foreign competition. Whereas startups rarely obtain strong
positions in Japanese and Korean markets, they do sometimes represent
significant competitive pressure within the American market. Furthermore,
American startups are generally more valuable for Asian firms than for
American oligopolists such as IBM. Asian entrants, unlike established U.S.
firms, often have little previous experience in advanced American systems
markets. 67 Hence startups provide information and direct assistance which
cannot easily be obtained by observing oligopolists such as IBM, as a
consequence of their vertical integration and attention to protection of
proprietary information.
A Final Example: Biotechnology
The U.S. biotechnology sector is extraordinarily analogous to the
merchant semiconductor industry. Genetic engineering is a novel generic
technology, developed through a publicly funded and publicly available (and
primarily American) science base, whose continued development will transform
both process and product technology in at least three major industrial
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sectors: agriculture, chemicals, and medical products including diagnostics
and pharmaceuticals. The United States currently leads the world by a
considerable margin in both basic scientific research and commercial
efforts. However, U.S. efforts have a characteristic structure reminiscent
of the semiconductor industry of the 1960s and 1970s. 68
A few of the large U.S. multinationals in the affected downstream
sectors have substantial efforts - notably DuPont (chemicals), Monsanto
(chemicals and pharmaceuticals), and Merck (pharmaceuticals). Most,
however, do not. Most biotechnology R&D, and most particularly the best
R&D, is being undertaken either directly in universities, where it is
entirely public, or in venture capital funded entrepreneurial firms which
resemble merchant semiconductor producers in virtually every way save the
nature of their capital equipment. 69 Over 200 such firms have been formed
over the last decade, often by departing university professors, and entry is
continuing; nearly $2 billion has been invested in entrepreneurial firms in
this sector. 70 However, product gestation periods are long, intellectual
property rights are in flux, many firms are losing money, and most obtain
the majority of their current revenue from contract research performed for
other firms. These research efforts are heavily concentrated upon drug
discovery and product R&D.
In contrast, the Japanese biotechnology industry evidences the same
structural and strategic configurations as the Japanese systems industry. 71
It is dominated by large, stable, diversified, vertically integrated firms
such as Ajinimoto and Kirin in food processing, Mitsubishi Chemical in
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organic chemicals, and Takeda in pharmaceuticals. Both R&D and experience
are concentrated in process technolgies such as fermentation, where Japan is
generally considered to lead the United States. Collections of firms, in
conjunction with MITI, have announced plans for joint R&D efforts, though
the amounts committed by the government appear presently to be small. In
contrast, regulatory structures in the United States appear to raise the
cost and difficulty of commercial drug approvals and exports, relative to
other industrialized nations, thereby providing incentives for foreign
licensing relative to domestic investment. Some of these policies have
recently been changed, but many remain. Court actions by one small activist
group, the Foundation on Economic Trends, have reportedly impeded several
firms' efforts.72
And once again, the Japanese market is amenable to strategic control,
while the U.S. industrial arena is open, fragmented, and unstable.
Ajinimoto has provided funds to M.I.T. research efforts; Takeda has funded
research at Harvard and sends five scientists annually to U.S. research
laboratories; Kirin has established a licensing agreement with Amgen;"
Chiron has technology agreements with several firms, some of them Japanese;
and in July 1987, Mitsubishi Chemical announced that they were considering a
licensing and reciprocal marketing agreement with Genentech, the largest
U.S. biotechnology firm.74 Mitsubishi Chemical would supply capital and
generic fermentation technology, in return for which it obtains Genentech
technology specific to manufacturing albumin, production assistance, and
export rights. Mitsubishi Chemical and Genentech have announced that they
may also cross-market each other's products.
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Patterns of personnel and technology flows, both domestic and
international, thus resemble the semiconductor case as well. Genentech's
two founders were researchers at Stanford and the University of California,
San Francisco; they were the object of legal action regarding a patent
dating from their university research. One of Amgen's founders was a
defector from Genentech. 75 Genentech's chief operating officer was formerly
president of Abbott, a major pharmaceutical producer; the firm's new vice
president of science was recently recruited from the M.I.T. faculty. Other
startups have been founded by faculty members of Harvard Medical School and
Boston University to exploit colony stimulating factors and wound healing
factors. One founder of such a firm told me in 1987 that a delegation of
Japanese businessmen had already visited him and asked to license his
technology. 76 Laboratories at Harvard and M.I.T. already have several dozen
visiting scientists on rotation from Japanese companies, 77 in some cases
working on prototypes of automated biotechnology-related capital goods
developed by U.S. firms. 78
Some knowledgeable analysts, for example Professor Mel Horwitch of
M.I.T., doubt that the biotechnology / pharmaceuticals case will replicate
the path of the semiconductor case. And indeed there are differences. For
example, biotechnology-related production may be more fragmented and less
capital intensive than semiconductor production, and regulatory requirements
constitute national entry barriers to some degree. There are also more
vertical collaborations (between large U.S. chemical and pharmaceutical
firms and the emerging biotechnology sector) than there were in the early
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history of the semiconductor industry. Nonetheless, it would be quite
surprising if the structural and strategic fragmentation of the U.S.
industry, and the asymmetric openness of the U.S. arena, did not have a
substantial effect upon the industry's future competitiveness.
In Conclusion
The importance of this asymmetrical U.S. openness is difficult to
assess independent of the other forces which reduce productivity growth in
the U.S. system. If the other structures and practices of the U.S.
information technology sector were favorable to investment, innovation, and
long term technical cooperation among firms, these strategic deficiencies
might be considerably less important. At present, however, it would appear
that optimal remedial policies would not only provide resources to, and
lengthen the time horizons of, U.S. firms, but would also increase the
strategic reciprocity of foreign economic systems which currently have more
access to the U.S. system than U.S. actors have to theirs. Both investment
levels and recognition of international strategic interactions are likely to
grow in importance over the next decade, as the globalization of high
technology industry continues and competition intensifies.
It would therefore appear that the internationalization of high
technology competition finds the United States in a declining structural and
strategic position. The final chapter of this essay considers, first, what
the consequences of continued decline would be, and second, the potential
effects of alternative strategies and policy measures.
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CHAPTER SIX
IMPLICATIONS: STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE FACE OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY DECLINE
1. Introduction
Implicit in the foregoing has been the idea that the retention of
competitive domestic semiconductor, computer, and other high technology
industries is important to the United States. Here, I consider this
proposition and, subsequently, several alternative responses to U.S.
decline. Three basic arguments are advanced. First, the decline of the
U.S. semiconductor and computer sectors would damage the United States
economy, and possibly the international system as a whole. Second, the
strategic and institutional sources of this U.S. decline imply that neither
market adjustment processes nor conventional economic policy prescriptions
such as increased R&D funding would suffice to ensure the future health of
U.S. high technology. Third and finally, satisfactory U.S. performance
would require policies which not only supply greater resources to American
industry, but which also change its incentive structures and the strategic
environment within which it operates.
Appropriate policy would therefore not only increase the supply of
human, technological, infrastructural, and financial resources available
within the United States (for example through increased subsidies for
engineering education and international study), but would also increase the
likelihood of their useful employment. One way to do so, for example, would
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be to link provision of these resources to conditions which increase the
time horizons of actors and their propensity to engage in procompetitive
cooperation. For example, Federal assistance to individuals and firms could
be phased over long time periods, linked to long run performance, and
require matching commitments. Federal policy could also reduce subsidies to
short-term profit taking and defection, for example through changes in the
tax treatment of stock options, pension benefits, corporate profits, and
capital expenditures. And U.S. science, trade, and foreign investment
policies could display increased strategic reciprocity in order to reduce
international asymmetries in market access, intellectual property
protection, and so forth.
An overview of the argument
Relatively standard economic arguments, in conjunction with the nature
of the industries in question, imply that the decline of the U.S.
semiconductor and computer sectors would have a substantially detrimental
effect upon the economic welfare of the United States. First, the
industries themselves are skill-intensive, high value added, high growth
sectors which will constitute a substantial fraction of global industrial
production by the turn of the century. The more a national economy is
composed of these sectors and the more efficiently these sectors operate
within it, the wealthier the host nation will be. Electronics sectors are
the largest high wage, high growth industries; and the U.S. already has a
large investment in these sectors, particularly in organizational experience
and human capital, not easily transferrable to other such sectors even if
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they existed.
But in addition, both the semiconductor and computer sectors have
strong and important linkages to other, collectively more important, arenas
ranging from semiconductor capital equipment to industrial electronics,
software, information services, aerospace systems, defense electronics, and
military operations. The externalities and system economies of scale
generated by their national collocation, and particularly collocation of
technological and commercial leadership, are probably large; the costs of
losing them are probably large as well. 1
Without economically and strategically sophisticated governmental
interventions, market self-adjustment is unlikely to provide any reversal of
the declines noted and/or predicted earlier in this essay. It is unlikely
that without such interventions, any natural equilibrating mechanism could
preserve the institutions and capabilities necessary for future U.S.
competitiveness. The capital markets, for example, are unlikely by
themselves to yield the large and coordinated financing required, for
reasons similar to those which have inhibited other forms of long run
cooperation in these industries.
Indeed, the requirement which presents itself is that of an integrated
strategic policy of wide scope, coordinated centrally within the Federal
government, and with both domestic and international components. It would
encompass domestic education, R&D, procurement, sectoral rationalization,
cooperative activity, systematic information exchange, long range
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investment, and changes in strategic incentives, together with a range of
internationalist policies covering trade, access to foreign arenas such as
product markets, and strategic regulation of foreign investment in the
United States. Since there are presumably learning effects in policymaking
as well as industrial production, the development of U.S. policy would
necessarily be gradual. Perhaps, for example, it should begin with low risk
policy measures such as joint R&D support, pursuit of Japanese market
access, and the establishment of high level analytical capacities within the
Federal government. In its entirety, the development of such an integrated
policy would require many years - perhaps a decade or more. Long time
horizons are beneficial to governments too; and arena performance might
suffer as much from short time horizons in policymaking as from the
shortsighted private behavior thereby induced.
2. Effects of Continued U.S. Decline
U.S. competitive failure in microelectronics and systems would have
consequences well beyond the industries directly involved. It would also
impose costs upon the wider economy, gradually reduce U.S. military
capabilities, and increase U.S. strategic dependence upon Japan. These
developments could also, possibly, provoke political conflict within the
United States, for example between conventionally protectionist forces and
sectors dependent upon Japanese technology, and might also lead to severe
political friction between the United States and Japan. Eventually these
processes could damage nations competing with the United States as well as
the U.S. itself, through trade friction and possibly geopolitical effects.
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Economic Implications
The economic consequences of reduced U.S. competitiveness in future
semiconductor and systems arenas are difficult to assess, but they would
probably be large - within 15 years, a significant fraction of GNP. Both
the size of the effect and the difficulty of assessing it arise from the
fact that although direct effects are clearly non-trivial, there are several
reasons to believe that indirect effects may dominate. Both semiconductors
and systems are critical inputs and capital goods for much larger downstream
industries. Furthermore the technology available to both producing and
consuming industries appears, in significant measure, to depend upon
structural and strategic variables connected to international competition.
Consequently if United States industry loses its competitiveness and
institutional bargaining power, it may also lose access to world class
technology. Moreover, this international competition could also affect
developments at national and international levels - matters such as the make
/ buy decisions of large semiconductor consumers, the future location
decisions of U.S. and Japanese electronics producers, and the evolution of
the Japanese defense industry.
In the case of semiconductors, the principal downstream industries
involved are (in no particular order) systems sectors such as the computer
industry; military electronics such as secure communications equipment and
weapons guidance systems; industrial electronics such as instruments,
robots, and numerically controlled machine tools; consumer electronics such
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as video games, compact disk players, VCRs, and digital televisions;
aircraft and aerospace electronics; and automotive electronics such as
dashboard instrumentation and fuel system controls. In addition, over the
next twenty years several non-electronics sectors will become dependent upon
semiconductors for the first time. Those often mentioned include the
construction and consumer durables industries. For example, as digital
communications becomes a pervasive infrastructural technology, the
engineering and construction of large industrial facilities has begun to
include digital systems. The current generation of "smart buildings" is the
first example of this process. It appears likely that digital systems such
as computers, digital switches, and local area networks will become so
pervasive that systems demand will encompass the entire economy. The
information systems intensity of advanced economies may reach 5% by the year
2000, and will probably continue to grow for several decades thereafter.
Collectively, the sectors which consume semiconductors are currently
twenty times the size of the semiconductor industry itself (some indicative
statistics are given in Appendix 2). The same is probably true of systems
sectors. In several of these downstream sectors, competitive semiconductor
and/or systems technology is critical to productivity growth and competitive
success. In addition the systems sectors, because of their size and
technologically advanced input requirements, affect the health of several
industries upstream from them. The semiconductor industry is probably the
most important one; but others of some significance include the construction
industry, producers of robots and CAD/CAM systems, parts of the chemical
industry, and parts of the educational and basic research system. For
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example, an increasing fraction of advanced manufacturing - of photographic
film, advanced materials, disk drives, optical cable, semiconductors, and
information products generally - occurs in highly controlled environments
requiring extreme precision, manufacturing reliability, real time
information processing, and purity in materials. The semiconductor and
computer industries are major, technologically leading users of such
technologies and advanced materials.
Consequently, if the technical competitiveness and growth of U.S.
semiconductor and/or systems production has any noticeable effect upon
consuming and/or infrastructural industries, long run intersectoral effects
could dominate the total economic effects of international competition in
information technology. And there is, in fact, some reason to believe that
such interindustry linkages contribute to relative productivity growth.
However, even on the most conservative assumptions, involving only direct
sectoral effects, the economic impact of competitive decline in information
technology sectors would be large.
World semiconductor markets are currently slightly over $30 billion;
total production, i.e. including U.S. captive production, is nearly $40
billion. This is not a large sum by the standards of international
industries; but semiconductor production has grown 15 percent per year for
twenty years, and will probably continue to do so for the next twenty. By
the year 2000, world semiconductor production will probably exceed $150
billion. Semiconductor materials and equipment production, currently $10
billion worldwide, will probably grow to $30 billion. The systems
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industries will be far larger. For example world computer and software
industry revenues are already on the order of $200 billion, and will exceed
$500 billion by the turn of the century. So even if U.S. decline is
confined to these sectors themselves, the economic stakes are still quite
substantial. Each one percent of the world market for these systems goods
will be worth nearly $10 billion by the year 2000.
The "direct" effects of competitive decline (i.e. not counting any
effect upon the competitiveness of downstream sectors) upon the U.S. economy
have two related components. First, decline would impose relative welfare
losses through unfavorable shifts in the equilibrium composition of U.S.
economic activity. While various mechanisms and policies can postpone such
losses or change their distributional structure across interest groups, they
could not be avoided. The decline of the semiconductor, systems, and
related industries would significantly reduce U.S. living standards,
investment, and tax revenues because high technology industries contribute
disproportionately to GNP, productivity, and living standards.
In 1984, for example, U.S. private sector wages averaged $350 per
week.2 In contrast, weekly wages in the semiconductor industry (as
imperfectly defined by SIC 3674) averaged $516.3 In the computer industry
(SIC 3573) wages averaged $552,' and in the entire office machines sector
(SICs 3570-9), they averaged $546.5 And information technology sectors are
growing 7% to 30% annually worldwide,6 far more rapidly than U.S. GNP as a
whole. For example, world semiconductor shipments have grown 15% annually
for several decades, 7 and world computer shipments have grown over 10%
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annually during the same period. 8 World software sales, currently on the
order of $30 billion, are growing over 25% annually. 9
These industries are already major employers; in 1984, the computer
industry (again, as defined by SIC 3573) employed 374,000 people inside the
United States.10 The U.S. semiconductor industry employed 192,000 people
domestically in the same year.11 In 1982, the U.S. software industry
employed 224,000 persons. 12 Hence the decline of these sectors would
significantly reduce U.S. GNP growth and welfare by changing the mix of
economic activity towards industries with lower wages, growth rates, and
productivity gains. In addition, there might be significant multiplier
effects due to reduced demand for other sectors' output.
The second class of "direct" effects is associated with trade and
capital flows. Deteriorating U.S. competitiveness in microelectronics and
systems would create a large negative item in the trade balance, as exports
would decline while continued U.S. demand would ensure import growth. While
macroeconomic responses might balance the current account in the long run,
this would prove scant consolation. First, the fact that aggregate accounts
might balance does not imply that sectoral accounts would do so. The United
States might still become a progressively larger net importer in critical
information technology sectors, and U.S. based systems production might be
increasingly controlled by foreign firms. Furthermore, balancing
international accounts would occur through mechanisms such as currency
depreciation, sale of U.S. assets to foreigners, or real wage reductions.
All would imply reductions in U.S. living standards, economic sovereignty,
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and/or political independence.13 Future decline in information technology
could therefore produce significantly detrimental economic consequences for
the United States. If downstream and supplier industries were also
affected, these problems would be even larger.
Indirect Economic Effects
Decreased U.S. access to information technology would probably cause a
more general deterioration in the long term technological and industrial
base of the United States. A high proportion of all professional
activities, products, and process technologies - in manufacturing, services,
and government - depend increasingly upon information systems. For example,
by the mid-1990s electronic content may account for half of the cost of
aircraft, a quarter of the cost of automobiles, and a high fraction of the
cost of weapons systems. Computer and other systems purchases will account
for a substantial fraction of all private sector capital spending.
The competitive decline of a single national sector can be transmitted
to related domestic industries through various forms of efficiency penalties
and/or strategic disadvantages.1 For example, domestic industries might be
cost-disadvantaged if they must shift to imports as domestic suppliers fail.
The exercise of market power by a foreign oligopoly could similarly raise
the costs of an industry whose domestic suppliers declined. 15 In the case
of a vertically integrated oligopoly, upstream technology might be withheld
from non-integrated foreign downstream competitors. Additionally, there may
exist interindustry positive externalities or infrastructural benefits which
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exhibit some degree of national specificity, possibly for strategic reasons.
Users faced with deteriorating U.S. suppliers may also be constrained
by sunk investments and large switching costs: for example, computer users
become locked into their vendors by virtue of complementary investments in
software, internal expertise, and operational procedure. Indeed were it not
for these constraints, the established U.S. computer industry would probably
have already deteriorated more than it has. As the technology of the vendor
deteriorates relative to competitors, users are forced to accept declining
relative efficiency or bear switching costs. If this "lockstep"
deterioration is nationally specific and there is international competition
in the downstream product markets, then foreign users will gain world market
share. In the case of systems industries, the most likely candidates for
such downstream lock-in are information intensive sectors with large
embedded systems or software portfolios - for example, telecommunications
services, financial services, the aerospace sector, certain parts of the
defense industry, and the military establishment.
The character, importance, and national specificity of these various
mechanisms in the semiconductor and systems -industries are difficult to
assess but probably substantial. For example, the U.S. computer industry
holds 90% of the U.S. installed base versus less than 40% of the Japanese
installed base.16  It is likely that some potential drag effect upon
downstream U.S. productivity and competitiveness does exist. For example,
most relevant studies (such as Tilton's 1971 study of the international
diffusion of semiconductor innovations, or Sciberras' 1977 study of
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multinational electronics production) have concluded that technology is
generally available first where it is developed, while foreign markets
obtain it later. Of course, the local availability of a technology is not
by itself sufficient to guarantee its use; if systematically short time
horizons prevent farsighted investments, we have the American syndrome: a
system which often still produces new ideas, but does not use them.
But perhaps as importantly, the availability of technology, its
diffusion, and the prices charged for it can be strongly affected by the
international balance of strategic conditions, institutional capabilities,
and bargaining power in addition to traditional efficiency considerations
such as transaction or transportation costs. The vertical integration,
concentration, and strategic behavior of the Japanese industry, in
conjunction with the fragmentation and competitive isolation of the relevant
American arenas, suggest that U.S. bargaining leverage with respect to
technology access would be low if the domestic U.S. industry were to
decline. The character of the Japanese industry also suggests that its
usage of technology denial strategies could become extremely attractive
within the forseeable future. Indeed, there is strong anecdotal evidence
that it is already underway in some areas, for example lithography equipment
and certain technologies required for high speed computers. 17 (In Appendix
2, I describe some of the technologies, product markets, and strategic
dependencies involved in the semiconductor and computer systems cases.)
Hence increasing Japanese leverage might generate a feedback process of
further U.S. decline.18 For example merchant industry decline would affect
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the capital equipment industry; the decline of the capital equipment
industry would then react back upon semiconductor production, because
neither remaining merchants nor captives will be able to obtain Japanese
equipment on terms equal to those available to Japanese producers. The
result, absent compensatory actions, would be gradual competitive decline
and/or increasing Japanese leverage over U.S. corporate and governmental
decisions in a potentially wide spectrum of electronics intensive
industries.
Political and National Security Implications
The military and diplomatic consequences of this transformation may be
comparable in importance to economic effects. The postwar system until
recently dominated by the United States has depended upon its technological
superiority and has consisted in part of U.S. security guarantees to Japan,
accompanied by Japan's commitment to refrain from nuclear weapons
development, offensive military deployments, and weapons exports.
Gradually, however, U.S. technological and economic superiority are giving
way to a situation in which advanced dual use technologies are widely
distributed or, in some cases, controlled by Japanese firms.
Hence the United States finds itself attempting to retain primacy in
policy and applications areas - East-West technology trade, future weapons
technologies, the force structure of the Western alliance, and the use of
military power - when other nations increasingly will possess or even
control the technologies and industries which ultimately underly these
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applications and policy areas.
Semiconductors, systems, and their related infrastructure can now be
counted among the technologies and industries in which U.S. hegemony has
waned. And the spectrum of military applications and policies affected by
information technology is extremely wide. It includes C3I, precision guided
munitions, strategic delivery systems, treaty verification technologies,
intelligence analysis, strategic and tactical warning systems, and support
processes such as system design and administrative data processing. In
other words, information technology is as pervasive in the military sphere
as it is in the economy. And while the technology now directly embedded in
new U.S. ordnance tends to be mature or even obsolescent, much of the
information technology employed for other military functions (e.g.
intelligence analysis), and in the design of military systems, is quite
advanced. The majority of this technology is dual use technology developed
and/or employed for commercial as well as military purposes, ranging from
embedded microprocessor-based control systems to scientific supercomputers.
Hence as the United States loses its information technology sectors, it
will lose the military technology base as well. As with other downstream
sectors, the result will be increased U.S. dependency upon Japan and
decreased U.S. control over global flows of military technology. For
example, it appears likely that United States dual use high technology firms
and defense contractors will not obtain Japanese technology as readily as
their Japanese competitors, nor will they be able to operate as efficiently
as if a domestic industry existed. As the Japanese defense industry grows
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and, potentially, begins to export weapons to the United States, this
difficulty will become progressively more acute. 19
This situation differs from other forms of foreign dependency more
familiar to U.S. defense planners, such as reliance upon imported oil or
strategic materials. If high technology decline persists, Japanese
technological supremacy will constitute a source of commercial leverage for
Japanese industry and, to the extent that the Japanese government can
control it, a form of political capital usable for a potentially wide
variety of ends. Therefore U.S. military policy may become increasingly
dependent upon domestic Japanese politics and upon Japanese foreign policy
calculations as dependency upon Japanese technology increases. To be sure,
some argue that this would not be an entirely negative development; but it
deserves attention.
The evolving structure of information technology markets has several
further implications relevant to U.S. defense and foreign policy. Two
matters deserve at least brief mention: decreased U.S. market power, and
the changing relationships between U.S. military R&D policy and commercial
competition. At one time, the United States government could reliably
assume that denial or provision of U.S. technology was a source of leverage
over other nations because U.S. technology was the best available. While
the degree of leverage and the wisdom of its employment can be questioned,
it clearly existed.
Conversely, declining U.S. competitiveness implies major increases in
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the worldwide availability of dual use high technology products whose
markets will not be controllable by COCOM policy, and certainly not by
unilateral American policy. Whereas formerly the U.S. tended to assume that
any commercial technology used by foreign nations was automatically obsolete
relative to that available to the U.S. military, it will increasingly be
necessary to assume the reverse. Many dual use product cycles now have
distinct international components as a consequence of licensing and second
sourcing agreements, increasingly competitive foreign technology bases, and
national development strategies. For example, IBM-compatible personal
computers appeared in the United States approximately a year after IBM's
open-architecture product reached the market.
By 1985, however, IBM PC-compatible machines were produced by literally
hundreds of firms in Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
Argentina, and other non-COCOM nations. The principal inputs to such
machines - Intel family microprocessors, imitations of IBM's Basic Input -
Output System (BIOS), various integrated circuits, floppy disk drives,
Winchester hard disk drives, and the MS DOS operating system - were
available through dozens of original vendors, second sources, imitators,
counterfeiters, and remarketers in many nations. IBM's decision to market
an open system, given the competitive environment, guaranteed that the
United States government would be unable to exercise any control over the
distribution of the machine. And while the IBM PC was perhaps an extreme
case, it is not a singular one. UNIX workstations, for example, are not far
behind.
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U.S. Information Technology and Department of Defense Policy
For at least twenty years following World War II, the U.S. military
funded a large fraction of both university and corporate R&D in advanced
information technology. Furthermore, military procurement represented a
majority of early purchases of newly developed products, a major fraction of
total demand, and possibly a major subsidy to commercial technological
progress. Since approximately 1970, however, the military's role has
changed and its contribution to commercial technology development has
steadily declined. Military funding of R&D, though difficult to account for
precisely, appears to have shifted towards military-specific, as opposed to
dual use or generic, technologies, and military technology now lags
commercial markets, in some cases by as much as a decade. As a consequence,
the competitive decline of U.S. information technology finds the U.S.
military in a sharply different position than it occupied previously.
Military procurement simply cannot sustain a technically competitive
commercial industry; yet U.S. military capabilities and policies depend upon
the industry, directly and indirectly.
The majority of advanced information technologies are dual use
technologies with major commercial applications. In these dual use areas,
commercial markets now often dwarf military markets, and their rates of
growth and technical progress now exceed those of military procurement (even
those of the Reagan period). Therefore the United States military is now
heavily dependent upon increasingly globalized industries over which it has
drastically less leverage than previously. 20 To the extent that dependence
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upon U.S.-based firms and U.S.-developed technologies is judged preferable
to future dependence upon Japan, the U.S. military will necessarily have an
interest in the long run competitiveness of U.S. industry in commercial
markets. If U.S. competitive decline continues, DOD will inevitably be an
interested party in high technology policy debates.
3. Market Self-Adjustment and Laissez-Faire
Given the argument advanced in earlier chapters, it appears unlikely
that market adjustment would suffice to ensure the health of the American
information technology sectors. In the absence of large scale changes in
both domestic and international arenas, at least some of which depend upon-
government policy, decline will continue. Resource icommitments to U.S.
information technology activities will remain inadequate, and the resources
supplied will be suboptimally employed, e.g. as a result of distributional
conflicts and redundant efforts conducted in fragmented sectors. As a
consequence of strategic forces, a high fraction of the social returns
generated by U.S. activities will accrue to other nations.
Many of the structural conditions unfavorable to U.S. competitiveness
involve institutional arrangements which are simply beyond the direct reach
of US. industry, at least in the absence of collective action or assistance
from some central authority. It is difficult for any individual actor to
initiate cooperation or lengthen their effective time horizon even if they
try, and they have incentives not to try; for, as indicated earlier, the
"public goods" characteristics of such endeavors are very strong. Time-
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horizon related decisions tend to involve strategic interdependencies or
externalities, and tend to imply short-run risks or sacrifices which are
rational only for agents with considerable security and resilience. These
informational deficiencies, time horizon problems, prisoners' dilemmas, and
public goods problems tend to reinforce each other. For many of the reasons
that such arenas generate low long run performance and extreme
fragmentation, they also fail to change when subjected to external attack.
For example, the short term competitive interest of individual U.S.
systems firms is to purchase Japanese components, rather than either
purchasing inferior U.S. components or making the. enormous investments
required for technically competitive captive production. This reduces the
long run competitiveness of U.S. semiconductor technology and, thereby, the
downstream industries themselves; but it is only in the systems sectors'
collective, long term interest to protect the domestic semiconductor
technology base. And U.S. firms face a set of strategic choices conditioned
by this fact.
Suppose that in the absence of collective action, the destruction of
American merchant production by the Japanese industry is a foregone
conclusion. In this case, the individual interest of American semiconductor
producers, particularly if their awareness is ahead of general market
knowledge, is to liquidate profitably - through licensing, mergers, short
term rent harvesting, and disinvestment. The collective interest of the
merchant producers together probably lies in conventional protectionism
which ensures their profitability at the expense of downstream industries'
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competitiveness and productivity. Only at the level of the collective
interest of the entire systems sector does one find an objective consonant
with long run, economywide benefit. Given my description of the strategic
dilemmas facing firms, this condition is unlikely to yield to market self-
adjustment.
Persistent Fragmentation and Learning Difficulties
It is similarly unlikely that the market will supply the
rationalization and capital flows required for competitive semiconductor and
equipment production. History is discouraging in this respect, but so is
logic; to a large extent, voluntary rationalization is yet another form of
long run cooperation discouraged by the strategic environment and by U.S.
firms' short time horizons. Consider mergers and acquisitions as a route to
structural rationalization and efficient scale. First, the whole is
frequently no better than the sum of the parts; by the time a merger is
considered, firms have chosen specific technologies and strategies without
prior regard to the other, and usually at least one is in dire trouble.
Both conditions limit the benefits of rationalization. But there are
strategic problems too. A prospective merger presents a bilateral
bargaining problem in which zero sum interactions assume major importance.
For example, the fact that a substantial fraction of top management will be
made redundant makes executives (even if willing to surrender their
sovereignty)21 extremely attentive to the organizational terms of the merger
and to the valuation of their stock. This tends to generate games of
"chicken," in which each party holds out for the other's capitulation. Such
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logic applies to joint ventures and cooperative R&D as well as to outright
mergers. For example, Texas Instruments reportedly refused to support
Sematech until memory manufacturing, which might have competed with TI's
products, was eliminated from the project's mission. 22 Of course, Japanese
industrial complexes are far more able to weather periods of unsustainable
competition than U.S. firms in industries characterized by instability and
undercapitalized fragmentation.
Vertical combinations additionally tend to have public goods
attributes, particularly in the presence of strong Japanese competition. If
the U.S. community could purchase from itself in a coordinated fashion (one
possible result of vertical integration), U.S. competitiveness and
bargaining power would probably increase significantly. But only if
diversified vertical integration is widely adopted could it reliably evolve
into an advantageous form of mutual cooperation combined with competitive
discipline. Any single firm adopting such a strategy unilaterally would
incur substantial cost penalties and strategic risks. Beneficial results
from such a structural change would depend upon the industrywide adoption
not only of the structure but also of longer time horizons, and of a
strategic regime of simultaneous procompetitive cooperation and competition,
yielding both information sharing and rationalization. The ability of firms
to switch to internal sourcing, and/or to retaliate in kind, would lessen
the danger of technology denial while increasing discipline and
communication. Hence if widely and stably practiced, vertical integration
combined with open market sales of intermediates and capital goods would be
an attractive strategy. But the U.S. system is not closed - new ventures
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continue to arise and vertical rationalization still faces the strategic
dilemmas described above. Additionally, it might raise serious antitrust
problems and, if not accompanied by measures to lengthen time horizons, the
structure could generate a real temptation to pursue shortsighted,
cartellistic strategies.
Another conventional economic question concerns capital availability.
If firms need capital and could operate profitably if it were supplied, why
does not the market supply it? And if financial institutions do not, why
cannot their customers, who depend vitally upon continued innovation in
semiconductor technology?
First, consider the financial markets' attitude towards investing in
the semiconductor industry. One cannot expect Wall Street to provide major
capital infusions into the merchant industry, given the U.S. industry's
failure to rationalize and the fact that each U.S. firm faces competition
not only from other merchants but from Japan and Korea. Capital from users
is to some extent a different matter, but it is equally unlikely that "the
market" will provide sufficiently favorable results, for reasons akin to
those which inhibit structural rationalization. In addition, the knowledge
and capabilities of many users lag, rather than lead, the supplying
industries. Few U.S. semiconductor users have the enormous sums and long
time horizons required to undertake efficient scale captive operations or to
fund a large merchant, even ;f they had confidence in a favorable result.
And unless it were massive and coordinated, user investment might not
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change the basic dynamics of the semiconductor and/or equipment industries.
Therefore to a large extent investment by a user would subsidize consumption
by merchants' employees, stockholders, and/or the firm's competitors. Only
where two interdependent oligopolists have a clear mutual interest in some
technology region will such funding make sense - as it did between IBM and
Intel, and IBM and Perkin-Elmer. But even IBM, for example, is only twenty
percent of Intel's market. The interdependence of IBM and Intel is
enormously larger than that of any other pair of companies; and yet their
relations have been far from completely harmonious, largely for the various
reasons cited above.
Thus although diversified vertical integration, greater interindustry
coordination, increased engineering education, ana increased investment
levels may be attractive to the nation, "the market" is unlikely to provide
them as a consequence of the public goods problems, strategic dilemmas,
communication failures, and interest structures which characterize sectors
such as the merchant industry. Absent strategically meaningful actions
undertaken at a high level, the industry's fragmented decline will continue.
Sematech
The constraints imposed by private fragmentation and the Federal
government's paralysis are nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the
evolution of Sematech, the semiconductor industry's proposed joint venture
for manufacturing research. The Sematech effort, conceived by IBM and
others in early 1986 and under development throughout the industry at this
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writing, contemplates increased coordination between semiconductor and
equipment producers, centralized development of advanced CMOS process
technology, and R&D in semiconductor manufacturing techniques. Technology
and output would be shared among, but restricted to, the U.S. based
membership. Since the sole government action requested is provision of half
Sematech's annual budget of $250 million (i.e., $125 million per year, a
small sum relative to the industry's importance), the Sematech effort can be
considered a "market" response to the problems of the U.S. semiconductor
industry. Consider, then, the degree to which Sematech could affect the
future competitiveness of the U.S. industry.
Sematech could have several benefits. It would provide increased
opportunities for systematic communication, information sharing, and in some
areas strategic signaling within the U.S. industry. It could play a
significant role in stabilizing the U.S. equipment sector through
coordinated purchasing, technical standardization, and subsidized R&D. And
it might improve the effectiveness of U.S. process R&D, manufacturing
operations, or both through lessened redundancy and improvements in
manufacturing practice. These are potentially important benefits, and if
even a fraction of them are realized Sematech is worth its cost.
However, Sematech's potential impact upon the overall, long run
competitiveness of U.S. semiconductor production is nonetheless quite
limited. First, consider what fraction of the large scale structural
problems described earlier in this essay would be addressed by such an
effort. Sematech will not open the Japanese market, prevent Japanese direct
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investment in the United States, reduce Japanese competition, persuade U.S.
merchants to merge for the national good, increase the supply of U.S.
engineers, relax antitrust constraints, prevent licensing of U.S. product
technology to foreign competitors, or provide significant capital infusions
to any U.S. semiconductor producer. (Capital infusions to the equipment
sector, conversely, might be of significant size.) Moreover, antitrust
constraints, political bargaining, the modest scale of the effort, and
intraindustry interests place strict limits on the efficacy of pure
voluntarism of the kind which Sematech embodies.
For example, early plans calling for a large production facility as
part of the Sematech effort were abandoned as a consequence of antitrust
problems, funding requirements, and objections from some producers.
Congressional support may require suboptimal regional allocations of
Sematech's budget to pacify powerful committee chairmen. The debate within
the Federal establishment probably imposed a one-year delay in Sematech's
activities, not inconsequential given the rate at which semiconductor
technology and competition proceed. The evidence suggests that unless the
competitiveness and strategic behavior of the relevant sectors improve
rapidly, the next recession (or certainly the subsequent one) will destroy
much of these industries outright. The merchant industry's losses during
the 1985-86 recession, for example, were equal to ten times the annual
budget of Sematech.
Therefore if Sematech is to have an effect, some commercial results
must show within three years, and major results must be obtained within five
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or six. Otherwise the medicine will arrive after the patient has died. But
even at best, timeliness will not guarantee success in reinstating U.S.
superiority in process technology. For example, Japanese X-ray lithography
R&D expenditures alone may exceed Sematech's net annual investments. At
current trend rates, commercial X-ray lithography will arrive in two or
three technology generations - in the mid-1990s, or about seven years after
Sematech would begin operations. The advent of X-ray lithography, which is
anticipated to be an exceedingly expensive and capital intensive technology,
would also coincide with the U.S. industry's increasing sensitivity to
cyclical shocks.
In some cases, in fact, cooperative efforts dependent upon acutely
endangered firms may actually reduce time horizons rather than lengthen
them. Improving near term performance will be of little ultimate benefit to
an industry which underperforms long-range R&D; yet voluntarist efforts
involving fragmented, shortsighted firms will tend strongly towards short
range activities. In a strategic version of Catch-22, those most in need of
cooperative long run efforts will be least able and inclined to provide
them. In high technology industries, a clear market signal - i.e. one
sufficient to galvanize an industry with short time horizons - is often the
weather forecast which arrives just after the hurricane. Almost by
definition, therefore, industrywide R&D efforts in high technology
industries which are forced by market decline, as opposed to efforts driven
by long range strategic assessments, will face serious short term pressures
as a consequence of survival pressures.
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Private, voluntary, nonexclusionary efforts must also begin with the
existing structure and cannot offend any substantial fraction of current
market participants. This imposes limits upon "market" action which may be
onerous as a consequence of opportunities for short-term rent harvesting.
If the arena is sufficiently fragmented or unstable, public goods problems
may arise; each firm will desire to obtain the results of collective work
without contributing to it, as reportedly occurred in the Microelectronics
and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). Firms may also seek provisions
which protect them from market discipline. For example, it may prove
exceptionally difficult to subsidize new entry from firms with strong
technology bases and marketing skills, analogous to those prominent in
Japan. Suppose, for example, that just as Canon and Nikon have emerged as
major lithography equipment vendors, future U.S. lithography and/or direct
writing equipment could best be developed by Polaroid, Kodak, or Xerox
rather than by (say) Perkin Elmer, Ultratech, GCA, and the like. The
requisite coalition would be difficult to form within a voluntary industrial
consortium composed of existing producers. In sum, efforts dependent upon
the consensus of all existing players may be limited by bargaining
requirements and the need to please initial rather than eventual
participants. For example, it might prove strategically preferable to fund
two or three competing Sematech consortia, each with a smaller number of
members, rather than a single, monopolistic one.
To be sure, Sematech would likely produce substantial benefits if
brought into operation. Information interchange, and the realization that
such interchange is important, would in itself be a very important gain to
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the U.S. industry. However, efforts bound by the requirements of market
voluntarism within the current regime are not likely, in and of themselves,
to change the long run fundamentals of international competitive dynamics.
Eventually, and preferably soon, major government intervention will be
required in order to correct structural distortions, to bargain with
Japanese industry and the Japanese government, to change the financial
incentives which currently generate strategic defection, to coordinate
efforts in institutionally disjoint arenas, and to provide the stable and
large resource flows which long term success will require.
In summary, it appears highly unlikely that market adjustments will
avert continued decay. More substantial strategic and/or governmental
actions would be necessary. What follows is one avenue of argument
concerning such actions.
4. Policy Considerations
General Objectives and Difficulties
The foregoing analysis suggests that future U.S. economic and political
welfare require that the United States preserve (or restore) a domestic
technological and industrial complex in the systems sectors which exhibits
roughly competitive rates of growth and technical progress over the next
twenty years, and which maintains a strong position in advanced
technologies. This would be necessary and sufficient to provide direct
benefits such as improved per capita income, and at least the opportunity
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for indirect benefits such as continued sovereignty and consistent
availability of best technology. However, this objective is not necessarily
consistent with the happiness of the systems sectors' current firms or
interest groups.
This policy objective has several other nontrivial implications.
First, it implies the maintenance of competitive U.S. based and U.S.
controlled research, development, training, corporate decisionmaking, and
production. It would probably not be satisfactory, for example, to have an
industry composed primarily of Japanese-owned firms operating in the United
States. Nor, however, is U.S. autarky realistic, or even desirable; indeed
continued U.S. competitiveness would probably tend to increase the systems
industry's rate of globalization. But global integration can occur on
either favorable or unfavorable terms. U.S. technical strength combined
with strategic regulation of Japanese penetration of the U.S. arena could
yield rather different long run results than would follow from continued
unregulated decline.
However, this does not imply the desirability of conventional
protectionism applied to current producers, of subsidies such as those given
to the U.S. merchant marine, or of stockpiling strategies such as those
employed for strategic materials. In fact, these strategies are strongly
contraindicated. Conventional protectionism would be essentially equivalent
to laissez faire, because in both cases the United States economy would be
denied competitive rates of technological progress.
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This implies that U.S. interests require policies which are subtly but
critically at odds with conventional economic wisdom. The reason lies in
the nature of high technology industries and associated technological
revolutions. In a rapidly growing arena driven by persistent technical
progress, long run welfare is not necessarily optimized by static efficiency
or by the absence of excess returns. Economy wide, long term benefits are
determined principally by the long run rate of progress in delivered price /
performance. Other things being equal, the welfare benefits of a higher
rate of progress within, and/or adoption of, information technology would
dwarf the effects of, say, allocative inefficiencies.
In fact the possession of consistently superior technology (which, in
these industries, necessarily implies superior rates of technical progress)
is probably the best way for a farsighted firm or industry to obtain rents
in the presence of substantial competitive discipline. Conversely, the
absence of rents as conventionally defined is no assurance that a firm or
industry is serving the long run national economic interest. The merchant
semiconductor industry, for example, does not seem to have demonstrated
industrywide or even firm-level rent taking, as conventionally defined, in
any substantial or enduring way. But rents were extracted indirectly - by
the professional labor force, Silicon Valley landholders, and others who
could partake in the industry's inflationary spiral. Second and probably
more importantly, the industry's incentive structure led it to exhibit
suboptimal long run rates of technical progress which damaged U.S. users and
invited Japanese attack. The Japanese industry, conversely, generated
consistently superior rates of progress.
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United States policy objectives therefore require two closely related
forms of action. First, the resources allocated to information technologies
and industries must be increased. And second, the incentives which drive
the arena, and which its current structure reinforces, must be changed such
that resources are used more productively. Most particularly, the effective
time horizon of information technology arenas must be lengthened. Both
resource allocations and incentive changes must, to some extent, be provided
governmentally. These requirements raise a number of problems which any
policy must address.
Any mechanism which provides resources also, at the same time, affects
incentives. Many of the incentives generated by resource provision would,
in the absence of structural change, reinforce the current structure;
therefore the resources would at best be wasted. At worst, they could
actually worsen the economy's long run position. Consider, for example,
what would happen if the Federal government offered to match the internal
R&D budget of every U.S. semiconductor firm. If the argument developed
earlier is correct, the result would be a short spike in U.S. merchant R&D,
followed by redundant efforts and increased formation of startups, followed
by increased licensing of new technology to Japan and Korea, followed by
decreased U.S. competitiveness relative to foreign competition. In fact, it
might be optimistic to expect even that sequence of events: the increased
R&D funding might simply bid up salaries and other costs without
significantly increasing real R&D output at all.
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Yet under a different incentive structure and industry equilibrium, the
same general policy instrument might have the opposite effect. A recent
experience at M.I.T.'s Sloan School provides some insight in this regard.
Hauser, Fader, and others have recently developed software models of price
competition based upon iterated n-person prisoner's dilemmas, and these
models were used in classes via computer simulations and tournaments
conducted by students. The models and tournament results themselves once
again vindicate the robustness of cooperation and reciprocity as efficient
long run strategies. But the effect of related and concurrent strategic
interactions, particularly those derived from centralized regulation, was
illustrated by an unintentional classroom experiment.
In one course, the professor announced that grades would be given as a
function of individuals' absolute performance in strategic tournaments which
modeled price behavior in an oligopolistic industry. Students consequently
cooperated, achieved high performance, and nearly the entire class received
high grades. In another course, however, the professor announced that
grading would follow a curve. Students resorted to distributional warfare,
defection levels increased, and average performance was far lower.2s The
signal provided by the professor in the one-period grading game influenced
students' strategy in the second game they simultaneously played with each
other, generating a different strategic regime and changing the total
performance of the class.
On a larger scale, the U.S. government confronts similar choices in
fashioning high technology policy. Policy must encourage cooperative
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behavior, and for the purpose of maximizing technical progress rather than
short term profits. If merchant firms had long time horizons, favorable
factor market conditions, and low turnover rates, matching (or otherwise
increasing) R&D funding would probably be an effective policy measure,
because it would provide resources without reducing competitive discipline,
and the resources provided would yield appropriable technical returns.
But in the case of the merchant industry, the simultaneous provision of
assistance and of measures to change incentives represents a substantial
problem. Any near term policy which involves resource commitments prior to
structural reform must be constructed so that it produces real benefits, and
does not inhibit the process of structural change by temporarily propping up
the least desirable portions of the existing system. For example, the
Sematech proposal clearly satisfies this requirement, while the 1986
semiconductor trade agreement may not. Sematech is explicitly structured so
as to raise the level of generic semiconductor technology and manufacturing
practice, while maintaining competitive discipline.
In the long run both resource provision and incentive conditioning must
involve, at least in part, the Federal government. At the extreme, this
requirement may imply the desirability of creating organizations and policy
mechanisms explicitly structured to be uncontrollable by electoral and
political pressures. But this would require the existence of a highly
capable, trusted cadre of policymakers and technocrats. Perhaps as
troublesome, therefore, is the Federal government's level of expertise in
high technology competition. U.S. public management elites are if anything
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less well informed, as a general rule, than the industries in question, and
the foregoing argument suggests that much of U.S. industry is not terribly
well informed itself. Yet in a very real sense, the entirety of the
foregoing argument also implies that policy can and must outperform the
market - and, in many cases, the firm. If there exists no public
institutional or human capital pool with expertise in the requisite areas,
how can any policy meet the test of adequate performance? In some cases,
policy can be highly general, and operate by decentralizing detailed
decisions to the market. But in some areas, particularly with respect to
the evaluation and implementation of measures intended to alter incentive
structures (or to allocate scarce resources properly) considerable
technical, strategic, and industrial expertise will be required.
U.S. policymaking structures, however, show evidence of the same
structural fragmentation and institutionalized communication failures which
have reduced the effectiveness of the private sector. Hence any effort to
increase communication flows within the private sector should explicitly
include actual and potential policymakers. Relatedly, institutional self-
education and the development of continuing institutional intelligence
systems should be among the earliest and most urgent of government policies.
Long Run Strategy and Policy
First, major resource commitments of two sorts are indicated. One is
sufficient financial support for public, shareable assets to ensure
competitive U.S. performance in inputs and infrastructure - education and
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training at many levels (and in subjects ranging from computer science to
manufacturing science to the Japanese language), scientific and engineering
research, information services, public digital networks. The other form of
resource commitment required is financial support for private sector
activities. Each form of support must ultimately involve net commitments of
several billion dollars annually if the United States is to retain a
competitive technological and industrial base in systems activities.
Second, the stability and security of firms in the relevant sectors
must be increased without lessening competitive discipline. Their time
horizons, risk tolerance, and ability to appropriate the returns to their
investments must be increased. This implies a combination of positive
incentives provided in part by government, continued discipline provided by
industrial competition (possibly fostered by procurement policies), and the
evolutionary selection of strong long term competitors. This does not
imply, however, the elimination of small firms. Rather, small firms should
face different incentives - to pursue long range development plans rather
than profit-taking, and/or to form complementary relationships with larger
complexes. For example, tax policy could favor wide distribution of stock
options to employees if they vest over long periods (say 10 years or more),
while penalizing narrow distributions to top management and vesting over
short periods.
Third, national policy should support information exchange,
communication, debate, and analysis within and between private managers, by
economic policymakers, the defense community, elected officials, and the
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academic community. The subjects involved should include not only technical
information but management issues and scientific, economic, policy, and
strategic analyses. In the case of private discussions, some form of
antitrust dispensation is probably implied. This objective also suggests
support for foreign language education, support for research in applied
economics and policy analysis, and perhaps the establishment of Federal
institutions devoted to economic policy analysis. But in addition to these
diffuse measures, tax and R&D policy could for example be used to reward
long term cooperation, for example by facilitating lending of personnel
between firms, joint product development expenditures, and the like.
Fourth, Federal policy should redress asymmetries in the United States
industry's position relative to other nations, particularly Japan. Obvious
candidates include the antitrust laws, export controls, technical standards
policies, intellectual property protection, regulation of direct foreign
investment, and the relative accessibility of U.S. versus foreign markets,
research, and educational systems. Many of these asymmetries are imposed by
the United States upon itself. Some, however, arise from international
strategic interdependencies and their manipulation by Japanese industry or
government. In these areas, strategic reciprocity would be appropriate.
For example, it may be reasonable to link Japanese access to U.S.
markets to certain forms of reciprocal U.S. access to Japan. Such strategic
bargaining, to be sure, can be perilous. It is frequently tempting to force
others to pay for one's own deficiencies. Furthermore, unless policy
objectives are evaluated with great care, strategic activity could degrade
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into cycles of reprisals. These could damage the United States as well as
Japan, and could unleash uncontrollable internal reactions within both
nations. But strategic reciprocity is also important for both economic and
political reasons. The Japanese semiconductor market is now larger than
that of the United States; exclusion of U.S. producers is a significant
matter. Continued Japanese dependence upon U.S. technology and suppliers is
also likely to have beneficial effects in political arenas.
Support for Education, Training, and Research
A gradual but major increase in relevant education and training would
bring diffuse but probably large benefits. This area is one in which
relatively obvious (though expensive) measures - scholarships, teacher
training, direct funding of science and foreign language education - would
appear to yield highly favorable returns.
Increasing the quality and supply of U.S. human capital would reduce
the growth of professional labor costs and dampen the inflationary
compensation and cost spirals which have characterized highly skilled labor
markets and regional industrial concentrations in American high technology.
The result would be increased use of skilled labor, particularly in areas in
which such labor is currently in scarce supply, for example manufacturing
engineering and foreign technology assessment. Turnover might also decline,
which would yield direct productivity improvements, longer time horizons,
and increased appropriability of firm-specific training. Employees would
become more solicitous of their employers' needs, and more interested in
346
long run organizational success relative to high current income. This
result might also be furthered by tax subsidies for long run (ten to twenty
year) stock option plans, versus the four-year period typical of current
Incentive Stock Options.
Increased technical literacy, particularly at precollege levels, might
also reduce barriers to computer use across the entire economy. A diffuse
but substantial increase in the adoption of and demand for advanced
technology, including information systems, might therefore follow from
having a more educated and capable workforce. It is worth emphasizing that
these effects - those derived from the general education level of the entire
labor force - could potentially prove as important as increased training of
elites. This conclusion is driven by the expected pervasiveness of systems
in economic activity, including the production of systems themselves. (For
example hardware manufacturing currently absorbs 30% of DEC's entire
worldwide workforce of 100,000, and the skill levels demanded for the
company's systems manufacturing are increasing more rapidly than the actual
skills of the workforce.)24 Within twenty years virtually all
manufacturing, clerical, administrative, professional, and managerial work
will be computer supported, and work in an advanced economy will
automatically involve computer use. Additionally, there will be computers
in many households. Increased skill levels throughout the labor force in
relevant linguistic and technical areas might, therefore, translate into
rising systems related demand and labor productivity.
The U.S. government could also test and implement such training
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policies internally. For example, the U.S. military inducts large numbers
of relatively unskilled personnel and increasingly depends upon their
training in order to cope with complex weapons and support technologies.
Basic instruction in systems technology for all military personnel might
prove an attractive route for wide diffusion of education and for testing
its efficacy.
In addition, there might be substantial benefits to the establishment
of quasi-national laboratories or similar research organizations open to
private firms. In a number of systems related disciplines, long range R&D
and future technologies imply a need for large scale, centralized research
facilities with permanent administrative and technical staffs. X-ray
lithography is certainly one example, but others include materials research,
manufacturing engineering, large scale networking, and possibly software
engineering. Several large laboratories devoted to systems-related R&D,
with boards of directors selected from firms and universities, might
therefore be able to provide generic technology, communication among firms,
and coordination benefits similar to those anticipated from Sematech.
Intellectual property rights could be granted to performers, with the
requirement that licensing be restricted to U.S. based firms. Exceptions
might be granted according to principles of strategic reciprocity, e.g.
access to foreign patent portfolios. Participation in such research
consortia might be required as a precondition for receiving other forms of
Federal support such as the tax expenditures suggested below.
Private Sector Support
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The design of private sector assistance and its integration with other
requirements is probably the most difficult problem in American high
technology policy. First, it is difficult to design policies which reliably
alter incentive profiles towards long time horizons and long run
productivity growth. And second, it is even more difficult to do so by
using neutral market incentives. For example, there is substantial
agreement among knowledgeable analysts as to which firms, technical
activities, and disciplines deserve increased support. It is much more
difficult, however, to specify a neutral, abstract market signal which
selects for such firms and activities. Given the strategic conditions
described earlier, how could policy provide resources and yet ensure that
they are invested rather than consumed, wasted, or iransferred to
competitors? Yet proposals based upon market signals are likely to be more
politically realistic, and probably more successful, than those which gamble
on the wisdom of a bureaucracy whose detailed choices replace the market.
And there do exist policy options requiring only minimal assumptions as
to specifics but which nonetheless provide industrial assistance, beneficial
incentive changes, and continued competitive discipline. The following
discussion provides an example for analysis and refinement, one which might
also serve other sectors facing similar difficulties, e.g. biotechnology-
related industries.
Federal policy might employ tax based measures to lengthen the time
horizons of U.S. decisionmaking, at levels ranging from individuals to
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entire sectors. One such device might increase the correlation between long
run employee compensation and the long term success of his or her current
employer. The intended effect would be to reduce turnover and to lengthen
the time horizons of the workforce. One important special case, for
example, consists of the incentives facing the founders and senior
executives of firms. One policy option would be to provide tax-based
capital gains benefits for very long term holdings of an employer's stock,
and/or tax penalties for its sale. Somewhat analogously, firms themselves
might be rewarded for farsightedness and long run growth through the
structure of corporate taxation.
The level of support available to qualified firms might be some
fraction of its U.S. production, whether captive or open market, within the
supported envelope of activities. To qualify for support, a firm and its
executives could be obliged to meet requirements associated with its R&D
record, training investments, and employee turnover. Support might consist
of a mix of R&D grants and unrestricted low interest loans, both disbursed
over a long period in annual installments. Principal and interest might
accrue unpaid for the first five years of disbursements, and repayment might
be partially forgiven as a function of later performance.
Moreover, the program could include a requirement that loans be
parially collateralized - with stock options, escrow accounts drawn from
salaries,. or pension fund contributions made during the support period.
Supported firms and their employees should be clearly aware from the onset
of support that if the firm defaults on its obligations, a substantial
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portion of employees' personal assets will be at risk. Finally, no firm
should be eligible for support if its current executive officers include any
person previously an executive officer of a firm which defaulted on a
support loan. In other words, long term success would be generously
rewarded, while long term failure will be punished, at both corporate and
individual levels. One example might be an arrangement whereby executives'
stock options receive favorable tax treatment as a function of their firms'
long term performance, beginning some period after the options are granted.
Such a linkage between support, rewards, penalties, and long run
conduct potentially yields positive externalities which affect both
intrafirm and arena-wide behavior. First, firms with short time horizons
would not request support. Second, those accepting support conditions would
increase their attentiveness to turnover and employee development. In turn,
employees would also be given an unambiguous signal that their future
depends upon the long term success of their employer. As less successful
(and hopefully, predominantly unsupported) firms lost competitiveness, the
desirability of secure employment would increase further. In the event that
a supported firm encountered competitive difficulty, there would be powerful
incentives in favor of an alliance or merger with another firm which itself
qualified for support, since the alternative would be painful for employees
and executives alike.
However, there would be no detailed government intervention in
corporate behavior, and participation would be optional. If support was
sufficiently generous it would migrate the basis of competition towards long
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run learning and investment, rather than short run rent seeking. But - to
repeat - this is no more than an illustrative suggestion for consideration
and refinement. Its primary intent is to establish that, although the
problem is difficult, the design of useful market incentives is not
completely implausible.
Procurement
One technically sensible project might be a Federal contract for the
national provision of fully compatible public ISDN services, using private
vendors such as AT&T, GTE, MCI, IBM, and the regional telephone operating
companies .as prime contractors. Another might be the provision of network
services within the U.S. government. Such large projects, though not
without a variety of risks (as recent Federal scandals connected with
procurement of telecommunications systems indicate), could if properly
administered lengthen time horizons and advance the industrial state of the
art. The use of large, private, multiyear contracts controlled by the U.S.
can also be used to promote strategic reciprocity. For example, foreign
bids might be permitted as a function of the degree to which U.S. firms are
permitted to bid on roughly equivalent foreign projects. Since at present
foreign bids are rarely permitted, an increase in Federal systems
contracting accompanied by reciprocity provisions might yield significant
improvements in both foreign market access and domestic competitive
discipline.
The principal risk to the policies described above, most U.S.
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executives would argue, involves the nature and history of Federal
procurement regulations. For example, current Federal standardization
requirements promote industrial fragmentation and eventually imitative
foreign competition. Hence, the productive use of direct Federal purchases
would probably require substantial changes in these policies. Additionally,
some might argue that Federal procurement as industrial policy, e.g. in the
defense industry, has proven consistently detrimental to efficiency and
commercial competitiveness. Nonetheless, if adequate competitive discipline
and flexibility could be maintained, there is room for useful modernization
of Federal systems hardware, and of systems employment in Federally
supported programs, for example public education. Federal purchasing
programs based upon generally accepted commercial guidelines could
contribute to demand stability in commodity markets, and to Federal and/or
commercial infrastructure provision. Procurement of commercial technology
is a relatively benign activity in this respect, e.g. relative to military
R&D programs.
Coordinated Strategic Education
Systematic analysis and greater communication among governmental,
university, and corporate professionals and executives might improve U.S.
performance as much as any expenditure of funds per se. But in addition,
the problems and long run requirements of U.S. systems sectors are
sufficiently large that major government actions will become politically
inevitable. The quality of these interventions will depend in part upon the
sophistication of public elites and the private organizations with which
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they bargain and debate. Consequently, the production of sophisticated
industry analysts and analyses (technical, economic, strategic, political,
managerial), and their increased use within and by government and industry,
would be highly valuable, as would the development of institutions which
systematically develop them.
Unless this process begins very soon, future policymaking will suffer
from the poorly informed debate and structural difficulties which have
surrounded the Sematech proposal. This educational process must therefore
be initiated by the strongest, best informed agents - those who could afford
the inevitable short term risks, but who could also appropriate the long
term benefits. In this arena, IBM and a few universities are the best and
possibly only current candidates. If an industrywide joint venture for
advanced manufacturing R&D becomes a reality, such an organization could
perhaps become another widely shared source of industry analysis, education,
and debate. The establishment of permanent research centers devoted to high
technology industry and policy analysis (perhaps housed within universities,
national laboratories, or Sematech) would be highly desirable. Until now,
for example, Sematech has not explicitly included industry analysis, global
technology assessment, or competitive intelligence among its principal
functions. The inclusion of such an analytic mission could be of great
benefit; for while resource flows and strategic incentives are important, so
is understanding the structure of the problem we face. The more we know,
the more wisely we might be able to act.
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APPENDIX ONE
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND STRATEGIC EVOLUTION:
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS
1. Introduction; Theoretical and Empirical Motivations
The growth of international competition in the semiconductor and
computer industries offers an unusually clear and important opportunity to
explore and test alternative theories of industrial behavior. Examination
of these industries sheds light upon the sources of industrial dynamics,
declining American competitiveness and productivity growth, and the
relationships between the nature of this decline and various possible
responses to it (both domestic and foreign, private and governmental). In
all of these areas there exist large outstanding problems and multiple,
contending schools of thought. Here, I argue that recently developed
(indeed, still emerging) theoretical models of evolutionary dynamics offer a
potentially substantial improvement over the traditionally dominant models
of such issues, namely those of neoclassical economic theory.
Theoretical Models of Industrial Arenas
Significant contributions from political economy, management, and
sociology notwithstanding, the principal theoretical models specifically
devoted to explaining industrial structure, national competitive
performance, and international trade have until now come from neoclassical
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economics. These models are mathematically rigorous, and the elegant
optimization processes upon which they rely account for many features of
economic behavior. But neoclassical economics depends heavily upon highly
idealized assumptions for both its analytical elegance and substantive
conclusions. And as intensifying international competition has sharpened
both academic and policy debate, neoclassical theory (and the policy
analyses it generates) has increasingly been found wanting.1 Its logical
and empirical problems are now sufficiently severe that its descriptive
accuracy and prescriptive utility must be considered limited. 2
Most obviously, perhaps, neoclassical economics has failed to produce a
reasonable account of the large scale structure, behavior, and performance
of industrial sectors (or, indeed, whole economies) over time and across
nations. Only recently, however, has there appeared an avenue of
theoretical inquiry which, by eventually complementing or superceding
neoclassical theory, might offer an improved general understanding of
competitive performance. Essentially, this line of inquiry considers the
dynamic and/or strategic behavior of systems in which neoclassical
considerations play a significant but not determinative role.
Several problems imply the need for a strategic and dynamic theory.
First, neoclassical theory tends to omit a number of supposedly extra-
economic issues such as politics, the behavioral propensities of actors, and
the strategic norms prevailing in competitive arenas.3 Second, traditional
neoclassical economics minimizes apparently significant economic forces
(externalities, information costs, increasing returns) and/or their
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implications for the principal foci of economic theory (such as competitive
market equilibria).' Third and relatedly, neoclassical theory employs
highly stylized, sometimes arbitrary assumptions in modeling those arenas
upon which it does focus its attention, often influenced by considerations
such as mathematical elegance or tractability. As a result, neoclassical
theory is often applicable only to relatively special cases, and when
applied to more common situations tends to generate conclusions which are
contrary to intuition and fact.
However, the strong implication of more natural, and less idealized,
alternative hypotheses is that industrial behavior is significantly
unstable, nondeterministic, dependent upon institutional dynamics, and
affected by the strategic behavior of firms or governments. For example,
two features characteristic of many economic arenas are (a) uncertainty in
decisionmaking (arising, say, from incomplete information, rapid technical
change, or strategic interdependency) and (b) increasing returns (or at
least opportunities for increasing returns) at the level of organizations
and industry structures. Yet these forces are powerfully, deeply subversive
of neoclassical models and their principal conclusions.5 This combination
(i.e., uncertainty as to the future and increasing returns) suffices to
generate strategic processes absent from neoclassical models, and ones which
cannot be cleanly analyzed in one-period or two-period models. Rather, the
resulting processes are iterated strategic dilemmas of the kind modeled by
Axelrod.s The first, still quite recent, application of these processes to
modeling microeconomic behavior, namely simulations of oligopolistic price
behavior by Fader and Hauser, 7 suggest that the use of iterated strategic
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models can yield promising insights.
It seems plausible to believe that economic actors face many options
which can give rise to long run strategic processes. Firms can refrain from
stealing each other's employees, or alternatively can hire them at will.
They can refrain from unsustainable price cutting, or they can engage in it
and retaliate for it. They can ask the government for mutually exclusive
private goods, or they can group together to press for collective benefits.
They can cooperate with their users in order to secure long term
relationships, or exploit them to obtain short term revenue. They can share
technical information amongst themselves or impose secrecy. They can
compete by making long term investments designed to produce superior
productivity, or alternatively through nonproductive means such as predatory
pricing and disruption of each other's operations. And they can cooperate
in some areas while simultaneously competing in others. Moreover, if such
strategic choices have real economic effects, they can alter the ensuing
structure and performance of firms, arenas, and perhaps economies.
To the extent that industrial and political arenas in fact display such
characteristics, the role of actions taken within regions of instability or
indeterminacy (and factors affecting the size of those regions) could in the
long run be as important as traditional neoclassical competitive equilibrium
considerations in determining the development, structure, and efficiency of
industries or other arenas of self-interested agents. (Since Axelrod makes
a persuasive case that such forces can decide whether opposing armies
actually fight each other or not, they would seem to have some salience.)8
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Moreover, the logic of stable or ex post arena behavior would necessarily be
sought at the level of industrywide strategic and institutional regimes, and
the evolution of such regimes, rather than through the straightforward
operation of determinate technical and competitive forces.
Under such assumptions politics, behavioral tendencies, strategic
decisions, coincidence, the weight of institutional history, and the logic
of strategic evolution become major determinants of economic behavior.9
Rather than being simply second-order distractions from equilibrium market
processes, they are primary, independent forces deserving of explicit
investigation. An understanding of these forces - i.e., of strategic
decisions and their relationship to traditional economic variables - could
reinforce, or mitigate, the action of "economic" variables themselves in
long run industrial behavior. Unfortunately, we have until recently lacked
any coherent model, or even any prospect of one, capable of ordering the
potential universe of strategically based behaviors and their large scale,
long run consequences. 10
Such a model might provide an explanation for the appearance and
persistence of historical specificity, and of observed regularities in
dynamic behavior inconsistent with smooth, foresighted, and determinate
neoclassical optimizations. Rather paradoxically, we shall see that an
evolutionary, strategically informed, and somewhat historicist view can
yield determinate predictions, and can also account for regularities
inexplicable through more traditional neoclassical mechanisms. For example,
evolutionary models have begun to elucidate the processes by which
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competitors begin to cooperate,'1 the degree of cooperation evidenced by
them,12 and the sometimes large benefits of such cooperation.13
Important economic arenas (such as high technology and/or strategic
industries) appear, in fact, to exhibit high levels of uncertainty,
increasing returns, and strategic interdependency. Hence, the factors which
determine the evolution of cooperative versus competitive behavior in such
industries - across various arenas of interaction, across the total
population of agents, and over time - might prove important to explaining
and/or affecting their economic performance and the distribution of its
returns.
2. The Evolutionary Model
This class of models considers the behavior of various arenas
characterized by the presence of structures, agents, or forces which give
rise to behavioral indeterminacy and evolutionary processes. In economic
arenas, such forces include stochastic effects, imperfect foresight and
other information limitations, sources of increasing returns such as network
externalities or learning effects, and strategic interdependencies such as
those described by Prisoner's Dilemma and other games. Behavioral or
dependent variables of interest in economic activity would include market
structure, comparative advantage, growth, and income distribution.
Our very limited theoretical knowledge pertaining to these and other
forms of nontraditional dynamic behavior represents the state of what I
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shall variously call the theory of evolutionary, strategic, and/or
nondeterministic dynamics. It should be emphasized that the theory is not
specific to economics, and thusfar noneconomic applications have received
more attention. The theory remains in its infancy. It currently exists as
a collection of fragmentary, quite heterogeneous, but conceptually related
models developed from within several disciplines, and with applications in
both the social and natural sciences. These include models of stochastic
processes; 14 of diffusion limited aggregation and fractal growth; 15 of
critical phenomena and catastrophe theory;1" the mathematical theory of
chaos; and simulation models of aggregate behaviors associated with
decentralized strategic interactions.
While their assumptions, explanatory power, and domains of application
are quite different, these models share an underlying respect for mechanisms
by which local, initially small fluctuations can collectively affect long
run and/or macroscopic behavior. Their common agenda, perhaps, is to
explore the limits of determinacy, and the nature of behavior under
conditions of indeterminacy or structural discontinuity, in dynamic arenas.
The formal theory of chaos, for example, describes how arbitrarily small
perturbations in simple, deterministic dynamical systems can give rise to
macroscopically turbulent behavior which obliterates structural regularity.
Among these various models, several appear particularly suggestive for
industrial dynamics. These would currently seem to be "population ecology"
models of market structure (perhaps an application by analogy more than a
model);17 stochastic models of economic dynamics under conditions of
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increasing returns; and Robert Axelrod's analyses of the evolution of
behavior under conditions of repeated strategic interaction.
The more complete development of these and perhaps other evolutionary,
nondeterministic models offers the prospect of a deeper understanding of
industrial organization, of the political economy of international
competition, and of economic dynamics generally. Neoclassical economics
would thereby become an integral part, and often a special case, of more
general theories of strategic dynamics in political economy and industrial
behavior. As such, the role of economics would be the description of the
"payoff structures" which condition, and also result from, alternative
strategic behaviors. Indeed such a model of political economy - in which
arenas are collections of interdependent, self-interested private and
governmental actors whose actions flow from but also reshape economic,
strategic, and structural conditions - might in turn become a special case
of a highly general theoretical account of nondeterministic arena
dynamics.' 8
The natural base elements of this general theory would be four.19
First, there must be an arena populated by individual agents and endowed
with some given structure. The population and structure might be capable of
change over time, or they might not. The population might be real or
hypothetical, sentient or inanimate. Examples might be grains in a
material,20 organisms in an ecosystem, 21 individuals in a society divided
into socioeconomic classes, citizens in a state of nature or governed by a
central authority, 22 firms in an unregulated market, firms and nations in an
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international economic system, or rational individuals preparing to choose
moral rules from behind a "veil of ignorance," as in Rawlsian ethics.23
Elements of arena structure beyond the number of agents might include their
information levels, rules of entry and exit, and the number of generations
of interaction.
Second, we must have a specification of the behavioral propensities,
and/or "objective functions," of the arena's populace. In the case of
physical systems, these propensities will typically be reflections of
parameter values relative to invariant physical laws. Grains of a material,
for example, orient themselves according to their masses,. dipoles, and other
characteristics in response to electromagnetic and gravitational forces. In
the case of strategic actors such as people, firms, or governments,
propensities may either be durable or subject to revision through
experience. Individuals might be altruists, egotists, or some combination
of the two; they might be prone to trust others or prone to distrust; they
might act according to specified cultural or strategic norms. They might
heavily discount the future, or have very long time horizons. These kinds
of propensities might be thought of, and sometimes may literally be, the
boundary conditions of individual strategic behavior.
Third, each member of the arena must face a local decision space and
incentive structure: a class of alternative courses of action and some
specification of the direct consequences, both to the member and others, of
"choosing" each alternative in a given generation of interaction. Often
such incentive structures will show some indeterminacy, through a random
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component or an interdependency with the behavior of other actors. A
gambler playing a round of poker, for example, faces the choice of folding
or continuing play. The consequences of continuing depend in part upon what
cards the gambler would then receive, which is a random variable. They also
depend upon the subsequent actions of the other gamblers, which is a
strategic interdependency. The prisoner's dilemma problems explored by
Axelrod are pure examples of the latter, while the urn processes described
by Brian Arthur are based upon randomized incentive structures. Industrial
competition shows many examples of both. A firm can decide to open its
computer architecture, permitting direct imitation, or close it. Its
optimal decision depends, among other things, upon market acceptance of the
architecture (often an unknown) and upon competitors' responses (a strategic
variable). Imitators might remain content with a minority share under a
price umbrella or they could try to overwhelm and destroy the market leader.
Potential alternative actions and their consequences - i.e., payoff
structures - might, again, either remain fixed or change over time; they
might depend upon prior actions or be independent of them; they might be the
same for all agents, or might be unique to each. For example, the rewards
to a specific firm of alternative investment or pricing decisions might
depend upon its technological strength relative to that of competitors, or
the size of its installed base, both of which might vary over time as a
function of prior decisions.
Fourth and finally, each member must be endowed with a decision rule
which specifies how, when facing any given strategic position and incentive
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structure, the actor will choose to "behave." In the case of self-
interested agents such as neoclassical or game-theoretic ideal optimizers,
one can think of this rule literally as a strategy. Decision rules, like
other elements of the model, might be either deterministic or randomized,
and might also be either dependent upon, or independent of, the behavior of
other parts of the arena. For example in an iterated prisoner's dilemma,
pure reciprocity is a strategy which specifies decisions which depend upon
the other player(s); an alternative would be uniform defection, a strategy
which yields actions independent of the actions of others.
Together these four categories constitute the elements of any
evolutionary model. They are simultaneously the tools and the object of a
theory of evolutionary arena dynamics, but they are of course not the theory
itself. The goal of such a theory, should it be possible to develop one,
would be to elucidate general relationships among these various elements,
and between the elements on the one hand and various aspects of long run
aggregate behavior on the other. Put another way, we wish to understand the
relationships between the goals or forces acting upon individual agents, the
structure and demographics of the arena in which they find themselves, the
decisions they face, the strategies used to make those decisions, and the
aggregate evolutionary behavior generated by these local, individual
decisions. Many specific questions of both academic and practical interest
arise. For example, in an arena populated by national governments and firms
engaged in international economic competition, we might wish to know which
incentive structures and decision rules will maximize the performance of
firms, sectors, nations, and/or the entire international system. Of course,
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the maximizing conditions for any one of these units might not maximize the
performance of the others; that is one question we might wish to pursue.
The principal difficulties with this theoretical structure derive from
its wide scope, its inhospitality to analytic solutions, and the extreme
heterogeneity of the specific cases it includes. We have only just begun to
explore it, and thusfar few general results have been obtained. It is far
too early to be able to say how rapidly progress will be made, and whether
it will predominantly depend upon induction from case studies, analytic
solutions, or exploratory analysis via computer simulation.24 Nor do we yet
know the extent to which aggregate behavioral determinacy can be shown to
exist despite the indeterminacy postulated by initial conditions in these
models.25
Axelrod's results for iterated'prisoner's dilemmas go some distance
towards establishing the proposition that repetition and natural selection
favor certain strategies and end results over others, generating aggregate
determinacy from local indeterminacy plus selection effects. In the
particular case of iterated prisoner's dilemmas played in "small" or "dense"
arenas (fixed small populations, complete information, intense selection
pressure), pure reciprocity or slightly more aggressive variants of it seem
to be heavily favored strategies.28 In larger or less stable arenas,
however, betrayal becomes more tempting, and may crowd out nicer
strategies. 27 Hence in some cases the structure of an arena can be shown to
imply predictable, specific relationships between a given local interaction
and long run, aggregate behavior.
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More recently, however, Axelrod has investigated strategic settings
giving rise to behavioral norms; and here, aggregate behavior seems highly
indeterminate. While for several reasons the "meta-norms" game he considers
in greatest detail is unpersuasive as a generator of behavioral norms in
most settings relevant to industrial dynamics, it demonstrates clearly the
magnification or lens effect often produced by strategic dynamics. 28 Under
many conditions, iterated strategic interactions appear to select for
certain forms of conduct to the eventual exclusion of others, even when they
are not clearly favored in any individual encounter. While sometimes the
form of behavior selected appears to be one which is inherently and uniquely
favored, in other cases it may be chosen at random. The triumph of
reciprocity in iterated prisoner's dilemmas seems to be an example of the
former situation, while the selection of particular norms in Axelrod's meta-
norms game is an example of the latter case. Sometimes a norm emerges;
sometimes none does. Somewhat analogously, Brian Arthur's analysis of urn
processes demonstrates that under some forms of increasing returns, one
class of the arena population will always become dominant in the long run,
but which class it will be is a random variable. Hence in some strategic
arenas, it may only be possible to develop typologies of possibilities and
specifications of the parameters upon which alternative results depend.
At present, however, we simply do not know how strong this kind of
theory can ultimately become. Those results which do exist have been
derived from extremely sparse, highly stylized cases which in this sense
resemble the neoclassical models I shall soon criticize. The limited
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predictive utility of the current theory in practical affairs reflects this
fact. Its application later in this essay to international structure and
competition in the semiconductor and computer industries is therefore
relatively heuristic and ad hoc: individual interactions can be analyzed,
and the evolution of an industrial regime can be reconstructed, but no
general model determines the effort. Not surprisingly, therefore, most
attempts to apply rigorous formulations of iterated strategic models have
focused on unusually sharp, univariate arenas in international political
economy and diplomacy - arms races, currency devaluations, trade wars.29
Von Hippel has applied a prisoner's dilemma model to the problem of long
term information sharing between partially competing "minimill" steel
firms, 30 but microeconomic applications remain a novelty.
Nonetheless it will be useful, first, to review the results of early
investigations of evolutionary dynamics and, second, to consider how
economic arenas and neoclassical models of them relate to the general
framework provided by evolutionary models. The discussion concentrates upon
processes likely to be relevant to political economy; other models more
specific to physical or biological systems are omitted.
Results from the theory of strategic processes
In considering international industrial competition, a model which
incorporates iterated strategic interaction seems necessary, for several
reasons. First, and unlike some dynamical systems, the success of
economically motivated agents is mediated by arena-wide (sectoral,
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economywide) pressures and disciplinary mechanisms - market forces and entry
threats, domestic political competition, national trade policies. These
mechanisms give rise to strategic interdependencies which affect individual
success; hence, agents are inherently competitors. "Competition" in this
sense means pursuit of self-interest; it does not preclude cooperation, but
cooperation will occur only when it suits the interests of individual
actors. Defection is potentially rational, in that individuals can
sometimes become more successful at the expense of others, perhaps even by
causing them to fail. Ecosystems, for example, are at least partially
"competitive" in this sense, while many physical systems are not.
The actors in industrial arenas - individuals, firms, nations - also
tend to be rational egotists: they have interests, and they can be assumed
to pursue them, at least up to the limits of their social habits, autonomy,
and knowledge. And because underlying facts of economic life seem to give
rise to interdependency (through increasing returns, for example), there are
many opportunities for cooperation and defection, and the process of
"competition" takes the form of multiple, concurrent strategic interactions.
Furthermore, the ability of agents to predict the future is often quite
limited, even though long term competition is the rule. This implies that a
model of iterated strategic choice is more appropriate than a single choice
of strategy fixed for eternity, or a deterministic market outcome based upon
all competitors optimizing over all potential future strategic choices.
Objective conditions can change, and so can the behavior of other actors.
The long term success of each agent is in large part determined by the
degree to which direct cooperation in local interactions can be elicited,
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and also by the level of cooperation and trust in the arena generally. This
last will depend heavily on arena-wide norms of strategic conduct, whether
produced by a central authority or by decentralized strategic processes.
These, as commonsense indicates and Axelrod's simulations have shown, can
make the "state of nature" of an arena into either a Hobbesian world of
brutal conflict or a Lockeian world of long term cooperation. 31
Consequently in comparing evolutionary dynamic models with neoclassical
economics, the evolutionary model whose results are most relevant is
essentially a generalization of Robert Axelrod's arena of self-interested
actors confronted with a repeated prisoners' dilemma - an arena in which
alternative choices, payoff structures, and the success of agents are
determined economically. The payoffs, information problems, and strategic
choices which confront executives, firms, and national governments are of
course vastly more complicated than a single, iterated prisoner's dilemma.
Hence in many ways current game-theoretic, evolutionary models are still as
stylized as those of neoclassical theory. For example, many models do not
include central authority, multiple concurrent interactions, the formation
of competing cliques of cooperators, or entry and exit - all of these
phenomena being critical to the dynamics of many economic arenas including
the information technology sector.
Simple models of iterated strategic dilemmas, and their analysis via
theory, computer simulation, and empirical testing, have nonetheless yielded
several noteworthy results. First, certain parameters strongly condition
the degree of cooperative behavior and the population dynamics of arenas.
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Second, alternative strategies offer different levels of individual success
as a function of these arena parameters, and selection processes will
therefore yield systematic patterns of arena dynamics. And third, arena-
level welfare (say, the discounted sum of individual performance levels over
many generations) is in turn related to these arena parameters and to
individual strategy choices. I will briefly consider each of these issues,
beginning with arena structure.
Arena parameters and rational strategies
The degree of cooperation likely to evolve in the face of iterated
strategic decisionmaking depends upon four characteristics of the arena:
payoff structures in force in each iteration; the importance of the future;
the complexity and difficulty of coordination and communication; and
finally, the values of agents (e.g. their discount rates and propensity to
trust others). Each of these singly, and all in combination, affect the
prevalence of cooperative versus antagonistic behaviors.
Under some payoff structures, there is no indeterminacy: players have
flatly consistent or uniformly inconsistent interests. Under many others, a
strategic indeterminacy exists: cooperation brings benefits, but only if
others cooperate too, and defection is tempting. The intensity of the
indeterminacy, and the payoffs to unilateral defection, cooperation,
victimization, and mutual betrayal, strongly affect the rational propensity
to cooperate. These effects, however, differ between one-period and multi-
period games. (In a microeconomic context, payoff matrices might be
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interpreted as reflecting current costs, demand, and profit opportunities.
One example of cooperation would be joint profit maximization in pricing;
another very different one would be sharing of R&D. Defection would consist
in, say, highly aggressive pricing, or refusal to share one's R&D results.)
In most cases which have been studied theoretically or by simulation,
payoffs are held constant over iterations. But in many actual strategic
dilemmas, payoffs change - sometimes endogenously, through prior strategic
decisions. For example, market growth, technological change, and market
structure dynamics alter payoff opportunities, which in turn affect
subsequent technical and market developments. Many such attributes of
markets are subtly embedded in payoff structures, but not easily captured in
a realistic way by existing models, most of which leave payoff structures
constant for simplicity.3 2
The nature and extent of future interactions is another important
consideration, one closely associated with the structure of the arena and
the amount of information agents possess about it.33 If the same agents
must interact repeatedly and are aware of this fact, cooperation will be
more favored because the prospect of future retaliation for prior defections
weighs heavily, and so do the benefits of long run cooperation. Other
patterns of interaction yield different behavior. If interactions are blind
and/or random, for example, this implies that the greater the number of
agents, the lower will be the incentives for cooperation generated by the
shadow of future iterations. Analogously for coordination and control
problems: in general, the complexity of coordination, and the likelihood
that at least one agent will defect, increase with the number of agents and
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with the difficulty of directing responses to particular agents. The
greater the effort required to achieve and enforce cooperation, and the
greater is uncertainty regarding the identities or decisions of others, the
less likely cooperation will become. Once again there is endogeneity in
these relationships, not easily captured in simple models. Cooperation
yields information, trust, and efficient coordination which in turn
facilitate future cooperation, while defection increases the likelihood of
future defection for similar reasons.
Finally, the level of general cooperation depends upon the strategic
propensities of agents. Their strategies are influenced by their degree of
trust, their subjective discount rates, and so on. A small change in these
can affect general conduct, even holding other conditions constant. For
example, sometimes one agent can significantly affect the general level of
cooperation, as when defection by an unknown individual breeds distrust and
increases the general propensity to defect preemptively. Similarly, actors
with higher discount rates defect more, because retaliation - even if
guaranteed to occur well into the future - weighs less heavily upon them.
So the introduction of short-sighted agents into an arena can reduce the
general level of cooperation it displays. Moreover, strategic processes can
lead to the development of arenawide norms of conduct which might become
internalized, e.g. in corporate or professional cultures. And finally, it
might not be entirely foolish to assert that under some conditions, altruism
and/or a basic propensity to trust others can affect strategic conduct.
The nature of optimal individual strategies
376
The evidence suggests that different strategies are rational under
different arena conditions, and yet that certain strategies are surprisingly
robust. Axelrod's early simulations indicated that Rapaport's simple
strategy of reciprocity, named Tit-For-Tat (cooperate as long as others do,
retaliate as long as they defect), proved extraordinarily successful against
a wide variety of opponents. 34 But under certain conditions, e.g. an arena
with high levels of change (entry, exit, and/or mutation), it seems less
successful than somewhat more aggressive behavior. Later simulations by
Axelrod uncovered a strategy which first defects, but then reverts to
reciprocity if interaction persists and the initial aggression elicits
retaliation.35 This strategy often outperforms pure reciprocity. It seems,
also, that under conditions of poor information (when the agent responsible
for a defection cannot be identified with certainty) simple reciprocity may
be less successful. The simplicity and robust success of strategies which
include long-run reciprocity nonetheless remains striking.
Arena-level performance
Optimal individual strategies are related to, but not coincident with,
optimal arena-wide behavior; that is the nature of strategic interactions.
When will the performance of the entire arena, considered as the sum of
individual results over time, be maximized? In simple models of iterated
prisoners' dilemmas, this is equivalent to maximizing the total level of
cooperation. From the foregoing, it is evident that this occurs when agents
interact with each other repeatedly and consistently, when defection elicits
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targeted retaliation, when individuals have low discount rates, when the
number of actors is small, when reliable information is available, and when
agents are predisposed towards trust and cooperative strategies. This list
suggests a variety of possible strategies for reshaping arenas to increase
the levels of cooperation they exhibit. For example one can decompose lumpy
interactions into successive smaller ones in order to lengthen the shadow of
the future, or establish central authorities to discipline defectors.36
However, relationships between strategic choice and performance are
less direct in industrial arenas than in international relations. In the
latter sphere, uniform cooperation is often assumed to be desirable.
However, increased cooperation does not necessarily make good economic
policy, and truly complete coordination is considered infeasible in most
complex economic systems. (Indeed, that is the benefit of markets: they
decentralize decisionmaking.) In applying the analysis of iterated
strategic dilemmas to industrial dynamics, it is therefore necessary to ask
how various forms of cooperation and competition among firms and governments
affect the performance of units or groups ranging from individual
corporations to an industry or national economy. Certain forms of
cooperation will be beneficial, while others may not. (Traditional
neoclassical economics focuses forms of microeconomic cooperation which are
detrimental - collusion, cartels, etc. - while only occasionally considering
forms of coordination, usually macroeconomic, which might be beneficial.)
Some individually rational strategies or forms of industrywide cooperation
improve technical progress and efficiency, while others increase costs.
Behavior which yields benefits for some groups may also impose losses upon
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others (foreign nations, other industries, future generations). Moreover,
the benefits of cooperation in one arena (say, R&D or interfirm trade in
intermediates) may depend upon the maintenance of competition in others
(say, final goods markets).
It may even be the case that competition in certain activities is
intensified by precluding it in others. If competing firms can and do poach
(i.e. hire away, steal, bribe) each other's experienced employees, they may
compete less aggressively in entry level labor markets and in internal
training efforts. Hence the dynamics of industrial "competition" will
derive from a complicated, integrated system of competition and cooperation
in many arenas of interaction, one likely to be governed by relatively
complex regimes composed of explicit regulation, norms of conduct, and
bargains. Industries may tend to evolve stable behaviors which constitute,
in effect, a strategic "regime" which might have strong implications for
sectoral productivity and international competitiveness. At least in
principle, the "regimes" characterizing various arenas - domestic politics,
labor markets, foreign politics, product markets - could evolve
independently and into rather different environments. Whether this is so
depends upon higher level strategic processes concerning "linkage," an issue
not yet well understood. 37 This suggests that in industrial arenas,
regularity and explanatory logic is to be found at the level of complex,
integrated politico-industrial regimes and their histories, in addition to
factor endowments or markets.
The decline of the American semiconductor industry, in fact, is in some
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sense the result of just such a strategic regime. In this case, early
history and strategic decisions, sometimes aided by the characteristics of
technology and by secular trends in the economy, combined to produce stable
patterns of cooperation and competition in exactly the wrong places. But
while inspection of a particular case may produce clear conclusions, we
presently lack a general framework for the analysis and optimization of
strategic industrial interactions and their correspondence to aggregate
economic performance. Further effort in this domain would therefore appear
valuable; for an understanding of such processes might lead to policy
disciplines capable of improving upon the prescriptions derived from
neoclassical economics. The attribution of a central role to strategic
interactions, incentive structures, and institutional history in
conditioning the long run performance of industries almost necessarily
elevates government policy to a major role. Unless further analysis yields
the unexpected conclusion that strategic interactions under conditions of
increasing returns and uncertainty guarantee optimal results, we are faced
with the strong likelihood that central authority can affect performance by
conditioning arena and payoff structures.
3. Neoclassical and Evolutionary Models Compared
In general, neoclassical models and the economics discipline remain
heavily weighted towards static determinacy and against iterated
nondeterministic decisionmaking." Most neoclassical models are either
static or, if dynamic, they assume that enough information exists to
generate a smooth trajectory, and/or to permit actors to collapse their
380
entire futures into one or two decision periods. 39 Second, the strategic
intensity of arenas is assumed to be low, in at least two senses. One
concerns local interactions: the regions and extent of strategic
interdependency existing between agents at any given time are restricted,
typically to price and production decisions. The other concerns global
interactions: indeterminacies (random variables, strategic interactions,
and alternative decisions with respect to them) are assumed not to generally
affect long run structure and performance in a very profound way.
Indeed some of the most natural candidates for strategic indeterminacy
are simply left out. National government, for example, was until recently
neglected as a strategic actor; it was rarely considered save as a provider
of public goods or a source of dysfunctional market distortions. Cost
structures which provide incentives for technical cooperation among
competitors, for example, are rarely modeled. In general, then,
neoclassical models deemphasize those market structures, technologies, and
forms of interaction in which distinguish dynamic strategic behavior causes
deviations from determinate and optimum equilibria.40
Hence truly strategic models of political economy - in which
cooperation and its absence are important variables and open questions,
rather than being assumed away - are actually based upon rather different
ideas than neoclassical theory. For these newer models, economic forces
(technological opportunities, market competition) and government policy
alike primarily provide the structure of interaction: behavior will be
constrained by economically determinate payoff opportunities, but behavior
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will largely be the consequence of behavioral choices with respect to
strategic options. Indeed, strategic considerations can even affect
economic variables, as for example by increasing the experience obtained
with one technology versus another and thereby shifting cost advantages, or
through appropriability effects which determine investment in R&D, human
capital or other assets.4 '
The evolutionary model therefore views economic, political, and other
arenas as dynamic systems whose large-scale patterns are created by
repeated, concurrent, local interactions. These local interactions will
often be reciprocally conditioned by the larger environment, because when
local interactions reshape the larger arena they thereby reshape the
incentive structures faced by individuals in subsequent local interactions.
For example, both local and global behavior can be strongly affected by the
effective time horizons of actors. These are determined in part by arena
structure (e.g. by the likelihood of repeated future interactions) and
partly by subjective factors such as actors' discount rates and propensity
to trust each other. Over the long run, each affects the other; for
example, transitory interactions and opportunities for cheating will breed
distrust, while predictable and repeated interactions reduce it. Hence in
these models there is a continuous interplay between individual, short term
action and aggregate, long term, arena-wide dynamics - or, as Schelling puts
it, between "micromotives" and "macrobehavior." One is perhaps forced to
refer to a "dialectical" relationship between individual and aggregate
behavior.
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The roles and importance of these processes in shaping industrial
bahavior have potentially substantial implications for economic theory and
political economy. But equally important are their potential implications
for the practice of strategic decisionmaking and government policy.
Industrial competitions whose results can turn upon historical accidents or
strategic dilemmas may yield widely differing aggregate performance,
particularly over long time periods, as a function of private strategic
choices and the incentives provided by central authority. The potential
effects of policies or actions which shift incentives towards different
patterns of cooperation and competition may therefore be larger and/or
different than traditional economic theory would suggest. Moreover, these
decisions and their consequences might themselves turn on strategic
interactions between competing nations, industries, and firms.
Strategic protectionism is one example. A critical industry might show
opportunities for technical progress deriving from scale economies, either
static or dynamic. In such a case, government and industry face each other
across the following strategic dilemma. Government protectionism could
eliminate foreign competition, yielding larger and more secure markets for
domestic producers. The domestic industry, however, could then either
"cooperate" by investing in productivity growth and future competitiveness,
or it could "defect" by using its increased market power to extract rents
while stagnating technically. But the industry's response might depend upon
whether "defection" would result in future reductions in protectionism, or
would pass unpunished - an iterated strategic dilemma. The industry's
reaction might also depend upon other levels of strategic interaction - for
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example among competing firms within the industry, or between firms and
their employees. For example if personnel mobility is high, firms will be
disinclined to invest in training their employees, and employees will feel
less commitment to the future welfare of the employer, because conditions
for long term reciprocity are not propitious. One important avenue for
investment in productivity gains will therefore be foreclosed. There is
some evidence that precisely this issue is an important source of U.S.
problems relative to Japan.4 2
Neoclassical theory cannot generally predict behavior under such
strategic conditions, and often cannot even explain it. Thus if the
presence of forces which generate chronic strategic dilemmas is the rule
rather than the exception, and if these forces interact strongly with
traditional economic variables such as investment, market structure, prices,
and costs, then strategic processes might sometimes be as critical to large
scale economic behavior as scale economies or factor costs.
So for the purpose of analyzing industrial performance and
international competition, there exist two general theoretical alternatives.
They can be described as deterministic market equilibrium economics versus
nondeterministic (usually strategically driven) evolution, together with
various intermediate possibilities.
Since both neoclassical economics and the strategic (or
nondeterministic) views possess an internally consistent logic, their
evaluation as theories must be primarily based upon the plausibility of
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their assumptions, the prevalence of the conditions and mechanisms they
posit to be important, and their ability to explain and/or guide actual
behavior. Do industries, national economies, and international competitive
arenas behave more like economic machines or like regions of repeated
strategic interaction? What fraction of industrial behavior and performance
can be accounted for by competitive equilibrium optimizations, as opposed to
strategic forces, historical conjunctures, and accidents? How strongly do
the two classes of behavior interact? While the explanatory potential of
nondeterministic models cannot yet be fully assessed, a review of the
relevant portions of the neoclassical terrain suggests that change in this
direction is needed.
4. Neoclassical Models and Their Limits
Neoclassical models have traditionally been, and largely remain, based
upon assumptions of equilibrium stability, fixed or exogenously determined
conditions of technology and demand, complete foresight in decisionmaking,
and (frequently) perfectly competitive markets. Traditional neoclassical
models such as Hecksher Ohlin trade theory and most of the microeconomics of
industrial organization model static behavior under conditions of perfect
competition or, at their most nuanced, static scale economies. Recently,
these traditional models have been supplemented by new neoclassical models
which emphasize "imperfections" such as learning and externalities in
competitive behavior, and which takes economics some distance towards
nondeterministic models. But where "imperfections" such as increasing
returns and oligopoly have been considered, the strategic behaviors modeled
385
have been largely confined to price and output decisions.43 Economic models
of industrial behavior - principally industrial organization, international
trade, and growth - have serious limits as a consequence of these
simplifications, as do the policy analyses derived from them.
In each of these three areas of economic theory, serious questions
arise regarding the realism of assumptions, the match between theoretical
predictions and observed behavior, and the nature of relationships between
microeconomic and macroeconomic forces. These problems become more severe
when considering problems which transcend the traditional categories of
economic analysis - problems such as the international competitive
performance and comparative productivity growth of national industries.
Because the models developed within neoclassical theory for various specific
problems and levels of aggregation often employ unrelated or even
inconsistent assumptions, analysis of complex problems is limited by the
inability to integrate the various pertinent models as well as the general
difficulties shared by all of them. For example many industrial
organization models assume or explain the presence of market power, while
until very recently trade theory almost uniformly assumed the existence of
perfectly competitive markets. And while microeconomics continues to view
market power as welfare-reducing, the new international economics views it
as welfare-increasing.4
The most profound limits of traditional neoclassical models derive from
their shared underlying view of the principal determinants of industrial
structure, conduct, and performance. Aggregate market behavior is largely
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seen as the determinate, collective result of rational actions by
noncooperating market participants with perfect information about the
future. Agents' optimal decisions are largely made for them by a
macroeconomically determined external environment and by the degree of
market discipline implied by scale economies and horizontal industry
structure. Individual actions are in essence dictated by conditions of
demand, technology, competition, and factor costs usually assumed to be
beyond any actor's control. The possibility that these conditions might be
the result of strategic, historical, and institutional processes as much as
their cause is generally considered remote. More generally, chronic
strategic interdependencies and nondeterministic behavioral norms are
considered second order effects.
Given this relatively static, predictable, and constraining
environment, firms maximize their profits by manipulating (usually at the
margin) the few major variables they can control - primarily capital
investment, production levels, price, and product differentiation. Firms
are treated as black boxes, and the determinants of the boundaries between
firms and industries receive scant attention. Market behavior is thus
analyzed with little reference to the determinants of intraorganizational
activity, the efficiency of markets relative to hierarchies, or the
interactions between them.
To a first approximation, then, industrial behavior is seen as the
equilibrium result of supply and demand forces rather than the consequence
of strategic, institutional, or random processes. Competitive forces are
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generally assumed to operate rather fully and rapidly, at least in the long
run and in the absence of distortions from government policy. Institutional
forces and restrictions upon markets are generally considered rigidities or
distortions which interfere with market adjustment and reduce efficiency,
rather than as potential sources of efficiency gains, when they are
considered at all. The relevant equilibrium processes are generally thought
to be convergent and stable in the long run.
To the extent that neoclassical models of this sort have included
dynamics and strategic behavior, they have generally been confined to the
same traditional microeconomic decision variables - price, output, and
product differentiation in the product markets of oligopolistic industries.
Hence in this traditional vision, industrial market structure is
predominantly static and determinate, even when nominally dynamic in the
sense of modeling market behavior over time. The external environment
contains most of the determinants of market structure or comparative
advantage. Change in these fundamental variables is assumed to be
sufficiently predictable and well-behaved that dynamic behavior is smooth
and determinate.4 Or if not, e.g. when an external price shock changes
boundary conditions and relative costs, the system moves to a new, but
equally well specified, equilibrium.
The strategic interactions considered to exist within industrial
sectors are simple and limited in scope to one or two decision variables, as
with Cournot-Nash equilibria or Stackelberg behavior. Where situations
involving repeated strategic decisions are considered, traditional theory
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generally looks for criteria which produce determinate solutions based upon
optimization over a discounted infinite time horizon, and across the entire
set of strategic possibilities.
Analogously, international production and trade patterns (in Hecksher-
Ohlin theory) are determined by factor endowments and the relative costs of
capital, labor, and resources in various nations. Changes in the
international distribution of an industry's activities are explained through
changes in factor costs or, perhaps, shifts in relative demand for various
factors of production (for example caused by use of increasingly capital
intensive techniques). Aggregate patterns of comparative advantage and
trade are both determinate and globally optimal - modulo distortions caused
by domestic market imperfections and national trade -barriers.48
Therefore in both national and international markets, traditional
neoclassical analysis posits that individual optimizers are disciplined by
the market and constrained by externally determined cost and demand
structures. Hence most decisions are really made by the system, which both
determines the nature of optimal behavior and penalizes deviations from it.
Broadly speaking and with some important exceptions (public goods,
concentrated oligopolies), market competition undistorted by government
intervention yields aggregate resource allocations and patterns of
industrial behavior which are both determinate and desirable.4 7 And even in
the "imperfect" cases, the need for intervention is objectively determined.
Public goods and "natural monopolies," for example, are defined by the
inability to provide a good selectively in the former case, and by extreme
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scale economies in the latter.4 8 Neoclassical theory generally has not
investigated the proposition that these conditions are made not born: that
they can be created or eliminated, local or global according to strategic
conditions, and the result of market imperfections as well as their cause.
Not surprisingly, traditionally derived economic policy analysis has
also opposed government intervention in industrial markets - whether through
protectionism, sectoral subsidies, export promotion, investment targeting,
or strategic coordination of sectoral activity - except to provide public
goods, curtail monopoly power, or perform similar technical functions in
cases of well-defined market failure.49 For example, traditional
neoclassical analyses often assert not only the global optimality of free
trade, but also the futility of intervention even for the home nation;
production or export subsidies are held to benefit foreign consumers if
anybody. On the traditional view, the optimal goals of policy are to ensure
that the conditions of perfect competition exist to the maximum possible
extent and, where necessary, to provide public goods such as basic research,
infrastructure, safety regulation, and the like.50
The new neoclassical economics
Recently, the "new neoclassical economics" itself has yielded a
somewhat broader spectrum of models with divergent behavioral predictions
and policy implications. Their common feature is an interest in conditions
which generate market imperfections and strategic interdependency. In part,
this change was a response to empirical evidence that neoclassical models
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were seriously incomplete. For example, Hecksher-Ohlin theory corresponds
poorly with observed patterns of international trade; 5 ' and in some
important cases, sectoral dynamics contradicts traditional models of
industrial organization. In part, the new models were also, apparently, a
response to mathematical developments which eased formal modeling of
nontraditional cases.
In response, the new economics has produced models of market dynamics
and trade which, though based upon apparently reasonable assumptions, yield
a wide variety of strikingly unconventional results (at least relative to
traditional theory). For example, several models have explored the effects
of compatibility economies and network externalities. Some models imply
that strong network externalities in industries undergoing technological
change can produce suboptimal welfare results in the absence of
regulation.52 Under certain conditions the welfare optimizing market
structure is a monopoly. Moreover, the existence of network externalities
implies that domestic government procurement policy affects comparative
advantage in international markets,53 and can therefore effectively
represent a neomercantilist trade policy.
Other recent models have explored the implications of increasing
returns - static or dynamic or both - for market structure and international
trade. Compared to traditional factor proportions theory, the results are
once again startling. In a model world in which major nations have domestic
oligopolists, for example, such firms have direct incentives to engage in
dumping. By lowering their prices in foreign markets, firms increase their
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revenue while cutting into the rents of their foreign competitors rather
than their own.54 Moreover, increasing returns (including dynamic scale
economies, i.e. learning effects) provide a potential rationale for
protecting a domestic market, if (a) the resulting opportunities are
invested rather than simply used to raise prices, and (b) foreign
retaliation does not eliminate the domestic advantage.
This "new neoclassical economics" has therefore significantly widened
the range of theoretically consistent models of economic forces, outcomes,
and policy recommendations. Consequently it has cast further doubt upon the
presumptive superiority of traditional views, a presumption partially based
upon the previously inferior theoretical rigor of the alternatives. The new
models have therefore improved economic debate, largely by incorporating
issues long recognized as significant in practice. (Indeed one observor of
these matters remarked that it was rather as if someone announced a theory
demonstrating that the world might not be flat.)5 5 And some models - e.g.,
Brian Arthur's analysis of "lock-in" caused by small events early in an
industry's history - approach the spirit of the evolutionary models with
which I contrast the neoclassical view.
However, the appearance of the new economics leaves many prior
questions unanswered, and raises some new ones as well. First, a variety of
behavioral, institutional, and political questions are still neglected. For
example, many new models still confine strategic interactions among firms to
price and output decisions, and continue to assume that agents possess
relatively complete information, at least about costs. Many also still
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assume that large scale structural features, such as whether an industry is
fragmented versus concentrated, are relatively determinate and derive from
objective features of technology and demand, and perhaps now cumulative
production experience. Few consider iterated strategic dilemmas or linkages
between strategic actions in international product markets and domestic
sources of industry structure. Nor are multiple concomitant strategic
processes modeled, for example in markets and politics, despite clear
evidence that they occur.56
Nor do the new neoclassical models appear to improve the practical
utility of economic theory. For example, many of them imply the existence
of strategic indeterminacies without describing their optimal or actual
resolution in a convincing way. Will firms act cooperatively or will they
attack each other? Will agents use market power to raise current profits,
or conversely to invest in future competitiveness? Will they voluntarily
surrender sovereignty to create arena-wide institutions, or insist upon
acting individually? Will they be able to cooperate in some domains while
competing elsewhere, or will their behavior in all domains be equally
cooperative? If protectionism and nationalist procurement policy have
domestic economic benefits, but might cause retaliation by trading partners
and/or multinational firms, what will nations do?
Given these divergent possibilities, some models obtain a specific or
optimal'result by assuming some particular strategic response, or none at
all, or by assuming only one or two iterations of strategic choice. Often
these assumptions seem rather arbitrary. So while there now exists a wider
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spectrum of neoclassical models, it is not evident that this has brought a
corresponding increase in our power to account for economic behavior.
Furthermore economic theory still, in the main, focuses upon relatively
deterministic equilibrium explanations to the neglect of institutional and
evolutionary considerations, and upon the effects of technology and product
market structure to the neglect of factor markets, markets for corporate
control, political contests, and so forth. Ironically, however, the result
is still to subvert the determinacy of economic theory as a whole. Small
changes in assumptions produce wide variation in predicted outcomes, even
for these traditional variables. Attempts to measure precisely all the
parameters necessary to decide which models apply, and to what degree, are
likely to fail. The result is to discredit economics.
Industrial Organization
The neoclassical theory of industrial structure, conduct, and
performance has proceeded from its traditional emphasis upon static scale
and horizontal concentration to a more recent concern with dynamic scale
economies and externalities. In both traditional and new analyses, however,
the central source of structure is some version of scale, and the central
source of performance and market power is some version of structure.
Neoclassical theory has not yet accepted the proposition that network
externalities, learning effects, and economies of scale at the level of
organizations and systems of institutions (such as multinational firms and
industrial sectors) are as much the rule as the exception in industry. The
continuing presence of these economic forces implies the existence of long
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term indeterminacies and strategic interdependencies in industrial arenas
(in factor markets, product markets, political strategy, control of
information and intellectual property, and markets for corporate ownership,
among others).
Consider, for example, the coexistence of cooperation and competition
between firms - say, R&D sharing among firms which compete in product
markets. First, such phenomena are rarely considered by neoclassical theory
at all. The phenomenon of cooperation is generally neglected, and when
considered is modeled simply as a source of market power rather than of
efficiency gains. Furthermore the existence of such cooperation, and more
strikingly its coexistence with real competition, cannot readily be
explained in neoclassical terms. Nor, therefore, can the presence of
various forms of cooperation in some industries, with respect to some
variables, and in some periods, in contrast with their absence in others.
Yet in high technology industries, the combination of network externalities,
learning effects, and scale economies in R&D might imply that cost-side
cooperation among firms would maximize welfare. The evidence suggests that
Japanese industry has, in fact, cooperated extensively, that Japanese
government policy has promoted such cooperation, and that it has proven
beneficial (at least to Japan).
Moreover, learning and dynamic scale economies at organizational and
sectoral levels imply that the construction of institutional systems
involves commitments and switching costs potentially as large as those
associated with any technology or factory. In effect, institutional
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structures and components of them possess a degree of market power. As with
conventional learning effects attributed to cumulative manufacturing
experience, organizational experience increases efficiency but also
increases power, and does so in a manner open to strategic manipulation in
many alternative directions. It also raises the possibility of forms of
institutional or systemic "lock-in" analogous to those created by technology
adoption in the presence of conventional network externalities or switching
costs. If the wrong system or set of institutional relationships becomes
entrenched at some point in an industry's history, later sectoral or
institutional adjustment may prove difficult and highly resistant to normal
competitive pressure. 57 Hence the idea of organizational or procedural
learning economies is rather subversive to traditional microeconomic theory.
But systemic learning effects and the economic importance of institutions
might account for much which is otherwise puzzling. 58
Two examples might illustrate the impact of these considerations.
First, consider the problem of industrial market structure. Suppose
industry A produces inputs to industry B, that both industries show growth
and dynamic scale economies, and that there also exist at least some
economies of vertical integration. 59 We wish to understand what determines
the degree of vertical integration between them, the degree of horizontal
integration in each, and the extent to which there exists a market for good
A, as opposed to its production being fully internalized. (Notice that
vertical integration is compatible with full marketization: the producers
could sell to each other.) We might also want to understand the degree of
effective competition in the various markets, and the distribution of market
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power or rents across firms and industries.
Suppose now that we make the further assumption that there exist
opportunities for system economies of scale, dynamic scale economies, and
bandwagon effects, at the level of market structure itself - for example
through institutional learning, procedural refinement, and strategic
dynamics. Whatever large scale decisions a firms makes, it then acquires
experience in appropriate complementary techniques and progressively
increases its efficiency in using them. This pushes the firm down one
developmental path - whether in structure, scope, technology, or other
variables - while raising the costs of switching to others. Similarly for
entire industry structures: over time, they institutionalize and reflect
patterns of organizational investments and strategic interactions.
Under such conditions, strategic decisions at critical junctures could
lead to widely divergent subsequent structures and performance levels. If a
substantial fraction of increasing returns derive from organizational
improvement (at whatever the organization is doing) as opposed to simply
static investment scale or manufacturing experience, then opportunities for
such institutional, dynamic, and systemic scale economies could exist
simultaneously in several different structural and behavioral directions.
In this case, the evolution of the arena will be determined by the relative
progress of several potential sectoral regimes, as mediated by competing
positive feedback processes - e.g., system economies of scale versus
vertical integration. For example, suppose an oligopolist in either
industry decides upon vertical integration with both marketization of the
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intermediate good plus at least some internal consumption. This withdraws
demand from the remaining market, thereby revising other firms' scale
opportunities and positions. This, in turn, might lead to later,
countervailing structural changes by other producers seeking to avoid
depending upon endangered upstream firms, or their competitors, for inputs.
The nature of such changes, however, may also depend upon strategic
interactions between competitors, customers, and suppliers. As a function
of such behavior, firms will invest in their employees, their organizational
systems and activities, in horizontal and/or vertical capacity, and their
patterns of cooperation and competition with other firms. Such decisions
will probably ramify throughout the firm's entire panoply of strategies and -
operations - technical practices, hiring, purchasing, R&D, capital
investments, pricing, marketing. Cumulatively, these investments will
effectively institutionalize the insdustry's evolving structure and
strategic regime.
The second example, somewhat related to the first, concerns
relationships between market power, technological change, and performance
(competitively, in welfare terms, or both). A deep indeterminacy exists in
considering the impact of oligopolistic structure and scale economies upon
performance. On the one hand, concentration, scale, and protectionism
reduce competitive discipline and confer market power, whose abuse (in most
neoclassical models) leads to diminished welfare. On the other hand in the
presence of strong scale economies and/or learning effects, these same
structural conditions also permit greater operational and technical
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efficiency because concentration increases firm-level returns to scale. As
indicated above, a similar indeterminacy exists with respect to firms'
decisions to cooperate versus compete with each other. Firms (and the
industry collectively) will acquire more experience, and will be able to
invest more in R&D or in facilities, if supply side coordination is
permitted but product market competition continues. Given these contending
forces, how industries actually behave is not uniquely determined by
traditional neoclassical considerations.
The answer depends critically upon at least two related variables:
firms' time horizons, and the strategic environment. The more farsighted
the firm, the more likely it is to invest its current market power in the
generation of future market power by creating future competitive advantage,
as opposed to consuming monopoly rents immediately.60 But the effective
time horizon of an organization depends upon the subjective discount rates
of those who control it, and also upon the nature of the strategic arena.
For example we noted above that the "shadow of the future" as a factor in
strategy is lengthened by a structure which enforces repeated interaction
with the same set of agents. If so, high personnel turnover and/or a high
frequency of entry and exit in an industry could reduce the effective time
horizons of firms, even those which are stable, with respect to training or
interfirm coordination.
More generally, it is possible (even likely) that strategic norms will
evolve in the industry: expected patterns and habits of behavior with
respect to strategic interactions. One example might be an unwritten rule
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that firms will not attack each other individually in political arenas;
another might be a norm of unconstrained price competition in product
markets, but a concurrent norm of cooperation in purchasing inputs; yet
another might be traditional cartellization, i.e. a norm of contributing to
joint profit maximization at the expense of customers. In many cases, there
evolve norms of conduct which are intermediate between complete competition
and complete cooperation, even within (say) product markets; for example,
firms might agree to compete for new customers but to refrain from attacks
on each other's established customer base. In practice, such norms appear
to be extremely important, but also highly variable, in industrial behavior.
How they arise is not yet well understood. Axelrod recently described one
mechanism for their evolution, the meta-norms game, which depends upon
punishing not only deviance but also the failure of others to punish it.
While this mechanism seems unlikely to be important in industrial arenas, it
represents a first effort towards a more general evolutionary and strategic
explanation.
To the extent that phenomena such as these are important, one is drawn
to a substantially different conception of industrial dynamics than is
offered by neoclassical economics in its current state. Industrial
structure, conduct, and performance become the (potentially highly
contingent) consequences of highly complex stochastic and strategic
processes. These processes are presumably constrained to some degree,
possibly strongly, by exogenous, determinate economic conditions and by the
operation of competitive forces. But if institutional learning effects,
system-level scale economies, and strategic interactions are sufficiently
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dense, long run structural evolution and systemic performance might be
strongly conditioned by these processes. Whether they would wash out in the
long run becomes an interesting, but very open, question.
Moreover patterns of institutional conduct and relationships,
comprising not only technical practices but organizational decisions and
strategic behavior, might prove highly resistant to conventional forms of
market discipline. For in this conception, the evolution of industries
involves competition not only among actors such as firms, but also a contest
between alternative strategic and institutional systems. Such a competition
can end "monopolistically" if a single institutional system, comes to
dominate a national or even global arena. (One example of such a dominant
institutional system might be the domination of a complex of related
industries by diversified, vertically integrated multinational firms whose
strategic norm is to exchange intermediates while competing in final
markets.)
Hence although power within the resulting system might be
decentralized, the system itself might be strongly entrenched. Such
institutional factors might play a major role in the system's efficiency,
and in the distribution of its costs and benefits across firms, industries,
and nations. For example, some arenas of interaction might be globalized,
while others might be nationally specific, as with domestic politics, the
executive-level labor force, or nontraded intermediate goods. Even in
industries exhibiting global competition in product markets, there might
evolve distinct strategic regimes in nationally segmented arenas affecting
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firm-level efficiency and competitive advantage in the globally traded final
market.
If such behavior is important, it should be possible to model it
theoretically and to observe it empirically. Theoretically, two classes of
developments appear promising. One is the development of mathematical
models of relevant processes. Recent work in the theory of network
externalities and innovation shows promise, as do stochastic models by
Arthur and others, and possibly theoretical developments in the modeling of
other nondeterministic dynamical processes. The other promising area is
exploratory analysis via computer simulations which enable the
classification and evaluation of strategic behaviors and their large scale
results.
Thusfar, both of these avenues have been restricted to simple,
unidimensional processes in a manner reminiscent of the neoclasscial
competitive equilibrium models to which they are conceptually an
alternative. For example, Arthur's work analyzes univariate urn processes
and a particular process which can result in the early "lock-in" of one
technology over another within an industry. Axelrod's work emphasizes the
evolution of behavior in single-threaded repeated strategic dilemmas, and
the evolution of individual behavioral norms under such strategic
conditions. But most actual strategic arenas - including industries - are
messy; they involve multiple, concurrent processes involving different
interactions but the same actors.61 For example, firms which sell in the
same product market also lobby Congress for favorable treatment, buy and
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sell technology, and hire in the same labor markets. This complexity has
two related effects upon behavior which any successful theory must
ultimately capture. One is that actors might consciously decide to link
their strategic behavior in different regions of interaction. The second is
that even if they do not, large-scale dynamics will be the result, and not
necessarily the simple arithmetic sum, of several concurrent strategic
processes affecting the same set of agents.
Consequently the dynamics of any sizeable industrial arena might be a
complicated amalgam of multiple long run strategic processes and the
somewhat haphazard institutionalization of resultant strategic norms in
personnel policies, technical practices, vertical and horizontal industry
structures, government relations, supplier and customer relationships,
prevailing norms of cooperation and competition, and so forth. While the
development path of such an institutional system might show a coherent
logic, it may often be a contingent, non-universal one. Certain features
will be shared with other sectors and historical periods, while others will
be unique. The question then arises as to whether historically contingent,
but systematic, institutional dynamics can be discerned empirically, and
whether this behavior can be distinguished from neoclassical equilibrium
behavior, on the one hand, and from random noise, on the other.
Suggestive empirical evidence appears to be abundant, but it has not
yet received highly systematic analysis. Moreover, there is at least one
major difficulty in providing it. The assertion of nondeterministic theory
is that observed behavior will often be historically contingent and path-
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dependent. Current behaviors may have their origins in past technologies,
strategic decisions, or incentives which have themselves disappeared without
a trace. Hence - at least in the absence of a suitably general, testable
theory - the exploration of the nondeterministic hypothesis requires, at
least to some extent, a rather detailed examination of the technological,
institutional, and strategic history of the arena in question.
Paul David's economic history of typewriters6 2 provides an example of a
relatively simple case of technological lock-in: the entrenchment of an
inefficient keyboard (the Qwerty design). The Qwerty design arose as one -
not the only or the best - response to a technical difficulty facing late
19th century mechanical typewriters. A combination of economic pressures
and coincidences led subsequently to the dominance of this design and to
large barriers to replacing it with superior designs, even after the
appearance of new generations of hardware - such as personal computers with
nonmechanical keyboards. There were system economies of scale - network
externalities, essentially - between keyboards, employers, and the training
of users. If users could be trained for only one keyboard, and could then
use any typewriter they encountered, the total stock of typewriters and
typists would be more efficiently used. And both of these investments were
sunk costs which depreciated slowly.
Moreover, although conversion costs for typewriter manufacturers would
be low, the costs for users were potentially very high. In part this is a
result of the costs of switching frequently between incompatible designs,
but in part it reflects a strategic dilemma arising from the structure of
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the labor market. Any single corporate user seeking to convert would have
to train typists in a way which would be useless or even detrimental unless
many others converted to the same new keyboard too. Labor mobility among
clerical workers implied that if the new standard began to take off, those
trained in it could be hired away by new converts. Hence the first users of
any new standard would pay high costs but would be unable to appropriate all
of its benefits.
This, however, is a relatively innocuous example. Typing is a widely
diffused activity, but probably not one sufficiently critical to powerful
organizations that they would be willing to pay large costs, and take
sufficiently large risks, in order to improve it. And precisely because the
activity is widely diffused, the costs of inefficiency are equally shared
and relatively minor in each individual setting. Nor is the technology
directly critical to other major industrial institutions. In short, the
existence of such an isolated case, or even of a significant number of such
cases, says little about the structure, strategy and competitive performance
of important industries over long time periods. Do similar effects show on
larger scales, in more important cases, and can they have a major effect on
structural and competitive outcomes?
Studies of a variety of industrial sectors and economic institutions
suggest that they do. There is much evidence that the structure,
technological choices, and efficiency of industries differ strikingly across
nations independent of, or even in contradiction to, expectations derived
from competitive market models baased upon factor costs, technological
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opportunities, and demand. A portion of this evidence will be reviewed in
connection with the discussion, below, of American productivity and
competitiveness performance.
But in addition, my own analysis of the semiconductor and computer
industries supports this conclusion. In their large-scale structure and
behavior, the U.S. and Japanese industries differ in nearly every possible
respect. These differences are sufficiently large and have persisted
sufficiently long that they cannot be considered accidents or aberrations,
and they entail virtually every dimension of behavior considered important
by neoclassical economics. 63 They arose through a historically dependent
process of institutionalization, and are closely linked to national
differences in sectoral strategic norms, i.e. the patterns of cooperation,
competition, and reciprocity which prevail in interactions among firms,
including several markets and political arenas. I argue that the severe
failure of the U.S. semiconductor industry in recent international
competition derives in considerable measure from aspects of these
institutional regimes which, although detrimental to the U.S. industry's
competitiveness, were entrenched by switching costs, sunk investments, and
strategic dilemmas. This pattern, I also argue, places the future of the
U.S. computer industry in substantial jeopardy. In short, the evolution of
international competition in the semiconductor and computer industries is
not principally a story of factor costs or other traditional economic
considerations. Rather it is a story of strategic choices, incentives,
institutionalization, and the efficiency consequences of an arena's norms of
strategic conduct.
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To the extent this account is accurate, however, it raises questions
not only with respect to the theory of industrial organization, but about
other domains as well. In particular, the foregoing implies that even if
international product markets provide strict discipline upon producers, the
evolution of international competition may depend upon such processes as
strategic interactions in domestic markets, or the institutionalization of
the industry prior to the advent of foreign competition. Such matters are
quite different than those invoked by traditional models of trade and
comparative advantage.64
Trade Theory
Traditional economic models of the terms of trade, and of the
distribution of comparative advantage, have emphasized relative factor
endowments and macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates. For example,
Hecksher-Ohlin theory posits that nations will specialize in the production
of goods for which their factor ratios give them a comparative advantage, or
at least the smallest comparative disadvantage. In such traditional models,
the relevant factors of production are taken to be capital, labor, sometimes
human capital (labor weighted by education or skill level), land, and raw
materials endowments. Hence nations with large capital stocks will produce
goods requiring capital-intensive technologies, and trade them for the
labor-intensive output of other nations. One consequence of this vision is
that free trade maximizes welfare and efficiency, while protectionism
lessens it, sometimes even damaging a unilateral practitioner.
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These factor endowment models have been extended through consideration
of factor market imperfections (unionization which increases the cost of
labor, government controls which increase the cost of capital), simple
models of multinational corporations, and exchange rate effects.65 However,
it has long been clear that these considerations could not account for trade
behavior. Empirical analyses have shown that long run trade patterns depart
from those predicted from factor endowments in several respects. First,
national patterns of imports and exports simply do not match national
positions in factors. Second, much trade is between nations with similar
endowments and indeed represents international competition between firms in
precisely the same industries. Third, patterns of trade and national
comparative advantage over time cannot readily be explained through factor
proportions theory, nor even through the learning effects employed by the
"new" international economics. Why did the United States have a positive
trade balance for seventy-six consecutive years, followed by an increasingly
negative one for the last fifteen? And why, for example, did the United
States become a net importer of semiconductors relative to Japan by 1980,
even though the assets of the U.S. in that industry still dwarfed those of
the Japanese industry of the day?
Several models have been developed to account for the portions of trade
behavior which deviate from factor proportions theory. An early attempt was
the industry life cycle theory developed by Wells, Vernon, and others in the
late 1960s." The life cycle model posited that new products were first
developed in nations with an appropriately skilled workforce and advanced
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markets - i.e. the United States at that time. As markets widened and the
technology standardized, mass production could be transferred to locations
with lower labor or materials costs, and the originating nation might become
a net importer of the mature, low cost, low technology good. But the life
cycle model, though useful in some cases, cannot account for two phenomena
increasingly central to current economic history: the course of
international competition between advanced nations in high technology
industries, and the declining competitiveness of United States industry in
global competition.
More recent is the "new international economics" developed by Brander,
Spencer, Dixit, Krugman, Helpman, and other neoclassical trade theorists.
This has consisted principally in the belated inclusion of increasing
returns - scale economies or learning effects or both - into neoclassical
trade theory, together with some modeling of the international strategic
alternatives thereby offered to oligopolistic firms and governments. Once
again, however, the ability of these models to explain actual trade patterns
is extremely limited. The theoretical problems are analogous to those of
microeconomics, and in fact include most of them; for example, institutional
effects and iterated strategic interactions are neglected. The empirical
problems are if anything worse.
For example, American competitive difficulties and relative
productivity decline in several industries, including both mature and high
technology sectors, began when aggregate U.S. scale, assets, and experience
were enormously larger than those of any foreign competitor. If scale and
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learning per se determined comparative advantage, most troubled U.S. sectors
(including semiconductors and computers) would not have lost their
competitiveness when and how they did. Indeed, enormous U.S. advantages in
cumulative experience should have compensated for factor cost differences.
Moreover, the new international economics relies upon the neoclassical
theory of industrial organization by transfering parts of this theory into
an international market segmented by trade costs. But we have seen that
neoclassical models of strategic industrial behavior are seriously
incomplete. In fact, cross-national comparisons of firms and national
industries competing in the international market raise yet further questions
regarding neoclassical models not only of trade but of industrial
organization as well.
Such comparisons indicate that a high fraction of comparative advantage
cannot be attributed either to factor costs or scale effects (whether
dynamic or static). The sectors to which this conclusion applies appear to
include consumer electronics, steel, and automobiles. 67 In these sectors
among others, declining productivity growth and competitiveness appear to
have been the result of institutional, managerial, and strategic processes
which reduced efficiency, led to dysfunctional distributional struggles
(e.g. between management and labor), and impeded the adoption of practices
known to yield superior efficiency. (Below I will argue that semiconductors
and computers illustrate this point even more sharply.) And finally,
neoclassical models encounter similar explanatory difficulties at another
level of analysis, that of national productivity and output growth. In
particular, the nature, composition and sources of America's declining
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productivity growth and competitiveness are substantially inconsistent with
a neoclassical interpretation. 6 8
5. Growth Accounting and U.S. Economic Performance
Using conventional measurements and U.S. government time series, U.S.
productivity growth has declined from over 3% per year in the 1960s to less
than 1% per year presently, and shows no sign of improvement. Traditional
neoclassical models cannot account for this decline, nor can they explain
major aspects of its internal structure. Similarly, U.S. trade
competitiveness has declined severely over the same period, and the
composition of trade has changed, again in many respects which cannot be
explained by neoclassical analysis. 9
Productivity growth began to decline substantially earlier than
competitiveness. Neoclassical analysis - both the microeconomics of
production and the macroeconomics of growth - suggest that the determinants
of productivity behavior, including declining growth, are to be found in two
general areas. First, inputs can grow more or less rapidly, for example
through changes in net human or physical capital formation. Second, there
can be growth in total factor productivity, i.e. the efficiency with which
inputs are converted into outputs. This is usually thought to involve
payoffs to research and development which yield new knowledge; vintage
effects, as new knowledge is embodied in new equipment and brought into use;
and the exploitation of returns to scale (either static or dynamic). For
some time, it has been agreed that most output growth in most nations
411
derives from total factor productivity, which is usually calculated as a
residual category (after accounting for input growth).
Unfortunately, declining U.S. productivity growth cannot thus be
accounted for. All major econometric attempts to account for the last 20
years' decline fail to explain substantial fractions of economywide
behavior, sometimes more than half. Often, these accounts disagree with
each other as much as they agree. 70 Moreover, econometric and other
examinations of particular industries, technologies, and functional economic
aggregates (e.g. services versus manufacturing, or knowledge workers versus
production workers) reveal even greater puzzles.
First, consider the behavior of several industries which have fared
particularly badly in international competition, and/or whose productivity
growth, relative to both other nations and other U.S. industries, has been
poor. Steel, automobiles, and machine tools are among the clearest examples
of manufacturing industries failing in international competition;
construction, electric power, and financial services are among those facing
limited trade competition but whose productivity performance has been
exceptionally poor. In all of them, there is considerable evidence that the
causes of declining American performance are largely to be found outside
standard neoclassical variables.
This evidence comes in several forms. One is that detailed examination
of industry practices reveals large inefficiencies associated with
strategic, institutional, and political factors. These include poor choice
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of technology, such as the steel industry's failure to adopt continuous
casting; poor industrial relations; antagonistic relations between industry
and government; high scrappage rates and quality control problems; and a
general inability to make optimal use of existing capital equipment. In the
case of the steel industry, for example, capacity rationalization is now
impeded by huge exit costs associated primarily with severance pay and
pension funds. The inefficiency of the traditional sector, moreover, led to
a structural divergence between the U.S. and Japanese industries. The
Japanese industry was and remains dominated by large integrated steel firms
operating integrated plants of extremely high capacity and efficiency. In
the U.S. the inefficiency of integrated firms provided a high price, low
quality market umbrella which permitted the formation of a highly efficient
but fragmented domestic "minimill" sector of inherently limited size
(through its dependence upon the supply of scrap).
Similarly, evidence from factory studies suggests that the U.S.
automobile industry greatly underutilizes its capital stock as a consequence
of managerial and industrial relations problems. The Toyota-managed NUMMI
joint venture produces automobiles using a GM plant constructed in the late
1960s. Using the original capital equipment and a unionized workforce,
Toyota has obtained levels of quality and productivity twice as high as GM
management ever did, and which are roughly comparable to Toyota's
performance in Japan.71 A Honda plant in Ohio has obtained similarly
impressive results with low levels of capital investment and automation,
indicating that neither capital intensive automation nor U.S. production
labor quality account for Japanese efficiency.
413
Similarly for studies of specific functions and technical practices.
One of the most striking is Jaikumar's study of flexible machining systems
(FMS) utilization in the United States and Japan." Similar hardware
systems were employed differently in the two nations, and with divergent
results. Japanese firms manufactured eight times as many different products
per system as U.S. firms, and Japanese capacity utilization was twenty
percent higher than U.S. levels. Another case concerns the adoption of just
in time manufacturing (JIT) in discrete manufacturing sectors in which its
benefits are demonstrably significant. Suitable users clearly include the
automobile and semiconductor industries, and perhaps others as well. Yet
the U.S. automobile and semiconductor industries have been remarkably slow
to adopt the practice.
Another anomaly concerns the pattern of investment, productivity, and
employment in manufacturing versus services industries, and for production
versus nonproduction workers. Since the onset of U.S. productivity decline,
manufacturing productivity has grown more rapidly than services productivity
despite the fact that services' share of capital investment has increased
substantially.73 Moreover, the productivity of production workers in
manufacturing has increased far more rapidly than the productivity of white-
collar workers, whose productivity in some sectors has declined
substantially in absolute terms.74 U.S. firms in declining industries have
reduced their production workforce more sharply than their overhead, and
seem to maintain considerably larger and less efficient administrative
workforces than their foreign competitors. Some of the occupations
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experiencing most rapid employment growth - computer programming,
accounting, clerical work - are those which have also been the object of the
largest capital investments intended to increase productivity. Yet the
productivity of affected industries, such as financial services, has
stagnated.
Given the foregoing, we might summarize the limits of neoclassical
theory via the following observations. First, neoclassical theory tends to
neglect important cost-side forces which tend to generate lock-in,
instability, and indeterminacy in economic models. Among these are
uncertainty and random fluctuations; learning economies at the level of
organizations, institutions, and interorganizational relationships; network
externalities; and increasing static returns to diversification and vertical
integration as well as horizontal scale. Second, neoclassical models tend
to focus upon product market interactions to the neglect of other arenas of
strategic interaction which can be quite important: information;
investment; R&D; technology; technical property rights; skilled labor;
politics. Third, neoclassical theory also neglects considerations, such as
rapid technological change and uncertainty, which might force strategic
interactions to be iterative and evolutionary. Traditional models tend to
assume that strategic decisions can be made once, under conditions of
perfect foresight, over an infinite discounted time horizon, and without the
presence of destabilizing dynamic forces. At worst, such a decision is made
after a preliminary period of maneuver which yields a final strategic
position for eternity.
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6. Evolutionary Explanations Revisited
Since neoclassical predictions do not accord well with observed
behavior, it is unsurprising that the empirical evidence suggests that other
forces than those incorporated into neoclassical models must be in
operation. On the other hand, any attempt to explain aggregate phenomena
such as national productivity or trade performance through the evolutionary,
institutional, and/or strategic processes alluded to above encounters
substantial difficulties, at least upon first examination. Perhaps the
largest puzzle would appear to be as follows. Application of the
nondeterministic model at the sectoral level would predict any sectoral
decline to be sectorally specific, historically conditional, and rather
idiosyncratic. Instead, we apparently find widespread decline, much of it
occurring simultaneously in separate industries, and a number of important
regularities which transcend sectoral boundaries. One might argue that
these observations cast doubt upon the proposition that evolutionary,
nondeterministic forces are central to the U.S. problem. Unobserved
neoclassical forces or some pervasive political or cultural failure might,
on this argument, be more likely.
Such neoclassical or social forces may be present, but the observation
of widespread simultaneous decline and major cross-sectoral regularities in
its characteristics do not, in fact, disqualify the evolutionary models. To
the contrary, the regularities we observe, and likewise the coexistence of
these regularities with cross-national variation and historical specificity,
themselves reflect the importance of evolutionary, strategic processes. Two
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distinct considerations are involved in this apparent paradox.
First, there may exist strategic dilemmas and nondeterminstic processes
which generate similar behaviors and evolutionary patterns across a wide
spectrum of industries, possibly the entire economy. The strategic dilemmas
themselves might be rather different across industries, or they might be the
result of some economywide condition or government policy which
systematically gives rise to strategic dilemmas. The regularity of
resulting behavior, however, is still a consequence of evolutionary and
strategic processes. In a general way, this is the strongest result of
Axelrod's analyis of the evolution of cooperation: under conditions of
repeated interaction, a local strategic indeterminacy paradoxically favors,
and gives rise to, a long term aggregate regularity. Cooperative behavior
is favored and if a selection mechanism exists, it will come to predominate.
However, other general arena conditions or payoff structures - for example
high levels of entry and exit - could lead to different, less cooperative,
and less favorable behaviors which might become pervasive, stable features
of the arena.
Conditions generating incentive structures over a wide spectrum of
industrial arenas might include the large scale sectoral structure of the
economy, prevailing conditions in markets used by many sectors (capital,
labor, energy), government policies, the structure of political competition,
or widely diffused behavioral norms (such as the extent and acceptability of
labor turnover). Likely sources of such effects might include the cost of
capital (via its effect upon time horizons); the structure of equity
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markets; the prevalence of industrywide versus company unionization; a
variety of regulatory, trade, and procurement policies; and the strategic
norms prevailing in major infrastructural industries (steel, energy,
automobiles, semiconductors).
Consider, for example, the effects of general conditions of high
capital costs, high levels of entry and exit, and high labor turnover.
These will tend to produce (though not guarantee) forms of behavior which
reduce long run productivity, and not solely through direct economic effects
such as increased transaction costs or lower capital investment. They will
also reduce the effective time horizons of actors and their propensity to
engage in productive cooperation. For example, firms may decide against
human capital investments for fear that their employees will be lured away
by and/or defect to competitors. Long term technical cooperation will
become less likely if firms exit unpredictably, orphaning joint projects
with sunk costs. And firms will in general be more tempted by defection if
the future weighs less heavily than the present.
The forms in which these centrifugal forces manifest themselves may
differ from industry to industry, and they may sometimes be overcome. For
example, one industry might shift its operations offshore, while another
might cartellize and pass its high costs on to consumers. Alternatively, a
small number of leading firms may tacitly agree not to steal each other's
employees, thereby increasing the appropriability of human capital
investments. Hence a source of general, economywide pressure to shorten
time horizons and to defect rather than cooperate in economic relationships
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will produce aggregate decline, but a decline which may take a number of
specific forms and which may include notable exceptions.
A second process also generates similar regularities: once
established, strategic patterns can spread from one agent or arena to
another. For example, if one industry falls into a strategic equilibrium of
shortsightedness, defection, and vengeance, it may show this in its
relationships with neighboring industries - suppliers, customers, producers
of substitutes - and thereby influence their behavior in the same direction.
Or alternatively, the individual failure of an organization or sector (one
important to other sectors, or the entire economy) might produce a general
cost disadvantage and/or pressure for dysfunctional strategic behavior.
7. Strategic Decisionmaking and Government Policy
These evolutionary, strategic explanations depend heavily upon the
extent of institutional economies and/or lock-in, the effective length of
agents' time horizons, aspects of arena structure which condition strategic
calculation, and norms of strategic conduct. To the extent that such
institutional and strategic processes are important to international
industrial competition and national productivity performance, they will also
probably be important considerations in designing strategies or policies
intended to improve them.
Here, however, we have even less general understanding or experience
than in the positive theory and modeling of evolutionary dynamics. Our
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current knowledge suggests that if long run strategic processes are
important, then strategic bargaining, the design of incentive structures,
and hence government policy are in fact substantially more important than
traditional neoclassical economics has led us to believe. But we have as
yet no systematic discipline for the construction of appropriate strategic
or policy instruments. Axelrod and Keohane7 5 discuss a variety of
possibilities for increasing levels of cooperation in international
diplomacy, but their relevance to maximizing industrial performance seems
quite limited. The policy discussion which ends this essay considers this
problem in the particular context of the semiconductor and computer
industries, and some of these observations may prove more generally
relevant. But to a large extent, this area remains unexplored and demands
further analysis. Further understanding of strategic decisions and policy
effects, however, may depend upon and therefore await an improved
theoretical understanding of evolutionary processes generally.
But one large issue can at least be debated immediately: namely,
whether evolutionary and strategic considerations, and by implication the
forces which give rise to them, are important. The substance of this essay
is a case study and a policy discussion which suggest that they are. The
comparative evolution, structure, behavior, and competitive success of the
U.S. and Japanese semiconductor and computer industries do not derive
primarily from considerations such as factor costs. They derive largely
from historical and technological conjunctures, incentive structures, and
strategic interactions which led to a particular international strategic
regime, and from the characteristics of this regime.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE
1. For one survey and very critical assessment by a (somewhat
apostate) economist, see Laura Tyson, "Creating Advantage: An Industrial
Policy Perspective," unpublished manuscript, University of California,
Berkeley, August 1986.
2. For a critique of traditional factor proportions theory from the
vantage point of the new international economics, see Helpman & Krugman,
"Market Structure and Foreign Trade," p. 2 and pp. 261 ff. For a less
charitable and broader critique, see Bruce Scott, "U.S. Competitiveness:
Concepts, Performance, and Implications," in Scott & Lodge (eds.), "U.S.
Competitiveness in the World Economy," Harvard Business School Press, 1985.
3. For strategic issues and strategically motivated government
policy, see for example M. Borrus, L. Tyson, and J. Zysman, "Creating
Advantage: How Government Policies Shape High Technology Trade," BRIE
working paper, 1984. For a theoretical and simulation analysis of the
importance of strategy to norms and norms to the behavior of arenas, see
Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political
Science Review, December 1986.
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(and thereby invert traditional conclusions), see for example Kala Krishna,
"High Tech Trade Policy," unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 1986,
for an analysis of how network externalities and learning effects imply that
domestic government purchasing policy affects international competitiveness.
5. For two mathematical demonstrations of this see: W. Brian Arthur,
"Competing Technologies and Lock-In by Historical Small Events: The
Dynamics of Allocation Under Increasing Returns," Stanford Center for
Economic Policy Research Policy Paper #43, 1985; and Joseph Farrell and
Garth Saloner, "Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation," American Economic Review, December 1986.
For an exposition of the effects of uncertainty upon time horizons and
R&D investments, see George Rozanski, "The Dynamics of Competition: Price
and Product Strategies in International Semiconductor Markets," unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University Department of Economics, 1985, particularly
chapter 2.
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7. See Peter S. Fader, "Effective Strategies for Oligopolistic
Games," Ph.D. thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School of Management, 1987; and Peter S.
Fader and John R. Hauser, "Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's
Dilemma," Harvard Business School Working Paper 88-017, October 1987.
8. See "The Evolution of Cooperation," chapter 4, for a discussion of
the "Live and Let Live" tacit agreements which arose spontaneously in trench
warfare during WW I.
9. See for example Axelrod's analysis of norms for simulations in
which the development of a norm is indeterminate and depends upon small
events early in the simulation history. See also Paul David's history of
keyboard standards, discussed below in more detail. For many interesting
examples and a variety of hypothetical situations, see Thomas Schelling,
"Micromotives and Macrobehavior," Norton, 1978.
10. In the preface to a reissued version of "The Strategy of
Conflict," Thomas Schelling states that he had hoped the book would give
rise to a new discipline devoted to strategic processes. He may see the
birth of one yet.
I1. See Axelrod, "The Evolution of Cooperation."
12. For the determinants of cooperation, see particularly the essays
by Oye and by Axelrod & Keohane in "Cooperation Under Anarchy."
13. In the absence of central authority, the provision of public goods
is one such benefit. But it has been shown that under most conditions
envisioned by neoclassical theory, such public goods will be underprovided.
There appear to be many examples of public goods which are "local," for
example specific to an industry but "public" to everyone in that industry.
R&D, political lobbying, and personnel training are often said to be such
local public goods. For the classic economic analysis of the public goods
problem, see Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action," Harvard
University Press, 1965.
14. W. Brian Arthur's work is in this category. So perhaps is the
recent work of F.M. Scherer on the dynamics of market structure.
422
I---- - - -6.
15. See L. M. Sander, "Fractal Growth," Scientific American, January
1987; T. A. Witten & L. M. Sander, "Diffusion Limited Aggregation, A Kinetic
Critical Phenomenon," Physical Review Letters, vol. 47, *19, p. 1400.
16. See for example Christopher Zeeman, "Collected Papers On
Catastrophe Theory," for various applications including voting behavior.
17. See Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, "The Population Ecology of
Organizations," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, *5, p. 929; and also
W. Graham Astley, "The Two Ecologies: Population and Community Perspectives
on Organizational Evolution," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 30
(1985), p. 224.
18. This appears to be the agenda of several analysts of critical
phenomena and strategic processes. Axelrod is one example.
19. The following description owes much to the work of Kenneth Oye and
Robert Axelrod, but it is my formulation - and responsibility - not theirs.
20. Some analyses of local interdependencies have, for example,
considered how microstructures and small scale interactions affect annealing
processes or the formation of glasses.
21. Axelrod and others have applied strategic processes to ecological
processes and biological evolution.
22. In at least stylized form, the political theories of Locke and
Hobbes can be formulated as views regarding incentive structures, time
horizons, and subjective propensities in strategic arenas initially devoid
of central authority.
23. Rawls' theory of justice is actually a rather classical economic
problem, as opposed to a newer strategic one, in the sense that is
formulated as a strategic choice made once and for all time, as opposed to a
periodically revisable one.
24. As Axelrod has pointed out, the high degree of parallelism in
local interactions suggests that highly concurrent computer systems may
provide considerable increases in our ability to explore these questions.
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APPENDIX 2
U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
Semiconductor Capital Equipment, Materials, and Services
Capital equipment and inputs to semiconductor production include
capital goods such as direct steppers, reactive ion etchers, logic and
memory testers, CAD / CAE tools, and electron beam machines; materials such
as silicon, gallium arsenide, reticle glass, and ultrapure gases; and
services or inputs such as facility construction, mask making, or circuit
design. For brevity, I will call the collection of these activities the
"equipment sector." This sector is perhaps one-third the size of the
semiconductor sector it serves (including captive production).
The U.S. equipment sector is deteriorating in the face of the merchant
industry's problems and the rise of direct Japanese competition. This in
its turn threatens American semiconductor producers - both merchants and
captives. In many respects, the equipment sector's decline results from the
same structural problems which handicap the semiconductor sector itself.
The Japanese equipment industry is primarily composed of firms which are
either diversified, vertically integrated complexes themselves, or firms
which, while specialized, have exceptionally close relationships with their
customers. The Japanese industry is far more concentrated than its U.S.
counterpart, invests heavily and stably in R&D, and is supported by large
parent groups and by government policy. Critical technologies are developed
at efficient scale by small numbers of firms - usually two to four.
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Comparatively, American equipment firms and subsectors are often fragmented,
shortsighted, poor R&D performers, overly entrepreneurial, and
undercapitalized.
Effects of semiconductor market losses upon the equipment sector
In the particular case of memory products, U.S. merchant decline
reduces the size, profitability, and technical competitiveness of American
equipment firms in the most advanced technologies used in the industry, with
the possible exception of design systems. This effect is the consequence of
the large size of memory markets and of the role of memory production as a
"technology driver," i.e. a testing ground for advanced process technology.
Memory production requires the most sophisticated lithography and process
technology available - in wafer processing, initial testing and automated
defect removal, packaging, automated assembly, and final testing. The
technologies involved include not only individual pieces of equipment but
process "recipes," process control software, and turnkey automated
production systems. Memory production facilitates the development and use
of these technologies for memory production itself, and then for subsequent
logic production. Memories are technologically favored for advanced process
development because they are mass produced, standardized, geometrically
regular, functionally simple, and easily comparable. Hence the implications
of technical alternatives are readily assessed.
Moreover, competitive advantage in memory markets is inherently based
primarily upon integration levels, reliability, and production costs rather
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than upon functional uniqueness. The market is large and continually
growing, encouraging maximal exploitation of automation, scale economies,
and new equipment. Hence the market (as well as the technology) motivates
firms to produce memories using the most advanced processes available, and
to use memory production as the testbed for these processes. Conversely in
logic production, the equipment areas most affected are CAD systems,
advanced logic testers, electron beam and laser writing systems, maskmaking,
and flexible automation systems (since logic production usually involves
producing a considerable number of designs in the same facility). An
analogous argument applies: as U.S. firms lose logic markets, demand for
advanced design and other logic-specific equipment declines.
The damage to the equipment sector thus takes a similar general form in
both product areas. As American semiconductor producers decline, they buy
less capital equipment for both R&D and production. Their time horizons
shorten as they seek to avoid immediate financial crisis, and their
inclination to invest in long term cooperative efforts declines. This
process has been most severe in equipment oriented towards mass production
and/or memory devices. Since memory production increased rapidly for
fifteen years, American decline has shifted equipment demand from American
to Japanese producers, and therefore caused enormous growth in Japanese
equipment demand.
And Japanese semiconductor firms tend to buy from Japanese sources, for
several related reasons. First, major Japanese investments have resulted in
development of Japanese equipment which is now highly competitive. Second,
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Japanese semiconductor producers often have strong relationships with
domestic equipment firms. Fujitsu owns 22 percent of Advantest (testers),
NEC owns 50 percent of Ando (testers), Hitachi owns Hitachi Electronic
Engineering (various products), and Toshiba owns a producer of electron beam
equipment. Several semiconductor producers, including Hitachi and
Matsushita, also produce automated bonders. In other cases, equipment
suppliers are members of the same industrial complex as one of the
semiconductor firms. One such firm, Shin-Etsu, a member of the Sumitomo
group which includes NEC, holds 80 percent of the world market for mask-
quality glass and quartz. Another Japanese firm, Hoya, controls another 10
percent of the world market and also competes in maskmaking.
Recently, Japanese firms have also begun to acquire U.S. producers of
infrastructural goods, particularly of materials. Mitsubishi and Kawasaki
Steel, for example, both with growing semiconductor operations, have both
acquired U.S. silicon producers. And even where no structural relationship
exists, Japanese equipment firms have often benefited from enduring
sponsorship from major customers, MITI, and/or NTT. Nikon and Canon, which
may soon dominate the world market for some categories of lithographic
equipment, have both benefited from such assistance, as has Advantest.
Often NTT has issued development contracts with equipment firms for
development of new capital goods to be installed and used by the firms which
manufacture NT's semiconductors - i.e. the largest Japanese semiconductor
and electronics firms. In some cases, NTT and/or semiconductor producers
have assigned employees to work for the equipment developer for substantial
periods of time.
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As a result, many Japanese equipment firms have now become roughly
equal, and in some cases superior, to their American counterparts.
Furthermore, nearly all Japanese production and equipment purchases occur in
Japan. Relatively small, self-financed American equipment firms without
long-term Japanese relationships are significantly disadvantaged in
penetrating the Japanese market. U.S. firms sometimes decide that if they
are to enter the Japanese market, they must do so through joint ventures
rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. So as American semiconductor firms
have lost memory market share, American equipment firms have lost it as
well. In memory-specific areas such as memory testers, these losses have
been severe; even in other areas, they have been significant.
In the United States industry, market share loss, reduced cooperation
with American semiconductor producers, and diminished profitability
translate relatively directly into reduced productivity, higher costs, and
reduced R&D. Consequently as American firms have withdrawn from memory and
other technology-driving markets, the U.S. equipment industry has lost the
incentive and financial ability to advance the state of the art in
lithographic density, environmental and materials purity, testable clock
rates and pin counts, and production automation technology. Soon, design
technology may suffer as well. The result, already visible, is a gradual
loss of technical primacy culminating in abandonment of important research
projects, technologies, and business areas, which are then dominated by
Japanese firms.
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Probably the most extreme problems directly traceable to memory market
loss are in lithography and testers. In the projection aligner and stepper
markets, Canon and Nikon have established strong positions; Perkin-Elmer's
market share is reportedly declining, GCA is nearly bankrupt, and other
suppliers are minor by comparison. Similarly, Advantest and Ando are
gaining market share in testers. Teradyne, the American market leader, is
an excellent firm and has established wholly owned Japanese operations. But
Teradyne is a $400 million independent with limited diversification, and it
is now effectively the last supplier of technically competitive memory
testers in the United States. Sentry, a subsidiary of Schlumberger and once
part of Fairchild, is reportedly losing both market share and technical
competitiveness.
In several emerging technologies, developments are perhaps even more
alarming. Eight U.S. firms undertook major R&D efforts in electron beam
etching for direct writing and/or mask making. Only two remain: IBM and
Perkin Elmer. HP, Varian, GCA, Veeco, General Signal, and CDC/Microbit
cancelled their efforts, writing off over $100 million in investments by
mid-1985. In contrast, three Japanese firms have continuing efforts; one
(JEOL) already markets a system in the United States, and the other two are
closely linked to Hitachi and Toshiba respectively. Trends in R&D areas
critical to future equipment and process technologies are even more
alarming. Submicron lithography will be dominated by some combination of
three technologies: electron beam etching, laser based direct writing, and
X-ray lithography. I have already mentioned the deteriorating position of
American electron beam technology. Japanese R&D efforts in optoelectronics,
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semiconductor lasers, and laser systems generally are generally considered
quite strong.
X-ray lithography, roughly five to ten years from large scale
commercialization, shows an even more extreme decline in U.S. efforts
relative to Japan's. X-ray technology, generally considered the favored
technology for dimensions of 0.5 microns and below, will likely be based
upon computer controlled superconducting X-ray synchrotrons costing five to
ten million dollars each. Current R&D is led by Germany and Japan. German
firms have already announced commercial availability of synchrotrons and X-
ray steppers. In Japan, cooperative efforts between NTT, NEC, Fujitsu, and
Hitachi already involve beam line experiments with one synchrotron. Several
more jointly operated synchrotrons, at least one of them superconducting,
are planned. In contrast, IBM is the only major U.S. IC producer regularly
using its own beam line for lithography R&D (at Brookhaven). Several U.S.
equipment firms, including Varian, have cancelled their X-ray lithography
efforts. Announced Japanese projects appear to involve R&D budgets
totalling more than a billion dollars over the next five years.
Finally, semiconductor facility engineering and construction show
similar symptoms. In 1986, IBM for the first time chose a Japanese
construction firm, Shimizu, as the contractor for its next major
semiconductor plant in East Fishkill. An IBM executive told me that this
Japanese firm spends $10 million annually in R&D specifically devoted to
improving clean room construction techniques, whereas no U.S. construction
firm possessed any comparable effort. In 1987, IBM reversed its decision,
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apparently because IBM preferred not to provide Shimizu with details of its
facility engineering and fabrication methods.
If the costs of this deterioration were confined to the U.S. equipment
industry, the issue would be significant but not critical. But there is
another cost. As American equipment technology and suppliers decay, the
technical and competitive strength of American semiconductor production also
declines. Hence the decline of the semiconductor industry perpetuates
itself: decline in semiconductors leads to decline in equipment producers,
which leads to decline in semiconductor producers. Such decline, if it
reduces the level of technology available on the market, affects even world
class and/or captive producers. Their progress becomes limited by the
inadequacies of their suppliers; and no producer, including IBM, can supply
itself even nearly completely.
This phenomenon, which we will encounter repeatedly and discuss further
in connection with policy analysis, has an interesting implication. Every
U.S. producer, in the long run, is dependent upon external suppliers and
therefore, indirectly but powerfully, upon the collective vitality of its
suppliers' other major customers, i.e. its domestic competitors. Even
producers able consistently to better the industry - e.g. IBM - are
ultimately limited by the industry's average technology level and therefore
hostage to its health. Otherwise the domestic infrastructure will decay,
resulting in dependency upon whatever Japanese firms choose to make
available. Some of these Japanese firms are direct competitors, not all
renowned for their compliance with intellectual property laws.
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Effects of equipment sector decline upon semiconductor production
As semiconductor design and production become increasingly
computerized, automated, and capital intensive, the interdependencies
between semiconductor production, capital equipment, and downstream
industries (particularly computer systems) continuously increase.
Therefore, semiconductor production increasingly requires detailed, long
range cooperation with equipment suppliers and factory automation
management. Furthermore, the leverage derivable from superior capital
equipment and its customization to processing requirements is significant
and possibly increasing.
Indeed, some fraction of recent American decline and Japanese progress
in semiconductors can be attributed to the arms-length, short-term, even
adversarial relationships which have traditionally existed between American
semiconductor producers and their equipment suppliers. Large, long term
cooperative investments diffuse rapidly to competitors. Cooperation is
rendered difficult and precarious by distrust, bargaining and coordination
problems, and the financial instability of potential partners. Therefore
U.S. producers tended not to develop close, enduring relationships with
their suppliers. But such relationships are important to technical progress
and maximum productivity, and the Japanese industry has emphasized them.
The decline of American equipment technology and suppliers will (unless
reversed) eventually damage both merchant and captive semiconductor
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production. To the extent that U.S. semiconductor producers continue to
rely on domestic sources, they will find themselves using inferior
technology and struggling against the equipment industry's short time
horizons and instability. But if U.S. producers seek to obtain Japanese
equipment and technology, they will labor under disadvantages relative to
their Japanese competition. As I indicated earlier, some major Japanese
equipment suppliers have equity relationships with large semiconductor and
electronics firms such as Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, and Toshiba. They also
have longstanding cooperative technical relationships which involve joint
equipment development, NTT funded research, technology and personnel
transfer, so-called "beta" (i.e. site) testing of new machinery, and in some
cases permanent engineering staffs at customer sites for equipment
modification, maintenance, and repair service. (Service is critical to
throughput in capital intensive plants.)
American firms are unlikely to obtain similar relationships. One might
suspect that Advantest, partially owned by Fujitsu, has a closer
relationship to Fujitsu than it has to IBM. Reciprocally, IBM might be
pardoned for feeling a certain reluctance to disclose detailed technical
information to Advantest, given that IBM is also pursuing legal action
against Fujitsu related to allegedly large scale theft of intellectual
property. So while Japanese firms may continue to commercialize their
equipment, they will tend to do so after extensive beta testing and
modification conducted in conjunction with their favored customers, who will
surely be Japanese. Furthermore, many American firms have limited
understanding of Japanese business practices, little experience with the
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Japanese industry, limited ability to scan and assess Japanese technical
practice and product offerings, and few employees who speak Japanese. For
at least the time required to learn, they will suffer accordingly. Finally,
Japanese firms usually have less extensive service networks in the United
States than in Japan.
For all these reasons, Americans will wait longer for their equipment,
obtain less throughput from it, pay higher prices, and receive less
technical support and service - even if Japanese firms do not engage in
strategic technology hoarding. But furthermore, they probably do. I have
been told independently by several U.S. firms, both merchants and captives,
of cases in which Japanese firms refused to sell advanced equipment, or made
purchases difficult and expensive.
If continued, this process will have two consequences. First, American
semiconductor producers will fall further behind Japan in process technology
and manufacturing. Most significant, perhaps, is the potential damage to
technically strong and/or critically important captive producers such as
IBM, AT&T, DEC, HP, and GM/Hughes. The dependence of these firms upon the
Japanese equipment sector is significant and increasing. So, therefore, is
the advantage to be gained by Japanese firms from withholding technology.
And second, U.S. producers will shift their production facilities and/or
purchasing to Japan in the hope of gaining improved access to technology.
We do not yet know precisely how severe these effects will be. On the
currently available evidence, it appears that they could eventually become
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extremely serious. But more important, probably, is the process which will
translate Japanese superiority in semiconductor technology into competitive
advantage in larger downstream industries. Developments in systems markets
exemplify this development, but other sectors will be affected as well.
Semiconductors and Downstream Industries
Semiconductor components are a rising fraction of virtually all
mechanical or assembled goods - cars, weapons, computers, machine tools,
washing machines, telephones, consumer electronics. The semiconductor
content of computers, industrial and medical electronics, telecommunications
equipment, and military electronics typically ranges from 3 to 10 percent,
and is increasing rapidly. For example, IBM now (1987) consumes roughly $4
billion in semiconductors annually, yielding a content level of
approximately 6% for its computer business. Dataquest's estimates for
various U.S. industries are as follows:
Semiconductor Content of U.S. Industry Output:
1985 Actual & 1990 Forecast
Category 1985 1990
Data Processing Equipment 4.5% 6.6%
Communications Equipment 5.0 7.0
Industrial Electronics 4.4 5.5
Military Electronics 3.0 3.4
Automotive Electronics* 9.3 10.1
*Electronic content, not entire automobiles. (Dataquest, 1986.)
There is wide agreement within these industries that semiconductor
technology is becoming important to competitiveness in final markets. With
the advent of VLSI, many systems previously based upon analog or low-
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integration technologies are being digitized and converted to LSI and VLSI
logic. Concomitantly, semiconductor technology continues to progress. The
importance of microelectronics to competitive advantage in downstream
industries is therefore increasing rapidly. Within ten years, consumer
electronics will be nearly entirely digitized; new high definition
television sets will probably contain more logic gates than were used in
1970 mainframe computers. New personal workstations such as the PC RT,
Microvax 2, or Sun 3 already contain more logic, and processing power, than
1970 mainframes.
In some cases, the components involved are essentially commodities.
This is true, for example, of memories and of the microcontrollers used in
goods such as answering machines. However, this is not necessarily
reassuring. First, their contribution to cost can be substantial;
semiconductor memory is a significant and growing fraction of the cost of
personal computers, VCRs, and other mass-produced goods. Second, custom
digital design is becoming more important every year. This is a consequence
of the increasing attractiveness of VLSI logic, often in the form of
advanced microprocessors or application specific circuits such as gate
arrays. While low end, mature products such as inexpensive telephones may
always use circuits which are mature commodities relative to the state of
the art, the importance of advanced VLSI to novel or high end markets
appears to be increasing. This is certainly true of the computer,
networking, telecommunications, automotive, industrial, and consumer
markets. (It appears to be less true of defense markets as a consequence of
the currently long delays involved in the design, qualification, and
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production of weapons systems, at least in the United States.)
In some sectors, advanced semiconductor technology is already critical
to comparative advantage in final markets. The most important of such
sectors are computers and telecommunications systems. Certain specialized
areas within defense electronics, such as those requiring GaAs devices, also
require very advanced devices for rather different reasons such as combined
speed and radiation hardness requirements. When the merchant semiconductor
industry began its decline, American semiconuctor consumers therefore had
some combination of five choices: continued dependence upon decreasingly
competitive merchant technology; increased dependence upon Japan; extremely
expensive development of internal capacity; formation of stable, long term
relationships with semiconductor producers; or vertical integration through
friendly mergers and acquisitions.
With the exception of a few captive producers who have expanded (GM,
DEC, IBM), American industry has increased its dependence upon Japan. This
course permits American firms to avoid the direct disadvantage of inferior
merchant technology and/or higher merchant prices. But it does not
generally meet the need for closer integration between semiconductor and
downstream operations, and it renders American firms highly dependent upon
the Japanese firms who, in many cases, are their direct competitors in final
markets. Once again, the potential and actual benefits of technology
denial, and/or the exercise of technical leverage in order to obtain
increased control, are rapidly increasing as a result.
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Analysis of semiconductor dependencies
The implications of Japanese semiconductor dependency are dependent
upon three variables. These are (a) the degree of Japanese market power,
coordination, and technical control in various semiconductor product areas;
(b) the degree to which the Japanese controlled technology is critical to
competitive advantage and/or national security in downstream industry; and
finally (c) the degree to which Japanese semiconductor producers (and/or
their parent organizations) are or will become competitors in the downstream
industry. By all of these criteria the computer, telecommunications, and
industrial automation industries are the immediate candidates for Japanese
strategic action. The defense electronics industry is also potentially
involved, though not yet in a large way as a consequence of Japan's postwar
political commitment to refrain from weapons exports.
Semiconductor markets and computer markets
Bipolar LSI circuits
Three Japanese firms dominate production of Japanese mainframe
computers and supercomputers - Fujitsu, NEC, and Hitachi. They also control
over two thirds of the Japanese telecommunications equipment market, and are
three of the four largest Japanese semiconductor producers. They also
control over 80 percent of the world market for ECL RAMs critical to the
performance of mainframe cache memories, disk cache controllers, and
supercomputer memories. In these product areas, and particularly in
supercomputers, the importance of high speed memory to system performance is
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increasing substantially. Cray and ETA Systems purchase bipolar memory from
their direct Japanese competitors in supercomputer markets. Only IBM among
American firms produces substantial quantities of high speed bipolar memory
internally.
The CPUs of all minicomputers and mainframes are based upon bipolar
custom and semicustom logic, primarily gate arrays. Mainframe and
supercomputer CPUs typically use ECL gate arrays. Aside from IBM's captive
production, only two U.S. firms - Motorola and Fairchild - remain even
nearly competitive in this business, and American users are unanimous in
their opinion that U.S. technology is deteriorating relative to that of four
Japanese firms - Toshiba and the three mainframe and supercomputer firms
listed above. Excluding U.S. captive production (the vast majority of which
is accounted for by IBM), Japanese firms shipped 31 percent of all bipolar
gate arrays produced in 1985, worldwide. (The world total was $623 million,
again excluding U.S. captive production.) These shipments were divided
between internal consumption by the computer systems divisions of these
firms and open market sales. Most U.S. minicomputer, mainframe, and
supercomputer firms now purchase at least some of their CPU arrays from
these Japanese companies. In 1987, Unisys decided to use Hitachi bipolar
components in its future mainframe systems. (In addition Amdahl, which is
49 percent owned by Fujitsu, uses Fujitsu components.) The performance of
these arrays is critical to system price and performance.
Equally important, however, is the fact that American users sometimes
cannot purchase the most advanced technology available because the Japanese
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firms in question prefer not to sell it. There are already strong
indications that the relatively low world market share of Japanese firms,
and particularly of Fujitsu and NEC, reflects not the level of their
technical capacities but the fact that they are now using their best
technology in their own machines for significant periods of time before they
commercialize it.
CMOS technology
As circuit density and speed increase, CMOS technology becomes
increasingly favored relative to bipolar devices. One U.S. supercomputer,
the ETA-10, is already being designed using VLSI CMOS gate arrays cooled by
liquid nitrogen. It is generally agreed that five to ten years from now,
CMOS (either room temperature or cooled) will become a favored technology
even for extremely high speed CPUs which now use ECL arrays. The question
therefore arises as to Japanese versus U.S. CMOS technology levels and R&D
efforts. The answer is that Japan clearly leads the U.S. industry in CMOS
processing, and its lead appears to be increasing. Indeed this processing
advantage may already be contributing to increased Japanese dependency in
another critical product area, CMOS ASICs.
MOS ASICs are a rapidly growing market already critical to a wide
variety of electronic systems including personal computers, logic boards in
various control systems, and telecommunications equipment. Japanese firms
hold 40 percent of the world market in MOS ASICs, and have recently entered
the American market in CMOS gate arrays with extraordinary aggressiveness.
Japanese firms may capture one third of the American CMOS ASIC market this
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year (1987). Aside from IBM, AT&T, and HP, no major U.S. consumer has
competitive ASIC capabilities. There is some evidence that even these large
captive producers are losing technical competitiveness relative to the
Japanese. The potential dependency issues arising from Japanese control of
CMOS ASIC markets are quite large. ASIC customers must disclose their
designs to ASIC vendors and thereby expose themselves to industrial
espionage; and ASICs are increasingly important to an extremely wide array
of consumer, industrial, computer, and military products.
Further evidence of Japanese superiority in CMOS processing, and of its
strategic risks to U.S. firms, is found in the microprocessor market. NEC
and Hitachi are producing Intel and Motorola compatible microprocessors
respectively. Both Japanese firms reverse engineered the American devices
in CMOS, resulting in higher performance and lower power consumption.
Hitachi used its bargaining leverage to obtain cross licensing agreements
with Motorola, while Intel sued NEC for copyright infingement of its
microcode. (More recently, in 1986 Motorola signed a joint venture
agreement with Toshiba involving an exchange of Toshiba's CMOS process
technology for Motorola's 68000 family microprocessor architecture.) Intel
now holds less than half of the worldwide Intel-compatible microprocessor
market. It is possible that within four years, significant dependency
issues will therefore arise in 16 and 32 bit CMOS microprocessors.
Finally, there is increasing consensus that high speed computers,
signal processing equipment, communications satellites, various consumer
products, and a variety of military systems will soon employ gallium
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arsenide circuits in significant quantities. Cray Research, for example,
has announced that its Cray-3 machine will employ a GaAs central processing
unit. Although commercial markets for GaAs remain embryonic, evaluations of
Japanese R&D by IBM, the CIA, and others indicate that Japan possesses a
significant lead in GaAs and optoelectronics relative to most U.S. computer
systems and defense electronics firms, and an overwhelming lead in consumer
applications such as high definition television. Consequently the large
scale employment of GaAs will almost surely give rise almost immediately to
significant American technical inferiority in final goods and/or dependence
upon Japanese devices.
The next question, therefore, is whether the United States can maintain
its current competitive position in these large downstream sectors even if
it depends upon Japan for its most advanced semiconductors and semiconductor
capital equipment. The answer is no. If American semiconductor technology
and production deteriorate, American industries become dependent upon open
market Japanese technology. The gradual but inevitable result would be
deterioration in the productivity and international competitiveness of these
downstream industries. This in turn could lead to reduced demand, R&D, and
technical progress in their infrastructural industries, leading to further
difficulties in sectors such as construction, robotics, advanced materials,
and software.
Computer Markets and Computer Users
Analogously, deterioration within the U.S. computer industry is likely
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to result in differential damage to the productivity of U.S. computer users.
Many U.S. computer users, including much of the software industry, are
effectively locked into their U.S. vendors for substantial periods of time
as a consequence of complementary investments in personnel, software,
supplies, long term contracts, service networks, and procedures. Switching
costs are substantial. Hence for the same reason that U.S. market share in
computer systems would probably decline more gradually (relative to the rate
of decline in technological competitiveness) than has that of the merchant
semiconductor industry, consumers of those U.S. systems would suffer more.
Since the U.S. computer industry holds over 90% of the U.S. installed base
but less than 40% of the Japanese installed base, a disproportionate share
of adversely affected users will be American.
Hence, several further questions arise. The first is whether decline,
and particularly the decline already facing the merchant semiconductor
industry, has political and/or military consequences beyond the direct
economic damage.
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APPENDIX THREE
DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
As anyone who has tried knows, obtaining accurate and detailed
information about the semiconductor and computer industries is not an easy
task. Relative to other industrial sectors, at least three major problems
differentially complicate the life of an analyst of microelectronics and
information systems industries. First, much information is considered
confidential, as a consequence of the industries' dependence upon
proprietary technology, much of it not effectively protected by intellectual
property law. Second, the standard sources for industry information (for
example, the Census of Manufactures and other government statistical series)
are of very little use, both because they do not contain much of the
necessary information, and because they are frequently inaccurate. The
Census of Manufactures, for example, lists total U.S. captive semiconductor
production as roughly $1 billion for the year 1980, when IBM's production
alone was nearly twice that size, and total U.S. captive production was
probably $3 billion.
And third, the relevant industries are volatile, fragmented, and
internationalized, all of which characteristics render the collection of
accurate, internationally comparable data very difficult. In price-
performance terms, semiconductor and computer technologies change between
25% and 45% annually; production is divided between the United States,
Europe, Japan, and other Asian nations; and producers, particularly in the
United States, rise and fall rapidly. And the largest and stablest firm,
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IBM, is also by far the most secretive. For example, IBM is the largest
semiconductor producer in the world, but it has never released any
information about the size of its semiconductor R&D or production efforts.
As a consequence of these difficulties, studies of semiconductor and
computer industry dynamics have tended to be either inaccurate (which
several have indeed been), quite limited in scope, and/or highly dependent
upon nonstandard data sources. Hopefully the present study falls into the
third category. The information sources for this work have consisted of:
the extant industry studies, most of which do not address issues of
international competition or U.S. competitiveness; governmental and other
public statistical sources where they are reasonably accurate (such as for
product trade data); market research firms which collect industry statistics
through private means; and personal visits and interviews, which often
provide valuable information not otherwise obtainable. In addition, my own
personal experience - as an IBM employee, as a consultant to many firms, and
as an advisor to government studies of policy issues related to these
industries - has proven extremely valuable.
1. Existing industry studies. The most detailed semiconductor
industry studies of the traditional structure / conduct / performance sort
are those conducted by the Federal Trade Commission in 1979 and by Charles
River Associates in 1980. The recent (still unpublished) study of
semiconductor industry economics conducted by government economists in
connection with the National Security Council study of the semiconductor
industry is also of this type. In the computer industry, the best
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traditional studies are those conducted by government consultants and IBM
consultants respectively during the 13-year IBM antitrust case. Other major
studies are those of Tilton (semiconductor technology diffusion); Malerba
(European performance); Flamm (government R&D policy in computers); Dorfman
(innovation and market structure in U.S. semiconductors and computers);
Borrus, Millstein, and Zysman (international competition in semiconductors);
Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein (comparative structure of Japanese & U.S.
semicondutor industries); and the United Nations (multinational
semiconductor firms).
2. Public statistics. Government and public statistics do cover
aggregate trade flows (products, license revenues, capital flows), technical
education, employment, and aggregate market size. They do not, however,
accurately report industry-level, firm-level, or intrafirm data, nor do they
generally provide useful information concerning strategic variables or
technology. Corporate annual reports generally do not provide highly
precise information either. Louisa Koch's October 1987 report, "Data on the
Electronics Industry in the U.S. and Japan," is probably the single best
statistical picture available for the U.S. and Japanese semiconductor and
computer industries, and draws upon most of the public statistical sources.
3. Market research reports. Several market research firms, for
example Dataquest Corp. (for semiconductors and computers), ICE Corp.
(semiconductors), VLSI Research Inc. (semiconductor capital equipment),
Venture Economics (venture capital and new firms), and IDC (computers),
collect detailed statistical information which is frequently the best
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available, and usually far better than public sources. This information is
collected from firms themselves and from their customers, suppliers, and
contractors. The information is then aggregated and resold, usually for
extremely high prices (Dataquest charges $15,000 per year per industry
service). In addition, the research units of financial institutions such as
investment banks collect useful information. I have been able, through
various means, to obtain large quantities of market research data and equity
research, some of which is used in this study. Dataquest in particular has
been extremely patient and cooperative.
4. Personal interviews and visits. Over the last seven years, I have
interviewed over five hundred people in relevant industries, and a
considerable number of industry analysts, academic researchers, and
government officials not only in the United States but in Japan and Europe
as well. I have visited perhaps twenty semiconductor and computer factories
in the United States and Japan. The ground rules for these interviews and
visits have varied from complete openness to the requirement that the
interview's existence never even be disclosed. In addition to explicit
personal interviews, I have also participated in many meetings of industry
executives, investment bankers, etc. at which participants discussed their
companies or industries. In the majority of cases, I have checked material
with at least two sources before using it in this essay, unless I have been
able to confirm it personally.
By using and collating data from all of these sources, I believe that I
have been able to arrive at an unusually detailed, comprehensive, and
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accurate picture of the technological and competitive dynamics of these
industries. The level of industrial interest in my results, and the general
agreement by readers as to facts (if not always theories or explanations)
would seem to validate the general accuracy of the results.
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